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In a time of ongoing economic instability (which started with the 2007–2008 
global financial crises), sovereign debt crises in Europe (but also elsewhere), 
aging societies, and almost non-growing developed economies together with 
unemployment, make continued cost cutting in the public sector inevitable. On 
the other hand, there is a growing need for maintaining service standards, to 
find radical solutions for complex challenges and effective ideas for devel-
opment and growth. Therefore, public sector innovation becomes more crucial 
than ever before. 
This research is about innovation in the public sector. The research question 
(RQ) of the thesis asks what is the relative importance of different managerial 
and contextual factors influencing the innovation process in information 
technology-based public sector services and how do they determine the nature 
of public service innovation system? The research is based on a combination of 
theoretical foundations and an exploratory cross-country survey on techno-
logically innovative public sector services in four European countries – the UK, 
Denmark, Finland and Estonia. The current research is one of the early case-
based empirical and quantitative exercises (the survey originated from 20051) to 
study innovation in the public sector.  
In addition to existing theoretical and empirical knowledge about innovation 
in the public sector, the research has four perspectives through which the sub-
research questions and propositions are set up and the public sector innovation 
process is analysed. These are managerial, learning, technological and systems 
perspective. The research answers to the following sub-research questions 
(SRQ): what are the key features influencing, supporting and hampering, the 
development and implementation of successful, technologically innovative 
public sector services (managerial perspective); which managerial and organi-
sational improvements are necessary to innovate in public sector services 
(learning perspective); what is the importance of technological knowledge in the 
public service innovation process, where and how is it developed (technological 
perspective); and what does the composition and dynamics of public sector 
(service) innovation system look like across countries (systems perspective). 
The main contribution of new knowledge of this thesis is four-fold. Firstly, 
the purposely developed theoretical framework that gives a structured approach 
how to understand and manage innovation in public sector services. Secondly, 
the new conceptual-methodological approach of how to study and analyse the 
innovation process in public service organisations. Thirdly, the hand-made list 
of public service innovations from four countries and the database of the survey 
results. Fourthly, the quantitative analysis and synthesis of the survey results 
which characterises the innovation process of public service organisations in 
                                                                          
1  First published in Pärna and von Tunzelmann (2007). 
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the survey countries. As an important contribution, this thesis shows 
empirically how different internal and external forces and factors within the 
public service innovation system influence the innovation process and how 
they differ across countries. Research results contribute to the literature of 
public sector innovation and management as well as enrich academic and 
professional debates around these increasingly important topics. Additionally, 
contributions can also be drawn for economic theory, organisational theory, 
public administration and political science. 
The results might be also useful for policy-makers and public service 
managers to successfully encourage and manage innovation in the public 
sector. Knowing the key features influencing the development and imple-
mentation of successful technologically innovative public sector services is a 
prerequisite in this process. The research also explores to what extent the 
innovation process differs between the public and private sectors and which 
managerial and organisational improvements are necessary to innovate in 
public sector services. Innovation-related learning in the public sector is also 
analysed in this research. 
 
Positioning the work in the literature 
According to Chris Freeman (1994), there is very little disagreement among 
economists about the importance of innovation for long-term economic growth. 
“From Adam Smith to Robert Solow via Ricardo, Marx, Marshall, Schumpeter 
and Keynes there is virtual unanimity that the long-term growth of productivity 
is intimately related to the introduction and diffusion of technical and 
organisational innovations. Yet only Marx in the 19th century and Schumpeter 
in the 20th could be said to position innovation at the very centre of their 
growth theory…” (Freeman, 1994: 78). 
As governments face increasingly complex challenges, today’s innovation – 
creative thinking and development of new or significantly improved products, 
services, processes and business models – is no longer the monopoly of the 
private for-profit sector. Governments need to respond to a variety of pressing 
demographical, social, environmental, economic, political and ideological 
demands. Moreover, in many respect, they need to modernise and funda-
mentally change to keep their countries developing, to get used to permanent 
fiscal restraints, and to respond to growing citizen demands for efficient, 
effective, convenient and quality service delivery. On the one hand, these 
increasingly demanding customers will require more responsive and person-
alised services as well as want to have a say where and how the country is 
developing. On the other hand, governments need to engage wider actor groups 
from society to respond realistically to global challenges. Some people call it 
Big Society, others support the “reinventing government” movement or 
“networked government” philosophy. However, in reality most governments are 
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solving yesterday’s problems, still ignoring what Abraham Lincoln once wrote, 
“dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present.”2 
Innovation should become an organic part of public affairs, strategy and 
action. Mulgan (2009) even stresses that it is a public good, which tends to be 
underproduced because of inadequate incentives. It becomes clear that a radical 
new approach to innovation in public services and even in models of state 
management is needed to address the major social and economic challenges in a 
period of massive financial constraints. Innovation should become a natural and 
integrating discipline in government. 
In the light of the global crisis (2007–2012), it becomes even clearer that 
failure to think differently and to innovate in public services creates imbalances 
in societies and additional fiscal restraints. Moreover, one should also not forget 
that public sector innovation can act as a springboard and stimulator for 
innovation at large – leading to increased R&D, emergence of new business 
models, knowledge (and innovation) spillovers, etc. Indeed, despite the impor-
tance of the topic, innovation in the public sector and its services is little studied 
(Teofilovic, 2002; Osborne and Brown, 2005; Nelson, 2008; Mulgan et al., 
2008) and even less systematically practiced. Public sector innovation literature 
is also often consultancy-based, so-called ʻgrey literature’, and therefore less 
academic, less critical and rarely research/survey-based. Accordingly, the 
bibliography of this thesis is also divided into two separate sections – scientific 
references and non-scientific (grey) literature references. 
This does not mean that there is a lack of research in public services as such. 
From political science and public administration to economics, there are many 
studies and analyses over time of how the public sector can be modernised, 
reinvented, decentralised, better organised and managed, programme run, 
efficiency secured, etc. See for example Dunleavy et al. (2005), Eadie (1996), 
Golembiewski (1996), Hale (1996), Hale and Williams (1989), Hood (1991), 
Ingraham and Jones (1999), McLaughlin et al. (2002), Mohr (1999), (OECD 
2000), Osborne and Gaebler (1992), Peters (1994), Willcocks and Harrow 
(1992). 
However, one can argue that there is a big difference between just good 
governance and innovative governance – one is doing things right, another is 
doing the right things in the best possible way, to challenge the status quo and to 
introduce fundamentally new business models. This is not necessarily doing 
more as a state (e.g. in financial terms), but doing things better, more effec-
tively, not just more efficiently. Moreover, if looking from the societal 
perspective, today’s innovation-based economy means innovation as a way of 
life across different sectors, disciplines and professions. Perhaps most impor-
tantly, it means innovation across different boundaries. Therefore, cooperation 
                                                                          
2  President Abraham Lincoln, annual message to Congress, December 1, 1862. The 
Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, ed. Roy P. Basler, vol. 5, p. 537. This passage was 
quoted in the preamble to the 1968 U.S. Republican Party platform. 
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and mutual learning between private, public, academic and non-for-profit 
sectors becomes crucial for states and nations to succeed. This is also supported 
by economists who estimate that more than half of today’s economic growth 
comes from innovation and new knowledge (see Helpman, 2004), which, 
however, is increasingly interdisciplinary and occurs between the private and 
public sectors (e.g. medical services, green economy). 
The difference between innovation and daily improvements are illustrated by 
Richard Nelson (2008: X) in the following way: “in … research concerned with 
innovation, innovation is seen as a purposive act or set of acts aiming to do 
something better, to meet a new need or to respond to new circumstances. The 
conception of trying something new, and not simply making a different choice 
among prevailing and well perceived alternatives, is an essential part of the 
innovation concept.” 
Except a few early attempts (e.g. Mohr, 1969; Gray, 1973; Roessner, 1977), 
most of the public sector innovation literature is relatively new, starting 
predominantly from the USA, Canada and the UK (Altshuler, 1997; Altshuler 
and Zegans, 1997; Bartlett and Dibben, 2002; Bekkers et al., 2011; Berry, 
1994a, b; Berry and Berry, 1999, 2007; Bason, 2010; Borins, 2001a, b; 
Considine et al., 2009; Damanpour, 1987; Damanpour and William, 1984; 
Damanpour et al., 2009; Hartley, 2005, 2006; Kimberly and Micheal, 1981; 
McCormic, 2003; Moore and Hartley, 2013; Mulgan, 2009; Osborne and 
Brown, 2005; Shergold, 1997; Sørensen and Torfing, 2005, 2010, 2011; 
Teofilovic, 2002; Walker, 2008; Walker et al., 2002; Walker et al., 2011; 
Zegans, 1997). Authors are also tackling innovation from the risks and obstacles 
perspectives (Bhatta, 2003; Kubr, 1988). As one might expect, some of the 
literature also tackles the similarities and differences of the public and private 
sector innovation (Earl, 2004; Grout et al., 2003; Halvorsen et al., 2005; Koch 
and Hauknes, 2005; Miles, 2004; Oracle, 2003; Tomkins, 1987; Vinten, 1992; 
Willcocks and Harrow, 1992). There are also authors who elaborate the topic of 
public policy innovations and innovation in policies (European Commission, 
2002; Kinder, 2002; Kingdon, 1984; Osborne and Brown, 2005; Polsby, 1984; 
Roberts and King, 1989; Schon, 1971) as well as successes and failures of 
government and policy learning (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000; Etheredge and 
Short, 1983; Kemp and Weehuizen, 2004; Johnson and Lundvall, 2001). 
Authors have also dealt with the broad but important issue of public 
entrepreneurship (Kingdon, 1984; Osborne and Brown, 2005; Osborne and 
Gaebler, 1992; Polsby, 1984; Roberts and King, 1989; Schon, 1971; Teofilovic, 
2002; van Mierlo, 1986). Indeed, Radošević (2006) argues that systematic 
aspects of public entrepreneurship as a policy challenge needs deeper under-
standing and suggest undertaking a series of case studies of entrepreneurial and 
systems of innovation functions aimed at developing empirically based 
taxonomies for the public sector. Finally, there are also some materials available 
dealing with the growing areas of social innovation (Mulgan et al., 2008), 
innovation motivators such as innovation awards (Altshuler and Zegans, 1997; 
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Borins, 2001c, d; Hale, 1996), and citizen/consumer engagement (Dooren et al., 
2004; OECD, 2001a; Peters and Savoie, 2000). 
One of the fundamental challenges to understand and boost public sector 
innovation is the fragmentation issue related to the definition of innovation. 
This is supported by both the real-life practices as well as related literature. 
There is a blurring between politically determined governmental reforms (e.g. 
deregulation, ‘agencification’) and narrowly understood public sector inno-
vation (e.g. quality certifications for the provision of social services, e-pre-
scriptions). Indeed, the real world challenges require more fundamental 
innovation philosophy from governments and nation states. However, in order 
to suggest or expect radical innovations in state affairs taking place, one should 
have quantitatively routed data and an understanding of which factors really 
influence innovation processes in the public sector. Therefore, the present 
research focuses on these issues. This is achieved by researching techno-
logically innovative public sector services, mainly e-services, in four countries. 
Despite the several writings related to innovation in the public sector during 
the last decade or more, there are strong limitations behind the research. 
According to Osborne and Brown (2005), much of the literature is full of 
normative assertions and/or pejorative arguments with little serious empirical 
work behind it. There is also growing awareness that there is a need for more 
systematic and comparable data on innovation in the public sector and its 
services (Koch and Hauknes, 2005). The existing attempts to study innovation 
in the public sector provide good descriptions of the work undertaken in public 
organisations, however, there is a lack of attempts to analyse innovation as a 
process itself (Osborne and Brown, 2005). A similar situation surrounds the 
social innovation phenomenon, where there are almost no major datasets or 
long-term analyses about it, and very few signs of professional academic 
interest (Mulgan et al., 2008). Experts argue that a lack of knowledge about 
social innovations impedes the many institutions interested in this field, 
including innovators themselves, philanthropists, foundations and governments, 
and means that far too many rely on anecdotes and hunches. 
As a result, the situation is also methodologically poor – we lack the 
knowledge of how to define, understand and encourage innovation in the public 
sector and/or services. The present research aims to cover some of these 
shortages in its own exploratory way. Common to the interdisciplinary approach 
practiced at SPRU, this quantitatively routed research is surrounded by an 
original composition of literature, coming from both the public as well as the 
private sector. It brings together some key contributions of relatively frag-
mented and young literature of innovation in the public sector, grounding partly 
on decades-long knowledge of innovation in the private sector, and partly 
flourishing from older modernisation waves of public bureaucracies. As public 
sector innovation has evolved over stages (Bason, 2010), although overlapping, 
the current research is positioned in this timeline (see chapter 1). The stages 
roughly follow the overall trajectory of public management since the early 
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1970s, which Benington and Hartley (2001) have characterised as ʻtraditional’, 
ʻnew public management’, and ʻnetworked government’. 
It is generally known that innovation is interdisciplinary and multifunctional. 
Its theory is not a formal and established theory, but a set or a combination of 
various disciplines: economics, management, organisational learning and psy-
chology, cognitive theory and systems theory (Røste, 2005). On the contrary, 
most innovation texts tend to emphasise single dimensions such as research and 
development management, production and operation management, marketing 
management, product development or organisational development (Tidd et al., 
2001). Moreover, in private sector innovation, there are interlinkages between 
micro-level foundations and macro-level growth and development behaviour 
(von Tunzelmann, 1995). Similar dilemmas appear if one wants to understand 
public sector innovativeness at the national level – it disaggregates down to the 
level of single public organisation or even its unit. Only once we understand 
how this micro-level innovation happens, or why it does not, can we extrapolate 
this knowledge to a wider context and try to understand how to make more 
fundamental innovations in state affairs realistic. 
Innovation research is also a combination of evolutionary theories as a 
dominating perspective behind innovation (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Nelson, 
1987, 1995). Therefore, within the evolutionary paradigm, the second part of 
the literature review draws a cross-disciplinary conceptual framework for 
further survey and empirical analyses, which has the following four layers: 
Managerial perspective – in the majority of ways, innovation is still an 
organisational issue; success is multi-factored as there are many organisational 
and managerial issues related to innovation and it might (or might not) be linked 
to technology (Cooper and Kleinschmidt, 1988; Gallouj 2002; Manz et al., 
2000; Peters and Waterman, 1982; Rothwell, 1977 and 1992; Rothwell et al., 
1974; Schumpeter, 1936, 1947 and 1950; Terry, 1986; Tidd et al., 2001). 
Learning perspective – the role of knowledge in the innovation process is 
strongly emphasised by many theoretical literatures; knowledge is seen as the 
fundamental resource in the modern economy, and accordingly the most 
important process seen is learning (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989, Cowan et al., 
2000, Dosi, 1997; Lundvall, 1992 and 1993; Lundvall and Johnson, 1994; 
Metcalfe, 1998; Nelson, 1995; Teece et al., 1997, Winter, 1984). 
Technological perspective – it is widely acknowledged that technological 
change and innovation are major drivers of economic growth and lie at the very 
heart of the competitive process; technological and information advances 
(although risky) are seen as once-in-a-century possibilities for transforming the 
government as they have done the business world (Dunleavy et al., 2005; Earl, 
2004; Eggers, 2005; Hamel, 2000, Heeks, 2001 and 2006; Jorgensen and Klay, 
2001; Magnus, 2007; Tiits and Rebane, 2009; The Standish Group, 1995). 
Systems perspective – innovation mostly takes place in a system, consisting 
of individuals, firms and institutions, and within a certain cultural and regu-
latory framework (Carlsson and Stankiewicz, 1993; Freeman, 1987; Goldsmith 
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and Eggers, 2004; Edquist, 1997b; Enzing and Kern, 1999; Lundvall, 1992; 
Malerba, 2002a, b, c; Nelson and Rosenberg, 1993; OECD, 1997). Most 
innovation processes start within companies (institutions) trying to solve certain 
problems. Through this learning process the company will make use of various 
sources of competences and knowledge in the innovation system, being those 
customers, suppliers, consultancies, patents, or various research institutions. 
Systemic innovation research is therefore often also company (or institution) 
centred (Røste, 2005). 
 
Research questions 
This research was planned to lead us towards a more systemic approach for 
understanding and managing innovation in the public sector. The underlying 
assumption of this thesis is that the empirical and quantitative examination of 
internal and external factors influencing the innovation process in public sector 
services can inform policy intervention and organisational/inter-organisational 
development in this broad and complex area. This analysis can be useful to 
understand which organisational capabilities the respondent’s organisation 
improved internally in order to innovate and which capabilities they obtained 
externally; did they have any previous experience with similar innovations and 
had they learned from the previous experience (internal and external, positive 
and negative) while innovating. It also opens up the main goals of the 
innovations and their alignment or misalignment with the actual results. Perhaps 
most importantly, it helps to understand the relative (i.e. in comparison to other 
factors) importance of different factors influencing the innovation process. It 
shows what are the most and the least important factors (internal to the organi-
sation and external) supporting and hampering the innovation process. The 
study also shows the country, field and innovation-type specific determinants of 
the innovation process in public sector services. 
The main research question (RQ) of the thesis is the following: What is the 
relative importance of different managerial and contextual factors influencing 
the innovation process in information technology-based public sector services 
and how do they determine the nature of public service innovation systems in 
four European countries? 
In order to conduct the analysis, a four layer conceptual framework is used: 
managerial perspective, learning perspective, technological perspective, and a 
systems perspective. These dimensions are associated with the following four 
area-related sub-research questions: 
 Managerial perspective – What are the key features influencing, sup-
porting and hampering, the development and implementation of 
successful, technologically innovative public sector services (SRQ1)? 
 Learning perspective – Which managerial and organisational improve-
ments are necessary to innovate in public sector services (SRQ2)? 
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 Technological perspective – What is the importance of technological 
knowledge in the public service innovation process, where and how is it 
developed (SRQ3)? 
 Systems perspective – What does the composition and dynamics of 
public sector (service) innovation system look like across countries 
(SRQ4)? 
 
These four sub-research questions open up the innovation process in public 
sector services while answering the main research question. We have also 
developed specific propositions related to these four areas, coming partly from 
the theoretical literature and partly from the existing empirical studies carried 
out in the public sector, to be tested throughout the thesis (see table 4.1). 
 
The context, scope and unit of analysis 
Due to theoretical and methodological limitations of the present subject, this 
research is exploratory. The empirical research focuses on key factors influ-
encing, supporting and hampering the development and implementation of 
successful, technologically innovative public sector services in four countries: 
the UK, Denmark, Finland and Estonia. There are four reasons behind the 
selection of these particular countries, see chapter 5. 
The basic unit of analysis for understanding the innovation process in public 
sector services is a specific, successful (i.e. existing), technologically innovative 
public service (ʻthe case’; mostly electronic or mobile service, see annex 9), 
developed and implemented by an actual organisation, and which directly or 
indirectly benefits citizens or customers. In defining the research subject and 
objects, the fundamental ideology of the Oslo Manual (OECD/Eurostat, 2005) 
has been followed, where innovation can appear in the form of a new or 
improved product, service or process. However, we have further developed the 
definitions, describing the research subject, from the perspective of the current 
research. Due to the theoretical and methodological limitations described 
earlier, the choice and structure of theoretical foundations, the methodology, the 
case definition as well as the sample developed for the study are experimental, 
as a result of this particular multidisciplinary exercise (see chapter 4 for further 
elaborations). 
From the methodological perspective, in addition to the questionnaire based 
case study survey, this research uses propositions and statistical techniques 
supporting the analysis of the results (also taking into account the research 
goals, size and nature of the research sample, and the logic of the question-
naire). In particular, descriptive statistics, principal component factor analysis, 
and univariate (ANOVA) analyses are performed. 
This is also a best practice research by its nature, i.e. only existing 
technologically innovative public services in four countries are analysed. 
Reasons why some services do not exist, do not work or have failed in their 
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development process are not analysed in this research. This method (also named 
best practice research) is supported by the fact that the purpose of the research 
was to examine the environment in which the innovation occurs, rather than to 
explore the innovations themselves. This type of research is not new. Inspired 
by Peters and Waterman’s (1982) work on excellence in private sector firms, 
the best practice researchers have attempted to identify the characteristics of 
successful and innovative public sector organisations (Barzelay, 1992; Osborne 
and Gaebler, 1992). Today, best practice research is an important stream of 
public management research, especially in the area of policy research (Borins, 
2001b). The author is aware of the possible shortcomings of the method, such as 
selectivity, sustainability, and comparability (see for criticisms Borins 2001b, 
Lynn 1996, Overman and Boyd, 1994), and has therefore tried to avoid them. 
 
Limitations and boundaries 
Innovation in the public sector is a relatively new research area and there were 
only few empirical and almost no quantitative studies in this arena while this 
research was carried out. This created the first large challenge, which was 
methodological – how to define and understand innovation in the public sector. 
Although given his best, the author takes full responsibility for the results of this 
exercise and the shortcomings this journey with limited resources might have 
had. The results of this thesis surely do not answer all of the questions one 
might have related to the topic of governments and public bureaucracies 
innovating. Therefore, explorations throughout the thesis have their boundaries 
and limitations. 
The empirical part of this research is a variation of a case study method, 
using questionnaires to produce qualitatively analysable data. This method 
indeed has also some limitations. For example, case studies typically rely on 
descriptive information provided by different people and this leaves room for 
important details to be left out. Moreover, much of the information collected is 
retrospective data, recollections of past events, and is therefore subject to the 
problems inherent to memory and attribution bias (Dougherty, 1992). Case 
studies also often involve only a few actors or organisations and therefore may 
not be representative of the general group or population. However, these 
limitations are solvable and, to some extent, they can be considered as a ʻnatural 
side effect’ of an exploratory study with its limitations. 
There are also challenges related to the fact that this is a best practice 
research by its nature, as said earlier. However, as experiences have shown, 
related limitations such as selectivity, sustainability and comparability, can be 
overcome. 
From the theoretical perspective, much of this thesis is about moving 
towards the understanding of how the public service innovation system looks 
and works. However, one should be aware that literature knows several 
systemic frameworks developed for describing and illustrating the innovation 
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and/or business process and/or knowledge flows and/or competitiveness. 
Starting from well known concept of national systems of innovation (Freeman, 
1987; Lundvall, 1992; Nelson et al., 1993; Edquist, 1997b; OECD, 1997) to 
sectoral systems of innovation (Breschi and Malerba 1997, Malerba, 2002a, b, c) 
to technological and socio-technical systems (Senker, 1999) to high cost 
complex product systems (CoPS) (Hobday, 1998 and 2000) to systems of 
competitiveness (Porter, 1980 and 1990). There are also many terms in the 
resent literature that uses networks to describe knowledge-related interaction 
inside groups, firms and sectors (Perini, 2008). Some of the terms are 
innovation networks (Frenken, 2000; Zander, 1999), networks of innovators 
(DeBresson and Amesse, 1991; Powell and Grodal, 2005; Soh and Roberts, 
2003), learning networks (Bessant and Francis, 1999; Teixeira et al., 2006), 
knowledge networks (Hansen, 2002; Owen-Smith and Powell, 2005; Seufert et 
al., 1999), project networks (DeFillippe and Arthur, 1998; Sydow and Staber, 
2002) and R&D networks (Birkinshaw, 2002; Hagedoorn et al., 2005). There 
are certainly differences between these concepts; however, they do also overlap 
to certain extent. 
While developing the theoretical logic as well as the conceptual approach for 
the empirical study, this thesis uses only a fraction of the knowledge developed 
through these comprehensive streams of literature. This research emphasises the 
public service innovation case (the unit of analysis) together with its sur-
roundings (organisation, learning environment, external environment) influ-
encing the innovation process. 
In addition, this research does not investigate the effects of particular 
innovations, the diffusion of innovations within and to the public sector, or the 
usage of these particular services by the clients/citizens. The study rather 
explores the environment in which the service innovation in the public sector 
occurs. There is also no claim that the results presented here represent the full 
arena of public service innovation in the four countries under supervision, 
however, the best was made to find out the majority of technology intensive 
innovations (mostly electronic or mobile services) available at the date of the 
study in 2005. Moreover, as the implementation of technological innovations in 
public service tend to be cyclical, one can claim that the majority of the major 
technological innovations, or one early wave of them (particularly e-services 
with basic functionalities), were up and running by the time of the survey in 
these countries (e-Tax offices, e-Custom offices, e-Stat offices, different 
registries, etc.). 
Finally, the research of innovation in the public sector and public service 
organisations is in its early stages. Therefore, the theoretical, methodological 
and empirical explorations of this research can be used as an alternative view to 
move forward – to build up more coherent and systematic approaches or 
frameworks in which to understand, analyse and manage innovation in the 
modern public sector. 
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The organisation of the chapters 
The thesis will comprise two major parts. The first part consists of a review of 
the fundamental theoretical and conceptual literature related to the research 
subject and will support the establishment of the research framework for 
analysing the innovation process in public sector services. The second part 
consists of exploratory empirical research and analysis, as well as the synthesis 
of the research findings from a systems perspective together with the key 
implications for the literature, policy recommendations and further areas of 
research. The structure of this thesis is as follows. The first chapter reviews the 
literature focusing on key debates on characteristics of the innovation process in 
public sector services. The chapter starts with an analysis of the evolution of 
innovation in the public sector and respective contemporary challenges; it then 
draws up the main differences between the public and private sector innovation, 
and analyses other modernisation waves, typologies, characteristics and trends 
of innovation in the public sector. Chapter two discusses the measurement of 
innovative activities in the public sector in the previous empirical research; it 
also positions the present research within the wider context of public sector 
innovation studies. The third chapter defines the theoretical framework for 
analysing the innovation process in public sector services and opens up four 
respective streams of literature related to that framework. Chapter four 
summarises the methodological procedures used in the empirical research. The 
fifth chapter analyses the empirical study results from the perspective of 
multidimensionality of the factors influencing innovation in public sector 
services. Chapter six performs principle component factor analysis on the study 
results in order to analyse group performances of factors influencing the 
innovation process. The chapter also analyses country, field and innovation-type 
specific determinants on the innovation process in public sector services. The 
seventh chapter synthesises the empirical results of the study from the systems 
framework perspective, as well as presents the main research findings. The final 
part of the thesis comprises a summary of the key conclusions, discusses the key 
implications for the literature, recommendations to public service managers and 
policy-makers, the boundaries and possible generalisations of the current 
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1. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND: EVOLUTION 
OF THE CONCEPTS OF INNOVATION, 
MODERNISATION AND TRANSFORMATION 
PROCESS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 
The aim of this chapter is to bring together some key contributions of relatively 
fragmented and young literature of innovation in the public sector, relying 
partly on decades-long knowledge of innovation in the private sector, partly on 
different modernisation and transformation waves of public bureaucracies. We 
have to acknowledge that public sector upgrading is a continuum between grand 
radical public sector and service provision innovations, to implementation of IT 
in e-government, to more modest organisational improvements. However, even 
if the fundamental nature of innovation drivers in government might be similar 
across these innovation streams, while studying innovation in the public sphere, 
one should clearly focus. 
This chapter should give us a more comprehensive and structured view on 
how innovation in the public sector is theoretically understood and seen. The 
chapter is divided into five sub-chapters. The first sub-chapter opens up the 
evolution of the innovation phenomenon in the public sector and some 
contemporary challenges faced by governments and the public sector more 
generally. The second sub-chapter analyses similarities and differences of the 
innovation process between the public and private sectors. The third sub-chapter 
analyses the typology, characteristics and trends of innovation in the public 
sector known from the literature. This is followed by an analysis on other 
progress, modernisation and transformation waves in the public sector. The 
chapter ends with a short summary and introduction to the next chapter, 
analysing the existing empirical innovation studies conducted in the public 
sector and positions present in empirical research within this context. 
 
 
1.1. Evolution of innovation in the public sector and 
contemporary challenges 
The race between global crisis, aging societies, environmental challenges and 
permanently unsustainable public finances in most developed countries makes it 
evident that failure to think radically differently and to innovate in the public 
sphere creates not just imbalances in societies and additional fiscal restraints, 
but also fundamental challenges to the sustainable and peaceful existence of 
these counties. Indeed, it has been argued and successfully demonstrated that 
public organisations are relatively stable and that prior behaviour is a major 
determinant of future behaviour (O’Toole and Meier 1999, 2003). 
Bekkers et al. (2011) argue that innovation represents a challenge to public 
administration in two different ways. First, the public sector, and subsequently 
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public administration, constitutes the foundation for a more innovation-driven 
economy. Without a public sector adapted and geared up to a different form of 
knowledge-based economy, the aim of making society and the economy more 
innovative will inevitably fail. Second, a future society requires that the public 
sector itself becomes innovative in order to face a number of challenges. 
Societal threats such as climate change, crime and international economic 
competition force the public sector to rethink the choice of priorities, solutions 
and instruments. In particular, this is because of a number of social and political 
developments (e.g. individualisation, globalisation, etc.) in (Western/European) 
societies have undercut some of the ‘linkages’ between various social actors 
thereby depriving governments the capacity of solving (cross-sectoral) ‘wicked 
problems’. 
The increasing economic importance of science and technology has 
necessitated the development of various intellectual tools needed to understand 
innovation (Martin and Nightingale, 2000). However, despite there being more 
than four centuries of academic work around the phenomenon of innovation, it 
has predominantly developed around the private sector. The balance of effort 
has swung in favour of the public sector in the past decade, but even in 2012 
there are at least 10 times more studies on innovation in the private sector as 
compared with innovation in the public sector (León et al., 2012). Therefore, 
theories, data and tools on public sector innovation are nowhere near as 
advanced as they are for the private sector. According to Matthews et al. (2009) 
just over half (51.1 per cent) of the 167 academic journal articles examining 
public sector innovation tracked by the extensive Thomson-Reuters database of 
academic journal publications in the period 1971–2008 were published in the 
three years: 2006–2008. The growth in the volume of the non-academic 
literature (also less critical than academic or private sector innovation literature) 
produced by governments and non-government organisations (technical reports, 
working papers, consultancy reports, public sector publications), although 
harder to track numerically with the same rigour, also appears to exhibit the 
characteristics of an emerging field. This recent rise in interest is not dissimilar 
from that exhibited by the more general literature on innovation (24 per cent of 
the 1971–2008 output has been published in the 2006–2008 timeframe), as 
Matthews et al. (2009) state. 
Conversely, according to Kelman (2012), since the end of 1950s, public 
administration as a research field has become separated from the mainstream 
social science and mainstream organisational studies that has resulted in what 
he calls “The public administration ghetto”, e.g. a too small number of scholars 
studying public administration today and with too low quality. He and his 
colleague analysed the articles of Administrative Sciences Quarterly (one of the 
main journals that deals with studies of organisation) since its beginning in 
1958. They classified them according to their focus – are they about 
government, business, non-profit, or mixed or general theory articles. At the 
beginning, business articles accounted for around 20 per cent and government 
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articles around 30 per cent of all the articles. At the end of the period (2002), 
business articles accounted 70 per cent and government articles only about 4 per 
cent, meaning that during this period essentially mainstream scholars studying 
organisations stopped studying government, and started studying firms.3 He 
summarises in his speech that “government needs help, governments often are 
not performing as they should be, and academics who should have the 
responsibility to help them as governments are an important part of the 
organisations world, they do not do it.” 
In addition, the vast literature on innovation systems has largely tended to 
ignore the role the public sector plays in innovation processes. Making a sharp 
distinction between the private and public sector often implies perceiving the 
public sector as a regulatory framework for innovation in the private sector, and 
as a passive recipient of innovations from the private sector (Bugge et al., 
2010). Public sector institutions are often seen as conservative and bureaucratic, 
and the changes in the public sector are often understood as consequences of 
innovations outside the public sector (Windrum, 2008) – abnegating the 
responsibility of being continuously creative and innovative in the public sector 
ʻin-house’. 
However, against the common wisdom, two of the most profound 
innovations of the last 50 years, the Internet and the World Wide Web, both 
came out of public organisations (Mulgan, 2007): DARPA in the first place, 
CERN in the second.4 “Looking further back, business was not particularly 
innovative for most of human history, at least until the late 19th century. Instead, 
the most important innovations in communications, materials, or energy came 
from wealthy patrons, governments, or from the military,” says Mulgan (2007: 
4). He concludes that “the idea that businesses and markets are powerhouses of 
innovation, or “innovation machines” to use William Baumol’s (2002) phrase, 
is a very recent one” (ibid.). 
An alternative way how innovations can be introduced into the public sector 
(and simultaneously creativity in the private sector can be boosted) is through 
procurement. Even though only a small part of public procurement involves 
new technologies, this is still a major contributor to the introduction of 
innovations in the public sector. Public procurement will normally account for 
10–15 per cent of GNP in industrialised countries (Geroski, 1990). Public 
procurement is becoming an important issue also for innovation policies, based 
on the idea that it can be used to promote innovation in businesses. In terms of 
                                                                          
3  Today in the U.S., the Academy of Management has 17,000 members, the American 
Society of Public Administration (research section) only 355 members, and the American 
Political Science Association (Public Administration Section) only 515 members (see 
Kelman, 2012). 
4  DARPA is the Defence Advanced Research Project Agency, the central R&D 
organisation for the U.S. Department of Defence. CERN is the European Organisation for 
Nuclear Research, which is the world’s largest particle physics centre. 
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measurement, procurement can potentially affect innovation in two directions: 
contributions to innovation in the organisation itself and promoting innovation 
in other organisations (Bloch, 2010). An expert group report on public 
procurement for innovation (European Commission, 2005a) examined the role 
of procurement for innovation. Among the main issues identified were: 
 Whether a systematic approach is used in gearing procurement practices 
to innovation; 
 Intelligent customers (i.e. trained purchasers that have the knowledge 
needed to demand innovative solutions); 
 Early engagement of suppliers (getting their feedback on what is feasible 
and how tenders and projects should be designed); 
- Tenders and contracts (role of EU directives and other regulations; 
specification of tenders and contracts); 
 Details on actual contracting work 
- Interaction with suppliers, management of contracts; 
- Objectives of procurement (e.g. eco-innovation); 
- Types of procurement. 
 
Moreover, much wider than public procurement is the part of public services 
and public administration in the whole of the European socioeconomic activity. 
According to Thenint (2010), Europe’s public services account for between 
40 per cent and 55 per cent of GDP – compared to 32 per cent in the United 
States, 26 per cent in Japan, 16 per cent in China or 17 per cent in India. Public 
services-related employment accounts for between one-quarter and one-third of 
the total EU working-age population, and public employment (civil servants) 
represents more than 15 per cent of the total employment in the EU. Kelman 
(2012) also shows that in terms of its annual budget, the U.S. Department of 
Defense is larger than the annual sales of ExxonMobil or Walmart (the two 
largest private corporations in the U.S. in terms of annual sales). Therefore, the 
important role of public services as demonstrators, setters of standards, lead 
markets (and also procurers), all make their contributions to innovation and 
their role in innovation in other sectors, extremely significant. Thenint (2010) 
believes that public services could even become a comparative advantage for 
European competitiveness, by creating innovation-conducive environments – 
world challenges such as demographic change, pollution, and security concerns 
are creating new demands for public services, and the public sector may be a 
strong driver for EU leadership in these domains too. 
Indeed, in the public sector, innovation has never achieved comparable 
status as a criterion of organisational excellence (neither do civil servants as 
well as elected officials have legitimate roles to play as public innovators). 
According to Altshuler (1997), the reason is that, while government agencies 
face urgent problems, passionate claimants, and muckraking journalists, they 
experience little direct competition. Also, people in government fear nothing 
more than newsworthy failure. 
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Led by the third reason, it is relatively obvious that the corollary of 
minimisation of risks is the ability to foster innovation. However, public sector 
initiatives to innovate are limited because they are financed by taxpayer money 
and therefore subject to public scrutiny. While citizens demand a modernised 
government, they are generally ambivalent about innovation in the public 
sector, particularly because innovation often involves risk-taking that can lead 
to significant monetary losses (Teofilovic, 2002). This risk is simply as the 
uncertainty of outcome. The risk-related decision rule is to minimise the cost of 
uncertainty. According to Bhatta (2003), all risks can be dealt within any one 
(or combination) of these ways: hedged, transferred, averted, or internalised; 
regardless of how they are dealt with, a deeper understanding of risks vis-à-vis 
innovation is contingent upon an understanding of their conceptual bases. 
Overall, risk aversion is a fundamental constraint on innovation in the public 
sector. Therefore, as said by Teofilovic (2002), strong leadership is a necessary 
imperative for establishing a cohesive, yet flexible, workplace culture that 
encourages idea experimentation and tolerates ʻsmart failures’. 
The contemporary public service management agenda that has been 
emerging since the early years of the new Century seeks to challenge this ethos 
that the public sector is neither equipped to be, or should seek to become 
innovative (Matthews et al., 2009). Therefore, the dilemma whether the public 
sector should be more innovative or more stable is still open to debates, 
however existing literature focuses on promoting a more ʻself-conscious’ 
recognition of the importance of innovation in a public sector setting. Further-
more, the current crises as well as long-term trends support it. Rigid structures 
and a desire to resolve present and future complex problems with yesterday’s 
solutions have made the majority of Western countries incapable of responding 
to systemic crises. Indeed, the ability to renew ensures the sustainability of 
society and power. The crisis and the world’s shifting balance of power show 
that not only companies but also countries have stepped into the competition on 
the global market and battle for maintaining standards of living. It would be 
more accurate to say that a country’s competitiveness is ensured by synergy of a 
good governance practice and an entrepreneurial clout. 
According to Mahbubani (2011a), it is believed that the lack of development 
and ensuing unemployment are as important as the lack of democracy why the 
recent revolutions broke out in North Africa and the Middle East. Yet, the 
countries in Asia have not had any revolutions, primarily because they are 
focused on economic development. To prevent instability the countries have to 
continuously promote good governance. As long as the common people in the 
country feel that with every passing year their livelihoods, the livelihoods of 
their children and governance are improving, there will be relative political 
stability. 
There is also a difference between the Western and Asian narratives of 
governance. In the Western understanding, no good governance is possible 
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without a set of political freedoms. In East Asia no good governance is possible 
without social and economic growth and development. 
A good way to illustrate how governments should balance between order and 
creativity is the matrix developed by Lam (2011) that examines the ability of 
governments to respond to today’s challenges, which tend to be increasingly 
complex. 
Generally, there are two types of challenges in the world and at the level of 
countries and societies: simple (with some variables) and complex (with many 
variables). The first can usually be resolved with technical tools (a specific 
problem = a specific solution). Complex challenges are multifaceted, and they 
are often linked to values and are impossible to resolve with separate technical 
solutions (unspecific problem ≠ a specific solution), see figure 1.1. This model 
helps to determine the ability of any country or organisation to give an adequate 
response in different types of situations. The model has been compiled 
regarding challenges, but it can also be presented by opportunities. 
 
 
Figure 1.1 Solution matrix for different types of challenges based on the complexity of 
the task and availability of time (Lam, 2011) 
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As we see, public management becomes more complex over time, therefore, as 
also stated by Bugge et al. (2010), innovation in the public sector may be 
motivated and influenced by a number of economic, industrial, political, 
relational and personal factors. Due to different major challenges, a shortage of 
statesmen who adequately understand specific policy themes and are able to 
mobilise societies to steer their countries towards new success is growing all 
over the world. As stated by Mahbubani (2011b), the constant shortage of 
leaders in the world who rule with “their head and heart”, pinpoints the 
situation. A special emphasis is on the word ʻleader’ because in the majority of 
such cases the management of changes is required that relies upon providing 
inspiration for and building confidence in a large number of people. According 
to this logic, today’s statesmen should match the following criteria: 
 they have compassion, i.e. high morals and centred on higher objectives; 
 they are wise and positively cunning; 
 they are collectors of talent, i.e. they gather talents around them; 
 they are innovative and have high I.Q. to understand complexity; 
 they have the courage to make decisions and take responsibility. 
 
Therefore, as one might conclude, innovation is also linked to culture. This 
ʻinnovation culture’ is understood in terms of attitudes towards innovation, 
technology, exchange of knowledge, entrepreneurial activities, business, uncer-
tainty (Hofstede, 2001), and related behaviour and historical trajectories. In his 
essay on the theoretical background that could be useful in enlightening the 
concept of innovation culture, Wieland (2004) conceives it as the institutions 
(norms, values, formal and informal) that have a significant influence on how 
the actors involved in an innovation process perceive economic and technical 
challenges and that provides them with strategies to tackle these. Indeed, 
Hofstede’s model of national culture contained four dimensions (2001): power 
distance, individualism, masculinity, uncertainty avoidance, long-term orien-
tation; with a fifth dimension added later: long-term versus short-term orien-
tation. According to Cornford et al. (2006), existing evidence suggests that, 
while the potentials of ICT are available – at least to some degree – to every 
region, the ways and the effectiveness with which regions exploit these 
potentials vary hugely across the EU territory. Indeed, as most comparative 
work on cultures is based on the assumption that there is a large degree of 
homogeneity within nation states as opposed to large differences between nation 
states (Didero et al., 2008), our proposition in the present research is to test 
whether the main characteristics and driving forces of the public service 
innovation system do or do not differ across different countries. 
The critical point is that the obstacles to innovation in government are 
structural (often values-based) and not only the result of human incompetence 
or reluctance. As put by Kubr (1988: 311), “managerial attitudes and behaviour 
in public sector organisations constitute a key issue which consultants have to 
deal with in most assignments. It is very much a system problem, as managers 
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tend to act in accordance with the written and unwritten behavioural rules 
proper to the public enterprise system. Thus, if risk taking is not encouraged, 
most of them will avoid it. If conformity is valued more than drive and 
originality, most managers will be conformists. Therefore, there are flaws in the 
system, these flaws inevitably affect managerial behaviour and efficiency at all 
levels.” 
Despite all the ʻrestrictions’ described, the structures of governance in the 
public sector are changing. Traditional public service monopolies are being 
challenged by contestability, competition and contracting out; old-fashioned, 
process oriented public administration is giving way to results-focused public 
management and the controls wielded by central departments are being 
devolved to the chief executives of line agencies (Shergold, 1997). Citizens are 
also demanding more personalised services, and there is a general pressure to 
accomplish more with less (Altshuler and Zegans, 1997, p. 68). Therefore, 
despite many services and institutions remaining non-innovative in public 
administration – the topic will become much hotter in years to come. More 
informed and quality-demanding citizens, growing budgetary pressure, global 
financial problems and related inflation, aging societies, health challenges, low-
growth related long-term unemployment (especially among youth and people 
over 50), environmental and energy issues, pollution, water shortages, safety 
problems etc., leave few alternatives to governments than to be creative, to use 
modern technologies and to innovate in policies, services as well as in 
governance models, systems and networks. 
Perhaps one of the largest challenges in public sector innovation research is 
to figure out where the main challenge (and so the largest opportunity) exactly 
lies. Are we talking about individual civil servants, organisational leadership 
and values, agency setup and regulations, or about something more wide and 
structural? According to Hämäläinen et al. (2011), governments should be 
strategically agile to respond to global challenges. Technological and demo-
graphic trends (and other megatrends, see for example Watson, 2008) and 
changes in the world economy transform societies and their operating environ-
ments. In order to adjust to these new techno-economic realities, the countries 
require social and institutional reorganisation, which by nature is far from easy. 
In this respect, governments typically overestimate their power to achieve 
permanent changes in the short term, and underestimate it in the long term. 
The review above shows us that innovation in the public sector is clearly a 
growing topic, both for academic research as well as for policy-making 
practices. This is partly led by contemporary (and often permanent) challenges 
faced by governments around the globe, and partly by the fact that societies and 
economies are becoming more complex over time. This situation is similar for 




1.2. Differences between the public and  
private sector innovation 
Despite acting similarly in many issues, one should be careful in applying 
theoretical understandings about innovation from the private sector directly to 
the public sector. Too many of the public sector innovation papers forcibly do 
so – the reason being a lack of data or lack of awareness. Nevertheless, these 
two wide sectors also have many things in common. Oracle (2003) has even 
called government the largest business in most countries as both the public and 
private sectors have employees in place to deliver products or services, both 
have customers that consume these products and services, both have a supply 
chain behind the delivery of products or services, and moreover both share a 
common objective in trying to reduce administrative overheads and improve 
core product/service delivery. Still, perhaps the largest difference between the 
public and private sector lies in the fundamentals of innovation. In the private 
sector, organisations that do not innovate effectively may be destroyed by those 
that do; this is not true in the public sector where organisations mostly lack the 
competitive pressure to innovate. In contrast, some studies have discovered that 
the public sector is even more innovative than the private sector. For example, 
when applying the Oslo Manual (OECD/Eurostat, 2005) methodology on 
measuring technological change to the Canadian public sector institutions, 
Statistics Canada discovered that the public sector was leading the private sector 
in technological change and it was supporting new technology acquisition (Earl, 
2004). The study also suggests that public sector organisations are doing a much 
better job than private sector firms in training their employees to use new 
technology. Moreover, Koch and Hauknes (2005) also found no proof in their 
public sector innovation research substantiating the proposition that public 
sectors are less innovative than private sectors. They also found (during the 
interviews) that the public sector is less willing to take risk than the private 
sector. Among other things, they stressed the differences in management 
incentives and that public managers are in general more likely to receive lower 
and less performance based material benefits, which may influence their 
willingness to take risk. 
There has been continued discussion over more than 100 years as to whether 
public services should be provided by public institutions, private institutions 
and/or charitable sectors. The preferences have been continuously changing. 
Moreover, there has never been an absolute distinction between the public 
sector and private sector, nor has a ʻpure’ public or ʻpure’ private sector ever 
existed (Vinten, 1992). Not all organisational forms fall easily into the two-fold 
classification of ʻfully private’ or ʻpublic: without competition’. Rather, a 
continuum between these extremes can be posited (Tomkins, 1987). For 
example, private with part state ownership, joint private/public ventures, private 
regulated, public infrastructure/private operating, contracted out, public with 
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ʻmanaged competition’, with considerable implications for how they may need 
to be differently managed 
However, one of the typical concerns is (see for example Grout et al., 2003) 
that publicly controlled organisations, not subject to the discipline of the 
competitive market, may lack incentives to control costs or provide quality of 
service and respond to the needs of consumers. In addition, they have a wide 
stakeholder base, and abstract social values and goals like safer streets, better 
public health and educational levels. Therefore, public organisations, perhaps 
more than private organisations, must deal with multiple stakeholders and 
potentially conflicting demands. How they balance the demands of multiple 
stakeholders will have consequences for their activities, outcomes, and the 
degree of trust in them by the public. 
According to Hartley (2005, 2006), there is increasing recognition that the 
context has an impact, both directly on innovation determinants, processes and 
outcomes and indirectly through organisational features such as the amount of 
organisational resources and organisational strategy. One element of the context 
of complexity for public service organisations is that they are embedded in 
society, producing not only benefits (and obligations) for individuals as we see 
but also providing public goods and services, establishing collective efficiency, 
and creating collective rules and purposes, such as human rights, justice and 
freedom. Therefore, analysis of innovation needs to consider not just the 
immediate improvements in service quality (or introduction of new services) 
and fitness for purpose, but wider issues of public value. 
The ways in which public agencies balance the needs and demands of 
stakeholders is a study in responsiveness (Bryer, 2006). The major differences 
between the public and private sector in environmental and dominant coalition 
factors are summarised in table 1.1. 
Røste and Miles (2005) similarly argue that differences between private and 
public sector innovation are less distinct and more nuanced than simplistic 
views would imply. This is very relevant for measurement of the two sectors 
and the question whether completely different tools are required (Bugge et al., 
2010). In the private sector, success is ultimately measured in terms of increased 
revenue, increased profits, increased shareholder value or some combination of 
the three (Bason, 2010). Public organisations just do not have the competitive 
pressure to innovate, as well as no need and drive to earn and maximise profit. 
If adding here negative rewards for risk-taking, then it is obvious that creativity 
and innovation in the public sector are accidental happenings caused by some 
brave people. Bloch et al. (2009) also support the notion that unlike in the 
private sector, where innovation is fundamentally driven by profit maximisation 
motives, public sector innovation is concentrated with maximising societal 
welfare created through public investments. Value creation in the public sector 




Table 1.1 Differences of presumptions in public and private sector management 
decisions 
Public sector Private sector 
Statutory and parliamentary regulation; 
codes and conduct 
Board of directors; company planning 
frameworks 
Multiple values and goals: service, public 
interest, equality, professionalism, 
consumer participation, complex trade-offs 
Relatively restricted (narrow) 
Primary social goals, e.g. safe streets, 
health, no user charge 
Primary profit goals 
Complex and debatable performance 
indicators 
Mainly quantitative financial measures 
Primary resource base from public taxes Primary resource base from operational 
returns and borrowing 
Relative openness of government and 
decision-making: stress on representatives 
Relative secrecy: stress on business 
confidentiality 
Attentive publics, wide stakeholder base; 
impact of subsidiary regulatory bodies 
Primary focus on shareholders and 
management 
Extensive accountability Accountability restricted 
Responsiveness to political masters and 
short political time-horizon 
No real national/local politician overlay; 
less artificial time constraints 
More ill-defined policy directives; 
complexity of policy implementation 
Relatively less ambiguous policy 
Needs for national economic management Marketplace signals, e.g. business lending 
rate 
Mostly long-term time horizon Mainly short-term time horizon (except 
utilities, infrastructural services, etc.) 
Source: Willcocks and Harrow (1992); Miles (2004) 
 
This means that innovation plays an essential (but also more complex) role in 
increasing the quality of public services (i.e. developing ways to address better 
societal problems to meet the needs of citizens and businesses) and raising the 
productivity of the public sector (i.e. increasing the effectiveness with which 
public monies are spent). An additional objective is creating trust and 
legitimacy of public sector institutions (Kelly et al., 2003). Cole and Parson 
(2006) put it simply, emphasising the dual ʻbottom-lines’ of cost-efficiency and 
outcomes. Inspired by the work on the UK National Audit Office (NAO, 2006), 
Bason (2010) proposes four types of value model for the public sector: 
productivity, service experience, results and democracy. The difficulty of the 
public sector or service organisations is that they have to create value in all four 
categories simultaneously, without destroying value on another. Cole and 
Parston (2006) therefore suggest that public organisations must view their 
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production of value in terms of a ʻbalanced scorecard’, where the challenge is to 
achieve positive value in all bottom-lines at the same time. This is an especially 
difficult task as some of the expectations of the general public, media, 
politicians or boards are often irrational and/or conflicting. It is also a specific 
problem for many governmental agencies, where management board members 
have to follow parallel policies coming from ministries, respective programmes, 
supervisory board directions, market developments, international competition 
between countries, etc. This makes the system rigid and slow to react, as well as 
always compromising and therefore not too decisive. This diminishes the 
overall effectiveness of policy delivery. We saw it everywhere in relation to the 
global financial crises – always too little and too late. 
Alternatively, Hartley and Moore (2008) argue that there are five other inter-
related characteristics distinguishing public sector innovations in governance 
from private sector product and process innovations. Innovations in governance: 
go beyond organisational boundaries to create network-based decision-making, 
financing, decision-making, and production systems; tap new pools of 
resources; exploit the government’s capacity to shape private rights and 
responsibilities; redistribute the right to define and judge value; and should be 
evaluated in terms of the degree to which they promote justice and the 
development of a society as well as their efficiency and effectiveness in 
achieving collectively established goals. 
Finally, the good news for public sector managers is that although the 
reasons are different, they are not alone in the pressure to create value and to 
innovate. As Prahalad and Ramaswamy (2003) stated long before the economic 
crises at the end on 2000s, competition in the private sector is intense and profit 
margins are shrinking – traditional prescriptions such as cost reduction, 
reengineering and outsourcing, while critically important, cannot solve the 
problem of margin pressure. The need to innovate is greater than ever. 
This sub-chapter draw parallels between the public and the private sector 
innovation process. The literature review showed that differences between 
private and public sector innovation are less distinct and more nuanced than 
simplistic views would imply. Knowing all this, one should be very careful in 
bringing decades-long knowledge and theory of innovation developed from 
private sector studies (mainly of manufacturing industry) directly to the public 
sector. This also proves the necessity for comprehensive (and in many ways 
exploratory) studies to find out the deepest roots of innovative behaviour in 






1.3. Typology, characteristics and  
trends of innovation in the public sector 
Typology is the study of types. As innovation in the public sector has several 
perspectives, types and characteristics, we hereafter analyse different streams of 
the literature from that perspective. The purpose of the literature review here is 
to bring together different streams of knowledge and theoretical understanding 
about public sector innovation. This is especially useful for the research design 
and questionnaire setup of the present exploratory research. Moreover, as 
comprehensive literature reviews about innovation in the public sector are rare, 
therefore, the current one also adds value from this respect. It also helps to test 
different statements coming from the literature throughout this thesis. The aim 
here is not so much to criticise, but more to synthesise together different 
theoretical understandings of public sector innovation. 
Overall, there are only three arguments for bureaucratic5 innovation, as 
stated quite radically by Altshuler (1997). Firstly, bureaucratic innovation is 
about means, not ends. Secondly, it is essential to the accomplishment of 
assigned missions and to the recovery of public confidence in government. 
Thirdly, the accountability–performance paradigm and being subject to 
adequate control by elected officials. 
Currey et al. (2008) define innovativeness in a public sector context as the 
quest for creative, unusual or novel solutions to problems and needs, including 
new services, new organisational forms and process improvements. Mulgan and 
Albury (2003: 3) put it simply – innovation equals ʻnew ideas that work’.6 More 
precisely, the authors state that “successful innovation is the creation and 
implementation of new processes, products, services and methods of delivery 
which result in significant improvements in outcomes efficiency, effectiveness 
or quality” (Mulgan and Albury, 2003: 4). The latter is a common typology 
applicable to both the private sector and public sector differentiates three types 
of innovation (Baker, 2002), i.e. process (e.g. new internal procedures, policies 
and organisational forms); product/service (e.g. changes in features and design 
                                                                          
5  The term bureaucracy is originally coined and defined Max Weber (1948). For 
clarifications: although most parts of the public sector may be considered as hierarchic and 
bureaucratic, so is most of the private sector, unless we consider worker cooperatives, and 
even these sometimes display bureaucratic tendencies (Vinten, 1992, p. 24). Moreover, even 
Weber did not make absolute claims for his theory – contrary to many interpretations, Weber 
did not maintain that bureaucratic organisations operate as efficiently as ʻsole machines’. He 
said rather that such organisations operate more efficiently than any alternative system of 
administration and that they increase their efficiency to the extent that they ʻdepersonalise’ 
the execution of official tasks (Bendix, 1966, p. 427). 
6  The new ideas that work at creating public value can mean many different things – new 
ways of organising things (like public-private partnerships), new ways of rewarding people 
(like performance related pay) or new ways of communicating (like ministerial blogs) 
(Mulgan, 2007). 
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of services/products); and strategy/business-concept/policy (e.g. new mission, 
objectives, strategies and rationales). Based on their literature review, IDeA 
(2009) suggests adding two other types of innovation: delivery of public service 
(e.g. new or altered ways of delivering services or otherwise interaction with 
clients), and system integration (e.g. new or improved ways of interacting with 
other actors and knowledge bases, changes in governance). These innovations 
can be incremental, radical or systemic/transformational. According to Chris-
tensen and Lærgreid (2001), they might be ʻsustaining’ (improved performance 
along an established performance trajectory) or ʻdiscontinuous’ (disruptive). 
Service innovations, according to Damanpour and Evan (1984), Kimberly 
and Evanisko (1981) and Normann (1991), are defined as new services offered 
by public organisations to meet an external user or market need: they are 
concerned with what is produced. Service innovations occur in the operating 
component and affect the technical system of an organisation and include the 
adoption of goods (which are material) and intangible services, which are often 
consumed at the point of production. 
From the user perspective, three types of service innovation have been 
identified and tested (Osborne, 1998; Walker et al., 2002). The first type is total 
innovations that involve providing new services to new users. Second, existing 
services provided to a new user group describes expansionary innovations. The 
third type is evolutionary innovations, which involve delivering a new service to 
existing users. 
According to Walker (2008), one should also be aware of two types of 
organisational process innovations (Edquist et al., 2001): marketisation and 
organisation. Marketisation innovations involve modifying the organisation’s 
operating processes and systems to increase the efficiency or effectiveness of 
producing and delivering its services to users (Schilling, 2005). Organisation 
innovations are innovations in structure, strategy, and administrative processes 
(Damanpour, 1987). 
Walker (2008) adds that in public organisations, the requirement to meet 
multiple goals means that it is necessary to be innovative across a range of 
innovation types; focusing upon just one type of innovation is unlikely to result 
in the achievement of a number of, what are sometimes, conflicting objectives. 
These innovations are called ʻancillary’ innovations by Damanpour (1987), and 
they are differentiated from other innovations because they are concerned with 
working across boundaries with other service providers, users, or other public 
agencies. Thus, their successful implementation is reliant upon others. Ancillary 
innovations are “organization-environment boundary innovations” (Damanpour 
1987: 678). 
There seem to be a broad consensus as to what innovation in the public 
sector means. Indeed, the understanding of it is relatively wide. The definitions 
may also vary depending on the author or precise topic under consideration – 
see for example Windrum (2008), and Howells and Tether (2004). The latter, 
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for instance, distinguish physical services, information processing services, 
knowledge creating services, and people-oriented services. 
These public service innovations should make governments more effective, 
efficient and citizen-friendly, or as stated by Kelly et al. (2002), there are three 
alternative forms of value creation in government: services, social outcomes and 
trust. According to McCormic (2003), innovations should lead governments and 
public sector institutions towards the following directions: 
 Diversity and choice versus monopoly; 
 Shared responsibility between policy-makers, service providers and 
citizens versus a culture of blame; 
 Openness and confidence in the face of informed critique versus defen-
siveness; 
 Early involvement of service users and providers in decision-making 
versus ʻdownstream’ consultation on operational/delivery issues; 
 Range of responses from the public: exit (contracting into private 
provision); voice (from deliberative public involvement to protest and 
litigation); and resignation (disaffection and falling expectations); 
 Citizen and staff demands for feedback versus internally closed 
hierarchy; 
 Technology as an enabler of timely and accurate service interaction 
versus fear, reluctant compliance or unrealistic expectations of what 
technology can achieve; 
 Alignment of mainstream budgets to strategic objectives in the long term 
versus time-limited innovation at the systematic and geographical 
margins (pilots, challenge funds, area-based targeting, initiatives); 
 Co-production of valued outcomes (e.g. health, learning, community, 
justice, quality of life) versus “manufacture” and delivery of services to 
the public dominated by inputs; 
 Value-based policy and practice as well as evidence-based; 
 Visioning as distinct from the ʻdelusion of predicting’; aspirations for 
how the next decade should unfold as distinct from forecasting. 
  
Berry and Berry (1999, 2007) argue that diffusion of policy innovations is 
driven by learning, competition, public pressure or mandates from higher levels 
of authority. Their framework points towards the importance of competition, 
learning, vertical influence from oversight bodies and public pressure as 
positive forces leading to the adoption of innovations. This framework has been 
empirically tested, primarily with state policy data in the USA, though other 
national and international studies have been conducted (see, for example, Balla, 
2001; Nicholson-Crotty, 2004; Weyland, 2004). 
Indeed, the fundamental challenge in the public sector is that innovators 
usually succeed despite, not because of, dominant structures and systems. “Too 
many good ideas are frustrated, filed away, or simply forgotten,” states Mulgan 
frankly (see Mulgan, 2007: 4). 
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Based on empirical work of Zegans (1997), who has questioned public 
managers in the U.S. about innovation, the following, somewhat surprising 
findings were discovered: 
“What does it mean for them to innovate?” Firstly, innovation is the process of 
implementing an idea, or enacting a technology, novel to a given situation; 
Secondly, successful innovation depends more on implementation skills and 
political savvy than on creative thinking; Thirdly, innovation is a tool for 
improving agency performance, not an end in itself; Fourthly, innovation is an 
intrinsic part of the public manager’s job. 
“What motivates the public managers to innovate?” Managers described their 
principal motivation as putting useful ideas into action. They also cited funding 
crises, technical changes, and burgeoning demands for public services as 
important spurs to innovation. They did not suggest that a personal need for 
creative expression or public credit for their ideas were important stimuli. 
“The fundamental responsibilities of civil servants as innovators?” To produce 
and promote useful ideas; to inform political overseers about changes in the 
policy environment and flaws in policy assumptions revealed in the course of 
normal practice; and to routinely improve the operating performance of their 
organisations in a manner of consistent and current policy. 
“Is discretion to innovate an asset or a liability?” – the managers argued that 
granting discretion to their employees is both necessary and desirable but that 
such discretion must be managed. When weighing the benefits to be obtained 
from intelligent grants of discretion to employees versus the risk of being held 
personally accountable for employee error, they consistently came down on the 
side of granting discretion. The managers saw it as their job to protect their 
employees from unfair attacks in the media and vindictive legislative enquiries. 
 
From the questions above, we can draw out some generalised conclusions that, 
firstly, there is a lack of emphasis on creativity and originality (as an extreme 
form of innovation), and secondly, that the tension is more towards 
productivity-enhancing initiatives versus client/citizen satisfaction. 
The following table 1.2 summarises different characteristics, drivers and 
impediments of innovation in the public sector drawn from the literature. 
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Table 1.2 Characteristics and management of innovation in public service organisations 
(PSOs) 
Characteristic
s of successful 
innovations 
The use of systems approach; the use of new technology; process 
improvement; the involvement of private/voluntary bodies in public 
services; the empowerment of citizens and PSO staff (Borins, 2001a; 





Bottom-up and top-down innovations (Baldock and Evers, 1991; Osborne 
and Brown, 2005). Needs-led innovations and efficiency-lead innovation 
(Halvorsen et al., 2005) 







Political policy initiative; new organisational leadership; an organisational 
crisis; internal organisational problems; new opportunity for growth 
(Borins, 2001b). Innovators are primarily senior managers and politicians 
(Bartlett and Dibben, 2002). Support a culture of innovation from the top 
of it; increase rewards for innovation; establish an innovation fund to 
support innovative projects; encourage diversity inside the organisation, in 
order to engender differential perspectives on issues; use information 
effectively; value experimentation – and learn from it (Borins, 2001a; 
Osborne and Brown, 2005). Efficiency drives; new government priorities; 
other factors; response to crisis; change in ministerial priorities; new 
technology; work with peer organisations; change in policy environment; 
changes in resource use; implementing EU policies; change of function; 
private sector; direct action by citizens/campaigns; and spin-offs from 
other work (National Audit Office, 2006). Politicians; agency heads; 
middle management; frontline staff; interest groups; citizens; clients; 
others (Borins, 2006). Due to EU regulations; to ministerial or political 
suggestions; to senior staff suggestions; to middle and/or frontline staff 
suggestions; to customer suggestions; or due to other public sector 
organisations (The LSE Public Policy Group, 2008). 
Innovation 
impediments 
Barriers that arise from within the bureaucracy/organisation; obstacles that 
arise primarily in the political environment; barriers that exist in the 
external environment (Borins, 2001a; Osborne and Brown, 2005). Risk 
aversion, delivery pressures and administrative burdens (i.e. no time to 
think about innovation); poor risk management skills; short term horizons 
and budgets; reluctance to close down failing programmes or organisations,; 
constraining cultural or organisational arrangements; lack of incentives; 
and over-reliance on high performers as a source of innovation (Mulgan 
and Albury, 2003). Bureaucratic culture; risk aversion; entrenched 
practices and procedures; trouble/busy coping with large-scale reforms; 
lack of capacity for organisational learning (Clark et al., 2008). 
Regulations and laws; funding; cooperation partners both internal and 
external; technology; union opposition; public opposition; concerns about 
loss of control and responsibility; opposition from private sector busi-
nesses; lack of clear vision or political support (Borins, 2006). Reluctance 
to new ways of working; stakeholders with different interests; getting the 
resources; fragmentation; coordinating stakeholders; lack of agreement on 
objectives; risks of audit; political uncertainty; lack of leaders; lack of 
training; working with contractors (National Audit Office, 2006). 
Source: Compiled by the author 
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From table 1.2 presented above, we see that there are clearly some similarities, 
but also many differences of organisational circumstances and external environ-
ment where public versus private sector innovation takes place. Perhaps one of 
the most important similarities between these two is that innovation is related to 
entrepreneurial thinking and some key individuals. It is known that analyses of 
public policy innovation span a wide-ranging set of policy issues, and identify 
multiple antecedents and consequences of those innovation policies (see for 
example Polsby, 1984; Kingdon, 1984; Schon, 1971). However, central to this 
research is the acknowledgement of a group of individuals who challenge the 
system, are irrationally committed to the inventions they championed, operated 
informally and subversively, exploited informal networks and mobilised outside 
pressures, engaged in life-long combat, and become heroes or martyrs to their 
cause (see Schon, 1971). Such individuals have been variously referred to as 
ʻ(product) champion’, ʻguerrilla’, ʻpublic entrepreneur’, ʻrevolutionary’, and 
ʻmissionary’ (Schon, 1963, 1971), as ʻinventor’, ʻadapter’, ʻpolicy entrepre-
neur’, ʻbroker’, and ʻincubator’ (Polsby, 1984), or as ʻadvocate’, ʻbroker’, and 
ʻpolicy entrepreneur’ (Kingdon, 1984). 
These individuals lead their ideas through a set of logically and insti-
tutionally required hurdles as illustrated in figure 1.2 (Roberts and King, 1989). 
These hurdles, which become increasingly complex, consist of idea generation, 
mobilisation of support, a proposal to and endorsement by power elite (gover-
nor), the drafting of a legislative bill, the transformation of the bill into law, and 
the administration and revision of a programme in compliance with the new 
law. It is rightly said by Peter Drucker (1985), that entrepreneurs innovate. 
Innovation is the specific instrument of entrepreneurship. It is the art that 
endows resources with a new capacity to create wealth. Innovation indeed 
creates a resource. According to Bergek et al. (2005), entrepreneurial experi-
mentation is also seen as one of the key functions of systems of innovation. 
However, the whole system is important. Howell et al. (2005) clearly point out 
that although innovation is contingent not only on individuals but also on a 
much wider range of factors such as organisational design, structures, cultures, 
working practices, etc., evidence does suggest that some individuals are more 




Figure 1.2 Hurdles in public policy innovation (Roberts and King, 1989) 
 
The term ʻpublic entrepreneurship’ was brought into wider discussion by 
Osborne and Gaebler (1992), who saw it as a device to ʻreinvent government’, 
to facilitate the complete transformation of bureaucratic government into 
entrepreneurial government. Entrepreneurial government is a government that is 
adaptable, responsive, efficient, and effective. In addition, it should not 
necessarily be a smaller government, but a better government. Such a govern-
ment must be able to produce high quality goods and services, be responsive to 
customers, be led by persuasion and incentives rather than command, empower 
clients, and – above all – be entrepreneurial (van Mierlo, 1996).7 According to 
van Mierlo (1996) public entrepreneurship combines elements of classical 
market entrepreneurship and elements of modern social entrepreneurship of in-
stitutions of private initiative (a management strategy for non-profit institutions, 
see De Waal, 1991; De Waal et al., 1994). Client-orientation, professionali-
sation and productivity improvement are the key concepts by which the entre-
preneurial bureaucrat in an entrepreneurial government can be characterised. 
Public entrepreneurship also imposes new challenges for bureaucrats operating 
between the political leadership of their bureau and the clients of the services 
provided by their bureau. Therefore, giving shape to entrepreneurship in 
bureaucratic organisations leads to an increasing demand for entrepreneurial, 
independent and innovative bureaucrats. Public entrepreneurship, however, also 
causes new problems of political-democratic control. To maintain the traditional 
values of public administration, e.g. accountability, efficiency and neutrality, 
Teofilovic (2002) suggests building an organisational strategy on three core 
principles: (1) partnerships; (2) empowerment; and (3) leadership. Within the 
                                                                          
7  The whole programme for reform of federal government in the U.S. (led by Vice-
President Al Gore from 1993) was inspired by the idea of ʻentrepreneurial government’ (see 













frame of public entrepreneurship, it is also appropriate to use the distinction of 
Osborne and Brown (2005), who differentiate three following types of 
individual agencies needed for public sector innovation processes (which should 
both exist and be balanced): 
 The champion of an innovation, at a variety of organisational levels; 
 The supporter (usually a senior manager) of an innovation; and 
 The advocate (usually a political or external stakeholder of an 
innovation). 
 
From the theoretical perspective, the troika-model of teamwork for innovation 
(see figure 1.3), can illustrate this further. 
 
    
  Figure 1.3 Troika-model of innovation promotors (Hauschildt and Kirchmann, 2001) 
 
The model was built by Hauschildt and Kirchmann (2001) for the private sector, 
based on earlier work of Witte (1973) and Chakrabarti and Hauschildt (1989). 
The model helps to integrate strategic project level functions into the 
managerial context, widening the perspective of the project manager as a 
ʻprocess promotor’. The promoter model was originally developed by Eberhard 
Witte in 1973, who was able to prove conclusively (based on his study of initial 
installations of computers in Germany) that innovations are only successful if 
energetic individuals give active support to the new product or process. Witte 
(1973) developed a two-fold dyad system, where the technology prompter (or 
promoter by know-how) has to contribute specific technical knowledge to the 
innovation process; specific knowledge must be employed against ignorance; 
innovators have to act as ʻeducators’ or ʻtechnologists’ in order to win over 
reluctant colleagues or customers. On the other hand, the power promoter has to 
use hierarchical power to overcome the psychological barrier of unwillingness. 
Chakrabarti and Hauschildt (1989) claimed that in addition to the technology 
Power Promotor
(also: “sponsor”, “innovator”, 
“promotor by hierarchical 
power”
Process Promotor
(also: “project champion”, 
“promotor by organisational 
know-how”
Technology Promotor
(also: “expert”, “investor”, 
“promotor by technological 
know-how”
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promotor and the power promotor, a third promotor is required for successful 
innovation processes. Problem complexity and system complexity (of organi-
sations) demand a ʻprocess promotor’. The process promotor has the task of 
overcoming further barriers, the barriers of non-responsibility and indifference, 
which are primarily caused by organisational and administrative resistance to 
the new idea. The process promotor derives his influence from organisational 
know-how. He knows who could be affected by the innovation. He forges the 
link between the technology promotor and the power promotor. He is able to 
translate the language of innovative technology into the language traditionally 
spoken and understood in the firm. Therefore, he is the champion of innovation, 
able to turn an idea into a plan of action. The process promotor has diplomatic 
skills and knows how to approach and win over different types of people on a 
one-to-one basis. An empirical analysis by Hauschildt and Kirchmann (2001) 
shows also that the existence of promotors and division of labour between them 
has a positive effect upon the innovation process. They claim that out of all the 
promotor structures the Troika-model can support the innovation and 
information transfer process most successfully. This applies if one can identify 
specific individuals as the power promotor, process promotor and technology 
promotor respectively. In this way, the complex innovation work is split 
between several, mutually complementary, individuals. 
Within a similar framework, interestingly enough, the National Audit Office 
(2009) study discovered that firstly senior management, then the policy team 
and only then equally importantly the internal innovation team and frontline 
staff were responsible for innovations. The earlier works of Borins (see Borins, 
2001c), tell a slightly different story. Approximately 50 per cent of innovations 
originated from middle managers or frontline workers, 25 per cent from agency 
heads, 20 per cent from politicians, 15 per cent from interest groups, and 10 per 
cent from individuals outside government (these numbers total more than 100 
per cent as respondents sometimes gave multiple answers). So in any case, the 
existence and importance of certain key individuals in innovative organisations 
is well proven. However, it is not yet clear how important they are in the public 
sector compared to other factors, especially if compared to political will and 
support, appropriate legal framework, and availability of financial resources, 
etc. Therefore, the present research will empirically assess the relative 
importance of these key individuals in the public sector innovation process. 
Finally, these creative individuals and innovation needs a supporting 
organisational culture, which has in Rainey’s words (Rainey, 1996) become one 
of the most widely discussed and reputedly important topics in management. 
However, it is also important to reiterate that although the need for cultural 
change can be easy to identify, it is much more difficult to implement such 
cultural change (Colville et al., 1996). In public organisations, leaders face the 
constraints of complex administrative rules, political interventions and 
oversight, periodic turnover of elected officials, relatively short tenure in their 
own positions, and complex, conflicting goals. The external environment also 
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consists of the legal environment, which can act as a regulative (strategic 
control), directive or restrictive framework for public service organisations in 
their innovation development (see for example McKevitt, 1992). However, 
despite the different challenges, there are ways for managing change in the 
public sector (for closer discussions see for example Eadie, 1996; Mohr, 1999; 
Ingraham and Jones, 1999; Golembiewski, 1996). 
A specific and increasingly important theme in the public sector innovation 
landscape is policy innovation. This is a complex process, weaving together 
multiple parties and interests, all of whom compete for a hearing and acceptance 
of their ideas on the government’s decision agenda (see also Roberts and King, 
1989). Policy innovation is an attempt to mobilise an innovation system – a set 
of ideas connecting people in multiple transactions, the thrust of which is to 
forge a new policy or procedure to guide public action. This system is 
embedded in an institutional context and environment that is constantly 
changing, providing new opportunities for some social actors, and setting up 
constraints for others. Authors suggest that we are now entering a ʻthird 
generation’ of innovation policy (see European Commission, 2002), which has 
placed innovation at the heart of each policy area, it is a unique opportunity to 
deliver innovation-minded thinking across different governmental bodies and 
agencies. If one succeeds in delivering innovation thinking widely across 
government, and it is done correctly, the mission might have the widest effect 
ever on public sector innovativeness. However, as government affairs and 
governance systems become more complex then the importance of knowledge 
transfer and management in the innovation process also increases. 
Therefore, an important element or factor of public policy innovation is also 
policy learning. Kinder (2002) stresses also the importance of the use of 
rigorous case study analysis as a means by which to advance public policy 
practice. Policy learning is not anything new; however, as said by Dolowitz and 
Marsh (2000), the technological advances have made it easier and faster for 
policy-makers to communicate with each other, and therefore the occurrences of 
policy transfer have increased. In their 1983 article “Thinking about Govern-
ment Learning”, Lloyd S. Etheredge and James Short (p. 41) asked the 
following questions: “Do governments ever learn from experience in the long 
run? If so, what are the processes? If not, what are the barriers? And what could 
be done to increase their learning rates?” In answering these questions, they 
distinguished five types of learning corresponding to different clusters of 
academic literature: scientific method learning; intuitive understanding 
(capacity); creativity; skills to implement intentions; and capacity for good 
judgement and wisdom, for which the criteria for differentiated recognition and 
articulation, hierarchical interaction, and perspective (e.g. for appropriate 
selection among alternatives) can be applied. In addition to these individual 
learning types, they also distinguished two types of organisational learning: 
intelligence of top-level decision-makers, and collective individual coherence. 
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Making parallels to the private sector, then the concept ʻopen innovation’ 
can inspire policy learning and innovation in the public sector. Osborne (1998b) 
has demonstrated that there is a need for an external orientation for the 
innovative public service organisation. In theoretical terms, it needs to be an 
open system rather than a closed system (Scott, 1992). The open innovation 
concept assumes that firms can and should use external ideas as well as internal 
ideas, and internal and external paths to markets, as the firms look to advance 
their technology (Chesbrough, 2003). The boundaries between a firm and its 
environment have become more permeable; innovations can easily transfer 
inward and outward. Besides acquiring external knowledge (typical to the 
innovation process), many firms have also begun to actively commercialise 
technology, for example, by means of out-licensing (see Lichtenthaler and 
Ernst, 2009). The central idea behind open innovation is that in a world where 
new knowledge is produced everywhere, and fast and widely distributed, 
companies cannot afford to rely entirely on their own research, but should 
instead buy or licence processes or inventions (e.g. patents) from other compa-
nies. In addition, internal inventions not being used in a firm’s business should 
be taken outside the company (e.g. through licensing, joint ventures, spin-offs). 
In today’s policy learning context, Kemp and Weehuizen (2004) suggest to 
make a distinction between three types of policy learning: technical learning 
(about instruments), conceptual learning (about goals, strategies) and social 
learning (about societal values, responsibilities, appropriate ways of interacting, 
policy approaches). Governments borrow policies, institutional ideas and their 
setups, and other things, with the expectation that this transfer will lead to 
policy success rather than policy failure. However, policy transfer is not always 
successful. There is also a relationship between policy transfer and policy 
ʻfailure’. Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) suggest (based on their research) that 
there are at least three factors which have a significant effect on policy failure. 
First, the borrowing country may have insufficient information about the 
policy/institution and how it operates in the country from which it is transferred: 
a process called uninformed transfer. Second, although the transfer has 
occurred, crucial elements that made the policy or institutional structure a 
success in the originating country may not be transferred, leading to failure: a 
process called incomplete transfer. Third, insufficient attention may be paid to 
the differences between economic, social, cultural, political and ideological 
contexts in the transferring and the borrowing country: a process called 
inappropriate transfer. In the framework of policy learning, it is appropriate to 
useful to distinguish four different kinds of knowledge (Johnson and Lundvall, 
2001) – know how: the ability to do something; know what: knowledge about 
facts; know why: knowledge about principles and laws; and know who: 
knowledge about who knows what. 
Furthermore, international organisations like the UN, OECD, EU, IMF, the 
World Bank and others have significantly boosted the phenomenon of policy 
learning. In addition, technology has made the transfer faster, wider and more 
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comprehensive. As far as the present research is concerned, this external 
learning does not appear universally but often by disciplines – like techno-
logical, conceptual, institutional and policies. 
To continue from a slightly different angle, then in parallel to public sector 
innovation and innovators, there is a thriving ascending community of social 
innovators emerging. In his speech exploring the future of civil society, its 
engagement and social enterprises, British Prime Minister David Cameron calls 
this phenomenon The Big Society (see Cameron, 2009). 
The term social innovation is used to coin innovative activities and services 
that are motivated by the goal of meeting a social need and that are predomi-
nantly diffused through organisations whose primary purposes are social. A 
good example of that is the Big Issue, a socially innovative organisation which 
publishes The Big Issue magazine, and its international successor network of 
magazines sold by homeless people. The social entrepreneur is in this respect 
the father of the Big Issue, Mr. John Bird, who launched the enterprise in 1991. 
Other examples of social innovations include the Open University in the UK, 
Wikipedia, and the Grameen Bank (the pioneer of micro-credit for poor, rural 
people). According to Mulgan et al. (2008), there are three key dimensions 
illustrating social innovations. Firstly, they are usually new combinations or 
hybrids of existing elements, rather than being wholly new in themselves. 
Secondly, putting them into practice involves cutting across organisational, 
sectoral or disciplinary boundaries.8 Thirdly, they leave behind a compelling 
new social relationship between previously separate individuals and groups 
which matter greatly to the people involved, contribute to the diffusion and 
embedding of the innovation, and fuel a cumulative dynamic whereby each 
innovation opens up the possibility of further innovations. The public, private 
and voluntary sector are increasingly overlapping and therefore also innovation 
in these sectors (see, for example, Bekkers et al., 2013, who have provided an 
integrative framework of relevant factors that influence the process of social 
innovation in the public sector). According to Mulgan et al., the key growth 
                                                                          
8  Moore and Hartley (2013) have named them as a special class of innovations in the 
public sector, characterising them as ‘innovations in governance’. These innovations differ 
from standard intra-organisational innovations in products, services, and production 
processes in at least two important senses. On the one hand, the innovations are conceived 
and implemented above the organisational level: they involve networks of organisations, or 
the transformation of complex social production systems rather than changes solely within a 
particular organisation. On the other hand, these innovations focus not only on concrete 
changes in what particular things are produced through what particular production processes, 
but also on the ways in which productive activity is financed (or more broadly, resourced), 
the processes that are used to decide what will be produced, and the normative standards 
used to evaluate the performance of the social production system. Four examples were 
given: contracting with community groups for Child Protection Services by The 
Massachusetts Department of Social Services, private partnerships to support New York 
City’s parks, congestion charging in London, and elder care in Singapore. 
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sectors of the 21st century economy look set to be health, education and care, 
accounting between them for around 20–30 per cent of GDP, and more in some 
countries. “These are all mixed economies, strongly shaped by public policy, 
and requiring models of innovation very different from those that worked well 
for cars, microprocessors and biotechnology,” states Mulgan et al. (2008: 7). 
This view is also supported by Stewart-Weeks (2008), according to whom there 
is a school of thought that suggests that over the next 20 years the things that 
will impact most on our ability as individuals, as communities and as a nation, 
to survive and prosper will not be economical but social. Our ability to fix some 
of the large, complex problems that impact us as people and communities – 
improving education and skills, preventing illness, and improving the pro-
ductivity and quality of health care systems, eradicating poverty, improving 
opportunities for people with disabilities, designing and managing more liveable 
cities – will have the greatest impact on how well we live and how successful 
we can expect to be. 
The end of this sub-chapter focuses on innovation awards as innovation 
motivators. William James (1920), the great Harvard psychologist and 
philosopher, made a poignant observation in a letter to his Radcliffe class in 
1896: “I now perceive one immense omission in my Psychology. … The 
deepest principle of human nature is the craving to be appreciated. I left it out 
altogether from the book because I had never had it gratified till now” (p. 33). 
According to Hale (1996), organisations with a goal not only on customers 
(citizens) and partners who are satisfied but also of employees who are 
enthusiastic about their jobs, often have an extensive employee recognition 
programme. The momentum of effectiveness is sustained by the talents and 
enthusiasm of employees and by management’s recognition of their 
achievements and creativity. “As social scientists point out, recognition lies at 
the core of healthy self-esteem from child’s earliest days,” Hale says (p. 145). 
A good and perhaps the largest exercise of awarding public sector 
innovations is the Program on Innovations in American Government, an on-
going joint venture of the Ford Foundation and Harvard University’s John F. 
Kennedy School of Government. The programme objectives are to identify 
valuable innovations at all levels of American government, to publicise them as 
sources of inspiration for other prospective innovators, and to develop curricular 
materials that may prove useful in training public officials to approach missions 
creatively. It includes both an annual competition and a programme of research. 
Each of the ten annual winners in the competition receives a cash grant of 
US$100,000 from the Ford Foundation, to be used for purposes of programme 
enhancement or dissemination. The intellectual agenda of the innovation 
programme has two main components: to pursue greater understanding of the 
dynamics of innovation in American government and to clarify thought about 
the place of innovation in the context of American public value (Altshuler and 
Zegans, 1997). The number of different awards has been rapidly increasing in 
the last decade (Borins, 2001c), however they do not recognise new but 
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unproven ideas (Borins (2001d); they choose the best applications on the basis 
of results and replication as well as originality. Ideally, the winning applications 
will be relatively recent inventions that have been in operation long enough to 
show results and be replicated. Different types of public sector innovation 
awards include (a) departmental or government-wide achievement awards given 
to groups or individuals for a number of factors, one of which can be inno-
vation; (b) innovation awards given by non-governmental organisations, such as 
the Ford Foundation/Kennedy School of Government and CAPAM awards; and 
(c) gain-sharing awards, such as financial awards (not necessarily large) given 
to groups or individuals for implementing cost-saving ideas or royalties given to 
public servants for inventions made while working for government. Indeed, the 
challenge for public sector organisations is to go beyond individual innovations 
to create a climate supportive of on-going innovation on a large scale. “Perhaps 
the efforts of persistent individual innovators, coupled with some important 
systemic changes, will create a new reality”, states Borins (2001c: 319). As we 
see, among other factors influencing the innovation process in the public sector, 
different awards and recognitions of key players – initiators and executors – 
together with appropriate organisational changes have a very important effect 
for progress in the public sector. This is especially taking into account the 
previously discussed nature of the public sector, which is lacking competitive 
and/or profit driven pressure to innovate. 
Finally, being innovative as an organisation is definitely a strategic issue. In 
her early study, Berry (1994a), while analysing the factors which lead a state 
agency (in the U.S.) to adopt strategic planning as an innovation in public 
management, developed four explanations for that: its resources, its leadership 
style, its orientation to business and citizens, and diffusion of strategic planning 
across states. Her research found that agencies are most likely to adopt strategic 
planning: (1) early in gubernatorial administrations, (2) under conditions of 
strong fiscal health, (3) when agencies work closely with private sector 
businesses, and (4) as the neighbouring state agencies that have already adopted 
strategic planning increases. Linking it to policy learning, then her review of an 
extensive literature on the determinants of state policy innovation (Berry, 
1994b) reveals that there are three principal types of explanations for what 
causes a state government to adopt a new policy: (1) the internal determinants 
model claims that the primary factors leading a state to innovate are 
characteristics internal to the state. The other two are diffusion models – 
regional diffusion, and national interaction – that regard state adoptions of 
policy as emulations of previous adoptions by other states. Her simulation 
analysis showed that using single-explanation methodologies on these three 
explanations frequently produce results that are wrong, and the danger is not 
‘false negatives’ but ‘false positives’. The results showed a tendency for single-
explanation methodologies to detect the presence of both internal determinants 
and national interaction when neither is present and when, instead, policy 
adoptions follow a purely regional diffusion pattern. Similarly, policies that do 
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not diffuse and the adoptions of which are determined strictly by internal 
determinants indicate the presence of regional diffusion when subjected to a 
single-explanation test. 
This literature review section analysed the typology, characteristics and 
trends of public sector innovation. It showed also that there is relatively wide 
and scattered understanding of innovation in the public sector, however with 
some exceptions, it is lacking empirically grounded evidence of the nature and 
details of the public sector innovation process. The following sub-chapter opens 
up other government modernisations and transformation initiatives often not 
directly covered by the innovation literature. 
 
 
1.4. Modernisation and transformation waves  
in the public sector 
There have been other government modernisation and transformation initiatives 
and eras around the globe over time other than what we call ʻthe innovation 
story’. For some countries, government reform and innovation involves the 
reform of an old bureaucracy in the context of a newly democratic state. For 
other countries, this entails an all out fight against corruption. For still other 
countries, the challenge is to modernise large, outmoded bureaucracies and 
bring them into the information age. While countries have come to government 
reform for very different reasons, government reform and innovation is a global 
phenomenon today. In some countries this movement has been called rein-
venting government; in other countries it is referred to as building state capacity 
or modernisation of the state; and in still other countries this is named New 
Public Management (NPM), or even a post-NPM regime in some countries. 
Moreover, in developing countries, government reform movements have often 
resulted from severe economic crises, corruption, or as the result of conditions 
imposed by international lending organisations or other global communities 
(such as the European Union). Another dimension in government transfor-
mation is related to e-government, more recently also mobile-government. The 
analysis of innovation through e-government will be started in this sub-chapter 
and followed more deeply in sub-chapter 3.3. 
An important point to mention is also that the convergence of reform 
strategies has meant that concepts have spread from one country to another 
(partly via previously discussed policy learning), often without even changing 
the terminology (see Kamarck, 2003). There are also several modern trends 
related to the public sector (see for example OECD, 2004b; IDeA, 2009); some 
of them are the following: 
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 Organisational structure, e.g. agencification, ʻdistributed governance’9; 
 Partnerships, e.g. PPPs, regional/local, voluntary sector involvement; 
 Horizontal integration, e.g. breaking down departmental ʻsilos’ and 
fostering cross-departmental co-operation and co-ordination; 
 Good fiscal management, e.g. budget reform, containment of deficits; 
 Performance-based management and budgeting, e.g. top down/systems 
versus bottom up/ad hoc approach; 
 Public service revitalisation, e.g. building/strengthening capacity at 
national/regional/local levels; 
 Devolution and decentralisation, e.g. devolution of power from central to 
regional/local government and other agencies; 
 Service improvement, e.g. provision of ʻpersonalised’, client-centred 
services; 
 Systems and process improvements, e.g. streamlining business processes, 
developing customer-centric systems; 
 Regulatory change, e.g. focus on deregulation and simplification, shift 
from enforcement towards voluntary compliance; 
 Use of IT for both front and back office operations, e.g. providing on-
line, ʻe-enabled’ services, investing in customer relationship management 
and service-oriented architecture technology. 
 
The question of why public management reform is answered in three ways 
(OECD, 2000). First, governments need to keep up with society. The purpose of 
reform in this respect is to make governments more responsive to society’s 
needs and demands. Public management is being reformed in order to provide 
better, faster and more services. However, quality, quantity and speed are not 
the only new competences that society requests from its government. Since the 
pace of societal change is accelerating, government should equally be able to 
respond to changing demands with new solutions (including technological). 
Secondly, government needs to be reformed with the purpose of re-establishing 
trust in government. Government needs to provide more choice, democracy and 
transparency. Therefore, the public services need to work with the political 
sphere. Equally important is strengthened communication and connection with 
citizens. Finally, governments need to be reformed due to new pressures and 
global challenges. Outside forces place competitive, but also existential pressure 
on government for serving the public, as well as securing economic stability and 
sustainability. In addition, greater economic interdependence, the opening up of 
societies and the growing importance of international structures and agreements, 
make outside pressures more complex and multi-dimensional. Hence, the 
environment in which and for which government operates presents new 
                                                                          
9  According to OECD (2004b) estimates, in 2004 such arm’s length bodies in central 
government accounted for between 50 and 75 per cent of public expenditure and 
employment in many OECD countries. 
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demands. Reform then is the process of preparing or adapting government to its 
new role in a changing society (Dooren et al., 2004). 
Yet from the theoretical side, Brunsson and Olsen (1993) characterise reform 
as a rationalistic effort at organisational change, which is mainly true in the 
private sector. In the public sector, reforms might originate also from other, 
external consequences. When reviewing the literature on reform theories, Peters 
(1994) identified three useful categories of reform models that can assist in the 
interpretation of recent reforms installed in the developed world. The first set of 
models is ʻpurposive’, the second set is ʻenvironmental dependency models’ 
and the third ʻinstitutional models’ (see table 1.3 for a brief elaboration). The 
application of Peters’ typology helps make sense of reform assessments 
(especially related to New Public Management, elaborated later in this chapter). 
 
Table 1.3 Peters’ categories of reform models 
Purposive 
Models 
 Leaders identify need for change, type of reform, direct 
implementation. 
 Reforms are endogenous in objective and guidance. 
 Reforms are guided by either implicit or explicit theory, 
commonly managerialism and/or economic theory of individual 
incentives. 




 Organisational change or reform constitutes adaptation to 
environmental factors by: 
- exploiting economic or technological innovations in the 
environment; 
- structures coming to reflect environmentally imposed tasks; 
- finding niches where they can survive. 
 Historical efficiency is at work in the adaptive process. 
Institutional 
Models 
 Organisations are collectives that reflect history, shared values, 
norms and roles. 
 Change requires alternative internal organisational values and, 
therefore, members’ operative values. 
 Organisational mutability is constrained by constitutive beliefs, 
relationships, and process. 
 Outcomes of reform are unpredictable. 
 Reform leads to unintended consequences. 
Source: Adapted by author from Peters (1994) and Skelley (2002) 
 
Hale (1996) brings in the term of high-performance public organisations. 
According to him, an attempt to define a high-performance organisation might 
take the following stance: it is a high-performance organisation when: 
 Anyone in the place can set out the organisation’s mission and values; 
 It is always looking into something new; 
 Its customers’ stratification level is high; 
64 
 A ʻfailure’ is considered a learning experience; 
 Its employees frequently work in teams; 
 The leader is a partner to the staff members; 
 Others study and write about it, and everyone wants to take credit for its 
accomplishments; 
 It can give relevant information on its programme results; 
 It is a laboratory and its own best model. 
 
The U.S. National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) Alliance for 
Redesigning Government has provided future testimony of characteristics of 
high performance work organisations: 
 They are clear in their mission; 
 They define outcomes and focus on results; 
 They empower their employees; 
 They institute new processes in order to motivate and inspire people to 
succeed; 
 They are flexible, adaptable, and quick to adjust when conditions change; 
 They are competitive in terms of performance; 
 They restructure their work processes to meet customer needs; 
 They maintain open and productive communication among stakeholders. 
 
According to earlier work of Minnesota’s STEP (Service Towards Excellence in 
Performance) high performance is based on the six ʻhypotheses’: 
 Closer contact with the customer will provide a better understanding of the 
customer’s need; 
 Increased employee participation taps the knowledge, skills and commit-
ment of all state workers; 
 Increased discretionary authority gives managers and employers greater 
control over and accountability for a bottom line; 
 Partnership allows the sharing of knowledge, expertise and other re-
sources; 
 State-of-the-art productivity improvement techniques will enhance pro-
ductivity; 
 Improved work measurement provides a base for planning and imple-
menting service improvements and giving workers information about 
their performance. 
 
A comparison of these three lists reveals a common pattern that affirms two 
fundamental approaches to high performance in the public sector: orientation 
toward a mission and the customer and empowerment of employees. In 
addition, a high performing organisation embraces teamwork, employee partici-
pation, flexible management, and rewards and recognises a nurturing-
community culture. 
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The New Public Management (NPM) movement (in the U.S. called ʻgovern-
ment reinvention’ movement) started in the UK after the so-called Thatcherism 
period, when public officials were considered inefficient and ineffective, and 
the perceived problems were answered with the privatisation and marketisation 
of public services (Ascher, 1987). The critique of this era stated that it was 
concerned more with economic and cost cutting than with effective service 
provision and that it assumed the superiority of the private sector and private 
sector management techniques above those of the public sector and public 
administration (Metcalfe, 1989). This debate become most focused in the 1990s 
and was characterised as the New Public Management (Osborne et al., 2002). 
The approach criticised bureaucracy as the organising principle within public 
administration (Dunleavy, 1991); a concern was the ability of public administra-
tion to secure the economic, efficient and effective provision of public services 
(Hughes, 1997). The core of the NPM framework was hands-on and entrepre-
neurial management; standards and performance measures; disaggregation and 
decentralisation; competition; private sector styles of management; and the 
discipline and parsimony of resource allocation. Rather, the planning, manage-
ment and provision of the public services was seen as something to be 
negotiated between a number of actors, including government, the voluntary 
and community sector and the private sector (Osborne et al., 2002). In this 
model, the key task of government becomes the management of these complex 
networks of public service provision (Rhodes, 1996; Kickert et al., 1997). 
ʻSteering rather than rowing’ become the famous stereotype for this process. 
The new public management agenda has challenged the traditional public 
administration model understood as a Weberian ideal of bureaucracy, where, 
according to Jørgensen (2010), some of the fundamental principles of traditional 
public administration found that governments should organise themselves 
according to the hierarchical principles based on strict predefined procedures. 
According to Hood (1991), the classic formulation of NPM holds that it 
comprises eight doctrines: 
(1) a focus on hands-on and entrepreneurial management, as opposed to the 
traditional bureaucratic focus of public administration (Clarke et al., 
1993); 
(2) explicit standards and measures of performance (Osborne et al., 1995); 
(3) an emphasis on output controls (Boyne, 1999); 
(4) the importance of the disaggregation and decentralisation of public 
services (Pollitt et al., 1998); 
(5) a shift to the promotion of competition in the provision of public 
services (Walsh, 1995); 
(6) a stress on private sector styles of management and their superiority 
(Willcocks and Harrow, 1992); 
(7) the promotion of discipline and parsimony in resource allocation 
(Metcalfe et al., 1990); 
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(8) separation of political decision-making from the direct management of 
public services (Stewart, 1996). 
 
By now, most of OECD countries have been actively reforming their public 
sectors for two decades. Initially the problem seemed to be a relatively 
straightforward one of improving efficiency, reforming management practices, 
and divesting public involvement in commercial enterprises. While more 
efficient government is certainly desirable, efficiency alone is not a guarantee of 
better government. A concern for efficiency is being supplanted by problems of 
governance, strategy, risk management, ability to adopt change, collaborative 
action and the need to understand the impact of policies on society (OECD, 
2003a). Moreover, the ʻreinventing government’ movement of the 1990s was 
supposed to slingshot the public sector into the twenty-first century. However, 
that movement focused mostly on reforming individual bureaus and agencies. 
Some limbs of the government become lithe and supple. Others started pushing 
for results, rather than simply trying to beef up their budgets. Ultimately, 
government as a whole remained creaky, old-fashioned, and disconnected. 
“Even reformed bureaus do not always play well with others,” states Eggers 
(2005: 2). Government made very little progress at working better, smarter, and 
more efficient across agencies and levels of government, despite the fact that 
almost everything government does today involves multiple agencies, multiple 
levels of government, and the business sector and civil society.10 As is noted by 
Stauffacher (2002), there have been many labels, for example ʻreinvention’, 
ʻredesign’, ʻpublic sector reform’, ʻthe new public sector management’, and 
ʻmanagerialism’, nevertheless, whatever the label, a process of profound public 
sector restructuring is sweeping the developed world. 
According to Dunleavy et al. (2005), although its effects are still working 
through in countries new to New Public Management (NPM), this wave has 
now largely stalled or been reversed in some ʻleading edge’ countries. This 
ebbing away chiefly reflects the cumulation of adverse indirect effects on 
citizens’ capacities for solving social problems, and because NPM has radically 
increased institutional and policy complexity. The character of the post-NPM 
regime is currently being formed. The present status of different directions of 




                                                                          
10  In the United States, 90 cents of every federal dollar goes to either individuals in the 
form of entitlements or to state and local governments and private or non-profit contractors 
as grants and contracts. See Kettl (2000). 
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Table 1.4 The key components of NPM and their current status (in ʻleading edge’ 
countries) 
Theme Component Current 
status 
Disaggregation Purchaser-provider separation X 
Agencification X 
Decoupling policy systems X 
Growth of quasi-government agencies X 
Separation out of micro-local agencies X 
Chunking up privatised industries X 




Competition by comparison ~ 
Improved performance measurement √ 
League tables of agency performance √ 
Competition Quasi-markets X 
Voucher schemes X 
Outsourcing ~ 
Compulsory market testing ~ 
Intra-government contracting ~ 
Public/private sectoral polarisation ~ 
Product market liberalisation ~ 
Deregulation ~ 
Consumer-tagged financing √ 
User control √ 
Incentivisation Re-specifying property rights X 
ʻLight touch’ regulation X 
Capital market involvement in projects X 
Privatising asset ownership ~ 
Anti-rent-seeking measures ~ 
De-privileging professions ~ 
Performance-related pay ~ 
PFI (private finance initiative) ~ 
Public-private partnership ~ 
Unified rate of return and discounting √ 
Development of charging technologies √ 
Valuing public sector equity √ 
Mandatory efficiency dividends √ 
Source: Dunleavy et al. (2005) 
Notes: (X) Trend has been wholly or partly reversed. In some cases the change has been linked to 
policy mistakes or disasters and has been rolled back. (~) Trend has substantially stalled. Even 
advocates no longer expect it to engender significant improvements in government effectiveness. 
(√) trend is still spreading and its usefulness has not been seriously questioned. 
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The overall movement towards the post-NPM incorporates the new shifts 
towards ʻdigital-era governance’ (DGE; see the next section), which might offer 
a unique opportunity to create self-sustaining change, in a broad range of 
closely connected technological, organisational, cultural and social effects 
(Dunleavy et al., 2005). 
Early post-NPM advancement ideas can also be found from the U.S. 
Department of Labour report (1996) ʻWorking Together for Public Services: 
Report of the U.S. Secretary of Labour’s Task Force on Excellence in State and 
Local Government Through Labour-Management Cooperation.’ The report 
states that there is clearly need for a change from more traditional ways of 
planning and delivering services and the traditional roles of labour and 
management. Indeed, the NPM movement led governments to secure the 
economic, efficient and effective provision of public services, as well as hands-
on and private sector styles entrepreneurial management together with per-
formance measures. Due to that, governments moved closer to private sector 
also in terms of innovativeness. However, innovative activities in government 
remained chaotic; improvements were focused more on cost cutting than well-
targeted investments into quality improvements, system improvements and 
citizen centric services. 
During the last decade or so, public sector innovation has been in many ways 
led by the e-government phenomenon. In the beginning it was more infra-
structure-driven and government-centric development (see figure 1.4), but as 
time went by it become more user-centric. This means that networking and user 
participation becomes more important, as well as systems more complex yet 
standardised. More recently, according to the OECD (2010), there have been the 
following drivers for this kind of e-innovations: financial, economic and social 
crisis; economic recovery and fiscal sustainability, strengthening core values in 
the public sector (efficiency, fairness, equity); ICT as an enabler and driver for 
public sector and service innovation; and strong political and managerial 
leadership – achieving long-term sustainability. Another perspective to look at 
value of this e-led transformation is maximised efficiency and effectiveness, 
achieved coherent and transparent government, and strengthened trust in 
government through integrity, transparency, accountability, responsiveness and 
inclusiveness. From the user perspective, this has led to the simplification of 
service organisation, service integration, cultural harmonisation among service 





Figure 1.4 E-Government-driven innovation (OECD, 2010) 
 
Therefore, technological advancements, especially ICT and the Internet have 
led to the rise of digital-era and networked governance. However, the challenge 
for today’s governments comes from their struggle to use twentieth-century 
tools to cope with twenty-first-century problems with nineteenth-century gover-
nance structures. According to Kettl (2001), people have pursued good manage-
ment through authority and hierarchy for a century, and when new challenges 
emerged, they responded by reorganising and strengthening the bureaucracy. 
However, today’s problems tend not to fit into the bureaucratic orthodoxy. 
The digitalisation process of government is perhaps a once-in-the-lifetime 
opportunity to rethink how the public sector works, how it is managed, how it is 
built up, how clients and citizens see it, and how back-office functions are 
structured and run. Instead of electronic channels being seen as supplementary 
to conventional administrative and business processes, they become genuinely 
transformative, moving towards the situation where the agency ʻbecomes its 
website’. Therefore, creativity in rethinking the government should be encour-
aged in all levels. However, it is challenging to both political leaders, as well as 
agency managers to manage and run this type of by definition relatively chaotic, 
networked form of government. Moreover, authors (see Longford, 2002: 17) 
also stress that “e-government ʻboosters’ tend to overstate the transformative 
capacity of information technology and to underestimate the numerous obsta-
cles to enhancing the quality and participatory nature of democracy, including 
endemic structural features of the political system, entrenched habits of 
government secrecy and hostility to access to information laws, the effects of 
neo-liberal public policy and public sector restructuring, and the recalcitrant, 
multiple inequalities cross-cutting the social fabric of a particular country.” 
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According to Goldsmith et al. (2004), the bureaucratic government can be 
upgraded by introducing so-called ʻnetworked government’. Thanks to a variety 
of factors, including advances in technology and the broader changes in the 
economy and society that favour networked forms of organisation, today’s 
networked government (see figure 1.5) trend is both greater in breadth and 
different in kind than anything seen previously. The author emphasises that the 
main elements or characteristics of network management are the following: big-
picture thinking; coaching; mediation; negotiation; risk analysis; contract 
management; ability to tackle unconventional problems; strategic thinking; 




Figure 1.5 Models of government (Goldsmith et al., 2004) 
 
According to Sørensen and Torfing (2005), governance networks have become 
a necessary ingredient in the production of efficient public governance in our 
complex, fragmented and multi-layered societies and the big question has 
become the extent to which governance networks also contribute to democratic 
decision-making. They also claim that: “Governance networks that take active 
part in determining the content of public policy making have traditionally been 
regarded as a threat to democracy on the grounds that they undermine the 
sovereign position of elected politicians and the autonomy of civil society; 
however, the liberal democratic model of parliamentary democracy no longer 
provides an adequate understanding of what democracy is and how it can be 




























Governance by network presents the confluence of four influential trends 
that are altering the shape of public sectors worldwide (Goldsmith et al., 2004). 
(1) Third-party government: the decades-long increase in using private 
firms and non-profit organisations – as opposed to government 
employees – to deliver services and fulfil policy goals. 
(2) Joined-up government: the increasing tendency for multiple govern-
ment agencies, sometimes even at multiple levels of government, to join 
together to provide integrated services. 
(3) The digital revolution: the recent technological advances that enable 
organisations to collaborate in real time with external partners in ways 
previously not possible. 
(4) Consumer demand: increased citizen demand for more control over 
their government services, to match the customised service provision 
technology has spawned in the private sector. 
 
Governing by network represents the synthesis of these four trends, combining 
the high level of public-private collaboration characteristics of third-party 
government with the robust network management capabilities of joined-up 
government, and then using technology to connect the network together and 
give citizens more choices in service delivery options. Michael E. Porter (2004) 
has pointed out that government alone cannot address society’s most pressing 
challenges. Instead, new kinds of collaborations are needed, with the private 
sector and social enterprises playing central role. There is currently an ongoing 
process of rewriting the roles of public management. 
Moreover, as government relies more and more on third parties to deliver 
services, its performance depends ever more on its ability to manage partner-
ships and to hold its partners accountable (Kettl, 2002), however, as stated by 
Donahue (1990), governing by network is hard – there are countless ways it can 
go wrong. One large obstacle is that government’s organisational, management, 
and personnel systems were designed to operate within a hierarchical, not a 
networked, model of government, and the two approaches often clash. 
An opportunity to overcome this clash might be to take a client viewpoint. 
Therefore, the voice of the client or consumer point of view, according to Pollitt 
et al. (1995), has been gradually given an organisational home with the system, 
sometimes also called citizen/customer centrist reforms. In this respect, the 
public sector has taken a more responsive form in order to cope with the 
external environment. As the OECD has argued, coping with ʻresponsiveness’ 
will require a new administrative style public management (OECD, 2005). 
According to Jørgensen (2010), this implies that the public sector to a larger 
degree has started to deal with outside groups to improve responsiveness, which 
was not the case in the traditional administrative model. The new approach 
allows and requires interaction with other groups both to obtain better results 
and enhance accountability, but also for wider engagement and ownership 
building. This can be done by introducing customer surveys, focus groups, and 
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foresight-type of thinking, new ways of gathering information on the users 
exist, which at the same time also allow the processes to be run directly by 
administrators, etc. 
According to the OECD, the dynamic way of getting citizens/customers of 
public services involved in order to enhance their perceptions, expectations and 
commitment through active participation has been a common strategy to obtain 
a legitimate level of quality and satisfaction of public services (see OECD, 
2001a). Thus, where the traditional relationships were bureaucratic and hier-
archical the new relationships are instead more pluralistic (Peters and Savoie, 
2000). This changing role of citizens/customers of public service has an impact 
on whole of the policy and management cycle. Traditionally, the policy and 
management cycle is dominated and controlled by politicians and adminis-
trators. However, as is illustrated also in figure 1.6, citizens/customers are more 
and more involved in this policy and management cycle at different stages 
(design, decision, implementation and monitoring, and evaluation). Citizens/ 
customers become co-designers, co-deciders, co-producers and co-evaluators 
(Dooren et al., 2004). This continued consultancy is defined by the OECD as a 
two-way relationship in which government talks to citizens and citizens provide 
feedback to government (OECD, 2001a). 
 
 
Figure 1.6 Active involvement of citizen/customer (Dooren et al., 2004) 
 
Maintaining an open, learning policy system in a society or a world of 
enormous diversity requires techniques that are engaging; efficient in their use 
of citizens’ limited time and varied expertise; and able to handle complex, 
multilayered problems (Redburn, and Buss, 2004). Governments are using 
73 
different tools to seek feedback on policy issues (e.g. opinion polls and surveys) 
or on draft policies and laws (e.g. comments and notice periods) from a broad 
range of citizens. They may also use tools of consultancy providing greater 
levels of interaction with smaller groups of citizens (e.g. public hearings, focus 
groups, citizen panels, workshops). Enabling citizens in policy deliberation and 
active participation requires specific tools to facilitate learning, debate and 
drafting of concrete proposals (e.g. citizen’s forums, consensus conferences, 
citizens’ juries) (OECD, 2001c). Moreover, technology has also created 
different opportunities for this, i.e. e-democracy solutions, making a dialogue 
between government and its citizens simultaneous and seamless. 
Therefore, the ability of a government organisation to solve controversial 
and complex problems depends both on its willingness to involve the public and 
on its ability to conduct a public participation process. While willingness to 
involve citizens may flow largely from local political conditions and climates, 
the skills necessary to conduct effective public participation process may be 
purposefully – and relatively easily – developed. Principal among these skills 
are leadership, facilitation, problem solving, and conflict management (Parr and 
Lampe, 1996). The type of leadership needed for effective collaboration – as 
distinct from charismatic or hierarchical leadership – requires competence 
across organisations, agencies, sectors, and sometimes cultures. In other words, 
successful collaborators must be able to convene people from very different 
backgrounds and help them work towards results despite their divergent values 
(Chrislip et al., 1994). 
The relative openness of governing institutions to citizen involvement may 
be located along a three-stage continuum, with each stage defined by a set of 
conditions, characteristic, and elements, as summarised in table 1.5. 
Therefore, as public organisations must deal with multiple stakeholders and 
potentially conflicting demands, stakeholder expectation management is 
perhaps one of the largest challenges for public sector leaders. In this respect, a 
stakeholder definition should be wider than coined by Freeman (1984: 46) – 
“Any group or individual, who can affect or is affected by the achievement of 
the organisation’s objective.” In the public sector a stakeholder can be anybody 
who might have something to say about the activities, performance or any 
aspect of the organisation. These, sometimes irrational expectations and public 
statements (amplified often by media) can recognise, but more often punish 
(sometimes unfairly) both public organisations and their managements. 
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One strong political party 
philosophy 




Weak or insecure 
leadership 
Leadership struggles Open and shared 
leadership 
Secretive bureaucracy Self-centred bureaucracy Progressive, quality-
oriented bureaucracy 
Influential, fractious special 
interest groups 
Alliances of interests Community cooperation 
Powerful, intrusive media Not fully competent media Competent, involved 
media 
Unorganised citizens Some citizen groups, but 
little coherence 
Active, effective citizen 
groups 
Poor information systems Lax information systems Freely collected and shared 
information 
Strong, inflexible unions Little or no labour 
organisations 
Strong, cooperative unions 
Source: Bens (1994). 
 
Finally, as Sørensen and Torfing have long studied governance networks (see: 
2005, 2010, 2011) they claim that there are three generations of governance 
network research. The first generation emphasised the contribution of networks 
to effective policy-making (Provan and Milward, 1995; Rhodes, 1997; Scharpf, 
1999). Governance networks facilitate the exchange and pooling of resources, 
coordination of policy initiatives and development of joint policy solutions. The 
second generation of research has focused on the role of governance networks 
for democratising public policy making by enhancing empowered participation, 
democratic deliberation and democratic ownership (Benz and Papadopoulos, 
2006; Klijn and Skelcher, 2007; Warren, 2009). Although governance networks 
sometimes suffer from illegitimate exclusions and a lack of accountability, they 
may help to enhance the input and output legitimacy of public governance. A 
new third generation of research is currently emerging. According to Sørensen 
and Torfing (2010), it aims to investigate the innovative capacities of gover-
nance networks and explore when, how and why governance networks can 
contribute to innovation in the public sector (Hartley, 2005; Considine et al., 
2009; Eggers and Singh, 2009). 
This literature review sub-chapter analysed the broad spectrum of moderni-
sation waves in the public sector often not directly covered by the innovation 
literature. It showed that reform in government is a continued and relatively 
natural process, helping governments to keep up with society and to face local, 
regional and global challenges. An important aspect is speed, quality and impact 
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of needed change, which can be sometimes linked to adoption of new solutions 
and technologies that requires knowing up-to-date modern trends, as well as 
being well networked and ready to learn and risk. 
However, even if change and continued self-reform and learning is part of 
some public administrations, one should know more precisely (with empirical 
proof) what are the factors supporting and hampering this innovation process in 
government to be spread more widely. Moreover, different reform initiatives are 
too much ʻagency-focused’ and lacking the overall picture of how really to 
deliver significantly better performance at significantly lower costs. More 
radical and systemic changes are needed for that and it should be better 
understood how the innovation system(s) in the public sector work. As stated by 
Harris et al. (2009: 15) “Radical new approaches require radical new actors. We 
need to combine the ingenuity and initiative of a diverse group of innovators – 
from the public sector, private companies and third sector, alongside users and 
communities (who are already at the forefront; p. 4) – to find new solutions to 
pressing economic and social problems.” 
 
 
1.5. Summary and considerations 
This chapter brought together some key contributions of relatively fragmented 
and young literature of innovation in the public sector, relying partly on 
decades-long knowledge of innovation in the private sector, and partly on 
different modernisation and transformation waves of public bureaucracies. 
The chapter showed that despite many services and institutions remaining 
non-innovative in public administration the topic will become increasingly 
central in years to come. More informed and quality-demanding citizens, 
growing budgetary pressure, aging societies, environmental and energy issues, 
and global financial problems leave few alternatives for governments than to be 
creative, to use modern technologies and to innovate in policies, services as well 
as in governmental systems and networks. The chapter also showed that one 
should be careful in bringing decades-long knowledge and the theory of 
innovation developed from private sector studies directly to the public sector. 
However, it is still difficult to identify and isolate factors specific the public 
sector innovation process and it is not clear what the unique context and 
practice of innovation might be in the public sector. This proves the necessity 
for good and in many ways exploratory studies to find out the deepest roots of 
innovative behaviour in public sector organisations and to develop more 
structural understanding and institutionalising ways of innovation in the public 
sector. As the understanding of innovation in the public sector is very 
fragmented (the definition is diffuse), the perspectives where it should be 
studied should be well defined and narrow enough to draw meaningful, and 
only then generalizable, conclusions. 
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There are many typologies, characteristics and motivational factors of 
innovation in the public sector and its services, however, the relative importance 
of those is not much analysed and needs additional empirical exercises. It was 
also showed that through placing innovation at the heart of each policy area, the 
so-called third generation innovation policy has a unique opportunity to 
disseminate innovation-minded thinking across the government. In addition to 
that, international organisations together with technology development have 
boosted the phenomenon of policy learning, which happens not horizontally but 
often by disciplines – like technological, conceptual, institutional and policy 
approaches. On the other hand, the chapter showed that while studying the 
innovation phenomenon in governmental or other non-profit sectors, public 
entrepreneurship and the existence of certain key individuals is crucial to 
understand. To develop, motivate and retain these key people is especially 
crucial to secure innovativeness of government and non-profit sectors. In 
addition, literature suggests that innovation studies in the public sector should 
carefully follow the growing role of citizens and final consumers. 
The next chapter analyses the current stock of empirical studies on public 
sector innovativeness, as well as positioning the current research in this 
landscape. The analysis of public sector innovation through e-government will 
continue in sub-chapter 3.3. 
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2. EMPIRICAL BACKGROUND:  
EXISTING EMPIRICAL PUBLIC SECTOR 
INNOVATION STUDIES AND POSITIONING  
OF THE PRESENT RESEARCH 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse existing empirical works on innovation 
in the public sector. Together with the previous theoretical literature review 
chapter, these should give us a more comprehensive and structured view on how 
innovation in the public sector is theoretically understood and how much is 
known about the public sector innovation process in practice. 
The chapter is divided into three following sub-chapters. The first sub-
chapter analyses the landscape of existing empirical public sector innovation 
studies over time. The second sub-chapter positions the current research in the 
historical timeline of public sector innovation studies. The chapter ends with a 




2.1. Existing empirical public sector  
innovation studies 
With some exceptions, scientific knowledge in the area of innovation has been 
generally limited to the private sector. There is a lack of good empirical 
evidence about innovation by the public and service sectors. Moreover, there is 
no good or unified framework by which to analyse it. Indeed, authors 
increasingly stress that to be able to improve our knowledge and understanding 
of the rate and degree of innovation in the public sector, as well as its 
incentives, processes and impact, there is now an increasing awareness of the 
need for more systematic and comparable data on innovation in the public 
sector (Koch and Hauknes, 2005). Osborne and Brown (2005) also emphasise 
that the case for the innovative capacity of public organisations is under-
researched; the literature is full of normative assertions and/or pejorative 
arguments (as we also saw in previous sub-chapters), but little empirical work. 
While analysing the existing attempts to study innovation in public sector 
services, they concluded that all these studies provide good descriptions of the 
work undertaken in public organisations, however, there is a lack of any attempt 
to analyse innovation as a process itself (or to borrow from organisation studies 
literature, for an understanding of the nature of the phenomenon). These 
statements are also valid in the case of social innovations11 (see Mulgan et al., 
                                                                          
11  According to Nesta (2008), social innovations can take several forms. These include 
public sector innovation within public services, to improve performance or save money, and 
innovation in the non-profit or for-profit private sectors that improves public services or 
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2008). Mulgan et al. point out that there is surprisingly little known about social 
innovation compared to the vast amount of research into innovation in business 
and science. In their extensive survey, Mulgan et al. found no major datasets or 
long-term analyses, and few signs of interest from the large foundations or 
academic research funding bodies on this topic. The authors also argue that a 
lack of knowledge about social innovations impedes the many institutions 
interested in this field, including innovators themselves, philanthropists, foun-
dations and governments, and means that far too many rely on anecdotes and 
hunches. 
The present chapter reviews the few existing empirical and/or survey-based 
studies of innovation in the public and voluntary sector. Indeed, one should 
mention that some of the empirical studies were carried out after the present 
empirical research (e.g. after 2005; see table 2.2). There also exist different case 
study exercises made about the public sector innovation (see for example 
Thenint, 2010), however, due to the nature of the present research, these are not 
in the focus. 
Public sector innovation (research) has evolved over four stages, which 
although they overlap, represent distinctive steps forward (Bason, 2010; see 
table 2.1). The stages roughly follow the overall trajectory of public manage-
ment since the early 1970s, which Benington and Hartley (2001) have charac-
terised as ʻtraditional’, ʻnew public management’, and ʻnetworked government’. 
The first innovation study reviewed is ‘Determinants of Innovations in 
Organizations’ by Mohr (1969), which was an attempt to identify the 
determinants of innovation in public agencies, i.e. the degree to which they 
adopt and emphasise programmes that depart from traditional concerns. 
Innovation was suggested to be the function of an interaction between the 
motivation to innovate, the strength of obstacles against innovation, and the 
availability of resources for overcoming such obstacles. The study group for the 
research included all full-time local health departments in Illinois, Michigan, 
New York, Ohio, and Ontario (in the U.S.), serving a jurisdiction no greater 
than 600,000 in population, whose chief executive – the local health officer – 
had occupied his current position during the entire period of 1960–1964. This 
group comprised 94 agencies. The data were collected primarily by interviews 




                                                                                                                                                                                    
provides new ones. Social innovations from the third sector (voluntary and community 
groups, and social enterprises), may be ‘spun-in’ to mainstream public service provision. 
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Table 2.1 Evolution of public sector innovation research 
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Two other early public sector innovation studies were conducted by Walker 
(1969)12 and Gray (1973), so-called diffusion studies – The Diffusion of 
Innovations Among the American States and Innovation in the States: A 
Diffusion Study – respectively. Walker’s work (1969: 881) was according to his 
own words “primarily an exercise in theory building”. His aim was to develop 
propositions which might be used as guides to the study of the diffusion of 
innovations and which might also apply to budgeting and other forms of 
decision-making. The major questions investigated were: (1) why do some 
states act as pioneers by adopting new programmes more readily than others, 
and once innovations have been adopted by a few pioneers, (2) how do these 
new forms of service or regulation spread among the American states? The 
research was based on understanding that levels of expenditure alone are not an 
adequate measure of public policy outcomes. “Before we can evaluate the 
relative importance of structural and political factors as determinants of policy, 
we need to investigate decisions outside the budgetary process. In order to 
advance that object this study will focus on one of the most fundamental policy 
decisions of all: whether to initiate a programme in the first place,” he says (p. 
880). The author was studying the relative speed and the spatial patterns of 
adoption of new programmes, not their invention or creation. He wanted to 
explain why some states adopt innovations more readily than others, he 
assumed that the pioneering states gain their reputation because of the speed 
with which they accept new programmes. The study therefore devised an 
innovation score that represented the relative speed with which states adopt 
innovations. The innovation score was based on the analysis of 88 different 
programmes, which were enacted by at least twenty state legislatures prior to 
1965. New York, Massachusetts, California and New Jersey appeared to be the 
four fastest adopters of new programmes. Walter concluded that it is likely that 
the great cosmopolitan centres in the country, the places where most of the 
society’s creative resources are concentrated, would be the most adaptive and 
sympathetic to change, and thus the first to adopt new programmes. For further 
details, see Walker (1969). 
Gray (1973) continued Walker’s work, seeking to extend the investigation of 
innovation by states in a more rigorous fashion. The policy areas selected were 
education, welfare, and civil rights. As in Walker’s study, an innovation is more 
specifically defined as a law which is new to the state adopting it, i.e. it is 
equivalent to a single adoption. Using the database of laws (innovations) in the 
aforementioned three policy areas, the duration of the adoption process, and 
number of adopters, Gray considered three questions: (1) How do new ideas 
                                                                          
12  Walker lists the body of research on the diffusion of innovations from which he draws 
many insights, see for general reviews of this literature: Rogers (1962), Katz et al. (1963). 
For early attempts to study the American states from this perspective, see Davis (1930); 
McVoy (1940); and Sutherland (1950-51). See also Hagerstrand (1967) and Mason and 
Halter (1968). 
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diffuse or spread among the states? (2) Why are some states more innovative 
than others? (3) Are there identifiable patterns of innovation? An effort was 
made to determine if the same states were innovative in all three policy areas. 
In his early work ‘Incentives to Innovate in Public and Private Organi-
zations’, Roessner (1977) uses different perspectives of economic theory, 
organisational theory, public administration, and political science to explore the 
question whether public organisations are inherently less innovative than private 
organisations, and synthesises existing empirical evidence to test the predictions 
and explanations of the theory. Indeed, the empirical evidence in his article are 
mostly indirect. For example, “trends in employment in public and private 
sector may provide some indirect evidence for rates of innovation in the two 
sectors, because it has been argued that employment in state and local 
government in growing faster than total national employment at least partially 
because technological change in the labour-intensive public sector does not 
keep pace with change in the private sector” (p. 354). However, available data 
did not support this assertion. Similarly non-convincing results come out from 
alternative studies referred to, like Scherer (1970), who compared the relative 
performance of public and private organisations that provide the same or similar 
products or services (U.S. Postal Services, etc.). Or comparisons of rates of 
diffusion of technology and process innovations in public and private sectors as 
a determinant of rates of productivity increase, e.g. Mansfield (1968) for the 
private sector; Feller and Menzel (1976) for urban services; Russell and Burke 
(1975) for the hospital sector. According to the authors, the sketchy data 
reported did not add up to a firm conclusion other than there is no dramatic or 
obvious difference in innovativeness between public and private organisations. 
Roessner (1977) finalises that “the answer to the question whether there is 
anything intrinsic to public sector organisations that relegates them to lives less 
innovation than their private sector counterparts appears to be, theoretically, 
yes; empirically, maybe and maybe not” (p. 360). 
One of the next wave of public sector innovation-related studies was 
‘Managing the Innovation Capacity of Voluntary and Non-Profit Organisations 
(VNPOs) in the UK’ (see Osborne, 1996, 1998; Osborne and Flynn, 1997) and 
it explored the innovative capacity of voluntary and non-profit organisations in 
the field of personal social services (PSS). The authors developed a model for 
this capacity which draws explicitly on the management and organisation 
studies literature and which emphasises the significance of environmental and 
institutional factors in the release of this innovative capacity. Prior to the 
research, the author defined innovation as representing newness to the organi-
sation concerned; innovation is different from invention; innovation is both a 
process and an outcome; and innovation involves discontinues change. The 
approach was subsequently adapted to produce a typology of organisational 
change in the human services. The key point was to allow explanations of the 
relationships between the impact of a change upon the beneficiary group of a 
voluntary and non-profit organisation and upon the services that it provides. In 
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the first stage, the VNPO study was a postal census survey. It was intended to 
establish what the key actors within the VNPOs understood by innovation, to 
discover the extent of actual innovation activity, both in terms of these 
perceptions and in terms of a theoretically derived typology of innovation de-
scribed earlier, and to test out some basic organisational parameters, which 
might describe the innovative VNPOs. In total, 376 organisations were surveyed 
across the three localities, and 196 replied (52.1 per cent response rate). The 
second phase of the VNPO study was a case study research. The three cross-
sectional case studies, of innovative, developmental and traditional (ʻnon 
innovative’) VNPOs were subsequently established across the three research 
sites by use of the typology described above. Twenty-four organisations were 
involved. 
Based on the VNPO survey, the author estimated that just over one-third (38 
per cent) of the VNPOs surveyed had engaged in genuine innovative activity 
over the previous three years. When the organisational characteristics of the 
innovators were explored further, using discriminant analysis, important differ-
ences were uncovered between the innovative and the traditional organisations. 
The former were characterised by the presence of at least one member of paid 
staff, the receipt of government funding as the major source of their income, 
and by being much younger organisations (defined as under five years old) than 
their peers. In their research, the following eight key issues were raised for the 
managers of VNPOs to consider in the context of the innovative capacity of 
their organisations: 
(1) It is fundamentally wrong to perceive innovative capacity as an inherent 
characteristic of VNPOs; 
(2) For those VNPOs which are engaged in innovative activity, is to be 
clear about the type of innovation that they are pursuing and its 
management implications; 
(3) Rather more negative, this is to assume that the structural characteristics 
or internal environment of a VNPO will automatically give it an 
innovative capacity; 
(4) Similarly, it is incorrect to put store by the importance of individual 
action by itself to activate the innovative capacity of a VNPO; 
(5) For the managers of VNPOs to take a deliberate strategic approach to 
the relationships of their organisation to its environment – in terms of 
the local community, its key shareholders and the larger societal 
environment; 
(6) The sixth issue concerns the funding pattern of a VNPO and its impact 
upon its innovative capacity. The research found that the innovative 
organisations were significantly more likely to receive funding from a 
(local)government source than from voluntary or other income (like 
donations or fees); 
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(7) The seventh issue for the leaders of VNPOs is therefore to be aware 
fully of their environment and its impact upon their organisation and its 
innovative capacity; 
(8) The final issue is one which drives directly from the one above. This is 
that the managers of VNPOs should not see themselves as the passive 
ʻvictims’ of their organisational context. Rather, they need to be pro-
active in shaping it. 
 
The next contribution comes from Borins (2000a, 2001a, b, c, d, 2002), who has 
explored in a series of studies the contingent factors that impact upon the inno-
vative capacity of public sector organisations (PSOs). Based upon extensive 
quantitative analysis (in North America and across the Commonwealth 
countries) he argues that innovation is difficult to achieve in PSOs because the 
rewards for it are ʻmeagre’ whilst the consequences of unsuccessful innovation 
are ʻgrave’ (Borins, 2001a). He produces a set of five characteristics of 
successful innovations in PSOs, as well as seven principles to guide managers 
in developing innovation in them (see table 1.3). Borins (1998, 2000a) has used 
large samples of the best applications to the Ford Foundation-Kennedy School 
of Government/Harvard University (Ford-KSG) innovation awards – 217 semi-
finalist13 applications from 1990 to 1994 and 104 from 1995 to 1998 – to 
deduce the characteristics of successful public management innovations – to 
study the characteristics, process, and outcomes of public management inno-
vations. This involved coding open-ended questionnaires completed by the 
applicants and then producing qualitative results. In addition, he sent a ques-
tionnaire based on that used by the Ford-KSG awards to applicants to the 
Institute of Public Administration of Canada (IPAC) innovation awards from 
1990 to 1994, a competition open to public sector organisations in Canada. A 
similar questionnaire was sent to applicants to the Commonwealth Association 
of Public Administration and Management (CAPAM) innovation awards in 
1998 and 2000. This competition was open to public sector organisations 
throughout the Commonwealth (Borins, 2000b, 2001a). The IPAC and CAPAM 
questionnaires yielded a total of 116 responses (Borins, 2001c). Borins (2001c) 
claims that other studies of innovation in the public sector have relied on 
individual or small sample case studies, or small samples of innovations in a 
particular region or specific policy area. These use large samples, many regions 
of the world, and many policy areas. They are therefore representative of the 
best public management innovations. 
The questionnaires asked applicants what they thought was innovation in 
their programme. The most frequent characteristic, observed in approximately 
60 per cent of programmes, was ʻholism’, namely that the innovation depended 
                                                                          
13  Approximately 1,500 initial applications come in each year (the initial application form 
is not hard to complete and the organisers make strenuous efforts to encourage as many 
public sector innovators as possible to apply). 
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on inter-organisation cooperation, that it delivered multiple services to 
individuals, or that it took a systems approach to a problem. The following three 
most frequent responses, all observed in approximately 35 per cent of 
applications, were that the innovations involved process reengineering, that they 
applied information technology, and that they developed alternative service 
delivery mechanisms such as contracting out to the private sector or partnership 
with the voluntary sector. The fifth most frequent characteristic, encountered in 
25 per cent of the applications, was the empowerment of staff or citizens. Since 
some respondents gave multiple answers (as also for questions below), these 
numbers sum to more than 100 per cent (Borins, 2001c). A common denomi-
nator of all five of these characteristics of public sector innovation is that they 
look very much like private sector (Borins, 2001c). In a review article on 
private sector innovations, Kanter (1988) noted as a defining characteristic of 
innovation the crossing of organisational boundaries, requiring different units of 
a corporation, or different corporations, to cooperate. Process reengineering and 
the application of information technology are also important routes to private 
sector innovation. Alterative service delivery in the public sector corresponds to 
private sector outsourcing, undertaken to enable a firm to focus on its core 
mission. Finally, staff and citizen empowerment in the public sector corre-
sponds to staff and customer empowerment in the private sector (Borins, 
2001c). 
Who are the originators of public management innovations according to 
Borins’ research? Innovations in the public sector are traditionally viewed as 
coming from the top. However, the innovation awards examined told a different 
story. In all of them, approximately 50 per cent of the innovations originated 
from middle managers or frontline workers, 25 per cent from agency heads, 20 
per cent from politicians, 15 per cent from interest groups, and 10 per cent from 
individuals outside government (some respondents gave multiple answers, 
therefore there was more than 100 per cent in total). The reason might be that in 
both the private and public sector organisations, the lower and middle levels 
contain many younger people who are closer to the cutting edge thinking they 
encountered at university. Generally, this thinking is also common to the total 
quality management (TQM) movement, which believes that ensuring quality is 
the responsibility of everyone of the company, regardless of their position or 
level of formal education (Borins, 1998, 2000a, b, 2001a, c). 
What conditions lead to public sector innovations? The conditions/ 
challenges that lead to the innovations fell into five groups, which according to 
their importance were the following: 
(1) Internal problems (such as the inability to reach a target population, 
inability to meet demand for a programme, resource constraints, or an 
inability to coordinate policies), appearing in 50–60 per cent of the 
innovations in every sample; 
(2) Crisis, defined as a current or anticipated publicity visible failure or 
problem, also around 30 per cent of the innovations in every sample; 
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(3) Initiatives coming from the political system, also around 30 per cent of 
the innovations in every sample; 
(4) New opportunities, created either by technology or other factors, also 
around 30 per cent of the innovations in every sample; 
(5) New leadership appeared least frequently, in approximately 10 per cent 
of innovations. 
 
Borins (2001c) concluded that innovation awards have discovered many 
instances of individual innovations, disseminating them, and inspired many 
more. Indeed, the challenge for public sector organisations is to go beyond 
individual innovations to create a climate supportive of on-going innovation on 
a large scale. “Perhaps the efforts of persistent individual innovators, coupled 
with some important systemic changes, will create a new reality”, he says (p. 
319). 
The following study ʻSurvey of Electronic Commerce and Technology 2000’ 
was conducted by Statistics Canada (see Earl, 2002, 2004). As indicated earlier, 
when applying the Oslo Manual (OECD/Eurostat, 2005) methodology on 
measuring technological change to the Canadian public sector institutions, the 
authors discovered that the public sector was leading the private sector in 
technological change and it was supporting new technology acquisition. The 
study found that technology adoption levels in the public sector are very high; 
82 per cent of public sector organisations surveyed between 2000 and 2002 
bought or acquired new information technology, compared with just 42 per cent 
of private sector firms.14 
As part of efforts to promote public sector innovation, Bloch (2010) refers 
also to the Korean Government Innovation Index (GII).15 The GII, which was 
implemented over 2005 and 2006, seeks to measure government innovation 
efforts, develop a tool for autonomous diagnosis and improvement of inno-
vation capabilities at each institution, and to benchmark government insti-
tutions. The GII is a web-based tool, where organisations can enter their own 
innovation data, and then the tool conducts a series of diagnostic analyses based 
on the organisations data and a previously collected set of data that is used as a 
comparison standard. The GII consists of a survey covering four areas of 
organisational capability (innovation leadership, vision and strategy, personnel 
capability and systemisation of management), the degree of adoption and 
implementation of pre-specified management systems and other programmes, 
and barriers to innovation. 
                                                                          
14  Indeed, when larger organisations of the same size (with more than 500 employees) were 
compared, there was little difference in the rates of technology adoption between the private 
and public sectors. 
15  This short description of the Korean GII is based on PowerPoint presentations by the 
Korean Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs (2005) and Yoon (2006). 
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Another contribution from the same period comes from the Norwegian 
NIFU STEP Institute, an EU Fifth Framework Programme Project on 
innovation in the public sector called Publin (coordinated by Per Koch). Publin 
has studied policy learning and technical and administrative innovation in the 
public sector, and tried to get a better understanding of behavioural changes, 
learning processes and the implementation of new or improved technologies in 
public organisations. The study covers innovation in policy-making organi-
sations, regulatory agencies and public enterprises, and takes into consideration 
the influence cultural traits, politics, management, networks and co-operation, 
entrepreneurship and evaluations have on innovation. The Publin contractors 
published a series of analyses and reports (see Koch et al., 2005, 2006; 
Halvorsen et al., 2005; Maroto et al., 2005; Kemp and Weehuizen, 2004; Røste, 
2005; Vigoda-Gadot et al., 2005; Malikova et al., 2005; Cunningham, 2005). 
The reports and analyses focused on the structure and size of public sector in 
Europe; on differences between the public and the private sector; on policy 
learning; on existing studies and the theoretical framework of innovation in the 
public sector; on innovation in the social sector; and on innovation in the health 
sector. As a result, two reports, a non-academic and an academic were produced 
(see Koch et al., 2005, 2006). The project also makes eleven national case 
studies on different public sector projects across Europe. The Publin public 
consortium includes ten European academic institutions/research centres. 
The empirical side of the Publin project recognises three sets of antecedents: 
informational, organisational, and top management dimensions (Vigoda-Gadot 
et al., 2005). The information dimension was divided into narrower areas of 
information management, information generation, information dissemination, 
and responsiveness to information. The organisational dimension consisted 
internal communication, organisational structure, internal politics, and 
employees’ participation in decision-making. The top management dimension 
was characterised as the management’s attitude towards change, top manage-
ment emphasis on and support for innovation, and top management vision (as a 
future, positive image of the organisation). Definitions and components of 
innovation included (a) creativity, (b) risk-taking, (c) organisational openness to 
change, (d) future orientation, (e) pro-activeness, (f) and organisational and 
policy learning. 
Samples were collected in all nine countries participating in the Publin 
project, with a goal of at least 100 respondents from each country for the 
manager/employee survey, and at least 50 for the end-user survey. Each 
country’s research team chose which sector of the public sector – health or 
social services – to sample for the manager/employee survey. The quantitative 
part of the survey focused on 163 in-depth interviews with public sector 
managers and frontline employees from all nine participating countries (on 
average 18 per country). The study used organisational theory, public adminis-
tration and management theory, and innovation theory as the theoretical frame-
work for analysis. Interviews were conducted in the countries’ original 
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languages. From the quantitative side, all scales employed in the survey used 1–
5 Likert scales where 1=definitely disagree and 5=definitely agree. 
The manager/employee survey questions were about: (a) antecedents: infor-
mation generation, information dissemination, responsiveness, internal politics, 
connectedness, and centralisation; (b) outcomes: innovations’ performance and 
overall performance, commitment, and work satisfaction; (c) innovativeness: 
organisational openness to change, risk-taking, future orientation, pro-
activeness, and innovativeness; and (d) learning organisation: innovation, 
learning orientation, and learning. 
End-user survey questions were about: (a) antecedents: connectedness, 
employee professionalism, ethics and morality, internal politics, promoters of 
innovation, public sector leadership/vision, and responsiveness; (b) outcomes: 
image, satisfaction from services, and trust in institutions; (c) innovativeness: 
innovation, and innovativeness; and (d) organisational characteristics: main 
function, aim of influence, and innovativeness. 
As part of the main conclusions, Publin mapped different types of barriers 
and drivers for innovations, i.e. social phenomena that hinder or encourage 
innovation activities in such institutions (see Koch et al., 2005). The main 
innovation barriers (based mainly on open-ended questions during the in-depth 
interviews) identified were the following: 
 Size and complexity (the public sector comprises extremely complex and 
large-scale organisational entities that may develop internal barriers to 
innovation); 
 Heritage and legacy (public sector organisations are prone entrenched 
practices and procedures); 
 Professional resistance (there are professional groupings with their own 
communities of practice, belief systems and perspectives); 
 Risk aversion (public organisations are under the close scrutiny of both 
politicians and the media, and employees are normally rewarded for 
taking risks); 
 Need for consultation and unclear outcomes (the large range of 
stakeholders involvement generates a strong requirement to consult and 
review any planned changes); 
 Pace and scale of change (there have been so many reforms that 
employees are becoming ʻinnovation fatigued’); 
 Absence of capacity for organisational learning (there may be a lack of 
structures or mechanisms for the enhancement of organisational 
learning); 
 Public resistance to change (elements of the public might be risk-averse); 
 Absence of resources (there may be a lack of financial support or 
shortages of relevant skills or other support services); 
 Technical barriers (there may be a lack of technological solutions to the 
problem at hand). 
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Vigoda-Gadot et al. (2005) specify that barriers to innovation in the public 
sector are predominantly internal to the organisation. The findings show that 
interviewees perceive barriers to innovation as deriving from the public 
service’s leadership and management (i.e. budget cuts or poor allocation of 
budget funds, and poor leadership). Additional obstacles are the traditional 
regulations and work routines, employee resistance, internal and external 
politics, poor learning environment, and end users’ resistance. Controversially, 
in private sector services, at a broad level, surveys tend to show that the external 
conditioning factors are seen as more significant barriers to firm innovation than 
internal barriers (see Howells and Tether, 2004). 
As technology innovation is often driven by suppliers (vehicles, devices, 
telecommunications) as found by Vigoda-Gadot et al. (2005), it might also lead 
towards larger technological risks. Indeed, public health systems studied in the 
same Publin project (see Koch and Haukens, 2005) appear to share a number of 
common features which could act in a way to hinder or prevent the process of 
innovation. Although a number of categories were identified, they were rarely 
mutually exclusive and one barrier may be the cause or effect of one or several 
others in a complex interplay. This may lead to (also technological) risk 
aversion with an understandable inherent resistance (which is particularly strong 
in the medical professions) to undertake or implement changes which may 
result in an increased probability of risk (to the patients in their care or to the 
other recipients of their services). 
The main innovation drivers (based mainly on open-ended questions during 
the in-depth interviews) identified were the following: 
 Problem-oriented drivers (people innovate in order to solve certain 
problems); 
 Non-problem oriented drivers (innovation may improve on the former 
situation); 
 Political push (strategic change frequently requires strong, top-down 
political will); 
 Growth of the culture of review (assessment practices may simulate 
innovation); 
 Support mechanism for innovation (authorities may implement policy 
measures aimed at funding and encouraging innovation); 
 Capacity for innovation (public employees have often high levels of 
professional expertise, creativity and problem solving); 
 Competitive drivers (performance targets may encourage the use of 
innovative approaches); 
 Technological factors (technological innovation can be a strong 
determinant for subsequent innovation); 
 NGOs and private companies (models developed by NGOs and private 
companies may be adopted by public institutions). 
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In addition, Vigoda-Gadot et al. (2005) found that all of the participants could 
be initiators of innovation in the public sector. However, managers and frontline 
employees are the primary initiators of innovation, followed by employees, 
other organisational personnel and professionals, government and politicians, 
end-users and external organisations. While the majority of innovations in the 
public sector are top-down and policy-driven, findings show that interviewees 
generally see the organisation’s management or political parties rather than 
external organisations or the EU as the initiators of new approaches. Indeed, 
facilitators of innovation are predominantly internal, organisational forces that 
include the leadership and management, cultures open to change, supportive 
personnel and proper funding. External facilitators include the EU, the 
legislature, or national initiatives, as well as information, learning, and net-
working. 
The Publin study also stresses the importance of learning for innovation. 
Public institutions ought to develop in-house learning strategies needed to find, 
understand and make use of competences developed elsewhere. Public 
organisations should develop inter- and intra-organisational networking; they 
should develop and use indicators for innovation and organisational perfor-
mance. Organisations, and especially coordinators higher up in the public 
hierarchy, may benefit from developing systematic plans for evaluation of 
organisations as well as policy strategies. The authors also stress the importance 
of policy learning, the need for development of appropriate belief systems and 
entrepreneurship, the need to convince stakeholders of the potential and actual 
benefits arising from innovation (to minimise risk aversion), that the 
innovations should have clear and sensible objectives, that policy makers should 
design structures and systems to promote, simulate and disseminate innovation 
in the public sector and between the public, private and third sector, and finally, 
that policy makers should develop proper methods of measuring innovative 
activity. From the EU perspective, the Commission should contribute to the 
development of a broad-based ʻthird generation’ innovation policy that also 
encompasses the public sector. Such a policy should encourage policymakers to 
move beyond the technological perspective of innovation and promote the 
concept of organisational, process and conceptual innovation (see Koch et al., 
2005, 2006). 
Finally, the majority of the interviewees reported differences between 
innovation in the public and in the private sectors (see Vigoda-Gadot et al., 
2005). A few indicated that they were not knowledgeable or familiar enough 
with the private sector. However, most surprising, some interviewees claimed 
that there were no differences between innovation in the public and the private 
sectors. Similarities in innovation between both sectors included the need for 
budget allocation and market orientation. 
There are also a few more recent public sector innovations studies available 
about the UK central and local governments (as also reviewed by Bloch, 2010). 
The UK National Audit Office has studied innovation in central government 
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twice: ‘Achieving Innovation in Central Government Organizations’ (2006) and 
‘Innovation Across Central Government’ (2009). The reports are based on a 
survey of innovation in central government departments, executive agencies and 
non-departmental public bodies; however, they differ in terms of focus and 
content. 
The 2006 survey was the first of these independent assessments of inno-
vation in central government (prepared by the Public Policy Group of the 
London School of Economics) and it asked for nominations of innovations and 
each questionnaire focused on a single innovation. The survey in particular 
deals with the driving forces behind the innovation, both internal and external, 
potential positive and negative impacts of the innovation, and barriers to 
achieving innovation. The final report draws on evidence from 125 specific 
cases (returned by 85 central departments and agencies) to assess the progress to 
date in developing innovative solutions to improving government productivity 
and effectiveness. The survey was combined with an extensive programme of 
interviews with civil servants across Whitehall and with outside stakeholders 
and experts; a set of focus group discussions of survey results with different 
kinds of public and private sector stakeholders; and some brief comparator 
studies of innovation in overseas governments, local authorities and private 
companies. Then the National Audit Office inspected government innovations 
in 2009, they found in particular, that central government organisations needed 
to improve their understanding about where the potential for innovation lies, 
increase the incentives for individuals to innovate, strengthen their ability to 
learn from one another and improve the pace at which innovations are 
implemented (see National Audit Office 2009). The purpose of the 2009 survey 
(data from 2008) in contrast to the 2006 report was the public sector 
organisation as a whole (Bloch, 2010). The fieldwork consisted of a literature 
review, survey of central government organisations, eleven case example 
interviews, online discussion forums, semi-structured interviews, and analysis 
of secondary data. The survey inquires about organisations’ own conceptuali-
sation of innovation, and how the organisation innovates, including culture and 
capabilities, risk management, drivers, incentives and barriers that can impact 
upon their innovative capability. 
The UK Audit Commission has also conducted a survey of innovation 
among local authorities in England – ‘Seeing the Light: Innovation in Local 
Public Services’ (Audit Commission, 2007). The study covers attitudes to 
innovation, the role of organisational structure and staff, barriers and enabling 
conditions, and learning activities. It also highlights a number of specific 
examples of innovations in local government. The survey of all local councils 
and fire authorities, conducted in 2006, found that 43 per cent of respondents 
reported that ‘a great deal’ of innovation was taking place in their organisation, 
and a slightly higher proportion (52 per cent) were of the view that ‘some’ 
innovation was taking place. Only 2 per cent of respondents said that there was 
hardly any innovation taking place within their organisation. In addition, ten 
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case studies were conducted that covered a range of activities including: 
community engagement and planning, delivering shared services, e-enabled 
service provision, and democratic renewal. 
The UK Department of Health and NHS have initiated a project (Ayling et 
al., 2009) to measure and value innovation in the NHS. The project seeks to 
develop indicators of innovation at the three stages of the innovation process 
(ideas, growth, diffusion) and indicators of innovation culture. Data on these 
indicators will be collected from health institutions and benchmarked against 
targets for the generation and subsequent development of new ideas, and their 
adoption and dissemination. 
The UK Centre for the Measurement of Government Activities (UKCeMGA), 
under the ONS, was established to implement the recommendations of the 
Atkinson Review, an independent review of the future development of 
government output and productivity (Atkinson, 2005). Both the review and 
subsequent work by UKCeMGA reflect an increased governmental and public 
interest in measures of public sector performance. In addition to a general 
framework and principles, the intention is to focus on practical solutions for 
measuring the key functional areas of health, education, public order and safety 
and social protection. This work has made considerable progress in developing 
aggregate measures of public sector output within these key sectors. However, 
at the same time this work reveals the complexity of measuring economic and 
social outcomes of public services. 
From the international organisations’ side, OECD Education has initiated a 
project (OECD, 2009) on the measurement of innovation in education. The 
group has established a forum for investigating relevant work in this area and 
discussing key questions on how to measure innovation in education and 
benefits and limitations of different approaches. The OECD is currently 
working on a project on a set of indicators (Government at a Glance) to measure 
six stages of government activities (revenues, inputs, public sector processes, 
outputs, outcomes, antecedents) (OECD, 2007). The working and technical 
papers of this project provide a broad overview of the use of quantitative indi-
cators, along with some key issues. In general, the work by Government at a 
Glance does not deal with public sector innovation explicitly, though 
knowledge of output and other measures of government activity is very relevant 
for innovation measurement (Bloch, 2010). 
The largest exercise to measure innovation in the public sector is the project 
called MEPIN – ʻMeasuring Innovation in the Public Sector in the Nordic 
Countries: Toward a Common Statistical Approach’ (ʻCopenhagen manual’). 
MEPIN was initiated by the Danish Ministry of Science, Technology and 
Innovation, and includes a consortium of research and statistics institutions 
from the Nordic countries. Furthermore, the project was co-financed by Nordisk 
Innovations Center (NIC) and the project was lead by DAMVAD, a Danish-
based research and consulting company. The purpose of the project was to 
develop a measurement framework for collecting internationally comparable 
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data on innovation in the public sector, which both would contribute to our 
understanding of what public sector innovation is and how public sector 
organisations innovate and would develop metrics for use in promoting public 
sector innovation (see the report: Bloch, 2011). The work was inspired from the 
understanding that efforts to understand better and to promote public sector 
innovation are greatly hindered by a great lack of quantitative evidence. “There 
is a pressing need for a common conceptual framework of public innovation and 
guidelines for collecting internationally comparable data covering the main 
dimensions of public sector innovation,” the project authors stressed on their 
project website (Pepin, 2009: front page). 
The first phase of the MEPIN project is documented through six papers and 
based on this work, a pilot study was conducted among public sector 
organisations in Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden between May 
and October 2010. The questionnaire type varied from an electronic version in 
Iceland, Norway and Sweden, and postal survey in Denmark and Finland. The 
results of the pilot studies and an assessment of the methodologies used are 
presented in ‘Report on the Nordic Pilot Studies – Analyses of Methodology 
and Results’ (see Bugge et al., 2011). A common Nordic questionnaire, which 
was developed, was inspired from the Community Innovation Survey 
questionnaire based on the Oslo Manual (OECD/Eurostat, 2005), covering the 
following topics dealing with innovation in public sector organisations: 
innovations, innovation activities and expenditures, the objectives of inno-
vations, information channels for innovation activities, innovation cooperation, 
external funding for innovation, innovative procurement practices, driving 
forces of innovation, innovation strategy, management and competences, and 
barriers to innovation. The statistical unit of the population was defined using 
the KAU-concept16 (Kind-of-Activity-Unit) and the distinction was made 
between units administrating services and units producing services (direct 
providers). The total sample of the Nordic pilot survey was 363 units and the 
response rate varied between 42 per cent in Denmark and 77.6 per cent in 
Iceland. Although the survey measured separately product innovation, process 
innovation, organisational innovation and communication innovation, when 
looking at overall innovation, shares were very similar across countries: 78 per 
cent for Sweden and Finland, 83 per cent for Norway, 86 per cent for Denmark, 
and 88 per cent for Iceland. 
Finally, the UK National Endowment for Science, Technology and the Arts 
(NESTA) has conducted a pilot survey for measuring innovation across the 
public sector (see Hughes et al., 2011). They developed and tested their survey-
based index approach during the summer and autumn of 2010, across two parts 
of the public sector: the NHS and local government. The project developed and 
                                                                          
16  KAU (see the Oslo Manual §237) is defined as “An enterprise or part of an enterprise 
which engages in one kind of economic activity without being restricted to the geographical 
area in which that activity is carried out”. 
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piloted a survey-based approach to measuring innovation in the public sector, 
with participation based on a voluntary, or self-selected, approach. The survey 
looked at organisations through four lenses: (1) innovation activity – describing 
the pipelines of ideas flowing through an organisation and the effectiveness of 
the key associated innovation activities in areas such as accessing, selecting, 
implementing and diffusing ideas, (2) innovation capability – describing key 
underpinning capabilities like management of innovation, leadership and culture 
and organisational enablers of innovation, (3) impact on performance – 
describing the impact of innovation activity on outcomes and service and 
efficiency measures, and (4) wider sector conditions – describing how the 
system in which an organisation operates helps or hinders innovation. Before 
the survey, the project compared the frameworks, findings and NESTA ob-
servations of four Innovation Index exploratory project reports produced in 
October 2009 (CFA DAMVAD, 2009; Deloitte, 2009; Ernst and Young, 2009; 
The Innovation Unit, 2009). See also related pre-studies from Dunleavy et al. 
(2008) and Clark et al. (2008). Dunleavy et al. (2008) propose a range of 
aggregate indicators across the dimensions of R&D activities, consultancy and 
strategic alliances, intangible assets, ICT infrastructure, human resources, 
institutional performance, E-Government, origins of innovations, innovation 
outputs, impacts and scope. A central framework of the proposal in Clark et al. 
(2008) was to conduct an innovation survey along the lines of that done for the 
business sector, modified to capture the particularities of public sector 
innovation. 
Two sectors, the NHS and local government, were selected based on prior 
indications of demand, potential participation and also the ability to draw 
meaningful sector insights from an anticipated sample size of up to 100 
interviewees per sector. Final participation was 16 per cent of the population in 
health (64 interviews) and 31 per cent of the population in local government 
(111 interviews). In each case, if possible, then the most appropriate person in 
their organisation responsible for innovation and improvement was interviewed. 
Each interviewee commented on behalf of the organisation as a whole and, in 
return, received an individual organisation scorecard along with the overall 
findings. In developing the questionnaire, the questions from NESTA’s Private 
Sector Index survey questionnaire (Roper, 2009) were used as a starting point. 
Questions were tailored to suit the public sector innovation framework and 
where required added questions from either international survey instruments 
where appropriate – the Nordic MEPIN Pilot Survey – or completely new 
questions. Approximately half of the questions in the survey are adapted from 





2.2. Positioning of the present research within  
the wider context of public sector innovation studies 
The notion that innovative capacity of public organisations is under-researched 
is true, however, there is a growing attention to conduct such studies. The 
previous sub-chapter reviewed the few existing empirical and/or survey-based 
studies of innovation in the public and voluntary sector. The following table 2.2 
shows chronologically how the public sector empirical innovation research has 
evolved. 
 















The Diffusion of Innovations 
Among the American States, 
Walker (1969) 
   
1965 Determinants of Innovations in 
Organizations, Mohr (1969) 
   
Prior to 
1969 
Innovation in the States: A 
Diffusion Study, Gray (1972) 
   
Prior to 
1977 
Innovate in Public and Private 
Organizations, Roessner (1977)
   
1996  Managing the Innovation Capacity of 
Voluntary and Non-Profit Organisations 
(VNPOs) in the UK, Osborne (1996, 
1998); Osborne and Flynn (1997) 
1990–
1998 
 Public Management Innovation based on 
Ford-KSG innovation awards 1990–
1994 and 1995–1998 in the USA, and 
Institute of Public Administration of 
Canada (IPAC) innovation awards 
1990–1994, Borins (1998, 2000a) 
1998–
2000 
 Public Management Innovation based on 
Commonwealth Association of Public 
Administration and Management 
(CAPAM) innovation awards 1998–
2000, Borins (2000b, 2001a, 2001c) 
2000  Survey of Electronic Commerce and 














2005  The present research; first published 
in Pärna and von Tunzelmann (2007), 
Innovation in Public Sector: Key 
Features Influencing the Development 
and Implementation of 




 Innovation in the Public Sector ʻPublin’, 
Koch et al. (2005, 2006) 
2005–
2006 
 Korean Government Innovation Index, 
Korean Ministry of Government 
Administration and Home Affairs 
(2005); Yoon (2006) 
2005–
2006 
 Achieving Innovation in Central 
Government Organizations, National 
Audit Office (2006) 
2006  Seeing the Light: Innovation in Local 
Public Services, Audit Commission 
(2007) 
2008  Innovation Across Central Government, 
National Audit Office (2009) 
2010  Innovation in Public Sector 
Organisations: A Pilot Survey for 
Measuring Innovation Across the Public 
Sector in the UK, NESTA, Hughes et al. 
(2011) 
2010  Measuring Innovation in the Public 
Sector in the Nordic Countries: Toward 
a Common Statistical Approach 
(ʻCopenhagen manual’) ʻMepin’, Bloch 
(2011), Bugge et al. (2011) 
Source: Composed by author; stage I–IV original definitions from Bason (2010), see also table 
2.1 
 
There is clear evidence that after 2005–2006 the attention towards public sector 
innovativeness has significantly grown – more than half of empirical studies 
and initiatives reviewed originated from 2005 and later. This proves the 
timeliness of the present research with original exploratory survey conducted in 
2005 (first published in 2007). It can be clearly recognised that if in late 1970s, 
1980s and 1990s innovation in government (if at all) was largely a study object 
of academics, then in 2000s it has become the focus of national experimental 
policy agencies (e.g. NESTA in the UK), National Audit Offices (e.g. in 
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Australia and the UK), and National Statistical Offices (e.g. in Canada and the 
Nordic countries). In addition, the attention of international multilateral 
organisations towards public sector innovativeness has grown over recent years 
(e.g. OECD and the EU). 
All these studies of innovation in public and non-profit sectors described 
have created some new and more empirically grounded knowledge of why and 
how the innovation process takes place in these sectors. However, from the 
perspective of the present research and its research question, they all have 
different shortcomings, especially the ones produced before the present ex-
ploratory survey (e.g. before 2005). For example, the VNPO study: despite 
making a significant contribution to studies of innovation public service 
organisations (PSOs), Osborne’s work concentrated only on voluntary and non-
profit institutions (VNPSs). The study did not covering the services developed 
and/or provided directly by public sector institutions. From the theoretical side; 
the author draws extensively upon the managerial and organisational studies 
literature in developing his theoretical model of the innovation capacity of 
VNOPs, however, he almost neglects the possible contribution of innovation 
management, as well as systems of innovation literature. The study did not 
focus on existing ʻpredefined’ innovation cases (like best practice studies 
usually do). The study was established more to understand what the key actors 
within the VNPOs understood by innovation, and to discover the extent of their 
actual innovation activity. The research was also not concentrated on techno-
logical improvements; instead, it was based on four types of organisational 
change determined by service (new, existing or improved) and beneficiary 
group (new or existing). 
Secondly, Borins’ study on innovation award cases was targeted more 
towards management innovations than technological ones. It was a pure best 
practice research, giving very little about the negative issues, and more 
importantly it neglected hampering factors related to the innovation process. 
The study had wide and polar case profiles, however, it did not differentiate 
sectoral or innovation-type specific results. The study involved coding of open-
ended questionnaire results received from the respondents, and then producing a 
quantitative database. However, this methodology makes it harder to perform 
serious statistical analyses/exercises. 
Thirdly, the Publin research focuses mainly on organisational inno-
vativeness. Publin surveys were random, i.e. they did not predefine and 
preselect innovative cases. Moreover, they asked relatively broad and basic 
questions like “how would you define innovation” and “can you give examples 
of significant innovations in your organisation in past three years”. In addition, 
only two fields of public sector were studies – social services and health 
services. Another weakness of the Publin survey is that it does not give the 
results on accurate scales. The problem is that many possible characteristics of 
innovation in public sector can be ʻpredicted’, without empirically studying 
them. The benefit should be in showing the importance of different factors, 
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goals, etc. (i.e. which are more, and which are less important). This also adds 
value if we want to bring out specific differences between public and private 
sector innovation process. The Publin study lacks concreteness in its 
conclusions; soft sayings such as “there may be a lack of technological solutions 
to the problem at hand” are not too convincing (Koch et al., 2006: 2). 
 
 
2.3. Summary and considerations 
By analysing the few existing empirical studies of innovation in public and non-
profit sectors, this chapter showed how much (or little) is known about this 
increasingly important topic in practice. The chapter also positioned the present 
research within the wider and historical context of public sector innovation 
studies. 
From the chapter, it become evident that empirical innovation research in the 
public sector is much less developed than in the private sector. The topic is also 
methodologically underdeveloped and, therefore, the landscape of innovation 
studies relatively chaotic. On the other hand, there is no quantitatively 
analysable public sector innovation data available. In addition, the majority of 
the existing research is qualitative. However, these are governments that need to 
innovate to survive the continuum of diminishing public budgets, growing 
citizen demand, societal and environmental challenges. Moreover, as Harris et 
al. (2009) has well said, this challenge becomes more complex as radical new 
approaches require radical new actors and it is needed to combine the ingenuity 
and initiative of a diverse group of innovators – from the public sector, private 
companies, and the third sector, alongside users and communities – to find new 
solutions to pressing economic and social problems. Therefore, it is needed to 
strengthen the methods by which innovations in the public sector are 
discovered, developed, and diffused. The mission of the present research is to 
contribute to these challenges in an exploratory way. The current research is 
concentrated on both, developing a more solid framework by which to analyse 
public sector innovativeness, as well conducting an exploratory empirical 
survey analysing the technological innovation process, influencing (supporting 





3. DEVELOPING A CONCEPTUAL  
FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSING THE 
INNOVATION PROCESS IN PUBLIC  
SECTOR SERVICES 
The previous two chapters were syntheses of theoretical and empirical under-
standings of modernisation, transformation and innovation in the public sector. 
We also know that organisational and environmental antecedents have held a 
central place in debates about the capacity of organisations to innovate for over 
four decades (Borins, 1998; Burns and Stalker, 1961; Damanpour, 1991; Light, 
1998; Tidd, 2001). According to Walker (2008), studies have variously pointed 
toward the benefits of organic structures, specialisation, resources and 
communication, and environmental conditions associated with uncertainty and 
complexity. This evidence base is undoubtedly rich; however, it is primarily 
drawn from studies of private organisations, and as Light (1998) has argued 
provides conflicting conclusions; organisations are simultaneously expected to 
have loose and tight organisational characteristics, be big and little, young and 
experienced, and specialised and unified. Walter (2008) also suggests that it will 
be necessary to model the incremental nature of innovation adoption by 
examining the effects of lagging and current innovation together with organi-
sational and environmental characteristics on organisational innovativeness. 
Regression analysis by Walter (2008), based on data drawn from a survey of 
English local authorities (for data collection procedures and pilot information, 
see Enticott, 2003), also suggest that organisational and environmental 
antecedents and innovation types provide the strongest explanation for the 
adoption of the innovation types studied. 
The present chapter draws a unique conceptual framework for further survey 
and empirical analyses of this thesis with the ultimate goal to understand the 
key features influencing the development and implementation of technologi-
cally innovative public sector services and the system in which it occurs. The 
framework developed has four different theoretical perspectives. These perspec-
tives (and the framework developed out of them) should allow us to study, 
analyse and understand the process of innovation in technologically innovative 
public sector services. The first perspective is the organisational view. In the 
majority of ways, innovation is still an organisational issue, which might (or 
might not) be linked to technology, new products or services. As success of 
organisations is multi-factored, there are many organisational and managerial 
issues related to innovation. Success is a matter of competence in all functions, 
and of balance and coordination between them, and not of doing one or two 
things brilliantly. The second perspective is the learning view. The role of 
knowledge in the innovation process is strongly emphasised, perhaps most 
strongly by the evolutionary literature as well as by the literature of the 
knowledge-based economy. Knowledge is seen as the fundamental resource in 
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the modern economy, and accordingly, the most important process seen is 
learning. The third perspective of the research framework is the technological 
view. It is widely acknowledged that technological change and innovation are 
major drivers of productivity growth, economic growth and lie at the very heart 
of the competitive process. However, technological advances are also seen as 
once-in-a-century possibilities for the transformation of government (as they 
have done with the business world). E-government is a rapidly growing 
phenomenon; it has an increasing impact on the work of the public sector; it 
absorbs an increasing proportion of public sector budgets; and it ʻpromises’ 
solutions to many public sector problems. The fourth perspective is the systemic 
view. This approach is justified by the general argument that innovation takes 
place in a system, consisting of individuals, firms and institutions, and within a 
certain cultural and regulatory framework. 
Following four sub-chapters will end with related area-specific propositions 
drawn from the existing literature and to be tested throughout the empirical part 
of the thesis. 
 
 
3.1. Organisational view on the innovation process 
The first perspective of the research framework of the present study is 
organisational. The classical linear model of innovation (a theoretical 
construction of industrialists, consultants and business schools, seconded by 
economists, see Godin, 2005) postulated that innovation starts with basic 
research, followed by applied R&D, and ends with production and diffusion.17 
Very few people defend such an understanding of innovation anymore: 
“Everyone knows that the linear model of innovation is dead”, claimed 
Rosenberg (1994: 139), but it is not always the case. Godin (2005) argues that 
the long survival of the model, despite regular criticisms, is due to statistics. 
Having become entrenched with the help of statistical categories for counting 
resources and allocating money to science and technology, and standardised 
under the auspices of the OECD and its methodological manuals, the linear 
model functioned as a ʻsocial fact’. Rival models, because of their lack of 
statistical foundations, could not easily become substitutes. Indeed, according to 
innovation management theory (see for example Rothwell 1977, 1992; Tidd et 
al., 2001), success is multi-factored. Studies show that, in general, successful 
innovators outperform failures across the board. There are no simple single-
                                                                          
17  The linear approach is often linked to the so-called ʻtechnology-push model’. In the 
innovation literature (see Martin, 1994), there is a distinction between technology-push and 
market-pull or demand-pull models of innovation. A technology push implies that a new 
invention is pushed through R&D, production and sales functions onto the market without 
proper consideration of whether or not it satisfies a user need. In contrast, an innovation 
based upon market pull has been developed by the R&D function in response to an identified 
market need. 
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factored explanations as success is a matter of competence in all functions 
(Cooper and Kleinschmidt, 1988), and of balance and coordination between 
them, and not of doing one or two things brilliantly well. Moreover, as noted by 
Rothwell (1992), the success factors are more or less common to all industries, 
although their rank order or importance can vary from sector to sector. 
Therefore, this should be also true for the public sector, however, according to 
the knowledge of the author, it has almost never been so analysed. 
Despite more than four decades of empirical research designed to determine 
the characteristics of technologically progressive firms, and the factors 
associated with success or failure in innovation, there still exists no precise 
prescription or recipe for successful innovation. Perhaps it is due to the fact that 
every innovation process is unique, so as every organisation, and every leader of 
the innovation project. Nevertheless, there are some basic characteristics 
established in the literature, which are agreed to be necessary for successful 
innovation projects. Firstly, after assessing nine systematic and comprehensive 
innovation studies undertaken during the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, Roy 
Rothwell (1992) summarised the most important success factors influencing 
innovation as the following (in no particular order): 
1. The establishment of good internal and external communication; effective 
linkages with external sources of scientific and technological know-how; 
a willingness to take on external ideas. 
2. Treating innovation as a corporate-wide task: effective functional inte-
gration; involving all departments in the project from its earliest stages; 
ability to design for ‘makeability’. 
3. Implementing careful planning and project control procedures: com-
mitting resources to up-front screening of new projects; regular appraisal 
of projects. 
4. Efficiency in development work and high quality production: imple-
menting effective quality control procedures; taking advantage of up-to-
date production equipment. 
5. Strong market orientation: emphasis on satisfying user-needs; efficient 
customer linkages; where possible, involving potential users in the 
development process. 
6. Providing a good technical service to customers, including training where 
appropriate; efficient spares supply. 
7. The presence of certain key individuals: effective product champions and 
technological gatekeepers. 
8. High quality of management: dynamic, open-minded managers; ability to 
attract and retain talented managers and researchers; a commitment to the 
development of human capital. 
 
In addition to these project execution-type success factors (Rothwell, 1992), 
Cooper (1980) has highlighted, among others, the following three additional 
kinds of variable important for success: 
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 The nature of the product: specifically its uniqueness/superiority and the 
economic benefit it confers upon the customer. 
 The nature of the market: intensity of market need, market growth rate 
and market size. 
 The achievement of technical and production synergies between the new 
product and existing products (importance of cumulative know-how). 
 
One of the first empirical studies on innovation, a project called SAPPHO, had 
also made similar conclusions before (see Rothwell et al., 1974). The two-phase 
project consists of a comparative analysis of ‘paired’ successful and unsuc-
cessful technological innovations, where one half of the pair is a commercial 
success and the other a commercial failure (in the fields of chemical processes 
and scientific instruments). Five main areas of difference between successful 
and unsuccessful innovators emerged, related to the innovator’s understanding 
of user needs, efficiency of development, characteristics of managers, efficiency 
of communications and marketing and sales efforts. 
Innovation management literature (see Rothwell, 1977, 1992, 1994; Tidd et 
al., 2001) stresses the importance of the ten following ʻstrategic level’ factors 
influencing the innovation process and its success. 
First, top management commitment to, and visible support for, innovation: it 
is about top management visibility, shared vision, leadership and the will to 
innovate. It is also important to overcome the barriers and resistance to inno-
vation. Indeed, according to Wilson (1989), high-level government executives 
are mostly preoccupied with maintaining their agencies in a complex, conflict-
ridden, and unpredictable political environment. Moreover, as stated by 
Mahbubani (2011b), there is a constant shortage of leaders in the world who 
rule with their head and heart. A special emphasis is on the word ʻleader’ 
because in the majority of cases the management of changes is required that 
relies upon providing inspiration (visions) for and building confidence in a large 
number of people (for further discussion, see sub-chapter 1.1). The latter is true 
in terms of political leaders as well as top executives and civil servants of public 
sector organisations. 
Secondly, long-term corporate strategy in which innovation plays a key role: 
innovation should not be an ad hoc process, but one that has direction and 
purpose. Properly planned, one project can contribute to the next project and so 
on. In other words, a coherent strategy enables firms to build on past successes 
and to capitalise effectively on emerging strengths (see Rothwell and Zegveld, 
1985). Firms need a strategy in order to obtain technical, marketing and 
production synergies between different projects. Public strategy, however, is 
more complex. According to Mulgan (2009), public strategy is the systematic 
use of public resources and powers, by public agencies, to achieve public goals. 
He stresses the meaning of the word strategy, which comes from the Greek 
ʻstrategos’, a general. A word, which brought together ʻstratos’, the idea of 
something that is spread out (an army or multitude), with a word ʻagos’, the idea 
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of leadership. From the public sector perspective, the question is how the 
sprawling mass of public agencies, laws services, embassies, armies, and 
laboratories that make up a modern state can be led in the same direction and 
serve the public interest that lives well beyond the state (Mulgan, 2009). 
The third factor is appropriate structure: organisational design should enable 
creativity, learning and interaction. The key issue is finding an appropriate 
balance between ʻorganic’ and ʻmechanistic’ options for particular contin-
gencies. In the public sector, sticking to thinking and acting through isolated 
organisational silos has time and again been identified as one of the main 
barriers of innovation (NAO, 2006, 2009; Eggers and O’Leary, 2009). 
According to Bason (2010), the past couple of decades have seen a surge in 
interest in ʻjoined-up’, ʻcollaborative’, or ʻnetworked’ governments as a way of 
responding to the need for increased coordination, and unity of policy develop-
ment and service delivery (Pollitt, 2003; Eggers and Singh, 2009; Mulgan, 
2009). Indeed, according to Stewart-Weeks (2010), the most influential people 
in public policy and management reform in the future may not be experts or 
people in ostensible leadership roles, but rather those who create new spaces 
and places for more complex, interactive and inclusive policy conversations. 
Fourthly, long-term commitment to major projects: this is to emphasise that 
innovation projects should not be based on the sole criterion of short-term 
returns on investment, but on considerations of future market penetration and 
growth. While innovation, and especially major innovation, requires a long-term 
view and at least some of the firm’s projects should be funded with ʻpatient’ 
money (Edwards, 1983; Innovation Advisory Board, 1990; House of Lords, 
1991). Indeed, the public sector budgeting usually does not include money for 
exploratory and experimental, often pilot work. Even if this is available, policy 
structures (in silos) do not allow spreading these experiences across the 
government and the traditional budgeting process hinders it even more. 
The fifth factor is corporate flexibility and responsiveness to change: due to 
increasing inflexibility in production, it is often seen as being too expensive to 
introduce product improvements (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978). As a result, 
products become obsolete. The introduction of Japanese-style flexible manu-
facturing systems could assist in overcoming this problem. Management should 
also recognise that technological innovations might require organisational and 
marketing innovations to facilitate their implementation; this is especially the 
case with radical innovations. Top management must accept this and the 
company should be sufficiently flexible to accommodate it. Indeed, there is 
little that bureaucrats hate more than innovation, especially innovation that 
produces better results than the old routines, as we quoted Frank Herbert in the 
beginning of this theses, and that improvements always make those at the top of 
the heap look inept (Herbert, 1984). This is perhaps the reason why creative and 
innovative people are more than often rejected by ʻthe system’, or they leave the 
system, although bureaucratic, stability-focused and/or stagnate/status quo 
favourable people stay. 
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The sixth factor is top management acceptance of risk, innovation is 
inherently a high-risk undertaking and one of the few things we can be sure 
about is that there will be failures. Management must accept this, and not use 
one failure as an excuse for withdrawing from the innovation race altogether. In 
addition, attempts should be made to learn the lessons of failure through 
analysing unsuccessful projects, which many firms fail to do (Burgelman and 
Maidique, 1988). Potential failures can continue for a considerable period under 
their own momentum, with extremely high opportunity costs for more 
promising projects, and it is essential that top management accepts the respon-
sibility for the termination of failing projects (Rothwell and Zegveld, 1985; 
Rothwell, 1992). 
The seventh factor is the creation of an innovation-accepting, entrepreneur-
ship-accommodating organisational culture: creative and innovatory aspects 
should be decoupled from the more mundane, routinised and bureaucratic 
aspects associated with making mature projects. ʻSpace’ should be created in 
the firm to accommodate the activities of in-house entrepreneurs. An ʻorganic’ 
style of management should be preferred to the ʻmechanistic’ approach. It is 
important to create a creative climate – positive approaches to creative ideas, 
supported by relevant rewards systems – a ʻwinners culture’. According to 
Burns and Stalker (1961), successful innovation and technical progressiveness 
tend to be associated with an open, horizontal management style which 
emphasises consultation and participation rather than formal directives from 
above; a style that emphasises the flow of information not only upwards, but 
also downwards and outwards from the centre. Behn (1995) stresses that an 
innovative organisation engages everyone throughout the organisation in the 
task of developing and implementing new ways to reach organisational goals. 
Bason (2010), however, warns that public sector reform too often focuses on 
reorganisation. However, shifting the boxes (i.e. the organisation charts) alone 
does not truly address how people run government. It usually does not affect the 
process of how solutions are developed and how people interact. These aspects 
are too complex to visualise compared to boxes which are easily describable. 
The eighth factor is organisational learning: it is important to have high 
levels of involvement within and outside the organisation in proactive 
experimentation, finding and solving problems, communication and sharing of 
experiences, and knowledge capture and dissemination. According to Lester and 
Piore (2006), productive societies, to sustain themselves, must be both efficient 
and creative. Mulgan (2009) supports an iterative, experimental, and adaptive 
view of how real governments work, with positive feedback reinforcing 
processes of change. This puts knowledge, which constantly evolves, at the 
heart of government – knowledge about why some schools systems work better 
than others, why some economies grow faster than others, or why some 
communities trust each other more than others. 
The ninth success factor is internal integration and co-operation: the 
coupling model of the innovation process suggests that whether the impetus for 
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new product development derives, it is important that all related departments are 
involved in project appraisal and project definition right from the start. With 
successful innovations, the emphasis is on interdisciplinary teams with the 
maximum sharing of information across functions. This ensures that customer 
needs remain the focus of R&D activity and that products are developed that 
can be efficiently and reliably manufactured. “We all are angels with only one 
wing; we can only fly while embracing each other”, perfectly said by the Italian 
author Luciano De Crescenzo.18 Taking into account global challenges, raising 
competition between countries, and new economic sectors (like healthcare), 
according to Bason (2010), collaboration around the creation and execution of 
government policies and services can thus take place across the public, private 
and third sector – or in a combination of all of them. Murray et al. (2009) argue 
that entire new business models are arising in the cross-section of the three 
sectors, essentially giving rise to a ʻfourth’ sector. 
The tenth and last strategic factor coming from the innovation literature is 
consumer linkage: to attain enhanced performance and to elicit full value from 
customers, would-be innovators should take pains to identify and interact with 
leading-edge customers during and following new product development. 
According to Gardiner and Rothwell (1985: 161–169), “Tough customers equal 
good designs”. In addition, if possible, products or services should be designed 
that are flexible with respect to user adaptation, thus enabling customers to 
make a significant contribution to product or service improvement (von Hippel 
and Finkelstein, 1978). In the public sector the consumer element means getting 
back to the basics. “Design thinking can remind public servants to ask the 
obvious: What’s it like to check into a hospital, call the police or collect the 
dole?” (Tim Brown, CEO and President, IDEO in Design Council, 2009). On 
the other hand, it means also co-creation with citizens, other public institutions, 
business or voluntary sectors, as well as more than often both back and front-
office integration within the government at large. 
In addition to factors influencing the industrial innovation process and its 
success suggested by Rothwell, Cooper (1980) added three additional kinds of 
variables important for success which are still perfectly valid. Firstly, the nature 
of the product: specifically its uniqueness/superiority and the economic benefit 
it confers upon the customer. Secondly, the nature of the market: intensity of 
market need, market growth rate and market size. Thirdly, the achievement of 
technical and production synergies between the new product and existing 
products (the importance of cumulative know-how) – take Apple Inc. for 
example. 
Literature of industrial innovation also stresses that success is people 
centred. On the one hand, it is a leadership issue. According to Terry (1986), 
there are currently at least 100 accepted academic definitions of leadership. 
Manz et al. (2000) believe that some leadership perspectives are more 
                                                                          
18  Quoted in Bennis and Biederman (1996), pp. 27-8. 
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appropriate than others, at least for specific situations. In their context of 
leadership studies, they focus particularly on visionary, participative, and 
transactional leadership processes (see table 3.1). A visionary/rhetorical view of 
leadership suggests a process in which various persuasive methods are 
employed to achieve a common view of reality in followers and to develop a 
vision that encompasses a common mission. A transactional view of leadership 
attempts to explain how the reciprocal process of influence between leaders and 
followers occurs over time. A participative leadership view involves processes 
in which part of the leadership function is passed on to followers. 
 
Table 3.1 Integrative framework for conceptualising different leadership and influence 
processes 
Leadership Perspective Primary Direction of the 
Influence Process
Primary Type of 
Involvement 
Rhetorical/visionary Top-down Identification 
Transactional Reciprocal Compliance 
Participative Bottom-up Internalisation 
Source: Manz et al. (2000) 
 
Ireland and Hitt (2005) stress the importance of strategic leadership, defining it 
as a person’s ability to anticipate, envision, maintain flexibility, think 
strategically, and work with others to initiate changes that will create a viable 
future for the organisation. According to their view, there are six important 
components of effective strategic leadership in 21st century organisations: (1) 
determining the organisation’s purpose or vision, (2) exploiting and maintaining 
core competences, (3) developing human capital, (4) sustaining an effective 
organisational culture, (5) emphasising ethical practices, and (6) establishing 
balanced organisational controls. In other words, leadership is a combination of 
task and context. The ultimate importance of strategic leadership also came out 
already from Child (1972), who said that strategic leaders, armed with 
substantial decision-making responsibilities, had the ability to influence 
significantly the direction of the firm and how it was to be managed and 
pursued. 
Schumpeter (1947) brought in the term visionary entrepreneurship. “It is in 
most cases only a man or a few men who see the new possibility and are able to 
cope with the resistance and difficulties which action always meets with outside 
the rut of established practice,” he said (p. 152). He also argued (Schumpeter, 
1936, 1950) that the main agents of economic growth are the entrepreneurs who 
introduce new products, new methods of production, and other innovations that 
stimulate economic activity. Schumpeter (1936, 1950) described entrepreneur-
ship as a process of ʻcreative destruction’, in which the entrepreneur continually 
displaces or destroys existing products or methods of production with new ones. 
More modern authors stress the importance of corporate entrepreneurship (see 
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Barringer et al., 1999) and its relation to strategic management. Although 
Schumpeter’s writings focused primarily on the activities of the industrial 
entrepreneur, in many settings entrepreneurship is arguably a firm-level 
phenomenon (Covin and Slevin, 1991a, 1991b; Miller, 1983; Stevenson and 
Jarillo, 1990). The main assumption that underlies the notion of corporate 
entrepreneurship is that it is a behavioural phenomenon and all firms fall along 
a conceptual continuum that ranges from highly conservative to highly 
entrepreneurial. Entrepreneurial firms are risk-taking, innovative, and proactive. 
In contrast, conservative firms are risk-adverse, are less innovative, and adopt a 
more ʻwait and see’ posture. The position of a firm on this continuum is referred 
to as its entrepreneurial intensity (Barringer et al., 1999). 
From the individual project leader’s perspective, their existence is also 
crucial. According to Rubenstein et al. (1976), it appears that organisations do 
not make development projects successful, individuals do. For those who 
believe that organisational structure, control mechanisms, formal decision-
making processes, delegation of authority and other formal aspects of a so-
called well-run company are sufficient conditions for successful technological 
innovation, it can be said that this is not so. An overwhelming majority of the 
projects he studied indicated that certain individuals had played (often informal) 
roles in their initiation, progress and outcome. The literature calls these 
influential persons ʻkey individuals’. In terms of an innovation project, the key 
individuals could be divided into so-called ʻproject champions’ and ʻtechno-
logical gatekeepers’. 
The product champion is an individual who enthusiastically supports an 
innovation project and who is personally committed to it (Schon, 1963). He/she 
often plays the role of internal entrepreneur. He/she is particularly effective at 
maintaining impetus and support when the project encounters major difficulties. 
Project champions are especially effective in flat, flexible, integrated organi-
sations. In hierarchical and bureaucratic organisations, his/her endeavours are 
often ineffective unless he has sufficient power and authority positively to 
influence the course of the project and to ʻpush’ it across internal barriers to 
change (Rothwell et al., 1974). The presence of effective product champions is 
strongly associated with the innovation process (Rothwell, 1992). 
The technological gatekeeper (Allen, 1986) is an effective transceiver of 
information. First, he/she attends conferences and seminars, has a comprehen-
sive network of external contacts and is an avid reader of the primary literature. 
He/she thus plays an effective boundary-spanning role by bringing a con-
siderable volume of relevant technical information into the firm. Secondly, 
he/she is an effective internal communicator and disseminates information to 
others within the R&D system often, in larger laboratories, via a gatekeeper 
network. Their presence within a development project is associated with a 
superior technical outcome. Rothwell (1992) adds, in order for them to be 
effective the firm must value their activities by allowing them to participate in 
external activities and to disseminate their information internally. They must 
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work in an environment which values information as an important commodity, 
and which rewards efficient information retrieval and dissemination. 
In addition to attracting and retaining these key individuals, Warner (1994) 
stresses also the importance of skills and continued training for innovation. As 
said by Aldcroft (1992), the level of skills is normally a precondition for and 
often a determinant of economic performance and international competitive-
ness. According to Tidd et al. (2001), there is a need for continuing and 
stretching individual development – long-term commitment to education and 
training to ensure high levels of competence and the skills to learn effectively. 
Moreover, Rajan (1992) stresses that hybridisation process calls for more 
workers trained with both function-specific and general skills. Three kinds of 
generic competences have to be involved: (a) technical skills – specific to 
technology involved, (b) business skills – specific to the company’s products, 
markets, etc., and (c) social skills – based in interpersonal abilities, team 
working skills, etc. 
Innovation management theory discussed above is grounded over-
whelmingly on innovation in the manufacturing industry and high technology 
sectors, which have been studied for many decades. However (according to 
Tidd and Hull, 2003 and OECD, 2000b), in the most advanced service 
economies such as the U.S. and UK, services create up to three-quarters of the 
wealth and 85 per cent of employment, and yet relatively little is known about 
managing innovation in this sector.19 Indeed, many assert that industrial 
practices are equally applicable to managing innovation in services (e.g. Levitt, 
1972; Fitzsimmons and Fitzsimmons, 2000; Meyer and DeTore, 2001), whereas 
others argue that services are fundamentally different (Smith, 1972; Bitran and 
Pedrosa, 1998; Gallouj, 1998). The relative misunderstanding around the 
service sectors is partly due to the fact that there are three myths historically 
related to services (see Gallouj, 2002): (1) the myth of an unproductive ʻthird’ 
sector, (2) the myth of low productivity and low capital intensity in services, 
and (3) the myth of the service society as a society of ʻservants’. The second 
reason is related to the fact that the criteria (as said by Smith, 1972), which were 
used by classical economists to distinguish services, are unsatisfactorily 
metaphysical, involving concepts such as ʻintangibility’, ʻimmediacy’ and 
ʻunstockability’. Despite the widespread recognition among economists of both 
the unsatisfactory nature of the indicators used to measure real output changes 
in the service sector and their downward bias in a number of cases, these factors 
are all too often neglected in presenting a picture of relative performance of 
sectors (Smith, 1972). Smith also proposed various measurable economic 
criteria which tend to distinguish services from manufacturing industries, such 
as a higher ratio of value added to total inputs (because services require less 
                                                                          
19  The definition of services has also been subject to much discussion. For proposed 
definitions of services, see for example Hill, 1977; Riddle, 1986; and Metcalfe and Miles, 
2000. 
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purchased raw material inputs), a longer degree of capital intensity, a different 
labour force composition (more female, part-time and self-employed workers) 
and different methods of measuring output. However, having defined these 
criteria, he conceded that none provide a clear-cut and unambiguous distinction, 
and for each there is significant overlap between manufacturing and service 
industries (Barras, 1984). 
Indeed, still today, the concepts that underpin services innovation need to 
take into account a number of important features of services, such as: 
(a) services are intangible processes, (b) services are interactive, with several 
parties participating in the innovation process, (c) services are extremely diverse 
in nature, and (d) services innovation can operate at different levels – the 
economy, business strategy, operations and even individuals. 
The technological dimension of services innovation tends to evolve around 
ICT developments, such as the installation of new computer hardware or the 
adoption of a customised software package. The non-technological dimension 
concerns the introduction of a new service concept, a new client interface or a 
new service delivery system. In order to operate these concepts from the policy 
perspective, Forfás (2006) developed a three-fold typology of services 
innovation – new business models/concepts, new customer/delivery interfaces, 
and new service/product offering (see figure 3.1). The typology assumes that 
each of these three types of services innovation can involve both technological 
and non-technological dimensions. There is a similar system also developed by 
van Ark (2006). 
 
 
Figure 3.1 A typology of service innovation (Forfás, 2006) 
 
In new business models or concepts, illustrated in figure 3.1, services 
businesses, partly due to the speed and immediacy with which they are able to 
address new opportunities, demonstrate a type of innovation that involves a 
complete or substantial change in the way in which revenues and profits are 
earned. Business model innovations can give a firm a strong and sustainable 
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competitive advantage, however, companies must typically continuously rethink 
their organisational arrangements in order to accommodate new business 
models as value migrates within and between sectors and players in a sector.20 
Innovation in the customer interface implies improving the dynamic 
exchange of information in services that occurs between the customer and a 
service provider, and which is a key element of any service function. The 
interface may be face-to-face, distant or entirely electronic and in all cases 
requires a heavily reliance on the staff employed, the technology that is 
mobilised and the timing of the exchanges. Technology may be a key enabler of 
such innovations although it is rarely a driver in its own right.21 
New service or product offering-type of services innovation is the most 
analogous to traditional manufacturing based innovation activity. Service 
companies need to introduce new services in order to respond to customer 
demand or competitor pressure as much as a manufacturing company. However, 
even here there are significant features that characterise services innovation. 
Potentially the most important of these is the relative speed with which new 
services can be brought to the customer compared to manufacturing products 
(Forfás, 2006). 
In getting systematic about service innovations, Ganz (2006) suggests to 
follow five perspectives: 
(1) Improve back stage provider or client productivity: applying six sigma, 
process re-engineering, and other transformation activities to the back 
stage. Functions of costs of activities, including costs of unwanted 
variance; 
(2) Improve front stage scope: expanding the scope of front stage services – 
addressing more or better the custom requests of clients, as well as 
exploiting more of the unique capabilities to providers. Function of 
value of needs, including enabling new capabilities; 
(3) Improve coordination: standardise processes and interactions. This can 
boost quality (compliance) and productivity. Function of scale, 
complexity, and uncertainty of the system; 
(4) Improve dynamic evolution: continuously migrate provider-client pairs 
to higher value creation and capture points on an ongoing basis. 
Function of time; 
(5) Improve capabilities of people, organisations, institutions or techno-
logies to enter into higher value creation and capture configurations. 
Function of systems productivity capacity – innovating new capabilities 
(incremental, radical and super-radical innovations). 
 
                                                                          
20  The advent of low cost or budget airlines in the 1990s was a typical innovation through 
the business model. 
21  The innovation of Internet banking is a good example of innovation in the customer 
interface. 
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From the relative importance aspect of different factors influencing the 
innovation process in the services sector it is worth looking at Howells and 
Tether (2004), who analysed the findings from the Second European Commu-
nity Innovation Survey (CIS-2), which covered innovative activities within 
service enterprises in 13 western European countries over the period of 1994–
1996.22 Among other things, the survey asked the firms to rank a variety of aims 
or objectives of innovation. Of these, improving service quality was the most 
widely recognised; 95 per cent of the innovating firms declared it relevant to 
their innovation activities, and over 60 per cent claimed it was ‘very important’. 
Opening new markets (or increasing market share) and extending the service 
range were also widely recognised (each was relevant to about 85 per cent of 
the innovating firms, and ‘very important’ to about half). The high significance 
attached to these aims suggests a strong ‘product’ orientation to the innovation 
activities of the service firms, but as service outputs typically lack an inde-
pendent physical existence (Gallouj and Weinstein, 1997), there is commonly a 
close nexus between the process (and organisation) of provision, and the nature 
of the services provided. 
Improving the internal business process and reducing labour costs were 
recognised as relevant by about 80 per cent and 70 per cent of the innovating 
firms respectively, and each of these was ‘very important’ to about 30 per cent. 
These aims are generally associated with ‘process innovation’, but these 
changes may impact directly on the nature of the services provided (Howells 
and Tether, 2004). 
From this viewpoint, Barcet et al. (1987) identifies three models of 
innovation in services – professionals in partnership, managerial, and industrial. 
Sundbo and Gallouj (2000) have proposed complementing these models with 
three others: neo-industrial (which arises from dividing the industrial model in 
two), the entrepreneurial, and the craft model. The characteristics of these 
models are according to Djellal and Gallouj (2001) as follows: 
The professionals in the partnership model characterises services with a 
large component of ʻgrey matter’, which do not precisely sell products or 
services, but have competence and capacity for solving problems in the given 
fields of expertise (for instance, consultancy, research and engineering firms). 
In this model, there are no formalised innovation structures. ʻResearch’ is, 
above all, individual, informal and pragmatic. This could be described as a 
ʻbottom-bottom’ or ʻtop-top’ innovation model. In this respect, it has a number 
of advantages: it is flexible, capable of rapid response to market indicators, and 
of synergistically combining the individual thoughts of its members. However, 
depending on its individual make-up, it also has a number of disadvantages, 
including the risk of the innovation process remaining unfinished, the absence 
of a ʻcomplete project’, and the risk of a ʻbrain drain’ linked to the turnover of 
ʻprofessionals in partnership’. 
                                                                          
22  The original research is provided in Tether et al. (2001) and Tether (2003). 
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The managerial model of innovation organisation is encountered in large 
audit and consultancy international networks. This model corresponds to the 
real existence of an R&D innovation policy, strategy or function within the 
firm, but the absence of a permanent innovation/R&D department. Research 
and, more precisely, the research of ideas is ʻeverybody’s business’, but 
development, which is a longer process, is the business of ad hoc project teams. 
The perspective favoured here is that of conceiving a ʻproduct’ which is as 
reproducible as possible. It cannot, however, be described as industrialisation of 
services. 
The industrial model of innovation organisation is, according to Barcet et al. 
(1987) the least frequent in services. This model is, however, encountered in 
large firms specialising in standardised production of operational services, 
dealing with materials as well as information, for example mass information 
processing firms, large contract cleaning or telesurveillance firms. This is a 
replica of the traditional industrial R&D model, which clearly separates the 
R&D department from production. In this type of firm, the production and 
delivery of services are separated. It is therefore possible to envisage a research 
and innovation department responsible for improving the ʻproducts’ to be 
delivered or developing new ʻproducts’. 
The traditional industrial model (in the strict sense) or Fordist model is 
described above. It is rare in services and it is becoming increasingly rare in 
manufacturing itself. It concerns large operational service firms. Specialised 
innovation departments may or may not exist, and maintain linear relationships 
(but no true feedback) with the other departments (linear model of innovation). 
There are often technical production departments and IT departments. 
The neo-industrial model corresponds to certain evolutions underway in 
mass information services, which traditionally functioned according to the 
Fordist model, but which are today subject to great competition (banks, 
insurance companies, post office). In this model, innovation is produced by 
multiple sources (actors) who interact (these are unavoidable ʻtechnical’ inter-
actions, whatever their effectiveness or quality may be). In the case of an 
insurance company, this would be, for example, the IT department, the different 
technical product departments, and possibly a ʻthink tank’ resembling a genuine 
R&D department, and so on. Project groups involving members of different 
departments are favoured and multiplied with varying degrees of success. 
The entrepreneurial model corresponds to the creation of service firms on the 
basis of a radical innovation. This involves small firms which have no R&D 
department, and whose main activity is selling the initial radical innovation. The 
appearance of IT services, repair services and so on, can be interpreted in these 
terms. Many service firms founded by university researchers often belong to 
this entrepreneurial model. 
The craft model describes the innovation model corresponding to small firms 
involved in operational services (contract cleaning, caretaking/security, hotel/ 
catering, and so on). These firms have no innovation strategy, nor do they have 
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an R&D or IT department. However, innovation does occur through the model 
of improvement and learning processes. 
The transformation of modern services has developed a concept of hybrid 
services (or modern manufacturing hybrid product respectively). The distinction 
between goods and services is widely accepted as a fundamental criterion for 
classifying and analysing economic processes (as we also saw from the 
discussions above). However, the formal definition of the division between 
manufacturing and service industries generated considerable debate (Barras, 
1984). The attributes describing ʻtypical services’, and differing them from 
ʻtypical products’, are their intangibility and perishability (i.e. unsold service 
time is ʻlost’ economic opportunity, that is, it cannot be regained), lack of 
transportability and homogeneity, their labour intensity, demand fluctuations 
and strong buyer involvement. However, the dichotomy between physical goods 
and intangible services should not be given too much credence. These are not 
discrete categories. Most business theorists see a continuum with pure service 
on one terminal point and pure commodity good on the other terminal point. 
Most products fall between these two extremes. For example, a restaurant 
provides a physical good (the food), but also provides services in the form of 
ambience, the setting and clearing of the table, etc. Moreover, some utilities 
delivering physical goods – like water utilities, which actually deliver water – 
are usually treated as services. 
In today’s information-driven world we cannot accept the historical 
Smith/Marx distinction between the productive and complicated work of 
manufacturing and the unproductive and simpler work of that characterises 
service activities (see earlier discussion). We should first accept that services 
can be even more capital intensive than manufacturing historically. Moreover, 
manufacturing work can be robust and simple, services can be highly 
knowledge and technology intensive. The phenomenon we also see is that value 
added in classical manufacturing is shifting from production to services (e.g. car 
manufacturing, servicing, and related financial services, i.e. financing car 
purchases). A product has become just factors surrounded by different perso-
nalised services. At the same time services, historically highly personalised, are 
moving towards standardisation (known more from scale intensive manu-
facturing industries). 
According to Grönroos (2006), the competitive advantage in services lies 
mainly in flexibility and adaptability, while in physical products it is 
standardisation. The main weakness in services is inconsistency, while in 
physical products it is rigidity. To overcome this two dimensional problem, 
Ganz (2006) suggest using sentences such as ʻindustrial tertiarization’, ʻhybrid 




Figure 3.2 Hybrid products versus hybrid services (Ganz, 2006) 
 
The ʻhybrid’ in product industries is determined by the ratio of services in their 
total value added. At the same time, hybrid service industries are determined by 
the ratio of products in their total value added. Hybrid products and services are 
dynamic as the ratio between product and service is continuously changing. We 
can talk about the hybrid ʻservice’ if the services part of total value-added 
exceeds the part of products in a particular firm or industry, and conversely, 
hybrid ʻproducts’ are in firms and industries where the product part of total 
value added exceeds the part of services (see figure 3.3). 
 
 
























































From the management and economic perspective in services, Grönroos (2006) 
sees the goal as to get easily manageable product-like offerings that are easy to 
communicate to the market and easy to put a price on. He sees the ideal 
situation where services are like physical products with standardised offerings. 
However, this standardisation is resulting in threats to losing flexibility and 
adaptability, which should be managed instead of being eliminated. Grönroos 
suggests using the CSS Model to solve these problems. The model has three 
parts: (1) conceptualising, (2) systematising, and (3) servicing. 
Conceptualise (first) 
(1) What should be achieved for customers? 
(2) How should it be done? 
Conceptualise (then) 
(3) What processes are needed? 
(4) What resources should be used? 
(5) How should these processes function in interactions with customers 
(and back office functions)? 
(6) What are the limits for flexibility and adaptability? 
(7) What support (physical, systems or leadership) is needed by the 
employees? 
Servicing (finally) 
(8) Make sure that every resource, process, interaction and customer touch-
point functions in a way that supports customers’ value-in-use, i.e. as 
services. 
 
Finally, within the world with hybrid products and services, firms are not selling 
just (innovative) products or services to their customers, they have moved 
towards selling (innovative) solutions. Prahalad and Ramaswamy (2003) 
propose that the next practice of innovation must shift the focus away from 
products and services and onto experience environments – supported by a net-
work of companies and consumer communities – to co-create unique value for 
individual customers. Moreover, instead of basing only on a firm’s internal 
competences, they are participating in competence networks of knowledge, 
which include suppliers, customers, research institutions and universities, and 
even competitors, as we have also discussed earlier (see figure 3.4). These 
experience environments and networks are conceptually different from company-
centric supply chains; experience networks comprise nonlinear, nonsequential 
interactions among companies, institutions and customer communities. The 
network creates an experience environment with which each customer has a 
unique interaction. The consumer actively co-creates his or her own per-
sonalised experience, which forms the basis for value to that customer. This 
model is probably evolving also in modern societies, where the public sector, 
the private sector and the civic society co-create national stories, intellectual and 
economic value, citizen experience and wellbeing. 
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Figure 3.4 The new competitive space for innovation (Prahalad and Ramaswamy, 
2003) 
 
In conclusion, we see that services are a diverse group of economic activities 
that include high technology, knowledge intensive sub-sectors, as well as 
labour-intensive, low skilled areas. In many aspects, service sectors exhibit 
marked differences from manufacturing – although these distinctions may be 
blurring (OECD, 2003). From the perspective of the present research, this is 
also true. Public services can be very knowledge intensive (e.g. healthcare) or 
relatively low skilled (e.g. simple postal services or technical workers). Indeed, 
there is still an on-going debate on whether service innovation can be analysed 
using the same concepts and tools as innovation in manufacturing (Drejer, 
2002). Coombs and Miles (2000) distinguish between three different approaches 
for defining and studying innovation in services: (I) an assimilation approach, 
which treats services as similar to manufacturing, (II) a demarcation approach, 
which argues that service innovation is distinctively different from innovation in 
manufacturing, following dynamics and displaying features that require new 
theories and instruments, and (III) a synthesis approach, which suggests that 
service innovation brings to the forefront hitherto neglected elements of 
innovation that are of relevance for manufacturing and services. The current 
exploratory research tends to support the third approach, developing an 
appropriate combination of factors supporting and hampering the innovation 
process from the angle of the present research. Moreover, the literature review 
has shown as that there are relevant ideas and understandings of the innovation 
process in both the manufacturing/high-tech literature as well as in the services 
literature. Looking at the public sector innovation and modernisation literature 
(chapter 1), we also see that in majority of suggestions factors overlap between 
what we know in the innovation theory of industry and services. 
The company 






























From the leadership perspective, the literature stresses both the importance 
of strategic leadership as well as the influence of certain key individuals – 
project champions and technological gatekeepers. From the perspective of the 
present research, we can call it a strategic project leadership (SPL) approach 
(Shenhar, 2004). If the traditional project management is focused on efficiency, 
operational performance, and meeting time and budget goals, then SPL takes a 
more strategic approach. The principal argument is that today’s organisations 
find that it is not enough to deal with strategy just at the executive level, and 
leave the operations to project manager. Project managers are required to grow 
and become team leaders, and they must handle all aspects of project 
leadership – strategic, operational, and human. For differences between 
traditional project management and strategic project leadership, see table 3.2. 
 
Table 3.2 From project management to strategic project leadership 
 Project management Strategic project leadership 
Basic paradigm Project are a collection of 
activities that need to be 
executed on time, budget, and 
requirements  
Projects are strategic 
organisational processes that 
are initiated to achieve business 
goals 
Focus Efficiency Effectiveness and efficiency 
Perspective Operational Strategic, operational, human 
Manager’s role Getting the job done – in 
time, budget, specifications 
Getting the business results 
winning in the market place 
Project 
management style 
One size fits all Adaptive approach 
Project definition Project scope (SOW), what 
needs to be done 
Product, competitive advantage, 
strategy, scope 
Planning Activity, schedule, budget End results, success 
dimensions, activities 
Project reviews Progress, status, milestones, 
budget 
Customer needs, strategy, 
success dimensions, status 
Human side Teams, conflict resolution Leadership, vision, spirit, 
meaning, motivation 
Source: Shenhar (2004) 
 
From the perspective of the present research, the SPL model can also extend the 
ʻmandate’ of the process promotor (see the Troika-model in figure 1.3). This is 
important because the more cross-institutional and cross-functional public 
sector innovation projects get, the more different leadership abilities of the 
project champion count. 
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As a conclusion of the organisational view on the innovation process sub-
chapter, we have developed the following sub-research question SRQ123 
related propositions to be tested throughout the empirical part of the thesis: 
 
PM1: Factors (including goals) influencing the innovation process in public 
sector services differ from those known from the private sector. 
 Arguments from the literature: Based upon extensive quantitative analysis in 
North America and across the Commonwealth countries, Borins (2001c, see 
also chapter 2) concluded that a common denominator of all the characteristics 
of public sector innovation is that they look very much like the private sector. 
However, in their Publin case study research, Vigoda-Gadot et al. (2005) 
received mixed results on this issue, where the majority of interviewees reported 
differences between innovation in the public and in the private sectors. During 
the interviews, Publin project team also found that the public sector is less 
willing to take risk than the private sector (see Koch and Hauknes, 2005 and 
sub-chapter 1.2). Røste and Miles (2005) similarly argue that differences 
between private and public sector innovation are less distinct and more nuanced 
than simplistic views would imply. This is very relevant for measurement of the 
two sectors and the question whether completely different tools are required 
(Bugge et al., 2010); see sub-chapter 1.2. We will test the proposition whether 
factors influencing the innovation process in public sector services differ to 
some extent from those known from the private sector in our empirical survey. 
 
PM2: Innovation goals in the public sector are polarised. 
 Arguments from the literature: Despite the innovation goals in the private 
sector (services) being skewed towards the quality issues (see Howells and 
Tether, 2004; chapter 2), due to multiple values and goals in the public sector 
(Willcocks and Harrow, 1992; sub-chapter 1.2), there is a reason to believe that 
possible goals in the public sector services are much more polar. Grout et al. 
(2003; sub-chapter 1.2) also stresses that the typical concern is that publicly 
controlled organisations, not subject to the discipline of the competitive market, 
may therefore lack incentives to control costs or provide quality of service and 
respond to the needs of consumers. 
 
PM3: The success of technological innovations in public sector services is 
below the initial expectations. 
 Arguments from the literature: This proposition is set up in order to discover 
how good are the innovation results in public sector services as compared to the 
initial expectations. The proposition is motivated by the fact that most 
governments experience problems when implementing large technology, mostly 
                                                                          
23  Managerial perspective – What are the key features influencing, supporting and 
hampering, the development and implementation of successful, technologically innovative 
public sector services (SRQ1)? 
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information technology projects. Budgets are exceeded, deadlines are overrun 
and often the quality of new systems is far below the standards agreed when the 
project was undertaken (see sub-chapter 3.3; Standish Group International, 
1995, 1996; Borins, 2001b). In addition, the larger the development, the more 
likely it is that it will be unsuccessful (Goldfinch, 2007) and explanations for 
failure include (see Heeks, 1999) data inadequacies, technical problems, 
management/process/technical skill shortages, cultural clashes, political 
infighting and external environmental factors. 
 
PM4: Innovation supporters in the public sector can be internal to the organi-
sation and external. 
 Arguments from the literature: Borins (2001b) supports the idea that inno-
vation supporters are always multi-factorial. Indeed, while he asked the 
respondents what was innovation in their programme, the most frequent charac-
teristic, observed in approximately 60 per cent of programmes, was ʻholism’, 
namely that the innovation depended on inter-organisation cooperation, that it 
delivered multiple services to individuals, or that it took a systems approach to a 
problem (see sub-chapter 1.3). Vigoda-Gadot et al. (2005) found that all of the 
participants could be initiators of innovation in the public sector. However, 
managers and frontline employees are the primary initiators of innovation, 
followed by employees, other organisational personnel and professionals, 
government and politicians, end-users and external organisations. While the 
majority of innovations in the public sector are top-down and policy-driven, 
findings show that interviewees generally see the organisation’s management or 
political parties rather than external organisations or the EU as the initiators of 
new approaches. Indeed, facilitators of innovation are predominantly internal, 
organisational forces that include the leadership and management, cultures open 
to change, supportive personnel and proper funding. External facilitators 
include the EU, the legislature, or national initiatives, as well as information, 
learning, and networking. 
 
PM5: Innovation barriers in the public sector are predominantly internal to the 
organisation. 
 Arguments from the literature: Vigoda-Gadot et al. (2005) claim that barriers 
to innovation in the public sector are predominantly internal to the organisation. 
Their findings show that interviewees perceive barriers to innovation as 
deriving from public service’s leadership and management (i.e. budget cuts or 
poor allocation of budget funds, and poor leadership). Additional obstacles are 
the traditional regulations and work routines, employee resistance, internal and 
external politics, poor learning environment, and end users’ resistance (see also 
chapter 2). Controversially, in private sector services, on a broad level, surveys 
tend to show that the external conditioning factors are seen as more significant 
barriers to firm innovation than internal barriers (see Howells and Tether, 
2004). 
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PM6: Personal leadership (i.e. existence of ‘key’ individuals) is an internally 
dominating factor supporting innovation in public sector services. 
 Arguments from the literature: Drucker (1985) states that entrepreneurs 
innovate. The importance of such ‘key’ individuals in the innovation process is 
stressed by many authors (see Koch and Hauknes, 2005; Rothwell, 1992). 
Indeed, Borins (2001b) supports the idea that innovation supporters are always 
multi-factorial and Altshuler (1997) stresses that people in government fear 
nothing more than newsworthy failure. Therefore, Teofilovic (2002) stresses 
that strong leadership is a necessary imperative for establishing a cohesive, yet 
flexible, workplace culture that encourages idea experimentation and tolerates 
ʻsmart failures’. Therefore, as it is put by Kubr (1988), managerial attitudes and 
behaviour in public sector organisations constitute a key issue which consultants 
have to deal with in most assignments; see also sub-chapter 1.1. It is known that 
analyses of public policy innovation span a wide-ranging set of policy issues, 
and identify multiple antecedents and consequences of those innovation policies 
(see for example Polsby, 1984; Kingdon, 1984; Schon, 1971). However, central 
to this research is the acknowledgement of a group of individuals who, as Schon 
(1971) describes them in the private sector, challenge the system, were 
irrationally committed to the inventions they championed, operated informally 
and subversively, exploited informal networks and mobilised outside pressures, 
engaged in life-long combat, and become heroes or martyrs to their cause. Such 
individuals have been variously referred to as ʻchampion,’ guerrilla,’ 
ʻentrepreneur,’ ʻrevolutionary,’ and ʻmissionary’ (Schon, 1971), as ʻinventor,’ 
ʻadapter,’ ʻpolicy entrepreneur,’ ʻbroker,’ and ʻincubator’ (Polsby, 1984), or as 
ʻadvocate,’ ʻbroker,’ and ʻpolicy entrepreneur’ (Kingdon, 1984). These 
individuals lead their ideas through a set of logically and institutionally required 
hurdles (Roberts and King, 1989). In their Troika-model of innovation 
promotors, Hauschildt and Kirchmann (2001) differentiate three different layers 
of these so-called public entrepreneurs: power promotor (at the top), process 
promotor (in the middle) and technical promotor at the expert or innovator level 
(at the bottom) (see also sub-chapters 1.3 and 3.1). Indeed, as discovered in the 
National Audit Office (2009) study, firstly senior management, then the policy 
team and only then equally the internal innovation team and frontline staff were 
responsible for innovations (see also sub-chapter 1.3). Therefore, we need to test 
the proposition of the importance middle level product champions in the public 
sector innovation process in our exploratory survey. 
 
 
3.2. Learning view on the innovation process 
The second layer of the conceptual framework of the present research is 
learning. Berry and Berry (1999: 171–7; 2007: 225–6) posit that governments 
emulate each other for one of four reasons: competition; learning; mandates; 
and public pressures. They argue that each of these variables will have a 
positive effect on the adoption of innovation. 
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W. Edwards Deming24 has put it perfectly in saying that “learning is not 
compulsory … neither is survival.” Knowledge plays a central role in 
innovation and production. According to Lundvall (1992), the fundamental 
resource in the modern economy is knowledge and, accordingly, the most 
important process is learning. The role of knowledge in the innovation process 
is strongly emphasised by the evolutionary literature (Nelson, 1995; Dosi, 1997; 
Metcalfe, 1998) as well as by the literature of the knowledge-based economy 
(Lundvall, 1993; Lundvall and Johnson, 1994; Cowan et al., 2000). In these 
contributions, knowledge becomes highly idiosyncratic at the firm level and 
does not diffuse automatically and freely among firms. Of the key components 
of a high-performance organisation, a learning mode is the most important. 
According to Hale (1996), a learning organisation places a premium on inno-
vation, risk taking, training, the right tools, communication, and measurement. 
In the framework of organisational learning, there are two important 
perspectives. The first perspective is related external environment. It reflects to 
the educational level of a country, to appropriateness and qualitative level of 
public research institutions (in the particular industrial field), as well as to the 
general international competitiveness of a particular industry (suppliers, buyers, 
competitors). The other side is organisational, sometimes also called as 
absorptive capacity (see figure 3.5). Introduced by Wesley Cohen and Daniel 
Levinthal in a seminal paper in the Economic Journal, absorptive capacity refers 
to one of a firm’s fundamental learning processes: its ability to identify, 
assimilate, and exploit knowledge from the environment. These three 
dimensions encompass not only the ability to imitate other firm’s products and 
processes, but also the ability to exploit less commercially focused knowledge, 
such as scientific research. Developing and maintaining absorptive capacity is 
critical to a firm’s long-term survival and success because absorptive capacity 
can reinforce, complement, or refocus the firm’s knowledge base (Lane et al., 
2006). From this perspective, the basics of the innovation theory should tell that 
organisations, both from the private as well as public sector, should be cleverer 
tomorrow, as they were yesterday. Quite simple. Indeed, too many organisations 
and nations are failing in this aspect. This is one of the fundamental reasons 
why many countries reach and stay in the so-called middle-income trap.25 
                                                                          
24  W. Edwards Deming was a U.S. business advisor and author (1900-1993); quoted in Bill 
Lucas (2005) Discover Your Hidden Talents, Strafford: Network Educational Press Ltd. 
25  The middle-income trap is an economic development situation, where a country that 
attains a certain income (due to given advantages), will get stuck at that level. This is a 
failure in many countries to progress from growth fuelled by resources and cheap labour to 
growth driven by higher productivity. Typically, as wages, rise manufacturers of a particular 
country often find themselves unable to compete in export markets with lower-cost 
producers elsewhere; yet they still find themselves behind the advanced economies in 
higher-value products. The World Bank calls the middle-income range about US$1,000 to 
US$12,000 gross national income per person measured in 2010 money. 
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After conducting a detailed analysis of 289 absorptive capacity papers from 
14 journals, Lane et al. (2006) suggest a more detailed definition of the 
construct (than Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Absorptive capacity is a firm’s 
ability to utilise externally held knowledge through three sequential processes: 
 Recognising and understanding potentially valuable new knowledge 
outside the firm through exploratory learning; 
 Assimilating valuable new knowledge through transformative learning; 
 Using the assimilated knowledge to create new knowledge and commer-
cial outputs through exploitative learning. 
 
 
Figure 3.5 A model of absorptive capacity, its antecedents, and its outcomes (Lane et 
al., 2006) 
 
Absorptive capacity also overlaps with dynamic capability. However, according 
to Teece et al. (1997: 516), dynamic capability is more internally focused, and it 
is defined as “the firm’s ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and 
external competences to address rapidly changing environments.” It thus 
reflects an organisation’s ability to achieve new and innovative forms of 
competitive advantage given path dependencies and market positions. 
Individuals and organisations generate possibilities for innovation by ob-
serving and reflecting on what others are doing and thinking, and by 
benchmarking themselves against good practices – wherever it might be found. 
Systemic scanning can identify promising ideas (Mulgan and Albury, 2003). In 
the public sector context, benchmarking and organisational learning is often 
tackled in the frame of policy learning (see chapter 1 for additional elabo-
rations). Policy learning is not anything new; however, as said by Dolowitz and 
Marsh (2000), the technological advances (but also international organisations) 
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have made it easier and faster for policy-makers to communicate with each 
other, and therefore the occurrences of policy transfer have increased. 
In the present research, we believe that knowledge, institutionally accumu-
lated and personal, has also been a major driving force behind the innovation 
process in the public sector. We strongly support the view that it is equally 
important to improve internal capabilities, as well as to learn externally – from 
the private sector, from other public sector institutions, from voluntary 
organisations, from different knowledge bodies (e.g. academic institutions), and 
from technology providers – locally, nationally and internationally. It is also 
important to learn from one’s own mistakes or those of others, and to discover 
any available best practices appropriate to improve one’s own processes, 
products and services. It is important to have close relationships with external 
partners, e.g. technology providers and user representatives. 
From the innovation system (IS) perspective, there are three kinds of 
learning (Edquist, 2004): 
(1) Innovation (in new products as well as processes) takes place mainly in 
firms and leads to the creation of ʻstructural capital’, which is a 
knowledge related asset controlled by firms (as opposed to ʻhuman 
capital’); it is a matter of organisational learning; 
(2) Research and Development (R&D) is carried out in universities and 
public research organisations as well as in firms and leads to publicly 
available knowledge as well as knowledge owned by firms and other 
organisations and by individuals; 
(3) Competence Building (e.g. training and education) which occurs in 
schools and universities (schooling, education) as well as in firms, and 
leads to the creation of ʻhuman capital’. Since human capital is 
controlled by individuals, it is a matter of individual learning. 
 
Learning organisations seek knowledge as the basis for competition in the 
twenty-first century. Mobilising and managing knowledge becomes a primary 
task and many of the recipes offered for achieving this depend upon mobilising 
a much higher level of participation in innovative problem-solving and on 
building such routines into the fabric of organisational life (Garvin, 1993; 
Leonard-Barton, 1995; Senge, 1990a). Innovation can be represented as a 
learning cycle, involving a process of experiment, experience, reflection and 
consolidation. Managing the process is primarily a function of the creation of 
conditions under which learning opportunities emerge and are exploited. A key 
determinant of relative success or failure is the ability to manage this learning 
cycle in explicit form – for example, in the development of new products or the 
implementation of new process technology (Bowen, 1994; Hayes et al., 1988; 
Maidique et al., 1985). Organisations do not learn – it is the people within them 
who do. According to Garvin (1993) the following mechanisms are important to 
mobilise individual and shared learning (see also Tidd et al., 2001): 
 Training and development of staff; 
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 Development of a formal learning process based on a problem-solving 
cycle; 




 Challenging existing practices; 
 Use of different perspectives; 
 Reflection – learning from the past. 
 
Indeed, organisations seek to apply formal techniques and new information 
systems to help them make more effective use of their data resources (e.g. data 
mining), information assets (e.g. Enterprise Resource Systems) and expertise 
(e.g. groupware and collaborative systems) raising the specific issue of Knowl-
edge Management (Miles, 2003). Organisational learning and an emphasis on 
human resources and intangible assets of all sorts become more of a central 
concern, with management tools being developed to help effective choice and 
improvement of systems. 
The evolutionary literature has proposed that sectors and technologies differ 
greatly in terms of knowledge base and learning processes related to innovation 
(see for example Malerba, 2000b). First, the knowledge domain spans 
applications, users and demands of sectoral products. Second, the domain 
reflects the specific scientific and technological fields at the base of innovative 
activities in a sector (Dosi, 1988; Nelson and Rosenberg, 1993), as well as the 
sources of technological opportunities, which differ across sectors. Freeman 
(1982) and Rosenberg (1982) among others have shown that in some sectors 
opportunity conditions are related to major scientific breakthroughs in uni-
versities. In other sectors, opportunities to innovate may often come from 
advances in R&D, equipment and instrumentation. In still other sectors, external 
sources of knowledge in terms of suppliers or users may play a crucial role. 
Indeed, not all external knowledge may be easily used and transformed into 
new artefacts. If external knowledge is easily accessible, transformable into new 
artefacts and exposed to many actors (such as customers and suppliers), then 
innovative entry may take place (Winter, 1984). On the contrary, if advanced 
integration capabilities are necessary (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989), the industry 
may be concentrated and formed of large established firms. Third, the domain 
relates to the degree of accessibility of knowledge (Malerba and Orsenigo, 
2000), i.e. opportunities of gaining knowledge that are external to firms. Knowl-
edge that is accessible may be internal or external to the sector. In both cases, 
greater accessibility of knowledge decreases industrial concentration. Another 
dimension states that knowledge may be also cumulative, i.e. the degree to 
which the generation of new knowledge builds upon current knowledge 
(Malerba, 2002b). He identifies three different sources of cumulativeness. The 
first source is learning processes and dynamic increasing returns at the 
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technology level. The cognitive nature of learning processes and the past 
knowledge constrain current research, but also generate new questions and new 
knowledge. The second source is related to organisational capabilities. These 
capabilities are firm specific and can be improved only gradually over time. 
They implicitly define what a firm learns and what it can hope to achieve in the 
future. A third source is the feedbacks from the market, such as ʻsuccess-breeds-
success’ processes. Innovative success yields profits that can be reinvested in 
R&D, thereby increasing the probability to innovate again. 
Indeed, even if there has been a growing culture of evaluation over the last 
two decades in most advanced economies, many public sector organisations are 
still essentially navigation blind when it comes to real-time, relevant manage-
ment information on performance (Bason, 2010). Mainstream evaluation studies 
are usually heavily retrospective, and often arrive far too late to inform policy 
decisions in a meaningful way (Pollitt, 2003). Bason stresses that when it comes 
to their development efforts, public sector organisation “seem to spend 80 per 
cent of their energies on understanding the past and (at best) managing the 
present, and perhaps only 20 per cent of their efforts on systematically 
exploring future directions for better policies and services” (p. 19). 
Therefore, the best way for somebody’s development is adequate, timely and 
inspiring feedback. Alternatively, an important influence is to give somebody 
also a new and more ambitious task, which requires more effort and external 
knowledge accruing. And finally, a classical and formal schooling, carefully 
planned and executed, is also important. 
As seen, the key component of a high-performance organisation is a 
dynamic learning mode. A learning organisation places a premium on inno-
vation, risk taking, training, the right tools, communication, and measurement 
(Hale, 1996). Senge (1990b: 7) quoted W. Edwards Deming’s belief that we 
have been systematically destroying the very attributes needed by a high 
performance organisation: “People are born with intrinsic motivation, self-
esteem, dignity, curiosity to learn, joy in learning. The forces of destruction 
begin with toddlers – a price for the best Halloween costume, grades in school, 
gold stars, and on up through the university. On the job, people, teams, 
divisions are ranked – reward for one at the top, punishing at the bottom. MBO, 
quotas, incentive pay, business plans … cause further loss, unknown and 
unknowable.” According to Senge (1990b), primary institutions are oriented 
predominately towards controlling rather than learning, rewarding individuals 
for performing for others rather than for cultivating their natural curiosity and 
impulse to learn. Successful organisations encourage employee innovation as a 
way to produce measurable improvements in quality, quantity, and cost-
effectiveness (Hale, 1996). 
In The Fifth Discipline, Senge (1990a) identifies five new ʻcomponent 
technologies’ that he claimed were gradually converting to learning organi-
sations – systems thinking, personal mastery, mental models, building shared 
vision, and team learning. 
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Also, as seen in the previous sub-chapter, innovation and risk taking are 
inseparable in a learning organisation, which Spear (1993: 14) defines as “a 
place of truth-seeking and speaking without fear of reprisal or judgement … a 
place where curiosity reigns over knowing and where experimentation is 
welcome.” Therefore, successful organisations permit employees to be creative 
and to take risks to find better ways to run a programme, deliver a service, or 
create a product. The structure of a learning organisation insulates them from 
the usual bureaucratic disapproval of risk taking or failure. Creating this 
environment is not possible, however, without the support of top leaders, as 
discussed in the previous sub-chapter. 
From the economics perspective, in his ʻNew Growth Model’, Kekkonen 
(2000, see figure 3.6) gives the central position to knowledge, information and 
innovations, which get inputs from education, research and technology, and 
give output via increased productivity to economic growth, growth of exports, 
higher employment, regional development and increase in welfare. 
 
 
Figure 3.6 New Growth Model – Sources of Economic Growth (Kekkonen, 2006) 
 
According to Bloch (2010), dissemination of innovations and learning activities 
are an important part of innovation in public sector institutions, and it also has 
direct policy relevance in a number of ways: how do public sector institutions 
encourage learning as an organisation? Moreover, how do they seek and access 
information from other actors. In terms of policy relevance, interest here stems 
both from a desire to increase learning, exchange of best practices, and so on 
across public institutions, and a strong interest in increasing the public sector’s 
contribution to business sector growth and innovation: public-private inter-













There are two directions at play here (e.g. in knowledge management): 
dissemination (outbound) and learning (inbound) (Bloch, 2010). Business 
innovation surveys generally focus on inbound diffusion and collaboration, 
though there are some examples here of surveying dissemination methods. The 
Audit Commission (2007) examined both directions, with more or less the same 
list of methods: special launch events, local seminars, sending guest speakers, 
regional networking meetings, own website, national seminars, journal articles, 
central website, mailshot, hardcopy newsletter, email newsletter. The Audit 
Office stresses that a further key benefit of innovation is the potential for its 
application beyond the authority where it originates. Many local public bodies 
face the same challenges and can support each other in identifying oppor-
tunities, sharing ideas and highlighting potential risks. In the private sector, the 
need for a distinctive position in the marketplace may inhibit knowledge 
transfer to competitors (indeed, the concept of open innovation becomes more 
popular). However, in the public sector, improvement can be driven by 
collaboration and the transfer of knowledge between organisations. 
Finally, according to Thenint (2010), if Europe seeks to be a dynamic and 
innovative knowledge-based economy, this is not a matter simply of 
transforming high-technology sectors. Public services are among the most 
knowledge-intensive and value added of all sectors, and thus obviously also 
need to be part of this mobilisation. Public services and public administration 
represent a significant part of the European socioeconomic activity; Europe’s 
public services account for between 40 per cent and 55 per cent of GDP and 
public services-related employment accounts for between one-quarter and one-
third of the total EU working-age population, and public employment (civil 
servants) represents more than 15 per cent of the total employment in the EU. 
Taking into account the large (and growing) proportion of public 
administration in Europe, the success of Europe is highly dependent on its 
ability to learn, to be creative, and surely more effective and efficient compared 
to the past. Moreover, as the National Audit Office (2009) rightly points out, the 
innovation lifecycle depends on more than just good ideas. Implementing 
successful innovations in the public sector depends upon clear drivers, strong 
incentives, good ideas, an absence of barriers to their implementation, and 
means for learning and replicating success (see figure 3.7). In addition, there is 
a reason and there are mechanisms for learning lessons from successful as well 




Figure 3.7 Implementing successful innovations in the public sector (National Audit 
Office, 2009) 
 
According to the National Audit Office (2009) public departments should also 
encourage innovation from suppliers, by early engagement to find out what 
solutions suppliers have to offer to policy problems, and commissioning for 
outcomes rather than procuring predetermined products; from citizens, by 
explicitly involving them in service design, learning from customers’ 
experience of services, and applying the Government Standard for Customer 
Service Excellence and measuring progress against it; and from other 
organisations, by encouraging greater openness and exchange of people and 
knowledge. It is also important to continuously improve learning processes as 
well as disseminate learning about successful innovation across government. 
And it is always wise testing and piloting when trying something new, and 
quickly identifying what is not working. 
Finally, as pointed out by Walker et al. (2011), government leaders and 
managers learn from each other, and emulate governments’ innovations that 
have been successful elsewhere in achieving goals or are popular with the 
voting public. Indeed the theory, and way it has been tested, does not indicate if 
these constructs apply to: (1) all innovations; (2) all localities that adopt 
innovations or just those that are more innovative; or (3) different types of 
innovation. Their study on local governments in the UK proved the fact. For 
example, high innovative localities seemed to be influenced by a different set of 
factors than low innovative ones are. The high innovative jurisdictions learned 
from professional associations, listened and responded to their primary govern-
mental stakeholder (central government) and did not search for innovative ideas 
from other local authorities. In other words, learning and central government 
policies drove high innovative authorities (they look beyond their immediate 
environment for innovation), while low innovative authorities can be 
characterised as reacting: most of the heavy lifting in low innovative authorities 
was attributable to the internal determinants and responses to local pressures 
(Walker et al., 2011). 
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Due to the importance of different types of learning in the public sector and 
governmental affairs, the survey of the present thesis will have a substantial 
amount of focus on this topic. We are especially trying to understand 
(empirically test) what the importance of learning in relation to concrete 




As a conclusion of the learning view on the innovation process sub-chapter, 
we have developed the following sub-research question SRQ226 related 
propositions be tested throughout the empirical part of the thesis: 
 
PL1: Technological innovation in the public sector services requires a broad 
range of managerial and organisational improvements. 
 Arguments from the literature: According to Røste (2005), the cumulative 
accumulation of knowledge and skills, i.e. the whole learning process, is crucial 
for innovation in the public sector. A similar finding is supported by Koch and 
Haukens (2005), who claim that in order to learn and innovate the actors in the 
public sector must interact with other actors, this being people, organisations or 
various sources of information; see sub-chapter 3.4. In the context of policy 
learning, Kemp and Weehuizen (2004) suggests in making a distinction 
between three types of learning: technical learning (about instruments), 
conceptual learning (about goals, strategies) and social learning (about societal 
values, responsibilities, appropriate ways of interacting, policy approaches), see 
sub-chapter 1.3. Indeed, what is not known from the present literature is the 
relative importance these and other factors, both in terms of innovation barriers 
as well possible knowledge areas improved while innovating. 
 
PL2: External learning and consultation plays a positive role in successful 
public service innovations. 
 Arguments from the literature: Not all the new ideas are generated inside the 
focal organisation; some are generated externally but are adopted by the 
organisation (Damanpour and Gopalakrishnan, 1998). The better the actors at 
developing networks that can help them get access to the relevant competences 
and partners that can help them in their learning processes, the greater the 
chances that their innovation processes will succeed (Kemp and Weehuizen, 
2004; see sub-chapter 1.3). From the organisation’s perspective, this altogether 
reflects in the absorptive capacity – the firm’s fundamental learning processes: 
its ability to identify, assimilate, and exploit knowledge from the environment 
(Cohen and Levinthal, 1989 and see sub-chapter 3.2). Developing and 
maintaining absorptive capacity is critical to a firm’s long-term survival and 
                                                                          
26  Learning perspective – Which managerial and organisational improvements are 
necessary to innovate in public sector services (SRQ2)? 
129 
success because absorptive capacity can reinforce, complement, or refocus the 
firm’s knowledge base (Lane et al., 2006). Controversially, taking into account 
the importance of different innovation champions that the literature stresses (see 
the previous proposition), one might conclude that real innovation is an 
exploratory and self-driven process without too much external learning and 
consultancy used. Moreover, as concluded for the private sector by Winter 
(1984), not all external knowledge may be easily used and transformed into new 
artefacts. If external knowledge is easily accessible, transformable into new 
artefacts and exposed to many actors (such as customers and suppliers), then 
innovative entry may take place. 
 
PL3: Innovation-related learning in public sector services is cumulative and can 
result equally from previous positive and negative experiences, internally and 
externally. 
 Arguments from the literature: Innovation management literature (e.g. 
Rothwell et al., 1974; Rothwell, 1974, 1992; Tidd et al., 2001; sub-chapter 3.1) 
suggests that success is multi-factorial and studies show that, in general, 
successful innovators outperform failures across the board. Moreover, success is 
a matter of competence in all functions, and of balance and coordination 
between them, and not of doing one or two things brilliantly well (Cooper and 
Kleinschmidt, 1988). According to Bloch (2010) the willingness to take on risk 
and the ability to learn from failures are important issues for public sector 
innovation. This motivates gaining more information on failures, both 
implemented changes (innovations) that did not meet their objectives or had 
negative impacts, and innovation projects that were abandoned. Therefore, we 
support the view that innovation and risk-taking are influenced by previous 
experiences, both within the organisation and outside. Literature also suggests 
that innovation can be represented as a learning cycle (or learning mode), 
involving a process of experiment, experience, reflection and consolidation. 
Managing the process is primarily a function of the creation of conditions under 
which learning opportunities emerge and are exploited. A key determinant of 
relative success or failure is the ability to manage this learning cycle in explicit 
form (Hale, 1996; Bowen, 1994; Hayes et al., 1988; Maidique et al., 1985). 
According to Bloch (2010), there are two directions in this respect at play: 
dissemination (outbound) and learning (inbound). Indeed, even if there has been 
a growing culture of evaluation and policy learning over the last two decades in 
most advanced economies, many public sector organisations are still essentially 
navigation blind when it comes to real-time, relevant management information 
on performance (Bason, 2010) and applying past experiences and best practices 
available. Also, available empirical exercises have not tried to quantify and 
compare the relative importance of learning from previous experiences (within 




3.3. Technological view on the innovation process 
The technological view is the third conceptual layer of this research as it is an 
important transformation facilitator in the public sector. Historically, govern-
ments, public administration and the military have played a vital role in creating 
and defining technologies of energy, materials, communication together with 
the emergent information society – usually through initiation of R&D projects 
and through the establishment of government as a potential customer for new 
technologies when no private market existed. This relates to all four techno-
logical developments – machine tabulation, electronic computers, micro-
processors, and the Internet (for further elaboration, see Jorgensen and Klay, 
2001). Although there is a substantial amount of policy focus on e-government 
and other forms of ICT-based innovation for the public sector, the literature of 
public administration (see also chapter 1) has until quite recently mostly ignored 
that historic role of governments in technology innovations. 
Despite that, there are different ways how government can boost innovation 
and government can also innovate itself, as discussed in the previous chapter. 
Indeed, much of today’s innovations in public sector are linked to the Internet and 
communication technologies (broadband and high-speed technologies) leading 
the way to so-called information innovations (compared to former merely 
technological innovations). According to Magnus (2007), both technological and 
information innovations are creating greater efficiencies and opportunities, for 
example in healthcare and education, perhaps two key areas for the future as we 
confront the challenges of population ageing and globalisation. 
While analysing the relative importance of ICT in boosting national wealth 
in Estonia, Tiits and Rebane (2009) found that state service improvements lie 
somewhere in the middle of the opportunity scale (see figure 3.8). Based on 
empirical research, areas where ICT influence was considered more important 
(in reflection to economic growth) were education, energy, industry, cyber-
security, culture, and transport. On the other hand, areas where ICT influence 
was considered relatively lower than the government were digital divide, 
environment, performance patterns, financial services, social services, agri-
culture, labour market, retail trade, tourism, and entertainment. 
What Tiits and Rebane also showed is that in addition to the relative 
importance of ICT use in a particular sector to economic growth, one should 
assess other factors (and their interdependency) influencing ICT take-up in a 
particular sector (including government), such as resistance to change, 
availability of appropriate technological competences in that particular sector in 
a country, but also on local and global technology demand in these sectors (see 
figure 3.8). From that perspective, government shows one of the highest score 
in change resistance, together with education, social services, and the labour 
market. Therefore, when analysing technological innovation in public sector 
services, one should keep in mind that there are both objective and subjective 





Figure 3.8 Relative importance of ICT in boosting economic growth in Estonia (Tiits 
and Rebane, 2009) 
 
From a strictly government perspective, it is known from more than a decade of 
research that most governments experience problems when implementing large 
technology, mostly information technology projects. Budgets are exceeded, 
deadlines are over-run and often the quality of new systems is far below the 
standards agreed when the project was undertaken. Moreover, governments are 
not alone in failing. Evidence suggests that private sector companies have 
similar problems. The Standish Group attracted a good deal of attention for its 
Chaos Report, a 1995 study of 8,400 IT projects in the public and private 
sectors in the United States. The study found that 31 per cent were cancelled 
before completion; 53 per cent were completed, but over budget and with less 
than full functionality, and only 16 per cent of the projects were completed on 
time and within budget (Standish Group International, 1995; 1996). Due to its 
economic purposes (to gain IT consultancy business), the report slightly over-
dramatised the IT problem (see Borins, 2001b), i.e. the assumption that a project 
not completed on time or within budget should be considered a failure is highly 
questionable. Indeed, the larger the development, the more likely it is that it will 
be unsuccessful (Goldfinch, 2007) and explanations for failure include (see 
Heeks, 1999) data inadequacies, technical problems, management/ 
process/technical skill shortages, cultural clashes, political infighting and 
external environmental factors. 
Therefore, large IT projects, similarly to other governmental innovations, 
can pose great political risks (as also discussed in previous chapter). Ministers 
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waste of taxpayer money. These significant economic losses comprise not only 
outright waste in exceeded budgets and abandoned projects, but also – and 
equally important – lost opportunities for enhanced effectiveness and efficiency 
as wrote by OECD experts (OECD, 2001b). Also, according to United Nations 
(2003), from a less successful perspective (i.e. no public value created), one can 
talk about such developments that are (a) wasteful (engages resources but does 
not result in optimisation of government operations); (b) pointless [even if it 
optimises government operations, it has no (or only minimal) effect on the 
development objectives preferred by society]. 
Despite dangers and failures in history, most OECD member countries have 
formulated ambitious action plans for implementing e-government. The aim is 
to move service delivery to the World Wide Web, to enhance information to 
citizens and to make public sector workplaces smarter for the benefit of citizens, 
politicians and servants alike (OECD, 2001b). For example, the Danish e-
government vision is systematically to use digital technologies to introduce new 
ways of thinking, transform organisations and work processes to improve the 
quality of service and efficiency (see Nielsen, 2006). 
According to Heeks (2006), e-government systems (see figure 3.9) are 
information systems that are socio-technical: combining the technical and the 
human. Heeks stresses that most of the e-government initiatives fail due to their 
poor implementation and management. According to his earlier work (Heeks, 
2001), there are seven dimensions necessary and sufficient to provide the 
understanding of e-government design-reality gaps: (1) information; (2) tech-
nology; (3) processes; (4) objectives and values; (5) staffing and skills; 
(6) management structures and skills; (7) other resources: time and money. This 
is most probably true also in terms of e-government successes. However, it is 
not known how important it is compared to other possible drivers. Therefore, 
the present research analyses the social factor in technologically innovative 





Figure 3.9 Full model of e-government (Heeks, 2006) 
 
Driven from past experiences, the OECD has concluded that unless govern-
ments learn to manage the risks connected with large public IT projects, these 
ʻe-dreams’ (i.e. ambiguous action plans for implementing e-government) could 
turn into global nightmares. “Governments must get the fundamentals of IT 
right if they want to harvest the huge potential of going online,” states OECD 
(p. 1). 
In order to get ʻIT right’, according to OECD (2001b), the following basics 
should be followed: 
 Establish appropriate governance structures; 
 Think small; 
 Use known technologies; 
 Identify and manage risk; 
 Ensure compliance with best practices for project management; 
 Hold business managers accountable; 
 Recruit and retain talent; 
 Prudently manage knowledge; 
 Establish environments of trust with private vendors; and 
 Involve end-users. 
 
While internal obstacles (such as collaboration for seamless services) are 
important, external barriers need to be addressed on a whole of government 
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e-government development can be the following (see also OECD 2003b, 2004 
and Stauffacher, 2002): 
Internal barriers: 
 Lack of leadership – lack of both top- and project level leadership, 
visions and will; 
 Centric values – agencies typically evaluate their IT systems according to 
how well they serve the agency’s processes and needs – not how well 
they respond to citizens’ needs; 
 Technology leverage – in the 1990s, government agencies used IT to 
automate existing procedures, rather than to create more efficient and 
effective solutions; 
 Island of automation – agencies too buy with systems that address 
internal needs, consequently, citizens have to search across multiple 
agencies to get service; 
 Resistance to change – budgetary processes, agency cultures and fear of 
reorganisation create resistance to integrating work and sharing use of 
systems across several agencies. 
External barriers: 
 Legislative and regulatory barriers can impede the uptake of e-govern-
ment – i.e. e-government processes can be adopted if they have the same 
standing as the equivalent paper processes, etc.; 
 Budgetary frameworks can restrict e-government initiatives – existing 
budgetary arrangements fund rather departments than cross-organi-
sational, government-wide projects; 
 The adoption of e-government solutions can lag behind technological 
change – governments face risks in fostering e-government while un-
certainties exist regarding to technological change. 
 The digital divide impedes the benefits of e-government – this can nullify 
the advantages of online access that are impossible to replace offline, 
such as the drawing together of information. 
 
In conclusion, even if most governments have experienced problems when 
implementing large technology projects, the reasons have been different – 
mainly internal to the organisation but also external. Therefore, both technology 
adoption and technological innovation are highly risky businesses, which should 
be properly planned and executed, managed and monitored. Acquiring external 
knowledge and systematically developing internal capabilities are the 
cornerstones in this process. 
From another angle, e-government is more about government than ʻe’ 
(electronic) (OECD, 2003b). It enables better policy outcomes, higher quality 
services and greater engagement of citizens. E-government initiatives refocus 
attention on a number of issues: how to collaborate more effectively across 
agencies to address complex, shared problems; how to enhance customer focus; 
135 
and how to build relationships with private sector partners. Based on that,  
e-government can be defined as the use of ICTs, particularly the Internet, as a 
tool to achieve better government (OECD, 2004a). The United Nations defines 
e-government as a government that applies ICTs to transform its internal and 
external relationships to optimise government service delivery, constituency 
participation and governance (United Nations, 2003; Gartner Group, 2000).  
E-government is the government’s use of technology, particularly web-based 
Internet applications, to enhance the access to and delivery of government 
information and services to citizens, business partners, and employees, other 
agencies, and government agencies (Stowers, 2005). E-government improves 
democracy – e-democracy is a natural part of the e-government strategy, putting 
the citizen in the centre of the government. E-government is justified if it 
enhances the capacity of public administration to increase the supply of public 
value, i.e. the things that people want. Public value refers to the value created by 
government through the provision of services, the passing of laws and 
regulations and other actions. The key things that people value tend to fall into 
three categories: outcomes, services and trust (United Nations, 2003). 
There are several ways how ʻe’ can improve the government (see OECD, 
2003c, for example). E-government can improve efficiency and effectiveness; it 
can improve and personalise services; it might help to achieve specific policy 
outcomes and contribute to economic policy objectives; it can be a major 
contributor to reform, as well as helping in building trust between governments 
and citizens. However, according to Püüa (2006), technology brings measurable 
value only if it eliminates a factor, which significantly constrains the 
improvement of (current) results. Technology adds value only if its price is 
smaller than the value it creates. 
Hamel (2000) stresses that ʻe’ without ʻi’, that is, ʻe’ without real innovation, 
is not very much. First, he does not think that there is such thing as an  
ʻe-business model’ in a pure sense and that ʻe’ is just another technology that 
does a variety of things. And allowing to distribute digital content extraordinary 
efficiently, it allows you to answer customer queries more efficiently, and it 
allows you to remove layers of bureaucracy and process in large organisations. 
Therefore, ʻe’ can support one’s core business, not replace it. Hamel also 
stresses that created efficiency may not end up on the bottom line (i.e. profits) 
because many companies have very similar e-strategies, they are based on 
similar platforms (e.g. SAP), and they are supported by the same handful of IT 
consultants (e.g. IBM Global Services or PWC). Hamel suggests that any 
executive needs to ask his/her CIO in a large company what they are doing to 
build a unique industry competitive advantage? Another reason for ʻe’ not 
raising but rather diminishing productivity and efficiency is that in the same 
way that the Internet is helping many companies to reduce costs and gain 
efficiency, it is also giving customers a lot more power in the overall purchasing 
equation. Although indirectly, this is also true in the public sector. 
136 
Literature (United Nations, 2003; OECD, 2003b, 2004) proposes many 
principles of successful e-government, which can be categorised as follows: (I) 
Policy: (a) priority development and government involvement, (b) political and 
administrative will, leadership and long-term political commitment. (II) 
Economy: (a) efficiency and effectiveness as key success criteria of government 
involvement, (b) financing, ability of initial funding and understood costs of the 
project, (c) accountability, (d) monitoring and evaluation, (e) perception of 
added value. (III) Framework conditions: (a) co-ordination within and between 
government agencies, (b) integration to broader policy and service delivery 
goals, (c) legal framework, (d) ICT infrastructure, (e) partnerships, (f) inter-
agency collaboration, (g) skills and culture of the civil service, (h) plans for 
development of human capital and technical infrastructure. (IV) User: (a) access 
and skills of users, (b) user choice, (c) public/user engagement, (d) privacy and 
security. 
Finally, as said by OECD (2003b), in the public sector, the e-government 
phenomenon has challenged the existing ways of working. ICT needs to be 
incorporated into a package of modernisation, organisational change and related 
reforms (including greater teamwork, flexibility in working agreements and 
remuneration and enhanced knowledge management practices) that challenge 
public governance frameworks. There will not be a single model of an  
e-government enabled organisation. E-government co-ordinators should use 
ICTs as a tool to facilitate change, and should not attempt to restructure public 
administration around current technology. 
E-government can be classified in several ways. As discussed earlier, public 
services, as well as e-government services, can be differentiated by their 
activity, field and target sector. According to Stowers (2005), there are nine 
primary types of e-government activity: (1) information access and delivery, 
(2) document access and download, (3) interactive information access (online 
databases), (4) communication with officials, (5) paperless document filing 
(online forms), (6) interactive discussions, (7) online mapping (e.g. GIS 
applications), (8) e-commerce applications, and (9) multimedia – streaming and 
playback. 
Willcocks and Harrow (1992) separate so-called fields of government, in the 
present time and context, as well as e-government. These are personal and 
environmental health services personal social services, probation and after-care 
services, police services, prison services, social security services, employment 
and training services, and housing, recreation, transport and education 
authorities/services. According to W’O Okut-Uma (2001), there are also  
e-services related to passports/citizenship, defence, power and water utility, 
inland revenue, etc. We see that these classifications are quite incoherent and 
therefore suggest that everyone studying public or e-government services 
should develop his/her own unique framework that allows both appropriate 
representation and comparability of cases/results. 
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E-government services can be distinguished also according to their target 
sectors. Although e-government encompasses a wide range of activities and 
actors, three distinct sectors can be identified (see for example Bonham et al., 
2003; Seifert, 2003). These include government-to-government services (G2G); 
government-to-business services (G2B); and government-to-citizen services 
(G2C). Some observers also indicate a fourth sector, government to employee 
(G2E). However, since G2E operations are intra-agency activities, they can be 
considered a subset of the G2G sector. 
In many respects, the government-to-government (G2G) sector represents 
the backbone of e-government. Some observers suggest that governments 
(federal, state, local) must enhance and update their own internal systems and 
procedures before electronic transactions with businesses and citizens can be 
successful (Atkinson et al., 2000). G2G e-government involves sharing data and 
conducting electronic exchanges between government actors. This involves 
both intra- and inter-agency exchanges at the federal level, as well as exchanges 
between the federal, state and local levels (Seifert, 2003). There are a number of 
forces motivating G2G e-government initiatives, for example legislation. 
Government-to-business (G2B) initiatives receive a significant amount of 
attention, in part because of the high enthusiasm of the business sector and the 
potential for reducing costs through improved procurement practices and 
increased competition (Gilbert, 2001). G2B initiatives also link to different B2G 
reporting areas (including statistics, taxes, etc.), where the interest in simple, 
faster, cheaper and more automated communication is mutual. 
Government-to-citizen (G2C) initiatives are designed to facilitate citizen 
interaction with government, which is what some observers perceive to be the 
primary goal of e-government. These initiatives attempt to make transactions, 
such as renewing licences and certifications, paying taxes, and applying for 
benefits, less time-consuming and easier to carry out (Seifert, 2003). It is also 
suggested suggest that one of the goals of implementing these initiatives should 
be to create a ʻone-stop-shopping’ site where citizens can carry out a variety of 
tasks, especially those that involve multiple agencies, without requiring the 
citizen to initiate contacts with each agency individually (Hasson, 2001; 
Matthews, 2000). 
According to Rose (2005), the supply and demand of Internet services 
(Internet capital) is determined by a country’s collective and individual capital. 
He believes that while some features of Internet capital are of pervasive 
significance for society, such as its national income, others are especially 
relevant to the Internet, such as the nationwide penetration of telecommu-
nication facilities. Collective national capital is essential for the supply of 
Internet infrastructure. Low-income countries have been unable to afford heavy 
investment in telecommunication facilities, and governments that censor the 
print and broadcasting media hesitate to promote a new medium that opponents 
can use to open up political debate. Local capital is a precondition for supplying 
Internet access to community. In many countries, there are great differences 
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between urban and rural areas in the supply of libraries, secondary schools and 
other facilities where Internet access may be made publicly available. In the 
absence of Internet infrastructure, individuals do not have a choice about going 
online, for the means of doing so are not at hand. This is the context in which 
most governments operate and in which the majority of the world’s population 
today lives. 
The normative literature agrees that there are different stages in e-govern-
ment provision and governments are going through a number of stages before 
reaching maturity (Irani, 2006). There are different frameworks developed to 
describe or assess the stages of e-government development (for example 
Gartner Group, 2000; Howard, 2001; Chandler et al., 2002; Layne et al., 2001; 
United Nations, 2002; Silcock, 2001; Moon, 2002; Rambøll, 2004; Capgemini, 
2006; Windley, 2002; Atallah, 2001; OECD 2004a; UNO, 2003; UNPAN, 
2006). These frameworks tend to have three to five stages (see figure 3.10), 
starting from the simple online presence of an organisation (i.e. posting of basic 
information) up to seamless or fully integrated web presence of government 
services (i.e. integrated services, data sharing, common platforms, e-voting). 
 
 
Figure 3.10 Integrated framework of the stages of e-government development (com-
posed by the author; based on the literature, including Capgemini 2006, 2007; Layne 
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The highest order of evolution for an e-government initiative is sometimes also 
called ʻtransformation’. There are, indeed, very few examples of this type of 
initiative, in part due to administrative, technical, and fiscal constraints (Seifert, 
2003). One of the distinctions of these initiatives is that they facilitate the 
seamless flow of informative and collaborative decision-making between 
federal, state, local, public, and private partners. In other words, transformative 
e-government initiatives often seek to remove the organisational barriers that 
promote agency-centric solutions and, instead, promote customer-centric 
solutions (Seifert, 2003). Some advocates suggest that, at its most advanced 
level, e-government could potentially reorganise, combine, and/or eliminate 
existing agencies and replace them with virtual organisations (Baum et al., 
2000). 
From the management perspective, e-government is a tool to achieve better 
government and therefore it offers potential solutions to leaders across the 
whole of government: IT managers, programme managers, agency heads, 
government-wide e-government planners and co-ordinators, and politicians all 
have a role to play (OECD, 2003c). Strong leadership can speed up the process 
of e-government implementation, promote co-ordination within and among 
agencies and help reinforce good governance objectives. Leaders are well 
placed to make the case for e-government and articulate such benefits to other 
stakeholders. Leaders drive e-government planning by setting a broad vision 
(OECD, 2003c). According to Heeks (1998), public servants/services should be 
feasible and accountable to politicians (political accountability), to finance 
providers (financial accountability), to citizens/clients (public accountability), to 
professional peers (professional accountability), to the judiciary (legal account-
ability), and to senior management (internal/managerial accountability). 
Heeks (2006) distinguishes centralised, decentralised, and hybrid models of 
e-government management (see figure 3.11). In ʻcentralised, top-down 
approaches’, decisions are taken at the most senior or central level – this model 
may be efficient but can be unworkable and inefficient, he says. In ʻdecen-
tralised approaches’, decisions are taken at some level lower than the most 
senior level, typically by individual work units within the organisation or even 
by individual staff. This model may match organisational realities but be high 
cost and/or low scope. In ʻhybrid approaches’, decisions are taken both senior 
and lower levels, separately or in an integrated manner – this model may be 
effective by compromising between central and local or by dividing 
responsibilities between central and local. Nevertheless, Heeks concludes that, 
ultimately, resources, values and politics determine how e-government is 




Figure 3.11 Different approaches of E-government systems responsibilities (Heeks, 
2006) 
 
Chen et al., (2005) suggest to organise the framework of digital government 
development into three sections (see figure 3.12). These insights are organised 
into digital government strategies (centre), environmental conditions (left), and 
performance results (right). Each group of factors is grounded in either the 
bodies of literature or some empirical evidence. Four principles govern the 
development of the framework. Fist, a good strategic plan needs to address the 
unique challenges posed by environmental circumstances facing a national 
digital government effort. What matters is the extent to which a strategy 
addresses its environmental conditions rather than setting ambitious goals. 
Second, there exists a set of principles and success factors, which, if done 
correctly, will increase the likelihood of success. Third, the framework 
acknowledges the evolutionary nature of digital government efforts. A strategy 
also needs to adapt to any possible shape the environment that a national 
government is in. Lastly, performance of digital government is an important 
element of the framework to trace the effect of strategies on outcome. 
 
 
Figure 3.12 A Conceptual framework for the development of a national digital 
government strategy (Chen et al., 2005) 
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According to Püüa (2006), from the citizen’s perspective, the common claims 
towards the state tend to be the following: (a) bureaucrats often ask for 
additional documents, (b) sometimes bureaucrats are ʻtoo slow’, (c) sometimes 
they have to visit the bureaucrat several times in order to receive the public 
good/service, (d) they have to visit the bureaucrat for ʻevery simple thing’, and 
(e) they can meet the bureaucrat only during the working hours (8 a.m. – 
5 p.m.). At the same time, from the bureaucrats’ perspective, citizens often ask 
for service/public goods they have no legal right to receive, citizens often do not 
bring all the documents with them to receive the service/public good, citizens 
do not follow the ʻofficial procedures’ to receive the service/public good, etc. 
Therefore, digital government is a tool for bringing government services 
closer to people. However, in a society and economy that is increasingly driven 
by technological innovations, people have to deal with a difficult trade-off 
between convenience and/or the efficiency that a technological innovation 
brings and the changes in the societal context that it imposes (United Nations, 
2003). E-government is also seen as a powerful tool for enhancing citizen 
engagement in policy-making. Indeed, the barriers of greater online citizen 
engagement in policy-making are cultural, organisational and constitutional, not 
technological. Overcoming these challenges will require greater efforts to raise 
awareness and capacity both within governments and among citizens (OECD, 
2003d). According to Eggers (2005), there are six ways technology can 
transform government-citizen relationships: 
1. Reorganise government around citizen needs; 
2. Make choice-based service delivery more viable; 
3. Provide neutral information to help citizens make important choices; 
4. Customise services and interactions between government and citizens; 
5. Allow citizens to complete government transactions anywhere, anytime, 
from a variety of devices; 
6. Reduce the cost of government. 
  
Eggers (2005) predicts a massive power shift from governments to citizens, as 
the latter no longer have to rely on bureaucrats to decide what information is 
needed and what must be done with it. His point of entry to this transformation 
begins with public sector portals. For years there have been discussions about 
what government would look like in a perfect world. “There wouldn’t be dozens 
of different federal job-training programmes (in the U.S.) where you would get 
five different answers to your question depending on which bureaucrat you talk 
to. You wouldn’t be endlessly transferred from one department to another,” 
Eggers argues (p. 17). Around the world, public sector portals have helped 
reshape, reorganise, and re-create the governments that built them. Alan Dobrin 
[the Chief Information Officer (CIO) of the city of New York] has argued that 
“In the world of bricks and mortars, enacting this kind of change would take 
forty years of fighting interest groups, however, in cyberspace you just do it” (in 
Eggers 2005: 17) Therefore, today many government websites have been 
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transformed from clumsy digital brochures into full-service virtual clearing-
houses that guide visitors to all manner of information and public services. 
In conclusion, there are also several dilemmas related to e-government. For 
example, the mere existence of e-government says nothing particular about the 
quality of life in the society (United Nations, 2003). At the same time, if a 
public administration does cross the ʻdigital divide’, it opens endless oppor-
tunities that are particularly inaccessible by any other means. Different authors 
also believe that government has been especially slow to realise the full 
potential of digital technology (e.g. Eggers, 2005). This should come as no 
surprise to anyone given bureaucracy’s inherent resistance to change and the 
lack of a profit motive in the public sector (see also discussions in the first 
chapter). Governments will never truly realise the transformative benefits until 
government systems, ways of delivering services, and bureaucratic structures 
are rethought and redesigned to reflect the realities of the Information Age. 
Moreover, the e-government development should not be too technocratic – there 
should be a balance between technological orientation, administrative orien-
tation and user orientation (Tat-Kei Ho, 2002). As said by Texas CIO Carolyn 
Purcell, e-government transformation will indeed be a matter of will and 
government leaders have to have the will to revamp their systems. Indeed, the  
e-government planning itself should be seen as an in-depth and group activity. 
Moreover, as suggested by Heeks (2006), the ʻhybrid’ approach should be 
preferred instead of only centralised e-government strategic planning or fully 
decentralised local approach. Therefore, “e-government planning should be seen 
as incremental, as participative, as limited in scope: guiding more than 
dictating,” says Heeks (p. 65). According to Nilsson and Ranerup (2002: 313), 
within hybrid approaches, a ʻmodified approach’ would encompass the more 
flexible notion of strategy as guidelines rather than blueprint, “allowing for 
revisions based on experiences from on-going process of change.” Compared to 
e-government planning with a strong strategic component, the hybrid approach 
would involve more active participation of users and local units in the 
formulation of strategy (Bishop, 2001) – it also balances the needs of internal 
and external stakeholders in setting priorities. 
These different discussions motivate (according to Bloch, 2010) the 
examination of a number of key issues in the development of definitions and 
indicators for public sector development research, for example: 
 How is innovation conceptualised? 
 Is it possible to measure innovation expenditures? 
 How is the role of ICT important for innovation, and how can this be 
characterised? 
 Is knowledge about innovation culture and how organisations innovate 
important for users? What key elements of their innovation activities can 
organisations themselves identify? 
 What do users need to know about external interactions? How do organi-
sations view the importance of external activities for their innovation? 
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 How can data on drivers and barriers to innovation be used? What do 
organisations themselves identify as most important for them? 
 How can innovation in the public sector be related to that in the business 
sector? 
 How does the heterogeneity of public sector organisations affect its 
development measurement? 
  
As the above-mentioned are more general innovation indicators for the public 
sector, from the pure ICT perspective, Dunleavy et al. (2008) proposes the 
following set of ICT-specific indicators: (a) share ICT expenditures, (b) share 
ICT expenditure spent on website, (c) average age of ICT equipment, 
(d) replacement time for PCs/computers, (e) development and management of 
ICT services done in-house, (f) intranet system, (g) percentage services that can 
be requested online, and (h) percentage services that can be delivered online. 
However, what Dunleavy et al. also stress is that these indicators are fairly 
standard, raising the question whether they are really able to capture the degree 
of ICT-based innovation. 
 Finally, beyond the strict technological aspect of innovation, IT should be 
considered more as an innovation driver rather than an innovation in itself 
(Thenint, 2010). Therefore, this research is positioned in between the concrete 
cases of government innovations (mostly e-services) and related organisational 
and external factors influencing the innovation process. 
 
As a conclusion of the learning view on the innovation process sub-chapter, 
we have developed the following sub-research question SRQ327 related 
propositions be tested throughout the empirical part of the thesis: 
PT1: Technological knowledge is the major element improved internally and 
obtained externally in the development process of public service innovations. 
Arguments from the literature: Explanations of failure of public sector 
technology projects include (see Heeks, 1999, and sub-chapter 3.3) data inade-
quacies, technical problems, management/process/technical skill shortages, 
cultural clashes, political infighting and external environmental factors. 
According to Heeks (2006), e-government systems are information systems that 
are socio-technical: combining the technical and the human. Heeks stresses that 
most of the e-government initiatives fail due to their poor implementation and 
management. According to his earlier work (Heeks, 2001), there are seven 
dimensions necessary and sufficient to provide the understanding of e-govern-
ment design-reality gaps: (1) information; (2) technology; (3) processes; 
(4) objectives and values; (5) staffing and skills; (6) management structures and 
skills; (7) other resources: time and money. The evolutionary literature (see  
                                                                          
27  Technological perspective – What is the importance of technological knowledge in the 
public service innovation process, where and how is it developed (SRQ3)? 
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sub-chapter 3.2) has proposed for the private sector that sectors and 
technologies differ greatly in terms of knowledge base and learning processes 
related to innovation. Knowledge differs across sectors in terms of domains 
(Malerba, 2000b). First, the knowledge domain spans applications, users and 
demands of sectoral products. Second, the domain reflects the specific scientific 
and technological fields at the base of innovative activities in a sector (Dosi, 
1988; Nelson and Rosenberg, 1993), as well as the sources of technological 
opportunities, which differ across sectors. Freeman (1982) and Rosenberg 
(1982), among others, have shown that in some sectors opportunity conditions 
are related to major scientific breakthroughs in universities. In other sectors, 
opportunities to innovate may often come from advances in R&D, equipment 
and instrumentation. In still other sectors, external sources of knowledge in 
terms of suppliers or users may play a crucial role. Despite these mixed views, 
there is a reason to believe that technological knowledge might still be the 
major element improved internally and obtained externally in the development 
process of public sector innovations. 
 
PT2: The role of technology in today’s public sector is integrated with other 
managerial processes. 
Arguments from the literature: In the private sector, if advanced integration 
capabilities are necessary (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989), the industry may be 
concentrated and formed of large established firms. This domain relates to the 
degree of accessibility of knowledge (Malerba and Orsenigo, 2000), i.e. 
opportunities of gaining knowledge that are external to firms. Knowledge that is 
accessible may be internal or external to the sector. In both cases, greater 
accessibility of knowledge decreases industrial concentration. Besides acquiring 
external knowledge, many firms have also actively begun to commercialise 
technology, for example, by means of out-licensing. This increase in inward and 
outward technology transactions reflects the new paradigm of open innovation 
(see Lichtenthaler and Ernst, 2009; chapter 1.3). Interestingly, Senge (1990a) 
identifies five new ʻcomponent technologies’ that he claimed were gradually 
converting to learning organisations – systems thinking, personal mastery, 
mental models, building shared vision, and team learning – none of them 
directly related to technology. Indeed, technological factors can be a strong 
determinant for subsequent innovation (Koch and Haukens, 2005; chapter 2). 
Moreover, in their ʻNew Growth Model’, Kekkonen (2000) gives the central 
position to knowledge, information and innovations, which get inputs from 
education, research and technology, and give outputs via increased productivity 
to economic growth, growth of exports, higher employment, regional develop-
ment and an increase in welfare (see sub-chapter 3.2). Indirectly, the literature 
tends to suggest that technological progress is seen more as an integrated 
process in organisational upgrading than something clearly separate due to the 
sophistication and complexity of modern technologies. 
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PT3: Classical ʻtechnology push’ does not work in the public service innovation 
process. 
Arguments from the literature: The classical linear model of innovation (a 
theoretical construction of industrialists, consultants and business schools, 
seconded by economists, see Godin, 2005 and sub-chapter 3.1) postulated that 
innovation starts with basic research, followed by applied research and 
development, and ends with production and diffusion. Very few people defend 
such an understanding of innovation anymore: “Everyone knows that the linear 
model of innovation is dead”, claimed Rosenberg (1994), but it is not always 
the case. Godin (2005) argues that the long survival of the model, despite 
regular criticisms, is due to statistics. Having become entrenched with the help 
of statistical categories for counting resources and allocating money to science 
and technology, and standardised under the auspices of the OECD and its 
methodological manuals, the linear model functioned as a ʻsocial fact’. Rival 
models, because of their lack of statistical foundations, could not easily become 
substitutes. Conversely, while analysing the relative importance of information 
and communication technologies (ICT) in boosting national wealth in Estonia, 
Tiits and Rebane (2009; see also sub-chapter 3.3) found that ICT take-up in a 
particular sector (including government) is dependent on many interrelated 
aspects, such as resistance to change, availability of appropriate technological 
competences in that particular sector in a country, but also on local and global 
technology demand in these sectors. From that perspective in their study, 
government showed one of the highest scores in resistance to change, together 
with education, social services, and the labour market areas. Due to these 
controversial views, with our sample and the exploratory questionnaire survey we 
will try to test whether the linear model is still valid or not in the public sector. 
 
PT4: Technological risk is among the most important external hampering 
factors in the public service innovation process. 
Arguments from the literature: Among other things, authors are tackling 
innovation from the risks and obstacles perspectives (Bhatta, 2003; Kubr, 
1988). While citizens demand a modernised government, they are generally 
ambivalent about innovation in the public sector, particularly because inno-
vation often involves risk-taking that can lead to significant monetary losses 
(Teofilovic, 2002), see also sub-chapter 1.1. As technology innovation is often 
driven by suppliers (vehicles, devices, telecommunications), as found by 
Vigoda-Gadot et al. (2005), this might lead towards larger technological risks. 
Indeed, public health systems studied in the same Publin project (see Koch and 
Haukens, 2005) appear to share a number of common features which could act 
in a way to hinder or prevent the process of innovation. Although a number of 
categories were identified, they were rarely mutually exclusive and one barrier 
may be the cause or effect of one or several others in a complex interplay. This 
may lead to (also technological) risk aversion with an understandable inherent 
resistance (which is particularly strong in the medical professions) to undertake 
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or implement changes which may result in an increased probability of risk (to 
the patients in their care or to the other recipients of their services), see also 
chapter 2. To understand the relative importance of technological risks in 
comparison to other innovation hampering factors in the public sector, the topic 
is integrated into our empirical survey. 
 
 
3.4. Systemic view on the innovation process 
The systemic view is the final, fourth perspective of the research framework of 
the present study. Researchers argue that innovation takes place and/or diffuses 
in a system consisting of individuals, firms and institutions and within a certain 
cultural and regulatory framework. Rogers (1995: 5) defines diffusion as “the 
process by which an innovation is communicated through certain channels over 
time among the members of a social system”. 
It is nowadays claimed that instead of scientific institutions, most innovation 
processes start within organisations trying to solve certain problems. Through 
this learning process, the organisation will make use of various sources of 
competences and knowledge in the innovation system, being those customers, 
suppliers, consultancies, patents, or various research institutions. Systems also 
create stronger networks between people, ideas and opportunities. From the 
literature, we know different frameworks are called ʻsystems’. Although the 
majority of the systemic concepts of innovation and/or business process have 
been developed for the private sector, we will discuss them here in order to 
facilitate the development of a systemic framework for the present research in 
public sector services. In more recent studies, researchers argue vigorously (e.g. 
Bugge et al., 2010) that when trying to understand how innovation takes place 
in the public sector this should not be done without seeing this in relation to the 
wider innovation system in which it is part. Bason (2010) stresses also the 
necessity seeing things in the innovation ecosystem context – an explicit, 
systemic approach to strengthening the awareness, competencies and ways of 
working that can power innovation within the public service. Within this 
ecosystem, public sector innovation happens in an on-going tension between 
constraining and enabling factors across four parts of the ecosystem: con-
sciousness (awareness), capacity (structure), co-creation (process) and courage 
(leadership). 
The broadest possible definition of a system is that it is “anything that is not 
chaos” (Boulding, 1985: 9). According to Edquist (2004), to the question ʻWhat 
is a system’ is a common answer in the everyday language as well as in 
scientific contexts (Ingelstam, 2002): 
 A system consists of two kinds of constituents: There are, first, some 
kinds of components and, second, relations among them. The components 
and relations should form a coherent whole (which has properties 
different from the properties of the constituents); 
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 The system has a function, i.e. it is performing or achieving something; 
 It must be possible to discriminate between the system and the rest of the 
world; i.e. it must be possible to identify the boundaries of the system. If 
one, for example, wants to make empirical studies of specific systems, it 
must know their extent. 
  
The original purpose of the ʻinnovation system’ was to create a ʻfocusing 
device’, which puts interactive learning and innovation at the centre of the 
analysis (quoted in Lundvall, 1992). According to McKelvey (1997), an 
innovation system is a network involving individual and collective processes of 
searching, learning and selection among different innovation opportunities, 
including technical and economic dimensions. Innovation is something that is 
not static and happens in the form of a process. The results of that process might 
be static, i.e. a product, but the way to achieve it is definitely not. Every process 
happens in a system, which might be very simple, as well as extremely 
complicated (e.g. CoPS, see elaboration later this sub-chapter). There is no 
consensus on the exact definition of an innovation system, and the concept is 
still emerging. Innovation is often the result of the interaction among an ecology 
of actors, and the term ʻinnovation ecosystem’ is occasionally used to 
emphasise this. For some, the term ʻinnovation ecosystem’ is a subset of, or 
synonym for, the ʻinnovation system’. Others separate the expressions, using 
the expression ʻinnovation system’ for labelling a planned innovation environ-
ment, and ʻinnovation ecosystem’ for an ecological innovation environment (see 
also: Malerba, 2002c). 
An innovation system is a flow of technology and information among 
people, enterprises and institutions, which is the key to an innovative process. It 
contains the interaction between the actors who are needed in order to turn an 
idea into a process, product or service in the market. According to innovation 
systems theory, innovation and technology development are results of a 
complex set of relationships among actors in the system, which includes 
enterprises, universities and research institutes. Innovation systems can be 
categorised (see for example Edquist, 1997a) into national innovation systems 
[NIS – determined by national boundaries and focussed on the roles of govern-
mental and non-governmental organisations and institutions (Freeman, 1987; 
Nelson, 1993; Lundvall, 1992)], regional and local innovation systems [the 
boundary is the region (Cooke 1992; Cooke et al., 1997)], sectoral innovation 
systems [the boundary is the economic sector or economic unit, e.g. a firm 
(Breschi and Malerba, 1997)], and technological systems and distributed 
innovation systems [the focus is mainly on networks of agents for the 
generation, diffusion and utilisation of technologies and for innovation 
(Carlsson and Stankiewicz, 1995; Hughes, 1984; Callon, 1992; Andersen et al., 
2000, 2001)]. However, these bodies of literature have significant overlaps too; 
they also serve to complement one another in identifying additional features, 
which may affect the process of technological change (Senker, 1999). The NIS 
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approach is a macro-level concept, whereas the technological systems approach 
focuses on the meso and micro levels in specific techno-industrial areas. Socio-
technical approaches also focus on the meso and micro levels but make a 
significant contribution in emphasising public or private social actors, and 
intermediates in the network. The notion of a sectoral system of innovation and 
production complements all the other concepts within the innovation system 
literature. Indeed, as argued by Bugge et al. (2010), common to all these 
approaches to innovation systems is that they apply a systemic understanding of 
industrial development and economic growth, however, although many of these 
approaches have included the public sector into the analysis of the innovation 
processes in the private sector, they have tended to leave out the innovation 
dynamics within the public sector itself. Applied to the public sector an 
innovation systems approach would typically see the behavioural changes of a 
public organisation in relation to the interaction with its users (e.g. citizens or 
companies), its subcontractors (e.g. suppliers of ICT infrastructure or technical 
equipment), its collaboration partners (public or private), its political and 
institutional set-up as well as its management and intra-organisational 
dynamics, learning and absorptive capacity. Therefore, a successful innovation 
process in the public sector includes the generation and adoption of new ideas, 
their implementation, and it depends both on internal capacity and linkages with 
external actors. 
According to the OECD/Eurostat (2005, p. 20–2), the general institutional 
environment, or system, determines the broad parameters within which firms 
operate; with some exceptions and/or modifications, it applies also to the public 
sector and its services. The component elements of this environment include: 
 The basic educational system for the general population, which 
determines minimum educational standards in the workforce and the 
domestic consumer market; 
 The university system; 
 The specialised technical training system; 
 The science and research base; 
 Common pools of codified knowledge, such as publications, technical, 
environmental, and management standards; 
 Innovation policies and other governmental policies that influence 
innovation by firms; 
 Legislative and macroeconomic settings such as patent law, taxation, 
corporate governance roles and policies relating to interest and exchange 
rates, tariffs, and competition; 
 The communications infrastructure, including roads and telecommu-
nication networks; 
 Financial institutions which determine, for example, the ease of access to 
venture capital; 
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 Market accessibility, including possibilities for the establishment of close 
relationships with customers as well as matters such as size and ease of 
access; 
 Industry structure and the competitive environment, including the 
existence of supplier firms in complementary sectors. 
  
Based on the literature, Edquist (2004) constructed a hypothetical list of ten 
activities common to innovation systems. The activities listed are not ranked in 
order of importance, but start with knowledge inputs to the innovation process, 
continue with the demand-side factors, the provision of constituent of 
innovation systems, and end with support services for innovating firms. 
(1) Provision of R&D, creating new knowledge, primarily in engineering, 
medicine, and natural sciences; 
(2) Competence building (provision of education and training, creation of 
human capital, production and reproduction of skills, individual learning) 
in the labour force to be used in innovation and R&D activities; 
(3) Formation of new product markets; 
(4) Articulation of quality requirements emanating from the demand side 
with regard to new products; 
(5) Creating and changing organisations needed for the development of 
new fields of innovation, e.g. enhancing entrepreneurship to create new 
firms and ‘intrapreneurship’ to diversify existing firms, or creating new 
research organisations, policy agencies, etc.; 
(6) Networking through markets and other mechanisms, including 
interactive learning between different organisations (potentially) in-
volved in the innovation processes. This implies integrating new 
knowledge elements developed in different spheres of the innovation 
system and coming from outside with elements already available in the 
innovating firms; 
(7) Creating and changing institutions – e.g. IPR laws, tax laws, 
environment and safety regulations, R&D investment routines, etc. – 
that influence innovating organisations and innovation processes by 
providing incentives or obstacles to innovation; 
(8) Incubation activities, e.g. providing access to facilities, administrative 
support, etc. for the new innovative efforts; 
(9) Financing of innovation processes and other activities that can facilitate 
commercialisation of knowledge and its adoption; 
(10) Provision of consultancy services of relevance for innovation processes, 
e.g. technology transfer, commercial information, and legal advice. 
  
In order to understand and analyse public sector innovation in the systems 
framework, one should select a suitable concept. As briefly shown before, there 
are different systems frameworks available in the literature. The following table 
3.3 synthesises different approaches more closely in order to choose or combine 
a suitable one for the public sector. 
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Table 3.3 Synthesis of different ʻsystem’ frameworks 
System 
type 





The framework rests on four basic concepts: 
innovation, learning, systems, and nation. Focuses on 
interaction and mobility. Stresses that flows of 
knowledge, technology and innovation among people, 
enterprises and (research) institutions within a country 
are the key to the innovation process. The main 
elements of the system are formal institutions 
(organisations), informal institutions (social and 














The NIS concept can be limited or extended to the 
local or regional level, creating a framework 
accordingly for the local or regional innovation 
system, i.e. the boundary is the region. 
Cooke 1992;  








A network of agents interacting in the economic and 
industrial area under a particular institutional 
infrastructure and involved in the generation, 
diffusion, and utilisation of technology. Differ from 
NIS by focusing on specific techno-industrial areas, 
boundaries technological not geographical, scope is 
limited to microeconomic considerations, focuses on 














An integrated approaches from both economics and 
sociology to explain the organisation of socio-
economic relationships. These types of networks are 
believed to be the main components of contemporary 










Complements other concepts within the NIS literature 
related to national, regional/local innovation systems, 
technological systems, and socio-technical networks. 
Sectors provide a key level of analysis for economists, 
business scholars, technologists, economic historians 
and policy makers in the examination of innovative 
and production activities. From sectoral system 
perspective, national, regional and/or local boundaries 
matter to varying degrees depending upon the specific 
sector under consideration. Similarly, the sectoral 
system of innovation approach encompasses and 
includes the technological systems approach, by 














National diamond framework, together with his work 
on competitive five forces theory, value chain 
framework and theory of competitive advantage can be 
used both to analyze a firm’s ability to function in a 
national market, as well as analyse a national markets 
ability to compete in an international market. 
Porter’s clusters framework explains how clusters 
foster high levels of productivity and innovation and 









CoPS includes high value products, capital goods, 
control systems, networks and civil engineering 
constructs. CoPS tend to be made in one-off projects 
(or small batches) and the emphasis of production is 
on design, project management, systems engineering 
and systems integration. Examples include 
telecommunication exchanges, flight simulators, 
aircraft engines, avionics systems, train engines, air 
traffic control units, systems for electricity grids, 
offshore oil equipment, intelligent buildings and 
cellular phone network equipment. 
Hobday, 1998, 
2000 
Source: Composed by the author 
  
The systems frameworks elaborated above also certainly have their limitation. 
Firstly, they tend to fit into a particular contexts and one should choose or 
develop an appropriate ‘model’ to work with depending on the area and other 
circumstances. Secondly, the conceptual framework of NIS, for example, 
concentrates on the supply side and ignores demand by final consumers and the 
role of the media in influencing such demand; NIS might also differ by 
industrial sectors (Senker, 1999). 
From previous elaborations we see also that the majority of the systemic 
concepts of innovation and/or business process have been developed for the 
private sector. However, the current research is tackling innovation in the public 
sector, more precisely in technologically innovative public sector services. As 
the theoretical concepts elaborated show, organisations do not exist in vacuum. 
To be able to understand and explain innovations, all-important elements 
shaping and influencing the dynamic of the system must be taken into account 
also in the public sector (Røste, 2005). These are not restricted to economic 
elements, but also organisational, institutional, social and political factors, 
mechanisms and relations. The legal conditions and the norms and cultures in 
the institutional context represent important incentives and constrains to 
innovation. Through their activities, companies (or organisations) establish 
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relations with other institutions, suppliers, competitors, with customers and with 
other financial, technological and market partners. These relationships and their 
institutional context make a complex map of company’s (or organisation’s) 
interaction with sources of knowledge and technology and the potential for 
learning and cooperation. This cumulative accumulation of knowledge and 
skills, i.e. the learning process, is crucial for innovation (Røste, 2005). Similar 
findings are supported by Koch and Haukens (2005), who claim that in order to 
learn and innovate, the actors in the public sector must interact with other 
actors, this being people, organisations or various sources of information. The 
ability to innovate is dependent on their ability to find such relevant compe-
tences, understand them and make use of them. Koch and Haukens call these 
mutual learning environments innovation networks, which may be informal, i.e. 
dependent on individuals working in the public organisation, or a more formal, 
permanent working group of experts, a conference or seminar tackling the issue. 
Koch and Haukens use the term ʻsystem’ while talking about innovation 
barriers in the healthcare sector, stating that problems concern the systemic 
nature of innovation, i.e. the possibility that the introduction of one innovation 
may shift the underlying problem to another, downstream, part of the system or 
may have unforeseen and adverse consequences. Thus, according to their 
words, the introduction of any innovation should require close ex ante assess-
ment, coupled with careful review and evaluation. 
Bloch, (2010) argues that while the generic elements may be in the public 
sector similar to that for businesses, there may be very important differences in 
the details of these elements – in the characteristics of services provided, in the 
decision-making and organisational structure, general framework conditions, 
objectives, and the overall process by which ideas are created, transformed and 
implemented as innovations. He suggests that while the overall model may be 
very similar, when specified in detail the measurement framework will need to 
be different to capture the specificities of public sector innovation. He proposed 
a model of innovation in public sector organisations (see figure 3.13), which is 
divided into seven ʻelements’ starting with objectives, then inputs, the 
innovation process itself, outputs and outcomes. This ʻlinear’ approach of 





Figure 3.13 A model of innovation in public sector organisations (Bloch, 2010) 
  
Inputs of this model are relatively typical, however not always common in the 
public sector, e.g. effective technological infrastructure, development invest-
ments, training, consultancy, competences, educational background, expe-
riences and diversity of staff, etc. How organisations then innovate, is the matter 
of innovation process – it is related to culture (e.g. attitude towards risk), 
incentive structure and perception of barriers to innovation. Additional elements 
of the innovation process are the placement of innovation in the overall strategy 
(or business model), the role of management in promoting innovation, and the 
structuring of innovation processes. Importantly, incentive structures in the 
public sector are both a factor influencing innovation processes within the 
organisation and as part of framework conditions, determining incentives for the 
organisation as a whole. Incentivising might be made up of the direct rewards 
(or penalties) to individuals and/or the organisation for innovation, but also a 
broader set of internal and external factors that promote (or hinder) innovation 
activities (e.g. regulations and policies, political environment, general leader-
ship of the city, region or whole country). 
Contacts, linkages and knowledge flows are also important aspects, both 
within and outside the organisation – external information seeking, cooperation 
with others, both side sharing of innovative ideas, are all characteristics that 
shape the innovation process. These flows can have different partners (e.g. 
technology providers and other businesses, users and citizens, other public 
organisations locally and internationally). 
Finally, outputs – goods and services delivered or other activities by public 
sector organisations, and outcomes – broader end-outcomes of public service 
activities, where these outcomes will generally also be affected by a variety of 
















(policy, rules, budget, governmental structure)
EXTERNAL ACTORS
(users, businesses, universities, other public organisations)
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themselves – actual implementation of changes to services or other parts of the 
organisation’s operations. Some organisations may be more prone to incre-
mental improvements in their organisational processes while others seek to 
develop new types of services. 
Bloch’s (2010) model finally indicates that successful innovation is 
associated with some form of performance improvement, either in terms of 
higher quality in the organisation’s activities, increased efficiency, or both. In 
addition, innovation efforts can be associated with greater satisfaction among 
both employees and users. Social outcomes (social cohesion, equality, reduced 
crime, poverty reduction, better educated population, improved health, etc.) are 
also important, as they represent the central aims of public services. Moreover, 
successful innovation can carry other, intangible benefits, such as improving the 
image of the organisation and the services it delivers, thus strengthening its 
legitimacy and trust from users or other stakeholders. 
According to Bugge et al. (2010), part of the multifaceted and heterogeneous 
nature of the public sector is the outcome of its many interfaces: (1) its interface 
to the private sector, (2) the interface between the public sector and the citizens, 
and (3) internal interfaces in the public sector, e.g. across various governmental 
levels and across activity areas. Together, the various interfaces indicate some 
of the heterogeneity of the public sector which, according to Bugge, may be 
helpful when trying to decipher the logics of innovation in the public sector and 
how the public sector innovation system looks like. In particular, the form the 
interfaces take and which are most important may have a large impact on 
innovation processes in public sector organisations. These different charac-
teristics refer mainly to organisational innovation that can occur through formal 
partnerships/programmes but also wider inter-organisational arrangements. In 
such complex systems, the coordination of various organisations’ activities is a 
central feature for innovating (Borins, 2001d, 2006). This includes conducting a 
systemic analysis of how the problem in question interacts with other issues and 
programmes, fostering inter-organisational collaboration (education and health, 
implementation of systematic data cross-check procedures, etc.), and imple-
menting integrated, multi-faceted services (single desks/portal delivering a wide 
range of services). 
Looking at these different concepts of innovation systems, one should 
generally agree that while developing a concept for public sector innovation 
research, it should provide a framework for analysing and developing public 
sector and governance practices at the national level, at the level of a set of, or a 
single public institution, its unit or particular public service. Therefore, 
depending on the approach under consideration, one should choose an appro-
priate framework, identify relevant actors and relationships, and specify the 
innovation process. This leads to the understanding that to be meaningful in 
analysis, an appropriate systems framework should be tailor-made. Different 
fundamentals and components of the system can be surely taken from the 
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literature and systems frameworks elaborated earlier; however, one should be 
avoiding one-fits-all innovation system frameworks for all different occasions. 
At the organisational or its unit level, the model proposed by Bloch in 2010 
(five years after the survey of the present research was conducted) is logical. 
Indeed, depending on the purpose of the research and the research question, it 
can be outlined differently. The research question of this thesis asks what is 
relative importance of different managerial and contextual factors influencing 
the innovation process in information technology-based public sector services 
and how do they determine the nature of public service innovation system (in 
four European countries). In order to conduct the analysis, a four layer con-
ceptual framework is used: managerial perspective, learning perspective, 
technological perspective and systems perspective. These dimensions are 
associated with the four following, specific sub-research questions: (I) Man-
agerial perspective – what are the key-features influencing, supporting and 
hampering, the development and implementation of successful, technologically 
innovative public sector services? (II) Learning perspective – which managerial 
and organisational improvements are necessary to innovate in public sector 
services? (III) Technological perspective – what is the importance of techno-
logical knowledge in the public service innovation process, where and how it is 
developed? (IV) Systems perspective – what does the composition and 
dynamics of public sector (service) innovation system look like across 
countries? 
Finally, we can look at the innovation process also from the project structure 
perspective – both within the organisation and with external partnerships. As 
suggested by Hobday (2000; see figure 3.14), this may be functional, pure 
project, matrix, or the combination of the above (for additional project related 
processes see also PMI, 2002). Indeed, in many public sector organisations 
there are few or no formal processes for conducting the innovation process 
(Eggers and Singh, 2009), which leads to ʻrandom incrementalism’ in the public 
sector (Bason, 2010). Managers focus on budgeting, operations and tasks, and 
employees may be highly skilled lawyers, economists, doctors, nurses and 
schoolteachers – but few of them have formal skills in creativity and innovation 
(Osborn and Brown, 2005). According to Bason (2010), public sector 
organisations (at best) operate with highly linear, ʻstage-gate’ project process (if 
they even have a formal project organisation). However, innovation, in 
particular its early ʻfront end’ phases, need to focus more on co-creation: open 
collaborative processes, interaction, active user involvement, visualisation, 
prototyping, tests and experimentation (Kelley, 2001; Sanders and Stappers, 
2008; Brown, 2009). Most public sector organisations have not put in place the 
formal systems, or built the capacity among leaders and employees, that enable 
such processes to take place (Bason, 2010). In particular, they have not put in 
place types of practices that may generate more radical or discontinuous’ 
innovations (Bessant, 2005). And once a random innovation in the public sector 
happens, it is most surely not scaled, which is the most significant challenge to 
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realise the potential of innovation in government (Bason, 2010). In the absence 
of a market mechanism, which in the private sector generates significant 
demand for solutions that can lead to a profit, how might we create an army of 
ʻwilling adopters’? (Mulgan, 2009). What are the tools, approaches and means 
that can scale public sector innovations from one domain to all the domains they 
might benefit? Traditional methods such as best practice publications, websites, 
toolkits, command and control efforts, networks of various forms of 
collaborations have proven to be of limited effectiveness (Mulgan, 2007; Harris 
and Albury, 2009). 
 
 
Figure 3.14 Types of organisational structure: (A) functional; (B) functional matrix; (C) 
balanced matrix; (D) project matrix; (E) project-led organisation; (F) project-based 









































* F1-F5 = various functional departments of the organisation (e.g. Marketing, Finance, Human Resources, Engineering,
  Manufacturing, R&D)
* P1-P5 = major project within the organisation (e.g. CoPS projects)
* SM = senior management
Note:
* The number of functions and projects will vary according to the organisation in question. Various permutations are used here for
  illustration.
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Discussions in this sub-chapter gave us a strong argument to believe that 
systematic approaches can give new insights into innovative performance of 
public sector and public service organisations (PSOs). Therefore, the current 
research transfers the core of the systems research philosophy to the public 
sector. We will analyse technologically innovative public sector services in a 
systems perspective, as well as the conclusions given in this frame. We believe 
that, similarly to the private sector, innovation and technological development 
in public service organisations is a result of a complex set of relationships 
among intra- and extra-organisational actors and competences in the system. In 
addition, we do not deal with public service organisations in one piece in a 
surrounding system. Instead, we consider the public service innovation system 
as a horizontal set of intra and extra-organisational factors influencing, 
supporting and hampering the innovation process in public sector services. 
Moreover, the external factors are not viewed on an institutional basis (common 
to systems of innovation literature); instead, they are considered functional, not 
linked to a particular institution. This view is supported by Radošević (1998), 
who stresses that systems of innovation should be defined not only in 
institutional terms, but also in technological terms or, more generally, in 
functional terms. Only institutional variety that performs different economic 
functions (functional variety) can be considered relevant from an economic 
perspective (Radošević, 2005, p. 10); similarly, in terms of technology, only 
variety that performs different technological functions (technological variety or 
variety in terms of technological regime) can be considered relevant from an 
economic-institutional perspective. Radošević also argues that the absence of 
broader contextual factors and the dominance of person centric lines of research 
have limited the understanding of how contextual factors and system level 
variables affect entrepreneurship (Radošević, 2006), the term which was 
elaborated in the previous chapter. 
 
 
As a conclusion of the learning view on the innovation process sub-chapter, 
we have developed the following sub-research question SRQ428 related 
propositions to be tested throughout the empirical part of the thesis: 
PS1: Innovation process in the public services is a systemic phenomenon. 
Arguments from the literature: Theoretical discussions (in sub-chapter 3.4) 
gave us a strong argument to believe that systematic approaches can give new 
insights into the innovative performance of public sector and public service 
organisations. There is a general consensus among researchers that innovation 
takes place in a system consisting of individuals, firms and institutions, and 
within a certain cultural and regulatory framework (see Carlsson and 
                                                                          
28  Systems perspective – What does the composition and dynamics of public sector 
(service) innovation system look like across countries (SRQ4)? 
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Stankiewicz, 1993; Freeman, 1987; Goldsmith and Eggers, 2004; Edquist, 
1997b; Enzing and Kern, 1999; Lundvall, 1992; Malerba, 2002a, b, c; Nelson 
and Rosenberg, 1993; OECD, 1997). According to Røste (2005), innovation in 
the public sector is systemic (Koch et al., 2005 calls these systems ʻinnovation 
networks’). To be able to understand and explain innovations, all important 
elements shaping and influencing the dynamic of the system must be taken into 
account. These are not restricted to economic elements, but also organisational, 
institutional, social, political and legal factors, mechanisms and relations. While 
in the traditional literature of innovation systems (Freeman, 1987; Lundvall, 
1992; Nelson, 1993; Edquist, 1997b; OECD, 1997) external factors are viewed 
on an institutional basis, in this research they are functional. This view is also 
supported by Radošević (1998), who stressed that systems of innovation should 
be defined not only in institutional terms, but also in technological terms or, 
more generally, in functional terms. Radošević argues that varieties of 
institutional set-up that do not produce effects on the technological regime are 
irrelevant from an economic perspective. Only institutional variety that 
performs different economic functions (functional variety) can be considered 
relevant from an economic perspective (Radošević, 2006). 
PS2: The nature of public service innovations depends on different determi-
nants. PS2.1: The nature of public service innovations depends on the field they 
belong to. PS2.2: The nature of public service innovations depends on the type 
they are. PS2.3: The nature of public service innovations depends on the 
country they are from. 
Arguments from the literature: Mohr (1969) suggested that innovation in the 
public sector is the function of an interaction between the motivation to 
innovate, the strength of obstacles against innovation, and the availability of 
resources for overcoming such obstacles, which by nature differ according to 
particular circumstances. According to Howells and Tether (2004; sub-chapter 
3.1), in the private sector there are significant sectoral differences within 
services in terms of the activities. In order to overcome this great diversity in 
service activities, a fourfold typology of different service activities and 
conditions was used by authors based on the different transformation processes: 
those services engaged in physical transformation processes (particularly of 
goods); those services involved in the transformation of information; those 
services engaged in the provision of knowledge-based services; and those 
services which are aimed at the transformation of people. In the innovation 
capacity study of voluntary and non-profit organisations (VNPOs) in the UK 
(see Osborne, 1996, 1998; Osborne and Flynn, 1997), the authors found that for 
those VNPOs which were engaged in innovative activity, it is related to the type 
of innovation that they are pursuing and its management implications (see 
chapter 2). Additionally, the National Audit Office in the UK inspected govern-
ment innovations in 2006, and found in particular that central government 
organisations needed to improve their understanding about where the potential 
for innovation lies, increase the incentives for individuals to innovate, 
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strengthen their ability to learn from one another and improve the pace at which 
innovations are implemented (see National Audit Office 2009). Koch et al. 
(2005) also give an example that if one country decides to provide care for 
elderly through publicly owned organisations, another through private and yet 
another through a mix of both types, then these should all be included when 
saying something useful about innovation in the public sector, when a 
functional perspective is chosen. This leads to the understanding that there 
should be some differences in terms of the field, type or perhaps a country the 
innovation belongs. This research will test this proposition in three separate 
stages (sub-propositions). 
PS3: Public policy effects (in their wider sense) on technological innovation in 
public sector services are multi-factorial and weight differently depending on 
the activity. PS3.1: Innovation in public sector services requires changes in laws 
and regulations. PS3.2: Innovation in public sector services requires 
contribution from public policy (in its narrow sense). 
Arguments from the literature: Public institutions operate under certain 
regulatory, social and political rules, legacy and heritage – all influencing the 
innovation paradigm in the public sector. According to Bloch (2010), many 
public sector innovations may simply be dictated either directly or indirectly 
from external sources like policy changes, regulations, etc. Among the long list 
of innovation drivers the National Audit Office (2006) also lists the importance 
of new government priorities, response to crisis, change in ministerial priorities, 
change in policy environment, changes in resource use, implementing EU 
policies, etc. Dunleavy et al. (2008) propose the following list of indicators for 
ʻorigins of innovations’: how many innovations are due to EU regulations, due 
to ministerial or political suggestions, due to senior staff suggestions, due to 
middle and/or frontline staff suggestions, due to customer suggestions, due to 
other public sector organisations. The National Audit Office (2009) candidly 
concludes that innovative changes are often launched because of either political 
or ministerial pressures or efficiency drives. However, once this external trigger 
is provided, departments and agencies have a stockpile of possible innovations 
to hand which they use to sustain change. Authors of the National Audit Office 
(2009) study also state that the main barriers to innovation are a reluctance to 
embrace new ways of working and fragmentation within government, creating 
‘silos’ between agencies, partly also a policy and regulation issue. Furthermore, 
as often the issues faced by public authorities are complex, according to Thenint 
(2010), the wrong policy mix can have adverse effects on overall government 
performance. Within the present research, we aim to test the importance of both 






3.5. Summary and considerations 
The literature review chapter (chapter 1) brought together the key contributions 
of the literature of innovation, modernisation and transformation in the public 
sector. Chapter 2 analysed the existing empirical studies around this 
increasingly important topic. The purpose of these chapters was to give us a 
more comprehensive and structured view on how innovation in the public sector 
is theoretically understood and how much is known about the public sector 
innovation process in practice. The present chapter 3 developed a conceptual 
framework for further survey and empirical analyses of this thesis with an 
ultimate goal to understand the key features influencing the development and 
implementation of technologically innovative public sector services and the 
system in which it occurs. The framework developed had four different 
theoretical perspectives. These perspectives were the organisational view (in a 
majority of ways, innovation is still an organisational issue), the learning view 
(the role of knowledge in innovation process is strongly emphasised by many 
theoretical literatures, especially the evolutionary literature), the technological 
view (as it is widely acknowledged that technological change and innovation 
are major drivers of productivity growth, economic growth and lie at the very 
heart of the competitive process), and the systemic view (the general argument 
is that innovation takes place in a system, consisting individuals, firms and 
institutions, and within a certain cultural and regulatory framework). Respective 
sub-chapters ended with related area-specific propositions drawn from the 
existing literature and to be tested throughout the empirical part of the thesis. 
These contributions should facilitate the empirical exploratory survey of the 
present research with an ultimate research question (RQ) “What is the relative 
importance of different managerial and contextual factors influencing the 
innovation process in information technology-based public sector services and 
how do they determine the nature of public service innovation system in four 
European countries?” The survey methodology, sub-research questions and the 




This research has been planned as an exploratory attempt to assess empirically 
the relative importance of different managerial and contextual factors influ-
encing the innovation process in information technology-based public sector 
services and how they determine the nature of the public service innovation 
system in four European countries: the UK, Denmark, Finland and Estonia. The 
research question of the thesis asks what is the relative importance of different 
managerial and contextual factors influencing the innovation process in 
information technology-based public sector services and how do they determine 
the nature of the public service innovation system? Due to the theoretical and 
methodological limitations elaborated in chapters 1 and 2, the choice and 
structure of theoretical foundations, the methodology, the case definition as well 
as the sample developed for the study are experimental as a result of this 
particular multidisciplinary exercise. The research framework (see chapter 3) 
has four perspectives through which the public sector innovation process is 
analysed: managerial, learning, technological, and systems perspective. 
 
 
4.1. Country selection, unit of analysis and definitions 
These particular countries (the UK, Denmark, Finland and Estonia) were 
selected for the survey because of the following reasons. Firstly, as for a 
comparative study, one needs to select countries with a different nature and 
background – the selected countries differ in size, level of economic develop-
ment and historical roots. Secondly, they all are relatively advanced in applying 
new technologies, services and/or management methods in the public sector; 
however, their public sector development waves have been different. Thirdly, in 
all four countries English is widely spoken, minimising translation or 
understanding errors. Finally, the country selection was discussed and validated 
by field experts, as well as the SPRU research community. Additionally, the 
author has personal experiences and a cultural understanding of all four countries, 
helping to put the research findings professionally into a wider context. 
According to the Oslo Manual (OECD/Eurostat, 2005), innovation data should 
ideally be compiled and collected at the organisational level for which decisions 
on innovation activity are made. The statistical unit of the population may also be 
defined using the KAU-concept (Kind-of-Activity-Unit) 29, which is followed in 
this research (see also the elaborations of Bloch, 2011). In the current research, 
the basic unit of analysis for understanding the innovation process in public sector 
services is a specific technologically innovative public service (ʻthe case’), 
                                                                          
29  KAU (see the Oslo Manual §237) is defined as “an enterprise or part of an enterprise 
which engages in one kind of economic activity without being restricted to the geographical 
area in which that activity is carried out”. 
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developed and implemented by an actual organisation, and which directly or 
indirectly benefits citizens or customers. There are also many other types of 
public sector innovations, however, they have been left aside from the present 
research. The other types of innovation might be, for example according to 
Halvorsen et al. (2005), technology procurement as such, internal technological 
development, bureaucratic and organisational reform, new policies, etc. 
In defining the research subject and objects, we have followed the basic 
definitions of innovation suggested by Oslo Manual (OECD/Eurostat, 2005). 
However, we have developed the definitions, describing the research subject, 
from the perspective of the current research. The final definitions used for the 
present research are the following: 
 Public services are considered technologically innovative if they have a 
significant technological component or application that significantly 
improves the service or integrates systems (the author); 
 Services are considered successful if the technological component has: 
(a) radically changed the behaviour of the introducing institution (or its 
unit); (b) significantly improved the take-up of the service; (c) signifi-
cantly improved the quality of the service; (d) significantly reduced time 
spent on service delivery; (e) personalised the service; (f) reduced signifi-
cantly the cost of the service; or (g) made the service more accessible, 
including being available online (the author); 
 Public services are defined to be those services managed in the public 
domain (not necessarily provided there), funded predominantly by 
government-raised income, and subject to direct or indirect control of 
elected politicians (Willcocks and Harrow, 1992); 
 The innovation can appear in the form of a new or improved product 
(service) or process (OECD/Eurostat, 2006; the author); 
 A product innovation is the introduction of a good or service that is new 
or significantly improved with respect to its characteristics or intended 
use. This includes significant improvements in technical specifications, 
components or materials, incorporated software, user friendliness or other 
fundamental characteristics (OECD/Eurostat, 2006); 
 A process innovation is the implementation of a new or significantly 
improved production or delivery method (including system integration). 
This includes significant changes in techniques, equipment and/or 
software (OECD/Eurostat, 2005; the author); 
 The innovation can be incremental (evolutionary) or radical (OECD/ 
Eurostat, 2005); 
 The innovation can be new to the organisation or new to the market 
(OECD/Eurostat, 2005); 
 Pure marketing innovations or organisational innovations (as defined by 
OECD/Eurostat, 2005) without a major technological component [product 
(service) or process] are not considered ʻinnovations’ in this research (the 
author). 
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4.2. Research framework, research questions and 
propositions 
The research question (RQ) of the thesis is the following: “What is relative 
importance of different managerial and contextual factors influencing the 
innovation process in information technology-based public sector services and 
how do they determine the nature of the public service innovation system in 
four European countries?” 
The conceptual research framework with four perspectives developed in 
chapter 3 was used to propose the following sub-research questions, which 
should help answer the main research question: 
 Managerial perspective – What are the key features influencing, sup-
porting and hampering, the development and implementation of 
successful, technologically innovative public sector services (SRQ1)? 
 Learning perspective – Which managerial and organisational improve-
ments are necessary to innovate in public sector services (SRQ2)? 
 Technological perspective – What is the importance of technological 
knowledge in the public service innovation process, where and how is it 
developed (SRQ3)? 
 Systems perspective – What does the composition and dynamics of 
public sector (service) innovation system look like across countries 
(SRQ4)? 
  
We have also developed partly sub-research question related and area-specific 
propositions drawn from the existing literature, to be tested throughout the 
empirical part of the thesis (see table 4.1). 
 













PM1: Factors (including goals) influencing the innovation process in public 
sector services differ from those known from the private sector. 
PM2: Innovation goals in the public sector are polarised. 
PM3: The success of technological innovations in public sector services is 
below the initial expectations. 
PM4: Innovation supporters in the public sector can be internal to the 
organisation and external. 
PM5: Innovation barriers in the public sector are predominantly internal to the 
organisation. 
PM6: Personal leadership (i.e. existence of ‘key’ individuals) is an internally 













PL1: Technological innovation in the public sector services requires a broad 
range of managerial and organisational improvements. 
PL2: External learning and consultation plays a positive role in successful 
public service innovations. 
PL3: Innovation-related learning in public sector services is cumulative and can 













PT1: Technological knowledge is the major element improved internally and 
obtained externally in the development process of public service innovations. 
PT2: The role of technology in today’s public sector is integrated with other 
managerial processes. 
PT3: Classical ʻtechnology push’ does not work in the public service 
innovation process. 
PT4: Technological risk is among the most important external hampering 








PS1: The innovation process in the public services is a systemic phenomenon. 
PS2: The nature of public service innovations depends on different 
determinants. 
PS2.1: The nature of public service innovations depends on the field they 
belong to. 
PS2.2: The nature of public service innovations depends on the type they are. 
PS2.3: The nature of public service innovations depends on the country they are 
from.  
PS3: Public policy effects (in their wider sense) on technological innovation in 
public sector services are multi-factorial and weight differently depending on 
the activity. 
PS3.1: Innovation in public sector services requires changes in laws and 
regulations. PS3.2: Innovation in public sector services requires contribution 
from public policy (in its narrow sense). 
PS4: The main characteristics and driving forces of the public service 
innovation system do not differ across countries. 
Notes: (*) For theoretical and empirical arguments drawn from the literature see respective sub-
chapters 3.1–3.4 
 
The research framework of the present research combined with the structure of 
the proposed public sector innovation system is presented in figure 4.1. The 
framework has three sub-structures – external environment, learning environ-
ment, and the organisation itself with its innovation goals and results (for 




Figure 4.1 The research framework combined with the proposed public sector 
innovation system framework model 
 
The external environment can either support or hamper the innovation process. 
From the supportive perspective, this includes political demand, political 
commitment to long term major projects, supportive policies, appropriate laws 
and regulations, competition, budgetary pressure, existence of good examples, 
technology push, low technological risk, good cooperation with partners, user 
demand and user trust. From the hampering perspective, high political, 
reputation and technological risks and digital divide can be added. 
The learning environment (which will be more deeply elaborated later in this 
chapter) is linked to organisational capabilities required for innovation – which 
organisational capabilities did the organisations internally improve in order to 
innovate, which capabilities did the organisations obtain externally in order to 
innovate, did the organisations have any previous experiences with similar 
innovations, and did the organisations learn from the previous experiences 
while innovating (internally and externally, from positive and negative ones)? 
Also, which types of intra-organisational capabilities were improved in order to 
innovate, e.g. general management skills, project management skills, techno-
logical knowledge, organisational structure, motivation system of personnel, etc.? 
At the organisational level, factors influencing the innovation process can be 
supportive organisational strategy, top management commitment and support, 
open-minded managers, hierarchical (top-down) power, personal leadership or 
committed ‘key’ individuals, available mandate, motivation and tools of the 
project manager, innovation accepting organisational culture, flexible organi-
sational structure, good knowledge of existing technologies, close cooperation 
with technology providers, good market knowledge (existence of client surveys, 
etc.), close cooperation with future users and user groups, and internal learning 
capabilities. From the internal hampering side, lack of ideas, stagnating 
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organisational and/or rigid organisational structure, previous negative expe-
riences and failures, and lack of market knowledge can be also added. 
 
 
4.3. The survey of successful technological  
innovations in public sector services 
After setting up the main research question, developing the research framework, 
related sub-research questions and the propositions, the empirical research 
method was chosen. It was decided to carry out the case study research in four 
countries based on a questionnaire. Prior to the survey, the questionnaire was 
tested with six international field experts as well as within the SPRU research 
community. 
The questionnaires were sent out using e-mail and were directed to pre-
identified (during the case identification process) persons, ideally the ones who 
were personally responsible or linked to the particular public service innovation 
development.30 The e-mail based survey method allowed several advantages 
compared to an ordinary mail survey. 
Some relative advantages of the e-mail based survey are the following (see 
also Fricker and Schonlau, 2002): 
(a) It helps to direct concrete persons behind the development of particular 
innovations; 
(b) It helps in achieving the maximum response rate; 
(c) It raises the quality of responses; 
(d) It helps in being precise in terms of respondent (paper-based 
questionnaires rarely reach the most appropriate person for a response); 
(e) It allows fast feedback and respective corrections in case of wrong or 
incomplete contacts; 
(f) It makes it possible to link the e-mail address to a particular phone 
number of a particular person (for reminding calls); 
(g) It supports the use of the advantages of the Internet and ICT (i.e. for 
archiving the questionnaires); 
(h) It is economical (i.e. no postal fees); 
(i) It is fast (i.e. avoids intermediates, and it is simultaneous). 
 
                                                                          
30  According to the OSLO Manual §450 (OECD/Eurostat, 2005), “Choosing the unit’s 
most suitable respondent is particularly important in innovation surveys, as the questions are 
very specialised and can be answered by only a few people in the unit, often not those who 
complete other statistical questionnaires. In small units, managing directors are often good 
respondents. In larger units, several people are often involved, but one must be responsible 
for co-ordinating the replies. It is highly recommended to make a special effort to identify 
respondents by name before data collection starts”. 
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Due to the exploratory nature of the study, we could not use any existing 
databases or lists to select the cases for our survey. Therefore, cases for the 
survey were selected using multiple identification techniques. First, we 
conducted an e-mail based survey among the field experts in all four countries 
asking to identify any potential cases that might belong to our survey sample 
(according to predefined definitions; see annex 9). Experts were given instruc-
tions how to identify the potential cases. As a second step, we conducted some 
face-to-face interviews with certain key experts in order to identify cases they 
might know (as well as to discuss the survey questionnaire). The third step was 
an extensive survey on the Internet and publications (including so-called non-
scientific ʻgrey literature’) to identify as many public sector services as possible 
that fit our definition of the research subject. As a result of all these activities, 
159 cases of such services with appropriate contact persons were identified in 
the four countries. After cleaning the list (excluding inappropriate cases, cases 
with poor or inadequate contact, and merging inter-linked services) we had 135 
appropriate cases of technologically innovative public sector service to be 
included to our survey (see annex 9 for the list). 
The questionnaire structure follows the logic of the research framework (see 
figure 4.1). While developing the questionnaire, we followed four basic 
principles. Firstly, to keep the questionnaire as simple as possible to fill-in. 
Secondly, to keep the questionnaire short, not asking anything irrelevant from 
the perspective of our research question and propositions. The third principle 
was to avoid the use of open-ended questions, which do not allow later quanti-
tative analyses. Fourthly, to develop questions in a way that allows performing 
reasonable statistical analyses afterwards. The questionnaire was developed 
according to the best practices of similar questionnaires available. The author’s 
own previous experiences as a Community Innovation Survey (CIS 3) project 
manager in Estonia were very valuable, as well as different research methods’ 
seminars carried out during the SPRU programme. 
The questionnaire developed (see annex 1) has eight sections, five of them 
are the core sections (B, C, D, E and F), two sections are for categorisation and 
background information (A and G), and one section for contact information (H). 
Section A is for identifying the general framework of the case (technology 
innovative public sector service). It has questions about which field of public 
service the case belongs (A1); which part of the service the innovation 
influenced (A2); whether the service existed before the innovation (A3); where 
the innovation was developed (A4); at what level of public administration the 
service is provided (A5); and who is providing the service (A6). The respon-
dents had multiple choice questions in this section, where they had to choose the 
most appropriate answer. 
Section B (first core section) is about organisational capabilities. It has 
questions about which organisational capabilities the respondent’s organisation 
improved internally in order to innovate (B1); which capabilities they obtained 
externally (B2); whether they have any previous experience with similar 
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innovations (B3); and whether they had learned from the previous experiences 
(internal and external, positive and negative ones) while innovating (B4). The 
respondents had multiple choice questions in this section, where they had to 
choose one or several appropriate answers. 
Sections C to F (four other core sections) had scale questions, where respon-
dents were given 12–14 predefined responses. They were given a scale where  
1 = not important; 2 = of little importance; 3 = important; and 4 = very 
important. Respondents had to rate each predefined answer on the scale. Instead 
of the usual scale of five choices, four choice scales were used to prevent the 
propensity of respondents to tick the middle box. In addition to the 12–14 
predefined responses, the respondents were given one line as ʻother, please 
specify’ where they had a chance to write their own factor/response if missing 
in the predefined list. On the last two lines (after predefined responses and 
ʻother’) respondents were asked to indicate ʻthe single most important’ and ʻthe 
single least important’ factor/response to this question (i.e. most important 
goal/least important goal of innovation) – see the questionnaire in annex 1. 
These questions were developed in order to focus or clarify the results of the 
scale questions, i.e. to identify the single most or the single least important 
innovation influencing factor appropriate for the particular question. 
Section C (second core section) concerns the goals of the innovation. In this 
section respondents had to answer the scale question C1 ʻwhat were the main 
goals of the innovation’. 
Section D (third core section) is about support and motivations to innovate. 
In this section (which had two parts) respondents had to answer the scale 
questions D1 ʻassess the importance of different internal supporting/motivating 
factors for the innovation’ and D2 ʻassess the importance of different external 
supporting/motivating factors for the innovation’. 
Section E (fourth core section) is about the obstacles to innovation. In this 
section (which also had two parts) respondents had to answer the scale 
questions E1 ʻassess the importance of different internal hampering factors 
faced during the innovation process’ and E2 ʻassess the importance of different 
external hampering factors faced during the innovation process’. 
Section F (fifth core section) is about results of the innovation. In this 
section respondents had to answer the scale question F1 ʻassess the importance 
of the results of your innovation’. 
Section G is for additional details to identify and analyse the case. It has 
questions about whether the innovation required any changes in laws and 
regulations (G1); was the innovation motivated or influenced by written/ 
codified public policy (G2); does the usage of the innovation require legally 
valid authorisation of the user (G3); which methods are used for authorisation of 
the service user (G4); which were the sources of finance used to develop the 
innovation (G5); which methods were used to market the new innovative 
service (G6); has the success of the innovation been measured (G7); in terms of 
initial expectations, how do the respondent rate the current results of the 
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innovation (G8). The respondents had multiple choice questions in this section, 
where they had to choose one or several appropriate answers. 
Section H is for identifying the respondent’s details. This included name of 
the innovation; start of developing the innovation (year, month); time of 
launching the innovation (year, month); languages the service is available; the 
Internet address of the service; name of the organisation; respondent’s organi-
sation (if different); name of the respondent(s); position of the respondent(s); e-




4.4. Best practice research and its limitations 
Finally, the present research can be characterised as a best practice research 
(BPR). This method is supported by the fact that the purpose of the research 
was to examine the environment in which the innovation occurs, rather than to 
explore the innovations themselves. The main purpose of the research was to 
learn what the public service innovators have experienced during the develop-
ment and implementation of their innovations, to share this knowledge with 
other policy makers and public sector leaders, as well as to contribute theoreti-
cally. 
According to Overman and Boyd (1994), best practice research is the 
method of choice for contemporary post-bureaucratic reform theorists. Public 
management researchers increasingly examine ʻbest practices’ to advocate post-
bureaucratic principles of customer-driven, value-focused, entrepreneurial, 
market-oriented government. The authors stress that BPR and post-bureaucratic 
theory may be a positive, practical, prescriptive, and innovative new paradigm 
in public management research and theory, but numerous practical and scientific 
challenges remain (see also later elaborations). Broadly speaking, BPR is 
theoretically self-validating, non-cumulative, limited in scope, and politically 
skewed. The authors stress that BPR demonstrates the unique problems that 
arise when research and reform in public management become too closely 
linked. Indeed, today, best practice research is claimed to be one of the major 
new streams of public management research (Borins, 2001b). Inspired by Peters 
and Waterman’s (1982) work on excellence in private sector firms, best practice 
researchers have increasingly attempted to identify the characteristics of 
successful and innovative public sector organisations (Barzelay, 1992; Osborne 
and Gaebler, 1992). In addition, there have been a growing number of public 
management innovation awards in the last two decades, and scholars have used 
some of the best applications in these awards as the basis for case studies. These 
writers have then generalised about the process of innovation and the 
characteristics of innovative organisations (Behn, 1988; Golden, 1990; Levin 
and Sanger, 1994; Borins, 2001b). Best practice research is also not new in 
innovation studies. For example, Rothwell (1992), who studied different 
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innovation studies in private sector over three decade, concluded that: “Some of 
the many empirical studies undertaken have looked only at successful 
innovations, some only at failures. Others have compared successes with 
failures (because it controls); a number have taken the individual innovation 
project as the unit of analysis, while others have been conducted at the level of 
firm; some have considered only tactical (project execution) variables, while 
others have included strategic (project selection) variables; there has been 
considerable sample variety in terms of size of firm, technology and industrial 
sector” (p. 223). 
Best practice research has also faced criticism as indicated before (see for 
example Overman and Boyd, 1994; Lynn, 1996). According to Borins (2001b), 
the critique of best practice research lies with three problems: selectivity, 
sustainability, and comparability. He stresses that firstly, best practice re-
searchers choose cases to illustrate predetermined conclusions, accept uncriti-
cally the self-reporting of key informants and make no attempts at external 
collaboration (selectivity). Secondly, they report that some organisations 
characterised as excellent have subsequently experienced major problems and 
some excellent firms have gone bankrupt. Similarly, some innovations that have 
won awards have subsequently been terminated (sustainability). Thirdly, critics 
argue that it does not compare excellent organisations to mediocre or failing 
ones, making it impossible to draw conclusions about the factors truly respon-
sible for excellence (comparability). The critics advocate abandoning best 
practice research and returning to more conventional social science, in which 
theories are used to construct testable hypotheses. Out of these three, the 
problem of comparability is the most complicated to deal with as academics 
tend to study either success or failure, rather than putting the two together. 
There has also been a fourth line of criticism being dismissive of individual 
cases, arguing that they are unrepresentative and do not necessarily represent 
the larger sample. 
Within the current research, the above-mentioned criticism towards the best 
practice research method is taken into account and the side effects of the 
method have been minimised where appropriate and possible. 
  
171 
5. DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF FACTORS 
INFLUENCING TECHNOLOGICAL  
INNOVATION IN PUBLIC SECTOR SERVICES 
The experimental survey was conducted in 200531 in four countries, the UK, 
Denmark, Finland and Estonia among pre-identified technological innovation 
cases (the majority of them IT-based e-services, see annex 9). A common 
questionnaire was used along the lines of the current understanding of public 
sector innovation (chapters 1 and 2), proposed research framework (chapter 3) 
and definitions (chapter 4). This is the first chapter presenting the results of the 
empirical survey of the present research. The chapter draws together the main 
descriptive results of the survey and conclusions are presented at the end of 
every sub-chapter. 
The final sample of research comprised 135 concrete cases of technologi-
cally innovative public sector services (i.e. units of analysis) in four countries. 
There were 33 cases from United Kingdom, 26 cases from Denmark, 35 cases 
from Finland, and 41 cases from Estonia. The questionnaires were sent out 
using e-mail and were directed to pre-identified (during the case identification 
process) persons, ideally the ones who were personally responsible or linked to 
the particular public service innovation development (for argumentation see the 
methodology in chapter 4). 
The majority of questionnaires (with only some exceptions) were sent out 
and received back via e-mail. In case of non-responses, up to three reminding 
letters with attached questionnaire were sent out (with two-week intervals). 
Finally, in the case of no response, a reminding call was made. 
After strong effort and extensive work, we received 81 questionnaires 
back.32 Most of the questionnaires received were well filled in (i.e. there were 
very few missing values in general). From these 81 questionnaires, 15 were 
from the UK (response rate 45.5 per cent), 18 from Denmark (response rate 
69.3 per cent), 20 from Finland (response rate 57.1 per cent), and 28 from 
Estonia (response rate 68.3 per cent). The overall response rate of the survey 
was 60.0 per cent (see table 5.1). This response rate is quite favourable 
compared to other surveys: in the VNPO survey (Osborne and Flynn, 1997), the 
cross-nation response rate was 52.1 per cent. In the later MEPIN project (see 
Bugge et al., 2011), the response rate varied between 42 per cent in Denmark 
and 77.6 per cent in Iceland. 
This chapter of descriptive analysis is divided into five sub-chapters. For 
better overview, parts of the text directly answering to (sub-)research question(-s) 
and propositions are presented in a bold style. The first section, 5.1, provides 
                                                                          
31  Results were first published in Pärna and von Tunzelmann (2007). 
32  For details about the survey planning and the questionnaire, see chapter 5, annexes 1 and 9. 
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the results of the so-called ‘non-core’ questions.33 Thereafter, sub-section 5.2 
provides descriptive results about innovation-related organisational learning in 
the public sector. Sub-section 5.3 then gives descriptive results about innovation 
goals and results in public sector services. Descriptive results about factors 
influencing, supporting and hampering, internally and externally, the innovation 
process in public sector services are provided in sub-section 5.4. Finally, sub-
section 5.5 presents descriptive results about public policy effects (including the 
legal framework) on the development and implementation of technologically 
innovative public sector services. 
 
Table 5.1 Final sample and responses 
Country Final sample 





United Kingdom 33 15 45.5 
Denmark 26 18 69.2 
Finland 35 20 57.1 
Estonia 41 28 68.3 
    
TOTAL 135 81 60.0 
 
5.1. Descriptive results of non-core questions 
This sub-chapter opens up the results of the non-core questions (sections A and 
G) of the survey. The results are given following the general sequence of 
questions in the questionnaire, accommodated with appropriate tables. The 
results are calculated in SPSS using mainly descriptive statistics. 
 
Question A1 – Fields of public service the technologically innovative service-
cases belong to 
In the literature review in chapter 1 we discussed that there is no universal 
categorisation of type or field of innovation in the public sector (for alternatives 
see Willcocks and Harrow, 1992; Okut-Uma, 2001; Baker, 2002; Howells and 
Tether, 2004; IDeA, 2009; Windrum, 2008). We have combined these 
understandings and the structure of field categories used for this survey can be 
seen in table 5.2. The answered sample is distributed quite equally between 
eight categories we used. These categories were slightly reshaped after the ques-
tionnaires were received back (this was done because of the nature of 
responding service-cases and the fact that we used an exploratory methodology 
for this research). 
                                                                          
33  Non-core questions are generally those not directly linked to the main research question 
and sub-research questions of the present research. 
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Out of the questionnaires received back, 13 per cent belonged to the field of 
ʻsocial services’, 7 per cent to ʻeducation services’, 14 per cent to ʻother knowl-
edge services’, 13 per cent to ʻlogistical and environmental services’, 9 per cent 
to ʻbusiness services’, 8 per cent to ʻpersonal ID services’, 12 per cent were 
ʻgeneral administration portals’, and 5 per cent ʻeDemocracy related services’ 
(see table 5.2). 
 












Social (including pensions), health and 





Directly education related services (including 
online application solutions and portals, learning 




General knowledge services for citizens, 
businesses, civil servants and other groups (legal 
advice and databases, counselling, web-based 






Logistical and transport, environmental and 
housing related services (including journey 
planning, vehicles registration, driving licence, 
weather prediction, traffic safety, parking, public 
transport, land information and environment 





Taxation, customs, statistics, procurement, 
business and securities registry related services 
(all for business and/or private persons) 
9 11 
A1.6 Personal ID 
services 
Personal passport, ID card and address (and other 
personal data) related services, applications and 





General administration portals, organisational 
web pages, other services’ infrastructures and 
different public information and/or service 




eDemocracy, citizen participation and public 
relations related services (including public debate 
environments, influencing guides, crime 
reporting solutions, voting and election systems) 
5 6 
Total 81 100 
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Question A2 – Parts of the service the innovation mainly influenced 
There are different typologies or ways of classifying technological solutions in 
public services. The normative literature agrees that there are different stages in 
e-government provision and governments go through a number of stages before 
reaching maturity (Irani, 2006). As we showed in sub-chapter 3.3, there are 
different frameworks developed to describe or assess the stages of e-govern-
ment development (for example Gartner Group, 2000; Howard, 2001; Chandler 
et al., 2002; Layne et al., 2001; United Nations DPEPA, 2002; Silcock, 2001; 
Rambøll, 2004; Capgemini, 2006; Windley, 2002; Atallah, 2001; OECD, 2004; 
UNO, 2003; UNPAN, 2006). These frameworks tend to have three to five 
stages (see figure 3.10 in chapter 3), starting from simple online presence of an 
organisation (i.e. posting of basic information) up to seamless or fully integrated 
web presence of government services (i.e. integrated services, data sharing, 
common platform). However, due to the sample size of the present research, 
and to allow adequate comparison of the core results, we adopted a basic 
threefold structure of (1) ʻfront office’, (2) ʻback office’ functions, and (3) ʻboth 
front and back office’. As we see from table 5.3, the majority of innovations 
influenced both the front and the back office together (71 per cent of 
respondents), being more transformative to the organisation. Only 27 per cent 
were pure front-office innovations, and only 2 per cent pure back office 
innovation. The latter is partly due to the fact that the emphasis of the survey 
was on services, which by definition have to have a client or receiver interface 
(with only some exception, i.e. infrastructure innovations such as ID card). 
 
Table 5.3 Parts of service the innovation mainly influences (% of respondents) 
Country Only front office
(service delivery)
Only back office 
(process integration)
Both front and 
back office 
United Kingdom 53 13 34 
Denmark 22  0 78 
Finland 35  0 65 
Estonia 11  0 89 
    
AVERAGE 27  2 71 
Note: respondents were asked which part of the service the innovation mainly influenced 
 
Indeed, one should not over-simplify the results (the fact that innovations 
mostly influenced both front and back office together). On the one hand, yes, 
the digitalisation process of government is perhaps a once-in-the-lifetime 
opportunity to rethink how public sector works, how it is managed, how it is 
built up, how clients and citizens see it, and how back office functions are 
structured and run. Indeed, authors also stress (see Longford, 2002) that looking 
only at e-services, people tend to overstate the transformative capacity of 
information technology and underestimate the numerous obstacles to enhancing 
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the quality and participatory nature of democracy, including endemic structural 
features of the political system, entrenched habits of government secrecy and 
hostility to access to information laws, the effects of neo-liberal public policy 
and public sector restructuring, and the recalcitrant, multiple inequalities cross-
cutting the social fabric of a particular country. Therefore, e-government co-
ordinators should use ICTs as a tool to facilitate change, and should not attempt 
to restructure public administration around current technology (see OECD, 
2003b and sub-chapter 3.3). 
 
Question A3 – The existence of services before the innovation 
From table 5.4 we see that, according to the respondents view, as much as 24 
per cent of services existed before the innovation, 50 per cent did not exist 
before the innovation, and 26 per cent only partly existed. The largest amount of 
services existed before the innovation in Estonia (36 per cent) and the smallest 
amount in Denmark (only 12 per cent). At the same time, the largest amount of 
services, which did not exist before the innovation was in Denmark (as much as 
70 per cent), followed by Finland (55 per cent), the UK (47 per cent) and 
Estonia (35 per cent). Before the innovation, 33 per cent of services partly 
existed in the UK, 29 per cent in Estonia, 25 per cent in Finland, and only 18 
per cent in Denmark. The mentioned ratio between the services which (a) 
existed before the innovation, (b) did not exist before, or (c) only partly existed, 
shows us interesting issues. Firstly, in Denmark, where the majority of public 
sector service innovations did not exist before the innovation, therefore, the 
public service development can be considered relatively chaotic there. 
However, this is partly because many service-cases from Denmark were 
ʻprojects’ of a larger programme, initiating service innovations in the public and 
non-profit sector in Northern Jutland (a region in Denmark). At the same time, 
the fact that as much as 36 per cent of services existed before the innovation in 
Estonia, indicates a more systematic perspective in public service development 
in this country. This more systematic service development in the public sector 
can represent also the maturity level of public service development. In this 
respect, interestingly, public service development in Finland and the UK looks 
less mature than in Estonia. According to our result, the public service 
development is slightly more chaotic in these countries as only 20 per cent of 
services existed before the innovation (despite the fact that these countries are 
developed economies where most of public services should be in place and 
relatively advanced). Indeed, this point can be criticised because the sample 
does not represent the whole picture of public sector services in respective 
countries. However, from the e-services side, it might give hints about the 
relative maturity of public service development in these countries. 
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(did not exist before)
Partly 
(partly existed) 
United Kingdom 20 47 33 
Denmark 12 70 18 
Finland 20 55 25 
Estonia 36 35 29 
    
AVERAGE 24 50 26 
Note: respondents were asked did the service exist before the innovation 
 
Question A4 – Place of innovation development 
An interesting issue in innovation development is related to the question where 
it was developed. We have claimed in proposition PT3 that classical linear 
ʻtechnology push’ (see Martin, 1994) does not work in public service innovation 
processes. Table 5.5 illustrates the innovation development picture among the 
public service innovation cases of our survey. Although external cooperation 
does not automatically mean technology push from the supplier side, the survey 
results tend to support the proposition. Only 8 per cent of service-innovations in 
the public sector are fully developed externally; 24 per cent are developed only 
internally; and as much as 68 per cent are developed in cooperation between the 
organisation and its external partners. The only country where purely external 
innovation development is more active than in others is Denmark (24 per cent). 
The percentage of only internally developed innovations is higher in Finland 
(40 per cent) and the UK (33 per cent) and lower Estonia (11 per cent) and 
Denmark (18 per cent). Conversely, as much as 85 per cent of public service 
innovations in Estonia are developed in cooperation with the organisation and 
its external partners; Estonia is followed by the UK (67 per cent), Denmark (58 
per cent), and Finland (55 per cent). The strong tendency towards external 
cooperation in innovation development shows that the public service innovation 
process happens within the broader innovation system framework. This supports 
proposition PS1, where we put forward that the innovation process in the public 
sector services is a systematic phenomenon, and that it should therefore be 














United Kingdom 33 0 67 
Denmark 18 24 58 
Finland 40 5 55 
Estonia 11 4 85 
    
AVERAGE 24 8 68 
Note: respondents were asked where the innovation was developed 
 
Question A5 – The level of public administration the service is provided 
From table 5.6 we see that the majority (60 per cent) of technologically 
innovative public sector services were provided at the national level. The 
national level was followed by ʻinternational’ (21 per cent), meaning that the 
service can be used from or are partly targeted to the international community. 
Only 5 per cent of services were locally provided; this was followed by 14 per 
cent of regionally provided services. The local and regional dimensions were 
relatively high in Denmark (16 and 39 per cent respectively), partly due to the 
reason elaborated earlier (in relation to table 5.4). The conclusions here show 
that public service advancements/innovations are most likely to happen at the 
national level. This is partly because the majority of public services are 
provided at the national level (i.e. taxation, statistics, etc.) as well are most local 
governments subcritical in their size for proper technological innovation 
development. However, we know that services such as social security, health, 
education and transportation are whether only or partly provided at the local or 
sometimes regional level. Therefore, we could expect more service innovations 
from the local and regional level in the near future. Indeed, what we have seen 
from the present survey is that nationally developed services tend to be more 
sustainable and advanced, compared to the local or regional ones. Therefore, 
this leads to the conclusion that even if certain public services are locally 
provided, then if possible, the standardised common platform for them should 
be developed at the national level and then provided to all local or regional 
authorities simultaneously. This could compensate the usual lack of financial 
and human resources locally to develop great technological service-innovations; 
in addition, it can boost the real possible effect of the service innovation and 
integration across the country. Moreover, in this case, the same thing, i.e. the 
online registration system of as hospital, would not be developed in different 














United Kingdom 0 7 80 13 
Denmark 16 39 39 6 
Finland 0 5 75 20 
Estonia 4 7 54 35 
     
AVERAGE 5 14 60 21 
Note: respondents were asked at what level of public administration is the service provided 
 
Question A6 – The entity that is providing the innovative public service 
As we have seen from the theoretical parts of the present research (see chapters 
1), there has been almost a century of discussions whether public services 
should be provided by the voluntary/non-profit sector, by public sector organi-
sations, or by private sector entities. Table 5.7 illustrates the institutional struc-
ture of service provision among the respondents of the present survey. We see 
that altogether, 41 per cent of innovative services are provided directly by 
public entities; this is the highest in Estonia (43 per cent) and the lowest in 
Denmark (39 per cent). The public sector is followed by ʻpublic and private 
entities in cooperation’ (38 per cent). This cooperation-intensive service 
provision is most common in the UK (46 per cent) and least common in Finland 
30 per cent. Only private entities were providing 14 per cent of innovative 
public services, this is the highest in Finland (25 per cent) and the lowest in the 
UK (7 per cent). Academic and non-profit institutions are relatively unimportant 
in providing technologically innovative public sector services (1 per cent and 
6 per cent respectively). The relatively high importance of public-private 
cooperation in service provision (38 per cent of all services) also partly supports 
proposition PS1, where we claim that the innovation process in the public sector 
services is a systematic phenomenon. However, the high intensity of private-
public cooperation in service provision stresses a wide practice of highly 
formalised cooperation agreements between the public and the private sector. 
On the other hand, the fact that as much as 41 per cent of service innovations 
are provided directly by the public sector, also indicates a strong need for less 
formal cooperation practices within the innovation system, which might be 
based on many little agreements, but also on personal level day-to-day inter-
action. The overall cooperation necessity is also supported by Borins (2001b), 
who while asking the respondents of his study what was innovation in their 
programme, discovered that the most frequent characteristic, observed in 
approximately 60 per cent of programmes, was ʻholism’, namely that the inno-
vation depended on inter-organisation cooperation, that it delivered multiple 
services to individuals, or that it took a systems approach to a problem (see 
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chapter 2). From a critical perspective, one could say this extensive inter-
organisation cooperation marginalises the role of the project leader or champion 
and might lead to poor quality of the result as responsibilities are too disperse. 
 



















40 7 46 7 0 
Denmark 39 11 33 11 6 
Finland 40 25 30 5 0 
Estonia 43 11 42 4 0 
      
AVERAGE 41 14 38 6 1 
Note: respondents were asked who is providing the innovative service 
 
Question G5 – The sources used for financing the public service innovation 
development 
As this sub-chapter analyses the results of the non-core questions (sections A 
and partly section G), we will continue with section G question 5 from here. We 
know from many studies from the private sector, but also from the public sector 
(e.g. Koch et al., 2005), that lack of finances is usually named as the number 
one barrier for innovation development. We analyse whether this is or is not 
true in the public sector in the later stages of the empirical analysis. However, 
table 5.8 illustrates the sources of finance in the public sector to finance the 
service innovation development. We see that in exactly half of the cases (50 per 
cent), the source of finance has been the ordinary public annual budget. This 
was highest in Finland (60 per cent), followed by Estonia (57 per cent), the UK 
(53 per cent), and finally Denmark with only 24 per cent. The next important 
source of financing was “national, regional or local funds or specific 
programmes” (34 per cent). The importance of this source was the highest in 
Denmark (65 per cent), followed by Finland (40 per cent), the UK (27 per cent), 
and Estonia (with only 14 per cent). These two most important sources of 
finance were followed by “especially extended public annual budget” (23 per 
cent). The extended budget was the most used in Denmark (35 per cent), 
followed by Estonia (25 per cent), Finland (20 per cent), and the UK (only 7 per 
cent). From the other sources of finance, “international funds or specific 
programmes” have been financing 14 per cent of the service innovations, and 
“loan and leasing” only 1 per cent. About 11 per cent of cases of public service 
innovations were financed through “other” sources. These conclusions show 
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that the multiplicity of sources of finance tend to be important for public service 
innovation development. However, what we have seen during this survey is that 
systematic development in public services is more sustainable and effective than 
chaotic. We can extend this finding to the conclusion that continued and 
systemic methods of public service innovation financing should be preferred to 
any ad hoc or random methods of spreading resources. We also support the 
view that the development of both managerial and technological innovations in 
public services should be overwhelmingly financed through the natural process 
of public budgeting, not through separate programmes/projects. Moreover, to 
finance cross-institutionally seamless government services and shared 
infrastructure, budgetary regulations should facilitate co-operative funding 
mechanisms (OECD, 2003b). Related to that, organisations also need incentives 
for cross-organisational projects and tools for measuring returns of investment. 
 

























53 7 7 27 0 13 
Denmark 24 35 0 65 12 0 
Finland 60 20 0 40 10 10 
Estonia 57 25 0 14 25 18 
       
AVERAGE 50 23 1 34 14 11 
Notes: (1) respondents were asked which sources are used to finance the development of the 
innovation; (2) it was possible to select more than one answer to this question. 
 
Question G6 – Methods used to market the new innovative service 
The concept of marketing has conventionally been viewed by public service 
professionals as inappropriate to organisations concerned with the delivery of 
public good services (see Laing, 2003). However, the adoption of private sector 
based approaches to the organisation of public services in many post-modern 
western economies has forced a fundamental reconsideration of the potential 
contribution of marketing to the delivery of public services and related 
innovations. This is not the core focus of the present research, however, looking 
at the tools used for the marketing of newly developed public service-inno-
vations, we first see a high proportion of offline methods (i.e. booklets, 
newspapers; 79 per cent). Offline methods were used most often in Finland (in 
95 per cent of service cases), followed by Denmark (82 per cent), the UK 
(80 per cent), and Estonia (64 per cent). Online methods were the next 
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important marketing tool (used by 66 per cent of service cases). These were 
most often used in the UK (73 per cent), followed by Denmark and Finland 
(both 65 per cent), and Estonia (64 per cent). Only 13 per cent of service cases 
used other methods for marketing, and 8 per cent did not use marketing (see 
table 5.9). As public services are not homogeneous (rather, they are charac-
terised by a high degree of diversity) we cannot make a simple conclusion here. 
Indeed, as we see that offline methods are prevailing over online methods, one 
might expect more novelty in introducing new or improved services to their 
current and/or potential customers by public institutions. 
 
Table 5.9 Methods of marketing the new innovative service (% of respondents) 















United Kingdom 80 73 40 0 13 
Denmark 82 65 59 12 0 
Finland 95 65 75 15 5 
Estonia 64 64 50 18 11 
      
AVERAGE 79 66 56 13 8 
Notes: (1) respondents were asked which methods were used to market the new innovative 
service; (2) it was possible to select more than one answer to this question. 
 
 
5.2. Innovation-related organisational learning  
in public sector 
“You can be discouraged by failure, or you can learn from it. So go ahead and 
make mistakes, make all you can. Because, remember that’s where you’ll find 
success – on the far side of failure,” said Thomas J Watson, Sr. (founder of 
IBM). From the mainstream literature on innovation (based on the private 
sector, mainly the manufacturing industry) we know that learning has a crucial 
role in an organisation’s innovativeness (see also respective discussions in 
chapter 3). According to Lundvall (1992), the fundamental resource in the 
modern economy is knowledge and, accordingly, the most important process is 
learning. It is equally important to improve one’s internal capabilities, as well as 
to learn externally – from competitors, from different knowledge bodies (e.g. 
academic institutions) – locally, nationally and internationally. It is important to 
learn from one’s own mistakes or those of others, and to discover any available 
best practices appropriate to improve one’s own processes, products and 
services. Moreover, it is also important to have close relationships with external 
partners, e.g. technology providers and user representatives. 
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As seen above and discussed earlier in this research, several determinants are 
important when talking about organisational learning. Sub-research question 2 
(SRQ2) asks “Which managerial and organisational improvements are 
necessary to innovate in public sector services?”, and sub-research question 3 
(SRQ3), “What is the importance of technological knowledge in the public 
service innovation process, where and how it is developed?” In the current sub-
chapter, we assess the following parameters of organisational learning (see also 
statistical output tables in annex 4): 
(a) Which organisational capabilities did the organisations internally 
improve in order to innovate; 
(b) Which capabilities did the organisations obtain externally in order to 
innovate; 
(c) Did the organisations have any previous experiences with similar 
innovations; 
(d) Did the organisations learn from the previous experiences while inno-
vating (internally and externally; from positive and negative ones). 
  
Not all the new ideas are generated inside the focal organisation; some are 
generated externally but are adopted by the organisation (Damanpour and 
Gopalakrishnan, 1998). The better the actors at developing networks that can 
help them get access to the relevant competences and partners that can help 
them in their learning processes, the greater the chances that their innovation 
processes will succeed (Kemp and Weehuizen, 2004; see chapters 1 and 2). 
Table 5.10 shows the importance of different internal capabilities that 
organisations improved in order to innovate. We see that the most important of 
these are technological knowledge (69 per cent of all respondents) and project 
management skills (64 per cent). Relatively less important were improvements 
in general management skills (34 per cent), organisational structure (28 per 
cent) and motivation systems of personnel (15 per cent). The importance of 
internally improved capabilities was similar across all countries in the survey. 
These results support the views of Røste (2005), who states that the cumulative 
accumulation of knowledge and skills, i.e. the whole learning process, is crucial 
for innovation in the public sector. A similar finding is supported by Koch and 
Haukens (2005), who claim that in order to learn and innovate the actors in 
public sector must interact with other actors, this being people, organisations or 



























UK 40 73 73 33 7 7 7 
Denmark 41 76 65 41 29 6 0 
Finland 20 45 65 20 20 5 15 
Estonia 36 64 71 21 7 0 4 
        
AVERAGE 34 64 69 28 15 4 6 
Note: it was possible to select more than one answer to this question. 
 
Therefore, looking at table 5.11, we see that from the externally obtained 
knowledge perspective, the single most important externally obtained capability 
is technological advice and support, which in some cases is surely related to 
ICT outsourcing (81 per cent), far ahead of project management advice and 
support (21 per cent) and management advice and support (11 per cent). 
External technological advice and support was highly used in all countries 
(from 76 per cent in Denmark to 87 per cent in the UK). Kemp and Weehuizen 
(2004) also distinguish between three different types of learning: technical 
learning (about instruments), conceptual learning (about goals and strategies) 
and social learning (about societal values, responsibilities, appropriate ways of 
interacting and policy approaches), see sub-chapter 1.3. However, they did not 
differentiate the relative importance of different knowledge areas, which we 
have done here. Indeed, despite the dominant position of technological advice 
and support, we have to admit that this might be partly related to the fact that 
the survey sample consisted only of technological innovation and did not focus 
on other innovation areas (i.e. organisational innovations). 
Interestingly, although only 8 per cent of service-innovations in public sector 
were fully developed externally (see table 5.5), the fact that as much as 81 per 
cent of innovators obtained external technological advice and support, indeed, 
tends to question proposition PT3 that classical ʻtechnology push’ does not 
work in the public service innovation process, therefore we only partly accept 
the proposition. However, we have to accept fully proposition PT1 that techno-
logical knowledge is the major element improved internally and obtained 
externally in the development process of public service innovations. Despite 
some differences between countries, whether technological knowledge or 
project management skills were the most important internally improved 
capability for innovation, overall, the results show that the most important intra-
organisational capabilities improved by the innovating organisations was 
technological knowledge (69 per cent of respondents; see table 5.10) and table 
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5.11 shows that technological advice and support was the single most important 
externally obtained capability for innovation. The purpose of our research was 
not to study organisational success, however, the results are somewhat contrary 
to the experiences of Damanpour et al. (2009), who found that organisational 
success in the UK public service organisations does not follow a technological 
trajectory and depends on the adoption of both technological and non-
technological innovations. Their analysis provided empirical evidence for this 
view and demonstrated that the co-adoption of service, technological process, 
and administrative process innovations influence organisational performance in 
public service organisations. 
 























UK 33 27 87 0 7 7 
Denmark 0 18 76 6 12 6 
Finland 0 25 80 0 5 15 
Estonia 14 18 82 11 0 7 
       
AVERAGE 11 21 81 5 5 9 
Note: it was possible to select more than one answer to this question. 
 
According to Bloch (2010) the willingness to take on risk and the ability to 
learn from failures are important issues for public sector innovation and this 
motivates gaining more information on failures, both implemented changes 
(innovations) that did not meet their objectives or had negative impacts, and 
innovation projects that were abandoned. Table 5.12 shows whether the 
organisations had any previous experiences with similar innovations. We see 
that 53 per cent of responding organisations had previous positive experiences 
with similar innovations; only 11 per cent of respondents reported having 
previous negative experiences. As much as 45 per cent of responding organi-
sations had no previous experiences, positive or negative, with similar inno-
vation (this was highest in Estonia – 54 per cent and lowest in Denmark – 
35 per cent). Previous positive experiences were most encountered in Denmark 
(65 per cent) and least in Estonia (46 per cent). Negative experiences were most 
often faced in Finland (20 per cent) and least in Denmark (6 per cent). These 
results are relatively volatile, showing that innovators had only little more 
previous positive experiences than no experiences. Surprisingly, negative 
previous experiences did not exist by most of the respondents while developing 
innovations. Even if every innovation is different from another, one might still 
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expect that service providers in the public sector would put more emphasis on 
learning from mistakes and failures. This is especially appropriate in case of 
large technology projects, which, according to the literature, fail or are over-
budget and over-deadline every now and then (see sub-chapter 3.3). 
 







UK 53 13 40 
Denmark 65 6 35 
Finland 50 20 45 
Estonia 46 7 54 
    
AVERAGE 53 11 45 
Note: it was possible to select more than one answer to this question. 
 
Table 5.13 shows whether the organisations had learned from previous 
experiences (within the organisation and outside) while innovating. Learning 
from previous positive experiences seemingly dominates any learning from 
previous negative experiences. We also see that organisations are slightly more 
likely to learn from others than from their own previous experiences: 43 per 
cent for the former and 39 per cent for the latter in terms of positive 
experiences, 23 per cent and 21 per cent respectively from previous negative 
experiences. When comparing different countries, we see that in the UK and 
Denmark organisations most often learned from their own positive experiences, 
while in Finland and Estonia organisations were more open to positive 
experiences of others; and similarly for learning from negative experiences. We 
know that a key determinant of relative success or failure is the ability to 
manage the learning cycle (see Hale, 1996; Bowen, 1994; Hayes et al., 1988; 
Maidique et al., 1985). In addition to intra-organisational learning, it has two 
directions: dissemination (outbound) and learning (inbound), see Bloch, 2010. 
This external dissemination of knowledge has growing importance, contrary to 
the statement of Bason (2010), that many public sector organisations are still 
essentially navigation blind when it comes to real-time, relevant management 































UK 33 53 27 33 13 
Denmark 18 35 6 29 24 
Finland 35 45 35 55 15 
Estonia 7 29 21 46 21 
      
AVERAGE 21 39 23 43 19 
Note: it was possible to select more than one answer to this question. 
 
 
5.3. Goals and results of technological innovation  
in public sector services 
The goals of innovation are easier to talk about than to define. In the literature, 
there are mixed views whether innovation in the public sector occurs similarly 
or different from the private sector. From time to time private management 
methods have been preferred to the traditional public sector ones, and vice-
versa. Bryer (2006) also says that public organisations, more than private 
organisations, must deal with multiple stakeholders and potentially conflicting 
demands. How they balance the demands of multiple stakeholders will have 
consequences for their activities, outcomes, and the degree of trust in them by 
the public. Our claim here is that innovation in the public sector occurs differ-
ently; innovation goals in the public sector differ from the private sector mainly 
because of non-existing competition (no need to improve competitiveness) and 
relatively weak financial pressure (no need to generate profit). In chapter 1 we 
analysed the differences between the public and private sector innovation 
processes and saw that the current knowledge about innovation goals in the 
public sector is very fragmented. In addition to more typical private sector 
motives such as competition and efficiency, researchers claim that the principle 
factor for innovation is simply to put useful ideas into action, as well as to react 
to funding crises, technical changes, as well as to burgeoning demand from the 
user side (see Zegans, 1997). Mulgan and Albury (2003: 3) define innovation 
simply as “new ideas that work”. However, the new ideas that work at creating 
public value can mean many different things – new ways of organising things 
(like public-private partnerships), new ways of rewarding people (like perfor-
mance related pay) or new ways of communicating (like ministerial blogs) 
(Mulgan, 2007). 
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As seen above and discussed earlier in this research, there might be several 
reasons why innovation in the public sector takes place. In the present survey, 
we assessed the following:34 
(a) What are the goals and the results of technological innovation in public 
sector services? 
(b) How would it seem if we compare the initial innovation goals with the 
innovation results the public service organisations achieved? 
(c) Whether and how has the success of technological innovation in public 
sector services been measured? 
(d) How would it seem if we assess the innovation results of the selected 
organisations against the initial expectations the organisations had (on a 
four-point scale – excellent, good, average or poor)? 
  
Despite the innovation goals in the private sector (services) being skewed 
towards the quality issues (see Howells and Tether, 2004; sub-chapter 3.1), due 
to multiple values and goals in the public sector (Willcocks and Harrow, 1992; 
sub-chapter 1.2), there is a reason to believe that possible goals in the public 
sector services are much more polar ones. Grout et al. (2003; sub-chapter 1.2) 
also stress that the typical concern is that publicly controlled organisations, not 
subject to the discipline of the competitive market, may therefore lack incen-
tives to control costs or provide quality of service and respond to the needs of 
consumers. However, figure 5.1 illustrates the multidimensionality of inno-
vation goals in public services, and the results are different from what we 
expected.35 On average (across the countries) the most important innovation 
goal has been to respond to user needs (3.52 on a scale of 4), followed by 
improvements in service quality (3.49), to go online (3.43), and to improve the 
take-up of the service (3.3). The least important innovation goal has been to 
gain social or political popularity (2.21), followed by improvements in the 
organisation’s competitiveness (2.24), improvements and changes in organi-
sational behaviour (2.37), and reducing the service cost (2.53). We can also 
identify different country patterns in terms of their innovation goals. For 
example, in Estonia the most important innovation goal was to reduce the time 
spent on service delivery (3.57), while in Finland and the UK it was to go online 
(3.76 and 3.53 respectively), and in Denmark to improve transparency (3.59). 
Looking at the general picture of innovation goals across countries we see that 
transparency issues are more important in Denmark than in other countries; the 
service cost issue is more important in the UK; and the service diversity issue is 
relatively more important in Estonia and relatively less important in Finland. 
                                                                          
34  See statistical output tables and charts about the goals and results of innovation in annex 
5; and about results compared to initial expectations in annex 3. 
35  The assessment was made on a four-point scale, where 1 was “not important”, 2 “of little 
importance”, 3 “important”, and 4 “very important”. 
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In order to clarify the results, the respondents were also asked to name the 
single most and the single least important innovation goal. The results were 
clearer but slightly different from the previously described scale question. 
Twenty-five per cent of respondents named ʻto improve the quality of the 
service’ as the single most important innovation goal, followed by ʻgoing 
online’ pointed by 15.8 per cent of respondents, and ʻto respond to user needs’ 
by 14.5 per cent of all respondents. This clarification question emphasises 
slightly more the importance of quality issues versus user demand related 
issues. Country patterns are relatively similar to the scale question described 
earlier, i.e. transparency issues are relatively important in Denmark; user needs 
are important in Finland; while service diversity, delivery time, and take-up 
issues are important in Estonia. 
While asking about the single least important innovation goal, as much as 
33.8 per cent pointed to ʻgaining social or political popularity’, 21.6 per cent 
named ʻto improve or change organisational behaviour’, and 18.9 per cent ʻto 
improve the competitiveness of the organisation’. This is similar to what we 
saw in the scale question. From a single country perspective, ʻgaining social or 
political popularity’ was strongly the least important innovation goal in the UK 
(57.1 per cent) and Denmark (46.7 per cent), while in Finland and Estonia other 
aspects were considered as least important innovation goals. In Finland, compe-
tition issues were equally unimportant innovation goals as social or political 
popularity (both 27.8 per cent), while in Estonia organisation behaviour 
improvements (25.7 per cent) and competitiveness issues (22.2 per cent) were 
much less important innovation goals than social or political popularity (18.5). 
Indeed, we remain neutral in terms of proposition PM2 that innovation goals 
in the public sector are polarised. Although the responding organisations had 
many different innovation goals, cumulatively, the major ones are clearly drawn 
out: improvements in service quality, going online, responding to user needs, 
and improving the take-up of the service (see figure 5.1). 
However, based on these result, we should accept proposition PM1 stating 
that factors (including goals) influencing the innovation process in public sector 
services differ from the ones we know from the private sector. Competitiveness 
and service cost, which are important innovation drivers in the private sector, 
were both among the least important innovation goals rated by the respondents, 
see figure 5.1. This contrasts the findings of Borins (see 2001c and chapter 2) 
that a common denominator of all the characteristics of public sector innovation 
is that they look very much like the private sector. 
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Note: scale 1 = not important; 2 = of little importance; 3 = important; 4 = very important. 
Figure 5.1 Goals of innovation in public sector services (Question C1) 
 
From a statistical significance perspective within the innovation goal question 
(see figure 5.2), we see that all possible goals are significantly different at least 
from another goal. Nevertheless, when we look at the error bar, we see that 
many goals are with overlapping means. This gives evidence that the 
importance of different innovation goals is relatively homogeneous, i.e. many 
goals are performing similarly. Therefore, in the latter stage of our analysis, we 
try to group similarly performing innovation goals in order to find out common 
denominators describing and clarifying the picture of possible innovation goals 
in public sector services. The statistical significance of country differences 
within each innovation goal is given in the latter stage, when the goals are 
grouped (i.e. after principal component factor analysis, see chapter 6). 
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Figure 5.2 Statistical significance of differences in innovation goals (Question C1) 
 
Figure 5.3 illustrates the patterns of innovation results in public services. In 
general, the pattern of results is similar to that of innovation goals. On the one 
hand, this gives some evidence that, in general, the innovation results are 
similar to what was initially expected (i.e. in comparison to innovation goals). 
Alternatively, this may indicate aspirations rather than outcomes (see figure 
3.13 in sub-chapter 3.4) given that the respondent and the data source were the 
same. Koch and Haukens (2005) also support the need for external evaluation, 
stating that the introduction of any innovation should require close ex ante 
assessment, coupled with careful review and evaluation. Finally, there are still 
some differences between the importance of reported innovation goals and 
innovation results; these can be followed in annex 5. 
 
 
Note: scale 1 = not important; 2 = of little importance; 3 = important; 4 = very important. 
Figure 5.3 Results of innovation in public sector services (Question F1) 
One-Sample Test
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When looking at the innovation results question from a statistical significance 
perspective (see figure 5.4), we see that, similarly to innovation goals, all 
possible results are significantly different at least from another result. 
Nevertheless, when we look at the error bar we see that many results are with 
overlapping means. This gives evidence (similarly as for innovation goals) that 
the importance of different innovation results is relatively homogeneous, i.e. 
many results are performing similarly. Therefore, in the latter stage of our 
analysis, we try to group similarly performing innovation results in order to find 
out common denominators describing and clarifying the picture of possible 
innovation results in public sector services. The statistical significance of 
country differences within each innovation result is given in the latter stage, 
when the innovation results are grouped (i.e. after principal component factor 
analysis, see chapter 6). 
 
   
Figure 5.4 Statistical significance of differences in innovation results (Question F1) 
 
When comparing innovation goals (Question C1) and innovation results 
(Question F1), we see that even if the questionnaire and the questions were 
filled-out by the same person, and at the same time, there still are some 
statistically significant differences (i.e. the importance of different innovation 
goals was weighted differently from the results realistically achieved). From the 
paired sample T-test (see annex 8) we see that out of the twelve possible 
innovation goals and results, five were statistically significantly different, and 
all of them towards the results which were weighted as more important than the 
initial goals. This means that the results ‘available online service’, ‘improved 
transparency’, ‘improved competitiveness of the organisation’, ‘satisfied users 
(or user groups)’ and ‘gained social or political popularity’ were all weighted as 
significantly more important than their respective initial goals. This phe-
nomenon illustrates the situation where the innovation goals initially set up may 
actually differ statistically significantly from the results of a particular public 
service innovation. Nevertheless, one should keep in mind that the described 
goals and results which differed significantly from each other were neither all 
One-Sample Test
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the most or the least important when the respondents rated the importance of 
innovation goals and innovation results (see figures 5.1 and 5.3). 
Most of the organisations in the survey measured the success of their 
innovations (see table 5.14). The majority of them used automatic features of 
their systems to track user performance (52 per cent); this was highest in the UK 
(67 per cent) and lowest in Estonia (43 per cent). In terms of importance, the 
next tool used for user performance identification was the online user question-
naire (38 per cent), followed closely by offline user questionnaires. Online user 
questionnaires were again most used in the UK (60 per cent), followed by 
Finland (45 per cent) and Denmark (33 per cent). Offline user-questionnaires 
were used by less than half of the respondents (40 per cent) both in the UK and 
in Finland. Finland was also a strong user of other kinds of measurement tools 
(45 per cent). Interestingly, no user-performance measurement was used by 29 
per cent of Estonian organisations; this percentage was much lower in other 
countries (in the UK 6 per cent; Denmark 7 per cent; Finland 5 per cent). 
Nevertheless, the latter might be due to the fact that Estonian public service 
innovations in the survey are relatively new (mostly developed around 2004). 
Indeed, the most ‘productive’ starting year for developing public service 
innovations in general was 2000 (the development of 24 per cent of the cases in 
this survey started this year), followed by 2002 (18 per cent) and 2003 (18 per 
cent). 
 



























UK 67 60 40 7 7 
Denmark 56 33 33 17 6 
Finland 50 45 40 45 5 
Estonia 43 25 25 7 29 
      
AVERAGE 52 38 33 19 14 
Notes: (1) the respondents were asked whether the ‘success’ of their innovation has been 
measured; (2) it was possible to select more than one answer to this question. 
 
Responding organisations rated the success of their innovations very highly (see 
table 5.15). Compared to the initial expectations, 30 per cent rated their 
innovation results as excellent and 61 per cent as good, meaning that 91 per cent 
of respondents consider their innovations to be relative successes. Only a small 
minority rate their results as average (8 per cent) or poor (1 per cent). This 
relatively good evaluation is partly due to the fact that it was best practice 
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research by its nature, and partly because it is hard (and maybe not possible) to 
find any (common) quantitative measures to measure the innovation success in 
public sector (compared to the private sector where return on investment, sales 
or productivity measures can be used). The UK is the most confident country in 
terms of rating the innovation results: almost half (47 per cent) of responding 
organisations felt their innovation results were excellent. Most pessimistic 
results was in Estonia, where only 18 per cent of cases were rated as excellent, 
64 per cent as good, 14 per cent average, and 4 per cent poor. Based on the 
discussions above, we have to reject proposition PM3 that the success of 
technological innovations in public sector services is below the initial 
expectations. 
 
Table 5.15 Innovation results compared to initial expectations (%) 
Country Excellent Good Average Poor 
UK 47 40 13 0 
Denmark 29 71 0 0 
Finland 35 65 0 0 
Estonia 18 64 14 4 
     
AVERAGE 30 61 8 1 
Note: the respondents were asked how do they rate the current results of their innovation, 
compared to the initial expectations 
 
 
5.4. Factors influencing successful technological 
innovations in public sector services 
While developing the theoretical research framework, from a management 
perspective, we decided to use the basic understandings of the innovation 
management literature (see for example Rothwell 1977, 1992; Tidd et al., 
2001), which is based on systematic analysis of private sector innovation studies 
since 1950s. According to Rothwell (1992: 224), “Success is multi-factored. 
Studies show that, in general, successful innovators outperform failures across 
the board. There are no simple single-factored explanations”. Therefore, success 
is a matter of competence in all functions, and of balance and coordination 
between them, and not of doing one or two things brilliantly well (Cooper and 
Kleinschmidt, 1988). Rothwell (1992) also notes that the success factors are 
more or less common to all industries, although their rank order or importance 
can vary from sector to sector. For his summary of different innovation 
influencing factors, as well as for other materials from the innovation 
management perspective, see sub-chapter 3.1. 
Previous conclusions about different factors influencing successful inno-
vations belong to the private sector, primarily to manufacturing. Borins (2001b), 
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supports the idea that innovation supporters in public sector organisations are 
also always multi-factorial. However, which of the factors are more important, 
which less? Perhaps the public sector has some additional factors and some of 
the given factors do not work so well in the public sector? This question is in 
line with the main research question (RQ) of the thesis “What is relative 
importance of different managerial and contextual factors influencing the 
innovation process in information technology-based public sector services and 
how do they determine the nature of public service innovation system in four 
European countries”, as well as with the sub-research question SRQ1, “What 
are the key-features influencing, supporting and hampering, the development 
and implementation of successful, technologically innovative public sector 
services”. 
The current research (and the survey it is based on) is carried out in order to 
give more ʻground-level’ answers to these questions. 
 
In this sub-chapter, we carry out the following analyses:36, 37 
(a) What is the importance of different internal supporting and hampering 
factors influencing the technological innovation process in public sector 
services; 
(b) What is the importance of different external supporting and hampering 
factors influencing the technological innovation process in public sector 
services; 
(c) Importance comparison of internal supporting factors versus external 
supporting factors; 
(d) Importance comparison of internal hampering factors versus external 
hampering factors; 
(e) Importance comparison of internal factors versus external factors; 
(f) Importance comparison of supporting factors versus hampering factors. 
 
Figure 5.5 illustrates the importance of different internal factors supporting 
innovation in public sector services (by country). On average (across countries) 
the most important factor is personal leadership or existence of ‘key’ 
individuals (3.42), followed by top management commitment and support, and 
open-minded managers (both 3.19). Indeed, the prominent position of personal 
leadership might be slightly biased, as mostly persons who were responsible or 
linked to the particular public service innovation development filled in the 
questionnaires. To continue, close cooperation with technology suppliers and 
good knowledge of existing technologies were also rated as being important 
                                                                          
36  This section only considers the country as a determinant of factors influencing the 
development process of public service innovation. Other possible determinants will be 
analysed in the latter stages of this thesis, after we have performed principal component 
factor analysis for grouping the factors. 
37  Statistical output tables and charts of these issues are in annex 6 and in annex 7. 
195 
(both 3.16). Conversely, the least important factors were hierarchical (top-
down) power (2.06) and flexible organisational structures (2.49). From a single 
country perspective, the pattern was quite homogeneous. Nevertheless, from the 
perspective of supporting factors, the UK slightly exceeded other countries in 
terms of management commitment and support, cooperation with technology 
suppliers, cooperation with future users, and good market knowledge. In 
Denmark, the internal learning capabilities and flexible organisational structures 
were slightly more important than in other countries. All countries rated 
hierarchical top-down power as the least important factor supporting innovation 
in public sector services. 
In order to clarify the results, the respondents were also asked to name the 
single most and the single least important internal innovation supporting factor. 
The results were clearer but slightly different from what we saw from the 
previously described scale question. Across countries, the single most important 
factor was clearly personal leadership or existence of ‘key’ individuals (28 per 
cent of respondents), followed by supportive organisational strategy (14.7 per 
cent) and top management commitment and support (12 per cent). Compared to 
the previous scale question we see that the latter two factors have changed their 
places. From a single country perspective, only the UK did not have personal 
leadership as the most important factor; supportive organisational structure, top 
management commitment and support, and close cooperation with technology 
suppliers were more important there. This might be partly due to the nature of 
experimentation, often linked to certain persons or smaller groups that might be 
more common in smaller countries, compared to the larger countries, where 
project costs and political risks have a different magnitude. The single least 
important internal innovation supporting factor was hierarchical top-down 
power (43.1 per cent of respondents); this was common in all responding 
countries. Interestingly, good market knowledge in Denmark (33.3 per cent) and 
internal learning capabilities in Finland (23.5 per cent) were considered the least 
important innovation supporters in these countries. These results support 
accepting proposition PM6, stating that personal leadership (i.e. existence of 
‘key’ individuals) is the internally dominating factor supporting innovation in 
public sector services. Indeed, we have to keep in mind that the questionnaires 
were filled in by people directly linked to the surveyed innovations, which 
might give slightly biased responses towards the importance of personal 
leadership issues. These results support the basic statement of Drucker (1985: 
30), who stated that “entrepreneurs innovate”. The importance of such ‘key’ 
individuals in the innovation process is stressed by many authors (see for 
example Koch and Hauknes, 2005; Rothwell, 1992). As from a single country 
perspective, only the UK did not have personal leadership as the most important 
factor (see figure 5.5), which also shows the appropriateness of the Troika-
model of innovation promotors in the public sector (see Hauschildt and 
Kirchmann, 2001; sub-chapters 1.3 and 3.1). The model differentiates three 
different layers of these innovation leaders: the power promotor (at the top), the 
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process promotor (in the middle) and the technical promotor at the expert or 
innovator level. Furthermore, our research shows that from country to country, 
the level of the most important promotor might differ, however, it is always one 
of the most important driving forces towards the innovation success. 
 
 
Note: scale 1 = not important; 2 = of little importance; 3 = important; 4 = very important. 
Figure 5.5 Internal factors supporting innovation in public sector services (Question 
D1) 
 
Figure 5.6 illustrates the importance of different external factors supporting 
innovation in public sector services. External supporting factors are generally 
rated relatively lower than the internal factors. The most important external 
factor has been good cooperation with partners (intermediates and technology 
providers), rated 3.25. This was followed by user demand (3.18) and user trust 
(3.03). Supportive policies (international, national, regional or local) were also 
rated as being relatively important (2.79). Conversely, the least important 
external factor was competition (1.86), followed by budgetary pressure (2.09), 
low technological risk (2.14), technology push (2.18), and appropriate laws and 
regulations (2.26). From a single country perspective, the picture was more 
scattered than in the case of internal support factors. For example, in the UK, 
political demand, political commitment to long-term projects and budgetary 
pressure were relatively more important than in other countries. In Denmark, 
several factors were less important than in other countries, for example low 
technological risk, user trust and demand, and appropriate laws and regulations. 
Political demand and commitment to long-term major projects were relatively 
important in Denmark (as in the UK). In Finland, competition, budgetary 
pressure, technology push, and political demand and commitment to long-term 
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major projects were relatively less important for innovation than in other 
countries. User demand and trust were rated relatively higher in Finland than in 
other countries (except the UK). 
Similarly to the previous questions, the respondents were also asked to name 
the single most and the single least important external innovation supporting 
factor. Across countries, while the scale question found the most important 
factor was good cooperation with partners, in this question it changed to user 
demand (26.3 per cent), previously the second most important external inno-
vation supporting factor. The importance of the factor supportive policies 
(11.8 per cent) has slightly improved compared to the position of user trust 
(currently 6.6 per cent) in the scale question. From a single country perspective, 
user demand is highly important in the UK (38.5 per cent) and Finland 
(42.1 per cent), while in Finland good cooperation with partners (35.3 per cent) 
outperforms other external innovation supporting factors. The least important 
external innovation supporting factors across countries were competition (28.9), 
political demand (21.1 per cent), and technology push (10.5 per cent). These 
results support the acceptance of proposition PM1 – factors influencing the 
innovation process in public sector services differ from the ones we know from 
the private sector. From figure 5.6 we see that competitiveness together with 
budgetary pressure are some of the least important external innovation 
supporting factors in public sector services. However, one should be careful in 
making simple conclusions. For example, from the external hampering factors’ 
figure (see figure 5.8) we see that, as a direct hampering factor, finances are 
rated as one of the most important ones. The results confirm that classical 
ʻtechnology push’ (see Godin, 2005) does not work in the public service inno-
vation process (proposition PT3). In this proposition, ʻtechnology push’ was 
considered more openly than traditionally – i.e. from the perspective of 
technology suppliers and other partners (private firms) trying to sell, push or 
lobby their services and existing solutions to the public sector. From that 
perspective, we can surely support the proposition – technology push appeared 
to be the fourth least important external innovation supporting factor. The low 
importance of such activity might be linked to the fact that technological 
innovations in public sector are mostly unique, i.e. it would be impossible to use 
existing/standard solutions for their development. On the other hand, successful 
technological innovations are usually dependent on many interrelated aspects, 
such as resistance to change, availability of appropriate technological compe-
tences in that particular sector in a country, but also on local and global 
technology demand in these sectors, as was shown in terms of ICT take-up in 
different sectors by Tiits and Rebane (2009; see also sub-chapter 3.3). 
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Note: scale 1 = not important; 2 = of little importance; 3 = important; 4 = very important. 
Figure 5.6 External factors supporting innovation in public sector services (Question D2) 
 
Figure 5.7 illustrates the importance of different internal factors hampering 
innovation in public sector services. Organisations rate the importance of 
different innovation hampering factors (internal and external) much lower than 
they did the supporting factors (for statistical significance see the last part of 
this sub-chapter). Country differences are also relatively larger in terms of 
hampering factors (especially internal hampering factors) than for supporting 
factors. In terms of the importance of different internal hampering factors, we 
should first stress that most factors were rated below the average (2.5). Of these, 
the most important internal factor was lack of knowledge about existing 
technologies (2.05), followed by weak cooperation with technology suppliers 
(2.03), weak top management commitment and support (1.97) and no sup-
portive organisational strategy (1.91). The least important internal factors were 
lack of ideas (1.56), lack of hierarchical (top-down) power (1.65), previous 
negative experiences (1.66), and lack of personal leadership (1.72). The largest 
country differences are between the UK and other countries. For example, no 
supportive organisational strategy (written/codified) was rated much higher in 
the UK than in other countries, the same goes for weak top management 
commitment and support, close-minded managers, lack of personal leadership 
or committed ‘key’ individuals, stagnating and rigid organisational culture, and 
previous negative experiences/failures. Conversely, Finland rated many factors 
relatively lower compared to other countries, i.e. these were not important 
innovation hampering factors for this country (e.g. in lack of personal leader-
ship and ‘key’ individuals, close-minded managers, lack of ideas, previous 
negative experiences, and lack of market knowledge). 
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The respondents were also asked to name the single most and the single least 
important internal innovation hampering factor. First, we have to say that 
responses were quite equally distributed across all possible factors (i.e. no 
factors were much better than the average), especially if we talk about the most 
important factors. Still, the most important internal innovation hampering factor 
was weak cooperation with technology suppliers (12.3 per cent); followed by 
lack of market knowledge (10.8 per cent), no supportive organisational strategy 
(9.2 per cent), and stagnating organisational structure (9.2 per cent). From a 
single country perspective, in the UK the most important internal innovation 
obstacle was no supportive organisational strategy (25 per cent), in Denmark 
weak cooperation with technology suppliers (25 per cent), in Finland stagnating 
organisational culture (26.7 per cent), and in Estonia weak cooperation with 
technology suppliers as well as lack of market knowledge (both 15.4 per cent). 
From the perspective of the least important internal innovation obstacles, we see 
that no supportive organisational structure, as well as lack of ideas were 
mentioned most often (both 15.6 per cent); this was followed by previous 
negative experiences/failures (12.5 per cent). The non-existence of supportive 
organisational strategy was seen as the least important internal innovation 
obstacle more often in Estonia (26.9 per cent) and Finland (14.3 per cent) than 
in Denmark (9.1 per cent) and the UK (7.7 per cent). This leads to the 
understanding that the existence of an appropriate written strategy is seen as 
more important in the UK and Denmark than in Finland and Estonia. Indeed, as 
said earlier, one should be careful in interpreting these results, because in 




Note: scale 1 = not important; 2 = of little importance; 3 = important; 4 = very important. 
Figure 5.7 Internal hampering factors of innovation in public sector services (Question E1) 
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Figure 5.8 shows the importance of different external factors hampering inno-
vation in public sector services. The level of importance of external hampering 
factors is similar to internal hampering factors (for statistical significance look 
at the end of this sub-chapter). On the one hand, the most important external 
hampering factor was lack of finances (2.35), followed by high technological 
risk (2.04), absence of relevant good examples (2.01), high political/reputation 
risk (2.01), weak cooperation with partners (1.99), and digital divide (1.99). On 
the other hand, the least important external factors were lack of user demand 
(1.73), lack of trust (1.81), lack of supportive policies (1.83), no or weak 
political demand (1.85), and inappropriate laws and regulations (1.85). The 
largest country differences are for high political/reputation risk, and lack of 
demand (in both cases the UK rated relatively higher and Finland relatively 
lower). Interestingly, Finnish organisations were relatively less influenced by 
most of possible innovation hampering factors (i.e. no political commitment to 
long-term projects, lack of supportive policies, inappropriate/rigid laws and 
regulations, lack of finances, high political/reputation risk, high technological 
risk, weak cooperation with partners, lack of user demand, lack of trust, and 
digital divide). 
Asking to name the single most important external innovation obstacle, the 
respondents first stressed the lack of finances (21.1 per cent), followed by the 
absence of relevant good examples (15.5 per cent), and digital divide (9.9 per 
cent). In the UK, the most important external innovation obstacle was the lack 
of finances (30.9 per cent) followed by the absence of relevant good examples 
(23.1 per cent), while in Denmark it was absence of relevant good examples 
(21.4 per cent). In Finland, weak cooperation with partners (e.g. intermediates 
or technology providers) was seen as the most important external innovation 
obstacle (23.5 per cent), while in Estonia lack of finances was seen important 
(22.2 per cent), followed by digital divide (18.5 per cent). The least important 
external innovation obstacles were no or weak political demand (20.9 per cent), 
followed by lack of user demand (13.4) and high political/reputation risk (11.9 
per cent). In the UK, inappropriate or rigid laws and regulations (33.3 per cent) 
were seen as the least important external innovation obstacles, while in Finland 
high political/reputation risk (23.5 per cent), and in Estonia no or weak political 
demand (26.9) followed by lack of user demand (19.2 per cent) were the least 
important external innovation obstacles. 
In looking at these external factors hampering innovation, one should keep 
in mind that almost all of them were below the ‘scale average’ (2.5). This means 
that surveyed organisations faced different (internal and external) innovation 
hampering factors relatively weakly while developing their innovations. 
From the technology perspective, figures 5.5 to 5.8 show that different 
technological issues, such as good knowledge of existing technologies, close 
cooperation with technology providers, technological risk, existence of good 
examples, technology push (lobbying by technology providers) and digital 
divide are intertwined with managerial, political, legal, personal (personnel), 
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and other issues. Even if Koch and Haukens (2005) believe that technological 
factors can be a strong determinant for subsequent innovation (chapter 2), our 
research here tends to support proposition PT2 that the role of technology in 
today’s public sector is integrated with other managerial processes and the time 
when technology was considered something separate and different is over. The 
results show that the role of technology in today’s public sector is becoming 
integrated with other managerial processes. However, even if we accepted the 
proposition that technological issues are related to managerial processes, one 
can say that there is still a long way to go. The largest challenge is that today 
innovations in government are ad hoc initiatives and mostly linked to a 
particular organisation and/or particular services or technological solutions. 
Therefore, mutual and continued organisational and technological upgrading of 
governance and service systems, as well as fundamentally new approaches and 
business models of solving escalating problems and realising national 
opportunities are needed to successfully face today’s challenges. However, we 
accept proposition PT2 only partly as from the external learning perspective, 
technology-related issues are still the central issues. 
The above-mentioned research results support also accepting proposition 
PT4 that technological risk is the most important external hampering factor in 
the public service innovation process. The literature considers technological 
knowledge one of the more complicated types of knowledge and that innovation 
is related to risk-taking and uncertainty (which politicians typically avoid). 
Authors are tackling innovation from the risks and obstacles perspectives in 
public sector quite extensively (Bhatta, 2003; Kubr, 1988) – while citizens 
demand a modernised government, they are generally ambivalent about 
innovation in the public sector, particularly because innovation often involves 
risk-taking that can lead to significant monetary losses (see Teofilovic, 2002; 
sub-chapter 1.1). Our research supported this proposition that technological risk 
is among the most important external hampering factors in the public service 
innovation process. It was the second most important external hampering factor, 
after lack of finances, followed by the absence of relevant good examples, high 
political/reputation risk, weak cooperation with partners and digital divide. 
Moreover, as an innovation supportive factor (figure 5.6), low technological 
risk was the third least important external factor. 
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Note: scale 1 = not important; 2 = of little importance; 3 = important; 4 = very important. 
Figure 5.8 External factors hampering innovation in public sector services (Question E2) 
 
In order to understand the full picture of factors influencing successful 
innovations in public sector services, one should look also at the differences in 
importance between internal and external factors, supporting and hampering 
factors. For that purpose, we have performed Paired Sample T-Tests (see annex 
8 for details). 
Firstly, looking at innovation supporting factors, on average, the internal 
factors (Question D1 mean of means 2.9524) are weighted statistically 
significantly (0.000) more important than the external ones (Question D2 mean 
of means 2.5800) are. Therefore, we have to reject proposition PM4 stating that 
innovation supporters in the public sector can be internal to the organisation and 
external. The results support the views of Vigoda-Gadot et al. (2005), who 
found that all of the participants could be initiators of innovation in the public 
sector, however, internal actors like managers and frontline employees are the 
primary initiators of innovation. These are followed by employees, other 
organisational personnel and only then by professionals, government and 
politicians, end-users and external organisations. 
 
Internal supporting factors ( > ) External supporting factors 
 
Secondly, from the perspective of innovation hampering factors, the situation is 
vice-versa than in case of supporting factors, indeed, the difference is smaller. 
In this case, internal (hampering) factors (Question E1 mean of means 1.8479) 
are weighted significantly (0.008) less important than the external ones 
(Question E2 mean of means 1.9578) are. The results show that contrary to the 
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Lack of user demand 
Absence of relevant good examples (best practices) 
Weak cooperation with partners (e.g. intermediates, tech. providers) 
High technological risk 
High political/reputation risk 
Lack of financial resources to develop the innovation 
Inappropriate/rigid laws and regulations 
Lack of supportive policies (international, national, regional, local) 
No political commitment to long-term projects 

































statement of Vigoda-Gadot et al. (2005), who specify that barriers to innovation 
in the public sector are predominantly internal to the organisation, we have to 
reject proposition PM5 that innovation barriers in the public sector are 
predominantly internal to the organisation. Our research showed that innovation 
barriers in public sector are relatively equally internal to the organisation and 
external. Indeed, from the statistical perspective, internal factors had a less 
important weight than the external ones. Our findings follow the private sector 
services experiences, where, according to Howells and Tether (2004), the 
external conditioning factors are seen as more significant barriers to firm 
innovation than internal barriers. 
 
Internal hampering factors ( < ) External hampering factors 
 
Thirdly, when merging internal supporting factors with internal hampering 
factors (responses to questions D1 and E1; mean of means 2.4337), and external 
supporting factors with external hampering factors (responses to questions D2 
and E2; mean of means 2.3077), we see that the importance of internal factors 
slightly but statistically significantly (0.000) outperforms the importance of 
external factors. 
 
Internal factors (supporting + hampering) ( > ) External factors (supporting + 
hampering) 
 
This difference gives the confidence to say that, in general, in order to succeed 
in public service technological innovations, organisational factors are more 
important than the ones of the external environment, i.e. the existence of written 
strategy, open minded managers, and ʻproduct champions’ who are ready and 
motivated to carry through the project, are more important than the external 
influence, i.e. political demand, budgetary pressure, or appropriate laws and 
regulations. 
Fourthly, when merging internal and external supporting factors (responses 
to questions D1 and D2; mean of means 2.7500), and internal and external 
hampering factors (responses to questions E1 and E2; mean of means 1.9248), 
we see that the importance of supporting factors very significantly (0.000) 
outperforms the importance of hampering factors. 
 
Supporting factors (internal + external) ( > ) Hampering factors (internal + 
external) 
 
This dominance of supporting factors over hampering factors might mean 
different things. First, it might be due to the fact that we surveyed existing, i.e. 
only successful, cases of technologically innovative public sector services, and 
in order to succeed one should face more supporting than hampering factors. 
Secondly, it is psychologically easier to describe one’s strong features (i.e. 
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supporting factors within the organisation) than negative ones (i.e. hampering 
factors within the organisation). In any case, in order to succeed, one should 
look optimistically towards the possibilities and try to take advantage of the 
existing supporting factors and develop them, (both within the organisation and 
externally), at the same time minimising the influence of possible hampering 
factors (again, within the organisation and externally). 
 
 
5.5. Public policy effects on the development  
of technologically innovative public sector services 
As was elaborated in sub-chapter 1.1, national or regional ʻinnovation culture’ 
should be understood in terms of attitudes towards innovation, technology, 
exchange of knowledge, entrepreneurial activities, business, uncertainty 
(Hofstede, 2001), and related behaviour and historical trajectories. Wieland 
(2004) conceives culture of innovation as the institutions (norms, values, formal 
and informal) that have a significant influence on how the actors involved in an 
innovation process perceive economic and technical challenges and that 
provides them with strategies to tackle these. Public sector institutions are 
assumed to be non-innovative exactly because of their bureaucratic nature, with 
strict rules, rigid regulations and habitual ways of doing things. Therefore, it is 
expected that innovation in the public sector requires changes in laws and 
regulations; moreover, it requires significant contribution from government 
leaders and public policy in order to happen. From the innovation policy 
perspective, we know that its two first generations have neglected the public 
sector and its services (see for example European Commission, 2002), and only 
the third generation is expected to emphasise the benefits of co-ordinating 
actions in policy areas, and make innovation – and innovation-friendly 
policies – one of the core principles of this. Thus, it would place innovation at 
the heart of each policy area. 
In general, it is relatively difficult to assess the direct effects of any 
particular policy or law on a concrete case of public service innovation. 
Nevertheless, in the current survey, we undertook the following exercises (see 
also statistical output tables and charts in annexes 3 and 5–7): 
(a) We asked the survey sample whether their innovation required any 
changes in laws and regulations; 
(b) We asked the sample whether their innovation was motivated or 
influenced by any written/codified public policy; 
(c) We also tackled public policy, as well as laws and regulation related 
issues in other questions (scale questions related to innovation goals and 
results, and factors influencing the innovation process). 
 
Contrary to initial expectations, relatively few public service innovations 
required changes in laws and regulations (see table 5.16). Altogether, only 
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21 per cent of responding organisations reported that their innovation required 
changes in laws and regulations (5 per cent of them in local or regional, and 
16 per cent in national laws and regulations). The ‘legal barrier’ was larger in 
Estonia (40 per cent of innovations required legal or regulatory changes) and 
smaller in the UK and Finland (where 7 per cent and 10 per cent respectively of 
innovations required such changes). Legal and regulatory barriers were also 
evaluated as being non-important in the questions on external factors supporting 
innovation (see figure 5.6) and external factors hampering innovation (see 
figure 5.8), discussed previously. Therefore, we have to reject sub-proposition 
PS3.1 that innovation in the public sector requires changes in laws and 
regulations. 
 
Table 5.16 Changes in laws and regulations related to public service innovation (% of 
respondents) 
Country Yes, in local/regional 
laws and regulations 
Yes, in national laws 
and regulations 
No 
UK 7 0 93 
Denmark 0 17 78 
Finland 0 10 90 
Estonia 11 29 61 
    
AVERAGE 5 16 78 
Note: the respondents were asked whether the innovation require any changes in laws and 
regulations. 
 
If the legal barriers of innovation faced by the responding organisations were 
relatively weak (see figures 5.6 and 5.8 and table 5.16) then the motivations and 
influence of public policies on service innovation development were much 
larger (see table 6.17). Across all four countries, only 35 per cent of 
organisations reported not having any influence from public policies while 
innovating (this was largest in Estonia, 46 per cent, and smallest in the UK, 
20 per cent). The majority of organisations that felt the influence of public 
policy did so from national (governmental) policies (57 per cent), followed by 
international policies (12 per cent) and local/regional policies (7 per cent). 
Governmental policies were most influential in the UK (80 per cent of 
respondents), followed by Finland (65 per cent), Estonia (50 per cent) and 
Denmark (39 per cent). The importance of public policy contributions also 
emerges from the question on external factors supporting innovation, where it 
was the fourth most important (see figure 5.6). These findings support sub-
proposition PS3.2, claiming that innovation in the public sector requires 
contribution from public policy. The situation where the public policies have a 
considerable effect on public service innovations supports the broad idea of the 
so-called third generation innovation policy (see European Commission, 2003, 
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as well as related theoretical discussion in chapter 1). However, even if the idea 
of the third generation innovation policy was to put innovation at the heart of 
each policy area, it was more targeted at private sector oriented policies (i.e. 
enterprise policy, industrial policy, technology, science and innovation policy, 
regional policy, educational policies, agricultural policy, etc.). Our empirically 
led suggestion here is that innovation should also be put at the heart of any 
public or administrative policy or framework. Indeed, this should be done in a 
careful manner as the public sector is generally risk averse and cannot fail, as 
some business projects might and are sometimes even expected to do. 
 













UK 0 80 0 20 
Denmark 17 39 17 39 
Finland 10 65 10 25 
Estonia 4 50 18 46 
     
AVERAGE 7 57 12 35 
Note: the respondents were asked whether the innovation was motivated or influenced by 
written/codified public policy. 
 
Our research results have clarified the general understanding of the importance 
of laws, regulations and policies in the public sector innovation process. The 
general understanding has been that they ʻall’ are important.m For example, 
according to Bloch (2010), many public sector innovations may simply be 
dictated either directly or indirectly from external sources like policy changes, 
regulations, etc. Among the long list of innovation drivers, the National Audit 
Office (2006) lists as equally importantly the importance of new government 
priorities, response to crisis, change in ministerial priorities, change in policy 
environment, changes in resource use, implementing EU policies, etc.; a similar 
mixture of ʻorigins of innovations’ is also provided by Dunleavy et al. (2008). 
The findings of our survey therefore support proposition PS3 that public policy 
effects (in their wider sense) on technological innovation in public sector 
services are multi-factorial and weigh differently depending on the activity. The 
results show that public policy can affect public service innovations from 
different angles (i.e. direct policies, laws and regulations, and even political 
commitment to major projects as well as related leadership), however, different 
aspects of public policy have different influences. In general, public policy 
influence (in the narrow sense) is seen as a much more important driver for 
innovation than laws and regulations. Indeed, one should also understand that 
this was a best practice research by its nature, which means that non-existing 
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cases might be so because of a disruptive legal framework. This is definitely the 
case for larger infrastructural innovations (such as ID cards, cross-use of 
different databases, etc.). Therefore, the fundamental aim is to maximise the 
chances that the regulatory framework will support innovation objectives, rather 
than running the risk of impeding or undermining them. Therefore, we also 
accept the whole proposition (PS3) and support the views of Thenint (2010), 
that often the issues faced by public authorities are complex and according to 
the wrong policy mix can have adverse effects on overall government 
performance. 
We also asked the respondents whether the usage of their innovative services 
requires legally valid authorisation. We see from table 5.18 that 33 per cent of 
them required it (maximum 46 per cent in Estonia) and 68 per cent on average 
and across countries did not (maximum 87 per cent in the UK). This might be 
partly related to the sophistication services, the availability of certain infra-
structure (e.g. for personal identification), or the size of a country (for example 
e-elections have slightly different risks if they are conducted in a small or large 
country). 
 





United Kingdom 13 87 
Denmark 41 59 
Finland 20 80 
Estonia 46 54 
   
AVERAGE 33 68 
Note: respondents were asked does the usage of the innovation require legally valid authorisation 
of the user. 
 
Finally, for background information, table 5.19 illustrates the methods inno-
vators used for the user authorisation of their innovative services. Innovators 
mostly used either ID card related infrastructures (more actively in Estonia and 
Finland) or basic sign-up identification (more actively in the UK and Denmark). 
Indeed, in more than one-third of cases, users were not identified at all; this was 
highest in Finland (55 per cent) and lowest in Denmark and Estonia 







Table 5.19 Methods used for the authorisation of the user (%) 
















0 7 53 13 47 
Denmark 6 0 24 29 29 
Finland 30 15 10 20 55 
Estonia 57 25 29 18 29 
      
AVERAGE 29 14 28 20 39 
Note: respondents were asked which methods do they use for the authorisation of the user. 
 
 
5.6. Summary and considerations 
This first analysis chapter provided new empirical evidence illustrating the 
innovation process in public sector services in the UK, Denmark, Finland and 
Estonia. The chapter started with a sample description of the survey and 
response rates. It then opened up the nature of public service innovations of the 
survey. This was followed by the core themes of the research like innovation-
related organisational learning, goals and results of the innovation process, 
organisational and external factors influencing, both supporting and hampering 
the innovation process, as well as public policy effects (including the legal 
framework) on innovation processes. The chapter also answered – supported or 
rejected – many important research propositions (see also chapter 7) as well as 
provided an empirical basis for the next phases of the analysis (chapter 6). From 
the methodological side, analyses were undertaken using SPSS and descriptive 
statistics in this phase of the research. 
While studying how governments inovate, one should indeed be aware that 
public sector institutions cannot be flexible like start-up companies are, 
however, the spiritual climate should be there to encourage innovative thinking 
and allow bright people and small teams to emerge and experiment with certain 
services or governance practices. To make this innovation process more cross-
functional and cross-organisational, and to isolate it from daily administration 
functions, it is worth suggesting so-called task forces. Originally introduced by 
military, these temporary or permanent and mission oriented, often multi-disci-
plinary teams study a particular challenge (which often involves responsibility 
areas of several ministries, or even the private and non-for-profit sectors) and 
provide appropriate, creative and effective solutions. There are good examples 
where task forces have been in introduced in today’s more advanced and 
strategically agile governments; Singapore being the most famous example of 
how to make them an organic part of the governance system. Strategic agility, 
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meanwhile, is a term coined by Doz and Kosonen (2008). Strategically agile 
companies not only learn to make fast turns and transform themselves without 
losing momentum but their CEOs and top teams also have higher ambitions: to 
make their companies permanently, regularly, able to take advantages of change 
and disruption. They want their organisations to learn to thrive on continues 
waves of change, not to periodically and painfully adjust to change. Strategic 
agility requires strategic sensitivity, collective commitments and resource 
fluidity – allowing CEOs and their management teams to perceive early, decide 
quickly, and strike with strength and speed. 
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6. PRINCIPAL COMPONENT FACTOR ANALYSIS 
AND UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE 
(ANOVA) OF THE SURVEY RESULTS 
This is the second chapter presenting the results of the empirical survey of the 
present research. The chapter further analyses the goals and results of 
innovation, as well as the factors influencing the innovation process in public 
sector service development. The analyses are based on the results of the 
previous chapter, with the aim to clarify the highly fragmented picture of factors 
influencing the innovation in public sector services. Therefore, this chapter first 
performs principal component factor analysis in order to create more 
generalised meta-factors. 
Based on the results of principal component factor analysis, the second part 
of the chapter then performs univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA) of 
country, field and innovation type specific determinants on public sector 
innovation performance. 
The chapter is divided into the following seven sub-chapters. The first 
section, 6.1, performs principal component factor analysis of the goals and 
results of the innovation process in public sector services. This is followed by 
principal component factor analysis of the factors influencing the innovation 
process in public sector services in section 6.2. Thereafter, section 6.3 
summarises the results of the principal component factor analysis for further 
analysis and provides an introduction to univariate analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) of the survey results. The following three sub-chapters then analyse 
respectively country-specific (6.4), field-specific (6.5) and innovation-type 
specific (6.6) determinants on the factors influencing the innovation process in 
public sector services. The chapter ends with the summary and considerations’ 
sub-chapter 6.7. 
The results of both exercises, principal component factor analysis and the 
univariate analysis of variance, will assist our theoretical journey towards better 
understanding the public service innovation system (see chapter 7 for synthesis). 
For better overview, parts of the text directly answering to (sub-)research 
question(-s) and propositions are presented in a bold style. 
 
 
6.1. Group performance of goals and results  
of the innovation process in public sector services 
The current sub-chapter performs principal component factor analysis (PCA) 
among the initial list of goals and results (which due to its length can create a 
problem of degrees of freedom in later analyses), influencing the innovation 
process in the public sector. PCA is often used as a tool in exploratory data 
analysis for predictive models. We test whether the initial list of innovation 
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goals and results are performing in logical/meaningful groups that can be later 
used for multivariate analysis of country, field and innovation-type specific 
determinants of the public service innovation process. Clustering of the initial 
also results helps to reduce the broad spectrum of survey results into fewer and 
meaningful activity and factor groups to be used in illustrating and comparing 
the performance of public service innovation systems in four countries of our 
survey. 
Proceeding from the latter approach, we developed two new statistically 
independent factors representing goals and results of innovation (as they both 
had 12 mirroring questions). The reason for choosing two new statistically 
independent factors representing these two questions (innovation goals and 
innovation results), and not more, was the data performance as well as the logic 
we decided to use for grouping the initial goals and results. We found that the 
list of goals and results (originally 12 alternatives) can best be divided into 
ʻbasic’ and ʻadvanced’ goals/results (see table 6.1). The new factors describe 
30.0 per cent of total variance in the case of innovation goals and 34.7 per cent 
of total variance in the case of innovation results. Every new factor would have 
given an additional 11 per cent or less to the description of the total variance. 
For latter multivariate analysis we used the new factors developed (basic 
goals; advanced goals; basic results; advanced results) separately. However, for 
illustrational purposes, we collated (mirrored) these new statistical factors here 
(see table 6.1). 
The first statistically new factor called ʻbasic’ (G1 and R1 in table 6.1) refers 
to more basic goals and results of technological innovation in public sector 
services. Using the e-government stages’ framework as an illustration (see 
figure 3.10 in chapter 3), this factor refers to the first two (or perhaps three) 
stages. The ʻbasic’ factor is related to the following innovation goals: (a) to go 
online, (b) to improve the take-up of the service, (c) to improve transparency, 
(d) to use existing technological possibilities, (e) to gain social or political 
popularity, and (f) to improve/change organisational behaviour. The ʻbasic’ 
factor is related to the following innovation results: (a) available online service, 
(b) improved take-up of the service, (c) improved transparency, (d) used 
existing technological possibilities, (e) gained social or political popularity, and 
(e) satisfied users. 
The second statistically new factor called ʻadvanced’ (G2 and R2 in table 
6.1) refers to more advanced goals and results of technological innovation in 
public sector services. Using the e-government stages’ framework for 
illustration (see figure 3.10), this factor refers to the last two to three stages. The 
ʻadvanced’ factor is related to the following innovation goals: (a) to raise 
service diversity (i.e. personalised services), (b) to improve the quality of the 
service, (c) to reduce the cost of the service, (d) to reduce the time spent on 
service delivery (including waiting time), (e) to improve the competitiveness of 
the organisation, and (f) to respond to user needs. The ʻadvanced’ factor is also 
related to the following innovation results: (a) raised service diversity (i.e. more 
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personalised service), (b) improved service quality, (c) reduced service cost, (d) 
reduced time spent on service delivery, (e) and improved competitiveness of the 
organisation, and (e) improved/changed organisational behaviour. 
We have to admit that these groups look relatively heterogeneous, therefore 
we have to understand the fundamental meaning of the respective components. 
For example, reducing the cost of the service as an innovation goal is in-
corporated into the group of ʻadvanced’ factors. We know from Estonia for 
example, that several more fundamental technological innovations in govern-
ment have taken place due to limited funding, e.g. e-tax administration of the 
Estonian Tax and Customs Board (also in our sample), meaning that shortages 
in funding might lead to fundamentally service and organisation based models. 
At the same time, as there is no direct competition in the public sector pushing 
towards continued incremental cost-cutting, and new e-services are typically 
advanced solutions, then not incorporating the cost factor into the category of 
ʻbasic’ factors can be partly justified. 
Two of the innovation goals shifted their position in factor analysis while 
comparing factor analysis results about the innovation goals and the innovation 
results. These were, first, ʻimprove/change organisational behaviour’, which 
was initially a ʻbasic’ goal but as a result of factor analysis fell into the 
ʻadvanced’ group results; and conversely, ʻto respond to user needs’, which was 
initially an ʻadvanced’ goal but as a result of factor analysis fell into the ʻbasic’ 
group results. 
Although labelling the new factors ʻbasic’ and ʻadvanced’ innovation goals 
and results, one should be careful in interpreting the results. The relatively low 
cumulative description percentage is linked to the fact that we decided to divide 
the initial factors into only two statistically new factors – namely ʻbasic’ and 
ʻadvanced’. This was due to the fact that these two new factors behave logically 
in terms of initial factors (see table 6.1), as well as allow us to run further 
multivariate analysis (where a too large number of factors compared to the 
number of respondents would raise the problem of degrees of freedom). 
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Table 6.1 Rotated Component Matrix of the principal component factor analysis of 










To go online 0.567 0.011 0.568 0.154 Available online 
service 
To improve the take-
up of the service 




0.659 –0.002 0.424 –0.033 Improved 
transparency 
To use the existing 
technological 
possibilities 
0.272 –0.177 0.510 –0.008 Used existing 
technological 
possibilities 
To gain social or 
political popularity 





0.629 0.240 0.057 0.346 Improved/changed 
organisational 
behaviour * 
To raise service 
diversity (i.e. 
personalised service) 
–0.150 0.455 0.298 0.374 Raised service 
diversity (i.e. more 
personalised 
services) 
To improve the 
quality of the service 
0.59 0.698 0.178 0.644 Improved service 
quality 
To reduce the cost of 
the service 
–0.034 0.560 –0.224 0.561 Reduced service cost 
To reduce the time 
spent on service 
delivery (including 
waiting time) 
–0.115 0.677 –0.141 0.768 Reduced time spent 
on service delivery 
(including waiting 
time) 
To improve the 
competitiveness of 
the organisation 
0.195 0.401 0.365 0.620 Improved 
competitiveness of 
the organisation 
To respond to user 
need (user group 
need) ** 
0.226 0.402 0.541 0.293 Satisfied users (user 
groups) * 
Notes: (1) G1 Basic describes 13.268% of total variance and G2 Advanced describes 16.736% of 
total variance (cumulatively 30.004%) based on initial eigenvalues. (2) R1 Basic describes 
21.509% of total variance and R2 Advanced describes 13.157% of total variance (cumulatively 
34.666%) based on initial eigenvalues. 
(*) the innovation goal, which shifted its position as a result of factor analysis (from being a 
ʻbasic’ goal to an ʻadvanced’ result). 
(**) the innovation goal, which shifted its position as a result of factor analysis (from being an 
ʻadvanced’ goal to a ʻbasic’ result). 
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6.2. Group performance of factors influencing  
the innovation process in public sector services 
The aim of the present sub-chapter is to understand the logic behind the 
performance of different factors influencing the innovation process in public 
sector services. We test whether the initial factors (see chapter 5) perform in 
logical groups of activity, i.e. that for future analysis we do not need to use a 
long list of factors (which may also create a problem of degrees of freedom) and 
that they can be clustered in a meaningful way. For that purpose, we carried out 
principal component factor analysis similarly to the tests that were done for 
innovation goals and results. Clustering the initial factors helps both our latter 
multivariate analysis as well as in describing and comparing the performance of 
public service innovation systems in four countries of our research. 
Firstly, we look at the internal structure and logic of the factors influencing 
the innovation process in public sector services. As for the goals and results of 
innovation in the previous sub-chapter, we ran a factor analysis for developed 
new statistically independent factors representing (a) internal innovation 
supporting factors; (b) internal innovation hampering factors; (c) external 
innovation supporting factors; and (d) external innovation hampering factors. 
From the organisational (internal) perspective, we developed four new 
statistically independent factors representing both innovation supporting and 
innovation hampering factors. Following the data performance, the new 
statistical factors appeared to be similar for both internal supporting factors (isf) 
and internal hampering factors (ihf). The new statistical factors cumulatively 
describe 56.489 per cent of total variance in the case of internal supporting 
factors (isf) and 77.183 per cent of total variance in the case of internal 
hampering factors (ihf). The new statistical factors are the following (see also 
table 6.2): 
(a) Top management (referring to: top management commitment and 
support;  and hierarchical top-down power) – isf1 (describes 14.242 per 
cent of total variance) and ihf1 (describes 5.724 per cent of total 
variance) in table 6.2. 
(b) Structure and organisational culture [referring to: innovation accepting 
organisational culture; flexible organisational structure; good knowl-
edge of existing technologies; and supportive organisational structure 
(written/codified)] – isf2 (describes 9.838 per cent of total variance) and 
ihf2 (describes 8.951 per cent of total variance) in table 6.2. 
(c) Operational management (referring to: open-minded managers; per-
sonal leadership or committed ʻkey’ individuals; available mandate, 
motivation and tools of the project manager; existence of ideas; and 
previous negative experiences/failures) – isf3 (describes 12.798 per cent 
of total variance) and ihf3 (describes 52.906 per cent of total variance) 
in table 6.2. 
215 
(d) External cooperation [referring to: close cooperation with technology 
suppliers; good market knowledge (existence of client surveys); close 
cooperation with future users/user groups; internal learning capa-
bilities] – isf4 (describes 19.611 per cent of total variance) and ihf4 
(describes 9.602 per cent of total variance) in table 6.2. 
 
For subsequent analysis, we used the new factors developed for internal sup-
porting and hampering factors (top management; structure and organisational 
culture; operational management; and external cooperation) separately. How-
ever, for the illustrational purposes, we are collating (mirroring) the new 
statistical factors here on table 6.2. Although we have developed new statistical 
factors, before using them for any analysis one should carefully study the initial 
factors behind each of the four new factors (see table 6.2). Moreover, it is 
important to understand that although the new factors are similarly named (in 
the case of internal supporting as well as internal hampering factors), the initial 
factors behind them are slightly different (for example, questions related to 
ʻlack of ideas’ and ʻprevious negative experiences/failures’ were asked only in 
the hampering factors question). 
As with the internal factors, we also developed statistically new factors for 
external factors supporting and hampering technological innovation in public 
sector services. There were five new statistically independent factors developed. 
Due to data performance, the new statistical factors appeared to be different for 
external supporting factors (esf) and external hampering factors (ehf). The new 
statistical factors cumulatively describe 74.103 per cent of total variance (based 
on the initial eigenvalue) in the case of external supporting factors (esf) and 
81.214 per cent of total variance (based on the initial eigenvalue) in the case of 
external hampering factors (ehf). 
For external supporting factors, the new statistical factors are the following 
(see also table 6.3): 
(a) Policy [referring to: political demand; political commitment to long-
term major projects; supportive policies (international, national, 
regional, local); and appropriate laws and regulations] – esf1 (describes 
25.291 per cent of total variance) in table 6.3. 
(b) Users (referring to: user demand; and user trust) – esf2 (describes 
17.422 per cent of total variance) in table 6.3. 
(c) Economy (referring to: competition; and budgetary pressure) – esf3 
(describes 12.285 per cent of total variance) in table 6.3. 
(d) Technology and partners [referring to: low technological risk; and good 
cooperation with partners (e.g. intermediates, technology providers)] – 
esf4 (describes 10.421 per cent of total variance) in table 6.3. 
(e) Technological experiences [referring to: existence of good examples 
(best practices); and technology push (including lobbing by technology 
providers] – esf5 (describes 8.684 per cent of total variance) in table 
6.3. 
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For external hampering factors, the new statistical factors are the following (see 
also table 6.3): 
(a) Policy [referring to: no or weak political demand; no political commit-
ment to long-term major projects; lack of supportive policies (inter-
national, national, regional, local); digital divide] –ehf1 (describes 
49.778 per cent of total variance) in table 6.3. 
(b) Risks [referring to: absence of relevant good examples (best practices); 
high political reputation risk; and high technological risk] – ehf2 
(describes 11.850 per cent of total variance) in table 6.3. 
(c) User/partner [referring to: weak cooperation with partners (e.g. 
technology providers); lack of user demand; and lack of user trust] – 
ehf3 (describes 7.598 per cent of total variance) in table 6.3. 
(d) Finances (referring to: lack of financial resources to develop the 
innovation) – ehf4 (describes 6.377 per cent of total variance) in table 
6.3. 
(e) Laws and regulations (referring to: inappropriate/rigid laws and regu-
lations) – ehf5 (describes 5.639 per cent of total variance) in table 6.3. 
 
In later analysis, we used these new statistical factors developed for external 
supporting and external hampering factors separately. However, for illustra-
tional purposes, we collated (mirrored) the new statistical factors here in table 
6.3. Although we have developed new statistical factors, before using them for 
any analysis, one should carefully study the initial factors behind each of the 
five new factors (see table 6.3). For example, in the case of external supporting 
factors, the new factor ʻpolicy’ also includes laws and regulations, at the same 
time, in the case of external hampering factors, ʻlaws and regulations’ are a 
separate new factor (this is due to data performance). As we now saw, it is 
important to understand that due to data performance, the new statistical factors 
for external supporting and external hampering factors are differently named. 
This is in contrast to the previous analysis of internal factors, where new 
statistical factors developed for both supporting and hampering factors were 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































6.3. Summary of principal component factor 
 analysis and introduction to univariate analysis  
of variance (ANOVA) of the survey results 
The previous sections used principal component factor analysis (PCA) 
techniques to group the initial innovation goals and results, as well as 
organisational and external innovation supporting and hampering factors into 
meaningful meta-groups (new statistical factors). The exercise can be 
considered successful, as it was possible to group the initial goals and results, as 
well as the innovation influencing factors into new statistical factors. 
The new statistical factors developed in this chapter were the following: 
 Goals and results of the innovation process in public sector services: 
ʻbasic’ (G1, R1) and ʻadvanced’ (G2, R2); 
 Internal innovation supporting factors (isf): (1) ʻtop management’; (2) 
ʻstructure and organisational culture’; (3) ʻoperational management’; (4) 
ʻexternal cooperation’. 
 Internal innovation hampering factors (ihf): (1) ʻtop management’; (2) 
ʻstructure and organisational culture’; (3) ʻoperational management’; (4) 
ʻexternal cooperation’. 
 External innovation supporting factors (esf): (1) ʻpolicy’; (2) ʻusers’; (3) 
ʻeconomy’; (4) ʻtechnology and partners’; (5) ʻtechnological experiences’. 
 External innovation hampering factors (ehf): (1) ʻpolicy’; (2) ʻrisks’; (3) 
ʻuser/partner’; (4) ʻfinances’; (5) ʻlaws and regulations’. 
 
These new factors will now be used in the univariate analysis of variance of 
country, field and innovation-type specific determinants of the innovation 
process. 
It is known from the practice of private sector innovation research that there 
might be several factors, for example, industrial field and organisational 
structure, which determine the innovation intensity and success of firms. Tidd et 
al. (2001), for example, concludes from the existing knowledge base that there 
are no easy answers about successful innovation management and that 
innovation varies enormously – by scale, type, sector, etc.38 Mohr (1969) also 
suggested that innovation in the public sector is the function of an interaction 
between the motivation to innovate, the strength of obstacles against innovation, 
and the availability of resources for overcoming such obstacles, which by nature 
differ according to particular circumstances. Even while the potentials of ICT 
are available, the evidence suggests (see Cornford et al., 2006) that for every 
region, the ways and the effectiveness with which regions exploit these 
potentials vary hugely. Koch et al. (2005) gave an example if one country 
                                                                          
38  Indeed, Tidd et al. (2001) stress two universal points: firstly, innovation is a process, not 
a single event, and needs to be managed as such, and secondly, the influences on the process 
can be manipulated to affect the outcome, i.e. it can be managed. 
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decides to provide care for elderly through publicly owned organisations, 
another through private and yet another through a mix of both types, then these 
should all be included when saying something useful about innovation in the 
public sector, when a functional perspective is chosen. Indeed, most compara-
tive work on cultures is based on the assumption that there is a large degree of 
homogeneity within nation states as opposed to large differences between nation 
states (Didero et al., 2008; see also sub-chapter 1.1). These slightly contro-
versial thoughts lead to the understanding that there should be some differences 
in terms of the field, type or perhaps a country to which the innovation belongs. 
We test these thoughts on our survey sample, using the following starting 
points: proposition PS2 – the nature of public service innovations depends on 
different determinants, proposition PS2.1 – the nature of public service 
innovations depends on the field they belong to, PS2.2 – the nature of public 
service innovations depends on the type they are, proposition PS2.3 – the nature 
of public service innovations depends on the country they are from, and 
proposition PS4 – overall, the main characteristics and driving forces of the 
public service innovation system do not differ across countries. Answers to 
these propositions will partly facilitate our research towards identifying the 
specifics of public service innovation systems. 
 
 
6.4. Country-specific determinants on  
the factors influencing the innovation process  
in public sector services 
Country-specific determinants on public sector innovation performance can 
have two perspectives. Firstly, there might be similarly favourable precon-
ditions (for example technological) in place in all countries, however, as litera-
ture suggests, the real innovation performance across countries differs greatly. 
On the other hand, the innovations’ environment as well as public sector 
structures can differ from country to country, determining the conditions for 
public sector innovation. The present sub-chapter focuses on country-specific 
determinants on the development and implementation of technologically 
innovative public sector services. For that purpose, we have developed graphs 
below, as well as carried out univariate (ANOVA) analyses to test the statistical 
significance in differences between countries in the importance of certain 
factors supporting or hampering innovation (internally and externally). In 
ANOVA analyses, dependent variables are the new statistical factors developed 
during the principal component factor analysis (see previous chapter), and the 
determinant (fixed factor) is ʻcountry’. All figures in this section are given on a 




(A) Grouped factors representing goals and results of innovation in public 
sector services: country determinant 
In the beginning of the empirical chapters (see chapter 5), we analysed the 
multidimensionality of innovation goals and results in public sector services.39 
The analyses were carried out using twelve possible, predefined goals and 
results of innovation. Moreover, to clarify the results, the single most and single 
least important innovation goals and results were studied. The initial list of 
innovation goals and results was then limited down to ʻbasic’ goals and 
ʻadvanced’ goals, as well as to ʻbasic’ results and ʻadvanced’ results. The latter 
was done in the previous chapter, using principal component factor analysis. 
The first statistically new factor called ʻbasic’ (G1 and R1 in table 6.1) refers to 
more basic goals and results of technological innovation in public sector 
services. The second statistically new factor called ‘advanced’ (G2 and R2 in 
table 6.1) refers to more advanced goals and results of technological innovation 
in public sector services. 
Figure 6.1 shows fundamental differences if we collate advanced goals 
versus basic goals (graph 1), and advanced results versus basic results (graph 2). 
This general collation indicates that, in general, advanced goals are a little more 
important than basic goals (see graph 1). Indeed, when looking at graph 2, we 
see that basic results are clearly more important than the advanced results. The 
latter is also supported also by the one sample test (see annex 10 for details), 
which shows statistically significant differences between advanced and basic 
results [Basic results (rbasic)>Advanced results (radv)], but not in advanced and 
basic goals. 
 
Graph 1            Graph 2 
    




                                                                          
39  The assessment was made on a four-point scale, where 1 was “not important”, 2 “of little 
importance”, 3 “important”, and 4 “very important”. 
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Going a step further, figure 6.2 illustrates the performance of advanced inno-
vation goals (gadv) versus basic innovation goals (gbasic) (graph 1), as well as 
advanced innovation results (radv) versus basic innovation results (rbasic) 
(graph 2) by countries. When comparing the graphs of innovation goals and 
innovation results, we see that the innovation goals (graph 1) were more 
ʻoptimistic’ in Estonia and the UK, where advanced goals were seen as being 
more important than the basic ones. Conversely, in Denmark the basic goals 
were seen to be more important, and in Finland advanced and basic goals had 
equal importance. Turning towards the innovation results (graph 2), we see that 
initial optimism in setting up advanced goals has decreased. In all four countries 
we see that the basic results were more important than the advanced ones. The 
difference between the advanced and basic results is smallest in Estonia and 
largest in Denmark. The ANOVA analysis supports the conclusion by showing 
statistical differences between Estonia and Denmark (Est>Dk) and Estonia and 
Finland (Est>Fin) in the case of advanced innovation goals, and between 
Estonia and Denmark (Est>Dk) in the case of advanced innovation results. 
There were no statistical differences between countries in terms of basic 
innovation goals and basic innovation results (see annex 12 for details). 
 
Graph 1        Graph 2 
     
Note: gadv = advanced innovation goals; gbasic = basic innovation goals; radv = advanced 
innovation results; rbasic = basic innovation results. 
Figure 6.2 Advanced and basic goals and results of innovation in public sector services: 
country determinant 
 
(B) Grouped supporting and hampering factors of innovation in public sector 
services: country determinant 
In parallel to analysing the multidimensionality of innovation goals and 
results in chapter 4, we also analysed the importance of different factors 
supporting and hampering innovation in public sector services (internal to the 
organisation and externally). These analyses were carried out using a list of 
possible, predefined factors influencing the innovation process. Additionally, to 
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clarify the results, the single most and single least important factors were 
identified. The initial list of supporting and hampering factors was then reduced 
to four statistically new factors (in the case of internal supporting and 
hampering factors) and to five statistically new factors (in the case of external 
supporting and hampering factors). The latter exercise was done using principal 
component factor analysis in chapter 5. 
 
(B1) Internal factors 
Due to data performance during the principal component factor analysis, the 
new statistical factors developed for internal supporting and internal hampering 
factors of the innovation process in public sector services were similar (both for 
internal supporting and internal hampering factors). The factors were the 
following: (a) top management (isf1/ihf1), (b) structure and organisational 
culture (isf2/ihf2), (c) operational management (isf3/ihf3), and (d) external 
cooperation (isf4/ihf4). 
Figure 6.3 shows fundamental differences if we collate the four new 
statistical factors. As we concluded already in descriptive statistics chapter, 
innovation supporting factors (graph 1) were generally seen to be statistically 
significantly more important than innovation hampering factors (graph 2). The 
same is true here. From graph 1 in figure 6.3 we see that operational manage-
ment (isf3) was generally seen as the most important internal supporting factor, 
while top management (isf1) was the least important internal supporting factor; 
structure and organisational culture (isf2) and external cooperation (isf4) were 
between these two. The relative differences between factors within the internal 
hampering factor question were smaller, with structure and organisational 
culture (isf2), as well as external cooperation (isf4) slightly more important than 
top management (isf1) and operational management (isf3). 
For statistical differences between the factors above, we performed one 
sample tests (see annex 10 for details). Within the internal supporting factors 
question, all factors except isf2 and isf4 differed statistically significantly from 
each other. Conversely, within the internal hampering factors question, the only 
factors which differed statistically significantly were ihf2>ihf3, and ihf4> ihf3 




Graph 1          Graph 2 
   
Notes: (1) isf = internal supporting factors; ihf = internal hampering factors. (2) isf1 and ihf1 = 
top management; isf2 and ihf2 = structure and organisational culture; isf3 and ihf3 = operational 
management; isf4 and ihf4 = external cooperation. 
Figure 6.3 Grouped internal factors supporting and hampering innovation in public 
sector services  
 
Figure 6.4 illustrates the performance of grouped factors supporting (isf, graph 
1) and hampering (ihf, graph 2) innovation internally in public sector services 
by countries. Besides concluding that internal supporting factors are valued as 
more important in all countries than the hampering factors, graphs (7.4) show 
also other interesting issues. In graph 1 we first see that in three countries out of 
four operational management (isf3) was seen as the most important internal 
innovation supporting factor – only in the UK was it external cooperation (isf4). 
In all countries, the least important factor supporting innovation internally was 
top management (isf1). The latter might be because the new statistical (grouped) 
factor top management includes initial factors of ʻtop management commitment 
and support’ (rated as the second most important) and ʻhierarchical (top-down) 
power’ (rated as the least important) (see table 6.2 and figure 5.5).40 
Graph 2 in figure 6.4 shows the importance of internal hampering factors 
(ihf). We see that there are larger country differences here than there were in 
case of innovation supporting factors. Public sector organisations in the UK are 
seeing relatively more hampering factors while innovating than organisations in 
other countries, especially in Finland. This might be due to the size differences 
between the UK and other countries, which pushes up the project sizes and cost, 
and therefore the risks linked to them. Weaknesses in operational management 
(ihf3) are seen as a relatively weak innovation hampering factor (especially in 
Finland and Denmark). External cooperation (ihf4) conversely is seen as a 
relatively more important innovation hampering factor in Denmark and Estonia 
(not comparing the UK, where all hampering factors were assessed as being 
                                                                          
40  It is therefore important to look at the consistency of each new statistical factor before 
making any conclusions. 
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more important than in other countries). In general, the pattern of internal inno-
vation hampering factors across countries is relatively different. 
Within the internal innovation supporting factors question, the ANOVA 
analysis shows the only statistically significant difference in external coopera-
tion (isf4), between the UK, were it was the most important factor, and Estonia, 
were it was the second lowest factor (Uk>Est). We also saw similar tendencies 
in chapter 5, where from the perspective of single internal innovation sup-
porters, the UK slightly exceeded other countries in terms of management 
commitment and support, cooperation with technology suppliers, cooperation 
with future users, and good market knowledge [all but management commit-
ment and support were components of the component factor ʻexternal 
cooperation’ (isf/ihf4)]. Firstly, it shows that, from the methodological perspec-
tive, the principal component factor analysis has generated accurate meta-
factors corresponding adequately to the original factors. The reason why 
external cooperation is considered a little more important in the UK might be 
related to the size of the country, where by nature there are more players 
surrounding and/or integrated into any particular public sector service or its 
innovation. 
In the internal innovation hampering factors question, the ANOVA analysis 
shows statistically significant differences in operational management (ihf3), 
between the UK and Denmark (Uk>Dk), the UK and Finland (Uk>Fin), and 
Estonia and Finland (Est>Fin) (figure 6.4 and annex 12 for details). Similarly to 
internal supporting factors, in chapter 5 the largest country differences in 
original internal innovation barriers were between the UK and other countries. 
For example, no supportive organisational strategy (written/codified) was rated 
much higher in the UK than in other countries, the same goes for weak top 
management commitment and support, close-minded managers, lack of personal 
leadership or committed ‘key’ individuals, stagnating and rigid organisational 
culture, and previous negative experiences/failures. Two of them (close-minded 
managers, lack of personal leadership or committed ‘key’ individuals) were also 
parts of the grouped statistical factor ʻoperational management’ (isf/ihf3). It 
should be due to the country and institutional size why in general in the UK 
internal hampering factors have received higher importance compared to other 
countries. This might be one of the reasons to believe that shortages in 
operational management have hindered innovation development in the UK 
public sector services. An alternative reason might be larger personnel turnover 
and individual anonymity in larger organisational setups; however, we are 
unable prove this as it was not the core focus of the present research. 
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Graph 1      Graph 2 
    
Notes: (1) isf = internal supporting factors; ihf = internal hampering factors. (2) isf1 and ihf1 = 
top management; isf2 and ihf2 = structure and organisational culture; isf3 and ihf3 = operational 
management; isf4 and ihf4 = external cooperation. 
Figure 6.4 Grouped internal factors supporting and hampering innovation in 
public sector services: country determinant 
 
(B2) External factors 
While the new statistical factors developed for internal factors were similar for 
supporting and hampering factors, due to data performance in principal compo-
nent factor analysis, the new statistical factors developed for external supporting 
and hampering factors were different (see table 6.3). In the case of external 
supporting factors, the new statistical factors after the grouping exercise were 
the following: (a) Policy (esf1), (b) Users (esf2), (c) Economy (esf3), (d) 
Technology and partners (esf4), and (f) Technological experiences (esf5). In the 
case of external hampering factors, the new statistical factors after the grouping 
exercise were the following: (a) Policy (ehf1), (b) Risks (ehf2), (c) Users and 
partners (ehf3), (d) Finances (ehf4), and (f) Laws and regulations (ehf5). 
Figure 6.5 shows fundamental differences between countries if we collate 
the five new statistical factors externally supporting (graph 1), and other five 
externally hampering (graph 2) innovation in public sector services. To a lesser 
extent than in case of internal factors, but still, the external supporting factors 
are generally assessed as more important than the external hampering ones. 
From the supporting factors side (graph 1), generally users (esf2) were assessed 
as the most important factor, followed by technology and partners (esf4). From 
the other side, economy (isf3) was the least important factor. The latter might be 
because the new statistical factor ʻeconomy’ includes quite debatable initial 
factors – competition (the least important factor in the descriptive analysis) and 
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budgetary pressure (assessed as middling in the descriptive analysis) (see figure 
5.6 and table 6.3).41 
From the external hampering factors side (graph 2), in general finances 
(ehf4) were seen as the most influencing; this was followed by risks (ihf2). The 
importance of the other three external hampering factors – policy (ehf1), users 
and partners (ehf3) and laws and regulations (ehf5) – was lower but equal. 
For statistical differences between these factors, we performed one sample 
tests (see annex 10 for details). Within the external supporting factors question, 
all factors except esf1 and isf5 differed statistically significantly from each 
other. Within the external hampering factors question, less factors differed (as 
seen also from the second graph on figure 6.5) – ehf4>ehf1, ehf4>ehf2, 
ehf4>ehf3, and ehf4>ehf5, i.e. finances (ehf4) was a statistically significantly 
more important external innovation hampering factor than the other four (see 
figure 6.5 and annex 10 for details). 
 
Graph 1                    Graph 2 
   
Notes: (1) esf = external supporting factors; esf1 = policy; esf2 = users; esf3 = economy; esf4 = 
technology and partners; esf5 = technological experiences. (2) ehf = external hampering factors; 
ehf1 = policy; ehf2 = risks; ehf3 = users and partners; ehf4 = finances; ehf5 = laws and 
regulations. 
Figure 6.5 Grouped external factors supporting and hampering innovation in public 
sector services 
 
In further analysis, figure 6.6 illustrates the performance of grouped factors 
supporting (esf, graph 1) and hampering (ehf, graph 2) innovation externally in 
public sector services by countries. As said before, external supporting factors 
are valued as being slightly more important in all countries than the hampering 
factors. 
From the external supporting factors side (graph 1), we see that in all four 
countries users (esf2) were the most important factor supporting innovation 
                                                                          
41  It is therefore important to look at the consistency of each new statistical factor before 
making any conclusions. 
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externally. In absolute terms, users tended to be most helpful in Finland and the 
UK. Generally, the pattern of importance in this question looks quite similar in 
all four countries. In their importance, users (esf2) were followed by technology 
and partners (esf4) and policy (esf1). The high position of technology and 
partners stresses the importance of low technological risk, as well as the 
existence of, and cooperation with, technology providers and other partners (the 
original factors). In third position in the importance list was policy (esf1), 
indicating that appropriate public policies definitely have their role in successful 
public service innovations. The least important external innovation supporting 
factor was economy (esf3). The low position of economy as a supporting factor 
could be linked to the fact that one of the original factors behind this new factor 
was competition – usually not that important in the public sector as we know 
from the literature (the other original factor was budgetary pressure). Existing 
technological experiences (esf5) was only the fourth important external 
innovation supporting factor. This indicates that the existence of good examples 
(best practices) and strong technological push (initial factors) are not an 
important presumption to successful innovation process in the public sector. 
This gives a strong argument to say that public sector services, as well as 
service innovations, are too unique to gain direct input from existing techno-
logical solutions or services. However, this might not be true in terms of 
indirect influence of the existence of strong technology providers/partners, as 
well the positive managerial influence that can result if similar improvements 
have been successful in other organisations, within the country or abroad. 
Graph 2 shows that in all four countries, finances (ehf4) is the most 
important external innovation hampering factor. However, in absolute terms, 
lack of finances (ehf4) was the most important external restriction in the UK, 
followed by Estonia and Denmark. This might be due the size difference 
between countries, i.e. the UK is much larger compared to other three countries, 
and therefore projects are more costly, more risky, and the ʻpublic market’ for 
improvement projects might be more competitive. Interestingly, Finland faced 
all five external hampering factors less than other three countries. Finland 
behaves especially well in cooperation with users and partners (ehf3) – this 
hampering factor is almost non-existent in this country. In three countries out of 
four (except Finland), different risks (ehf2) are the second most important 
external innovation hampering factor. As risks are often linked to the provision 
of financial resources, and they are two most important hampering factors 
faced, we can say that financial pressure can result quite directly from the 
potential risks linked to a project. 
Within the external innovation supporting factors question, the ANOVA 
analysis shows the only statistically significant difference in users factor (esf2); 
in Finland it was significantly more important than in Denmark (Fin>Dk) even 
though it was the most important factor for both countries. Within the external 
innovation hampering factors question, the ANOVA analysis showed 
statistically significant differences in users and partners factor (ehf3), which 
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was significantly less important in Finland than in the other three countries 
(Uk>Fin, Est>Fin, Dk>Fin) (figure 6.6 and annex 12 for details). 
 
Graph 1           Graph 2 
   
Notes: (1) esf = external supporting factors; esf1 = policy; esf2 = users; esf3 = economy; esf4 = 
technology and partners; esf5 = technological experiences. (2) ehf = external hampering factors; 
ehf1 = policy; ehf2 = risks; ehf3 = users and partners; ehf4 = finances; ehf5 = laws and 
regulations. 
Figure 6.6 Grouped external factors supporting and hampering innovation in public 
sector services: country determinant 
 
This sub-chapter carried out univariate analyses to test the statistical signifi-
cance in differences between countries in the importance of new statistical 
factors supporting or hampering innovation (internally and externally) created 
in chapter 5. As the results show, there are many statistically significant differ-
ences across countries and we therefore accept proposition PS2.3 that the nature 
of public service innovations depends on the country they are from. These 
results contrast with most of the comparative work on cultures (see Didero et 
al., 2008), which are based on the assumption that there is a large degree of 
homogeneity within nation states as opposed to large differences between nation 
states. The sub-chapter also provided inputs against the acceptance of 
proposition PS4, stating that, overall, the main characteristics and driving forces 
of the public service innovation system do not differ across countries. Indeed, 







6.5. Field-specific determinants on  
the factors influencing the innovation  
process in public sector services 
We saw from the literature review in chapter 1 that there are no universal 
categorisations of type or field of innovation in the public sector (for 
alternatives see Willcocks and Harrow, 1992; Okut-Uma, 2001; Baker, 2002; 
Howells and Tether, 2004; IDeA, 2009; Windrum, 2008). We have combined 
these understandings and the structure of field categories used for this survey 
can be seen in table 5.2. Literature has also mixed views about whether the area 
or field of activity determines the fundamental ability to innovate. Therefore, 
the present sub-chapter focuses on the field determinant on public sector 
technological innovation, and sub-proposition PS2.1 drawn from the literature 
states that the nature of public service innovations depends on the field they 
belong to. For that purpose, we have developed the graphs below, as well as 
carried out univariate (ANOVA) analyses to test the statistical significance in 
differences between fields of public service in the importance of certain factors 
supporting or hampering innovation (internally and externally). In the ANOVA 
analyses, dependent variables are the new statistical factors developed during 
the principal component factor analysis (see previous section), and the 
determinant (fixed factor) is ʻfield’. The fields (of public services) in the current 
context are the following: (1) social services, (2) education services, (3) other 
knowledge services, (4) logistical and environmental services, (5) business 
services, (6) personal ID services, (7) general administration portals, and (8) 
eDemocracy services (question A1 in the questionnaire, see annex 1). All 
figures in this section are given on a mean scale of 0–1 (the original ques-
tionnaire data was on a scale of 1–4). 
 
(A) Grouped factors representing goals and results of innovation in public 
sector services: public service field determinant 
Figure 6.7 illustrates the performance of advanced innovation goals (gadv) 
versus basic innovation goals (gbasic) (graph 1), as well as advanced innovation 
results (radv) versus basic innovation results (rbasic) (graph 2) by eight 
different fields (described above). In general, advanced goals are a little more 
important than basic goals. Indeed, then looking at the innovation results, the 
basic results are clearly more important than the advanced results (for details 
and statistical significance elaboration see figure 6.1 and the respective section 
above). 
While looking at innovation goals (graph 1 in figure 6.7), we see that in all 
fields except social services (1) and eDemocracy services (8), advanced goals 
seem to be more important than the basic goals. Three fields where advanced 
innovation goals were the most important (compared to basic goals) were 
business services (5), general administration portals (7), and logistical and 
environmental services (4). Indeed, when looking at the field differences in 
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terms of innovation results (graph 2), we see that in all eight fields the basic 
result appears to be more important than the advanced one. The largest 
difference between the basic and advanced innovation results is in eDemocracy 
services (8) (rbasic>radv), the smallest in general administration portals (7) 
(rbasic>radv). In absolute terms, in terms of innovation goals (graph 1), 
advanced goals were the most important in business services (5), logistical and 
environmental services (4), and general administration portals (7). The least 
important advanced goals were in eDemocracy services (8), social services (1), 
and personal ID services (6). Basic goals were the most important in social 
services (1), followed by eDemocracy services (8), and logistical services (4). 
The least important goals were in other educational services (3) and personal ID 
services (6). In the case of innovation results (graph 2), in absolute terms 
advanced results were the most important in business services (5), and logistical 
and environmental services (4), and the least important in personal ID services 
(6), general administration portals (7), and social services (1). Basic results were 
the most important in eDemocracy services (8), and the least important in 
general administration portals (7), and personal ID services (6). The use of 
ANOVA analysis showed the only statistically significant difference in basic 
innovation results, between eDemocracy services (8) and general administration 
portals (7) [(8)>(7)] (see annex 13 for details). 
 
Graph 1         Graph 2 
   
Note: (1) gadv = advanced innovation goals; gbasic = basic innovation goals; radv = advanced 
innovation results; rbasic = basic innovation results. (2) 1 = social services; 2 = education 
services; 3 = other knowledge services; 4 = logistical and environmental services; 5 = business 
services; 6 = personal ID services; 7 = general administration portals; 8 = eDemocracy services. 
Figure 6.7 Advanced and basic goals and results of innovation in public sector services: 





(B) Grouped supporting and hampering factors of innovation in public sector 
services: public service field determinant 
In previous sections of the empirical analysis (chapter 5), we analysed the 
importance of different factors supporting and hampering innovation in public 
sector services (internal to the organisation and externally). These analyses were 
carried out using a list of possible, predefined factors influencing the innovation 
process. In addition, to clarify the results the single most and single least 
important factors were identified. The initial list of supporting and hampering 
factors was then limited down to four statistically new factors (in case of 
internal supporting and hampering factors) and to five statistically new factors 
(in case of external supporting and hampering factors). The latter exercise was 
done in the current chapter, using principal component factor analysis. 
 
(B1) Internal factors 
Due to data performance during the principal component factor analysis, the 
new statistical factors developed for internal supporting and internal hampering 
factors of the innovation process in public sector services were similar (both for 
internal supporting and internal hampering factors). The factors were the 
following: (a) Top management (isf1/ihf1); (b) Structure and organisational 
culture (isf2/ihf2); (c) Operational management (isf3/ihf3); and (d) External 
cooperation (isf4/ihf4). 
As was concluded already in descriptive statistics chapter, innovation 
supporting factors were generally statistically significantly more important than 
innovation hampering factors. The same is true here. Figure 6.8 illustrates the 
performance of grouped factors supporting (isf, graph 1) and hampering (ihf, 
graph 2) innovation internally in public sector services by fields of public 
service. As we see from the figure, internal supporting factors are performing 
more homogeneously by different fields of public service than the external ones. 
From the single innovation supporting factor perspective (graph 1), in seven 
out of eight fields, operational management (isf3) is the most influential factor. 
It is the second most important only in personal ID services (6), where the most 
important is appropriate organisational structure and culture (isf3). In absolute 
terms, operational management (isf3) has the strongest influence on business 
services (5), eDemocracy services (8), and education services (2). In five fields 
out of eight [education services (2); other knowledge services (3); logistical and 
environmental services (4); business services (5); and eDemocracy services (8)], 
the pattern of importance of factors is the following: operational management 
(isf3) the most important; external cooperation (isf4) the second most 
important; structure and organisational culture (isf2) the third most important; 
and top management (isf1) the least important. 
Looking at the innovation hampering factors (ihf, graph 2), which generally 
score lower than internal supporting factors (isf), we see that in social services 
(1), education services (2), and logistical and environmental services (4) 
external cooperation (ihf4) is the most important hampering factor. At the same 
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time, other knowledge services (3), personal ID services (6), general adminis-
tration portals (7), and eDemocracy cervices (8) faced the strongest resistance 
from organisational structure and culture (ihf2). Top management resistance 
(ihf1) was the strongest internal hampering factor only in business services (5). 
The latter might be due to the relatively higher importance of different risks 
faced in business service development (see the external hampering factor 
section and related figure 6.9). Except in personal ID services (6), operational 
management (ihf3) was generally seen only as the third or fourth important 
internal hampering factor in most of the fields of public service (see figure 6.8 
for details). 
To identify any possible statistically significant differences between fields in 
the importance of certain factors supporting and hampering innovation 
internally, we performed ANOVA analysis. However, the univariate analysis 
did not show any statistically significant differences between different fields of 
public services (see annex 13 for details). 
 
Graph 1        Graph 2 
   
Notes: (1) isf = internal supporting factors; ihf = internal hampering factors. (2) isf1 and ihf1 = 
top management; isf2 and ihf2 = structure and organisational culture; isf3 and ihf3 = operational 
management; isf4 and ihf4 = external cooperation. (3) 1 = social services; 2 = education services; 
3 = other knowledge services; 4 = logistical and environmental services; 5 = business services;  
6 = personal ID services; 7 = general administration portals; 8 = eDemocracy services. 
Figure 6.8 Internal factors supporting and hampering innovation in public sector 
services: public service field determinant 
 
(B2) External factors 
While the new statistical factors developed for internal factors were similar for 
supporting and hampering factors, due to data performance in principal 
component factor analysis, the new statistical factors developed for external 
supporting versus hampering factors were different (see table 6.3). In the case of 
external supporting factors (esf), the new statistical factors after the grouping 
exercise were the following: (a) Policy (esf1); (b) Users (esf2); (c) Economy 
(esf3); (d) Technology and partners (esf4); and (f) Technological experiences 
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(esf5). In the case of external hampering factors (ehf), the new statistical factors 
after the grouping exercise were the following: (a) Policy (ehf1); (b) Risks 
(ehf2); (c) Users and partners (ehf3); (d) Finances (ehf4); and (f) Laws and 
regulations (ehf5). 
Figure 6.9 shows fundamental differences between fields of public services 
if we collate the five new statistical factors externally supporting (esf, graph 1), 
and the other five externally hampering (ehf, graph 2) innovation in public 
sector services. To a lesser extent than in the case of internal factors, however, 
the external supporting factors are also assessed as being more important than 
the external hampering ones. From the supporting factors side (graph 1), users 
(esf2) were assessed as the most important external factor in all eight fields of 
public service. At the same time, interestingly, economy (isf3) was the least 
important innovation supporting factor in seven out of eight fields. The latter 
might be because the new statistical factor ʻeconomy’, developed as a result of 
component factor analysis, includes somewhat conflicting initial factors – 
competition (the least important factor in the descriptive analysis) and bud-
getary pressure (assessed as middling in the descriptive analysis) (see figure 5.6 
and table 6.3).42 Generally, five external supporting factors score relatively 
similarly across all eight fields of public services. In relative terms, the new 
external supporting factor technology and partners (esf4) was more important in 
education services (2), logistical and environmental services (4), business 
services (5), eDemocracy services (8), and social services (1); and the least 
important in personal ID services (6), and general administration portals (7). 
In five fields out of eight, understandably, lack of finances (ehf4) was seen 
as the most important external restriction to innovation (see graph 2). However, 
it is interesting to see that different risks (ehf2) were also seen as important 
factors hampering innovation. Risks were the most important external ham-
pering factor in business services (5), personal ID services (6), and eDemocracy 
services (8). Moreover, even if not the most important factor, risks were also the 
top external hampering factors in other fields of public service. Similar to 
internal hampering factors before, we also see here that business services (5) 
have faced generally less external restrictions than the other seven fields of 
public service. This can be explained by the fact that business service belongs to 
the group of a few public services which are directly (i.e. taxation) or indirectly 
(i.e. statistics) generating public income. Moreover, innovating in these fields 
can result in better quality public services, therefore generating more income for 
the state/regional/local budget. Business services (5) were also the only field of 
public service where two important restrictions to innovation – policies (ehf1), 
and inappropriate laws and regulations (ehf5) were almost non-existent. 
Interestingly, in six out of eight fields of public services [except business 
services (5) and eDemocracy services (8)], cooperation with users and partners 
                                                                          
42  It is therefore important to look at the consistency of each new statistical factor before 
making any conclusions. 
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(ehf3) was seen to be the least or second least important hampering factor. This 
indicates two possible scenarios – whether public institutions are too selfish or 
closed in their innovation process, or they have learned how to manage 
appropriately their partner and user/client relationships (especially in the early 
phases of the innovation process, where it is very crucial). 
While identifying any possible statistically significant differences between 
fields in the importance of certain factors supporting and hampering innovation 
externally, we performed ANOVA analysis. The univariate analysis showed 
statistical differences in the external hampering factor – policy (ehf1), which 
was significantly more important in education services (2) compared to business 
services (5) [(2)>(5)]. The differences in the importance of other factors 
between different fields of public service were not statistically significant (see 
annex 13 for details). 
 
Graph 1        Graph 2 
 
Notes: (1) esf = external supporting factors; esf1 = policy; esf2 = users; esf3 = economy; esf4 = 
technology and partners; esf5 = technological experiences. (2) ehf = external hampering factors; 
ehf1 = policy; ehf2 = risks; ehf3 = users and partners; ehf4 = finances; ehf5 = laws and 
regulations. (3) 1 = social services; 2 = education services; 3 = other knowledge services; 4 = 
logistical and environmental services; 5 = business services; 6 = personal ID services; 7 = general 
administration portals; 8 = eDemocracy services. 
Figure 6.9 External factors supporting and hampering innovation in public sector 
services: public service field determinant 
 
The focus of this sub-chapter was on field-specific determinants. Contrary to 
what the literature suggests, the empirical evidence show that there are very few 
statistically significant differences if comparing innovation goals, internal and 
external innovation supporting as well as hampering factors by the field of 
innovation. Therefore, we reject sub-proposition PS2.1 that the nature of public 
service innovations depends on the field they belong to, even if it is known from 
the practice of private sector innovation research that there might be several 
factors, for example industrial field and organisational structure, which are 
determining the innovation intensity and success of firms. 
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6.6. Innovation-type-specific determinants on  
the factors influencing the innovation process  
in public sector services 
The present sub-chapter focuses on innovation type-specific determinants. 
There are different typologies of classifying technological solutions in public 
services, as elaborated in chapter 2. Within technological services, the norma-
tive literature agrees that there are different stages in e-government provision 
and governments go through a number of stages before reaching maturity (Irani, 
2006; see also sub-chapter 3.3). Due to the sample size of the present research, 
and to allow adequate comparison of the core results, we adopted a basic 
threefold structure of (1) ʻfront office’, (2) ʻback office functions’, and (3) ʻboth 
front and back office’. 
To analyse innovation type as a determinant for public sector innovation, we 
developed the graphs below, as well as carried out univariate (ANOVA) analy-
ses to test the statistical significance in differences between different types of 
innovations in the importance of certain factors supporting or hampering inno-
vation (internally and externally). In ANOVA analyses, the dependent variables 
are the new statistical factors developed during the principal component factor 
analysis (see previous chapter), and the determinant (fixed factor) is ʻinnovation 
type’ – front office, back-office, or both front and back office. The innovation 
type determinant was developed as a way of asking respondents to mark which 
part of the service the innovation mainly influenced (question A2 in the 
questionnaire, see annex 1). All figures in this section are given on a mean scale 
of 0–1 (the original questionnaire data was on a scale of 1–4). 
 
(A) Grouped factors representing goals and results of innovation in public 
sector services: innovation type determinant 
In the beginning of the empirical chapters (chapter 5) we analysed the 
multidimensionality of innovation goals and results in public sector services.43 
The analyses were carried out using twelve possible, predefined goals and 
results of innovation. Moreover, to clarify the results, the single most and single 
least important innovation goals and results were studied. The initial list of 
innovation goals and results was then limited down to ʻbasic’ goals and 
ʻadvanced’ goals, as well as to ʻbasic’ results and ʻadvanced’ results. The latter 
was done in the previous chapter, using principal component factor analysis. 
The first statistically new factor called basic’ (G1 and R1 in table 6.1) refers to 
more basic goals and results of technological innovation in public sector 
services. The second statistically new factor called ʻadvanced’ (G2 and R2 in 
                                                                          
43  The assessment was made on a four-point scale, where 1 was “not important”, 2 “of little 
importance”, 3 “important”, and 4 “very important”. 
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table 6.1) refers to more advanced goals and results of technological innovation 
in public sector services. 
Figure 6.10 illustrates the performance of advanced innovation goals (gadv) 
versus basic innovation goals (gbasic) (graph 1), as well as advanced innovation 
results (radv) versus basic innovation results (rbasic) (graph 2) by three types of 
innovation, whether the innovation influenced front office (1), back office (2), 
or both (3); see the description above. When looking at innovation goals (Graph 
1), we see that advanced (gadv) and basic goals (gbasic) were relatively equally 
represented in innovations, which influenced only the front office (1) or both 
front and back office (3). However, in the case of the back office (2), we see 
that advanced goals (gadv) were much more import than the basic ones (gbasic). 
The latter can be explained, first, by the fact that only two per cent of 
respondents stated that their innovation influenced mainly the back office (see 
table 5.3). Secondly, ʻonly back office innovations’ are usually ʻadvanced’ by 
their nature, as they require business process reengineering, automation, data-
base integration, etc. Indeed, if we compare more closely the front office (1) and 
both front and back office (3), we also see that in the latter case (3), advanced 
goals (gadv) are more important than the basic ones (gbasic); in the case of the 
front office (1), the situation is opposite (see figure 6.10 graph 1). 
Analysing the innovation results (graph 2), we see two developments 
compared to what was seen in the case of innovation goals. First, in the case of 
back office (2), the importance of advanced results (radv) is still larger than the 
basic results (rbasic); however, the difference is much smaller than in the case 
of innovation goals. Secondly, the importance of basic results (rbasic) compared 
to advanced results (radv) has been rising clearly compared to what we saw in 
the goals (graph 1). Moreover, when moving from goals to results, advanced 
and basic goals/results have shifted their position in terms of importance in both 
front and back office (3) (i.e. if gadv>gbasic then radv<rbasic). Both these 
developments (if comparing innovation goals to innovation results) can be 
explained by the fact that public sector innovators are more optimistic when 
they are describing their goals, compared to when they are describing their 
actual results. 
To identify any possible statistically significant differences between 
innovation types in the importance of innovation basic or advanced innovation 
goals and results, we performed ANOVA analysis. However, the univariate 
analysis did not show any statistically significant differences between different 




Graph 1     Graph 2 
  
Note: gadv = advanced innovation goals; gbasic = basic innovation goals; radv = advanced 
innovation results; rbasic = basic innovation results. (2) 1 = service delivery (front office);  
2 = process integration (back office); 3 = both front office and back office. 
Figure 6.10 Advanced and basic goals and results of innovation in public sector 
services: innovation type determinant 
 
(B) Grouped supporting and hampering factors of innovation in public sector 
services: field determinant 
In previous parts of the empirical analysis (chapter 5), we analysed the 
importance of different factors supporting and hampering innovation in public 
sector services (internal to the organisation and externally). These analyses were 
carried out using a list of possible, predefined factors influencing the innovation 
process. In addition, to clarify the results, the single most and single least 
important factors were identified. The initial list of supporting and hampering 
factors was then reduced to four statistically new factors (in case of internal 
supporting and hampering factors) and to five statistically new factors (in case 
of external supporting and hampering factors). The latter exercise was done in 
the curent chapter, using principal component factor analysis. 
 
(B1) Internal factors 
Following data performance during the principal component factor analysis, the 
new statistical factors developed for internal supporting and internal hampering 
factors of the innovation process in public sector services were similar (both for 
internal supporting and internal hampering factors). The factors were the fol-
lowing: (a) Top management (isf1/ihf1), (b) Structure and organisational culture 
(isf2/ihf2), (c) Operational management (isf3/ihf3), and (d) External coopera-
tion (isf4/ihf4). 
It was concluded already in the descriptive statistics chapter that innovation 
supporting factors were generally seen statistically significantly more important 
than innovation hampering factors. Figure 6.11 illustrates by types of 
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innovation the performance of grouped factors supporting (isf, graph 1) and 
hampering (ihf, graph 2) innovation internally in public sector services. 
Analysing the internal innovation supporting factors (graph 1), we see that 
front office (1) and both front and back office (3) are performing relatively 
similarly in terms of influencing factors. In both types of innovation, opera-
tional management (isf3) appears to be the most important innovation driver. 
Moreover, in both types of innovation, operational management (isf3) is fol-
lowed almost equally by organisational structure and culture (isf2) and external 
cooperation (isf4). In both types of innovation (1 and 3), top management 
influence (isf1) comes out as the least important internal innovation supporting 
factor. The factors influencing only back office innovations (2) score differ-
ently. In this type of innovation, external cooperation (isf4) together with top 
management (isf1) are the most important positively influencing internal 
factors. However, the fact that back office (2) innovations perform differently 
also highlights some doubts. These come from the fact that these cases represent 
only two per cent of all respondents. The tendency that operational management 
outperforms top management in both well-represented types of innovation 
indicates that top management commitment and support, as well as hierarchical 
top-down power (initial factors) might be important but not crucial in 
innovation success in public sector services. We have a strong argument to say 
that personal leadership of committed ʻkey’ individuals, available motivation 
and tools of the project manager, together with open-minded managers (initial 
factors) give an important influence on public service innovation appearance 
and its success. 
Looking at the innovation hampering factors internally (ihf, graph 2), we see 
that they score generally lower than internal supporting factors (isf, graph 1). In 
the case of front office innovations (1), organisational structure and culture 
(ihf2), as well as external cooperation (ihf4) were the most influential ham-
pering factors. In both front and back office (3), all four external hampering 
factors affect the innovation process relatively equally. Interestingly, in back 
office innovations (2), all four internal hampering factors appear to be more 
important than in two other types of innovations (1 and 3). However, due to a 
relatively small representation of back office innovations in the responding 
sample, the latter tendency might not be too adequate. 
To identify any possible statistically significant differences between inno-
vation types in the importance of different internal innovation supporting and 
hampering factors, we performed ANOVA analysis. However, the univariate 
analysis did not show any statistically significant differences between different 
innovation types (see annex 14 for details). 
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Graph 1     Graph 2 
 
Notes: (1) isf = internal supporting factors; ihf = internal hampering factors. (2) isf1 and ihf1 = 
top management; isf2 and ihf2 = structure and organisational culture; isf3 and ihf3 = operational 
management; isf4 and ihf4 = external cooperation. (3) 1 = service delivery (front office); 2 = 
process integration (back office); 3 = both front office and back office. 
Figure 6.11 Internal factors supporting and hampering innovation in public sector 
services: innovation type determinant 
 
(B2) External factors 
While the new statistical factors developed for internal factors were similar for 
supporting and hampering factors, due to data performance in principal 
component factor analysis, the new statistical factors developed for external 
supporting versus hampering factors were different (see table 6.3). In the case of 
external supporting factors (esf, graph 1), the new statistical factors after the 
grouping exercise were the following: (a) Policy (esf1), (b) Users (esf2), 
(c) Economy (esf3), (d) Technology and partners (esf4), and (f) Technological 
experiences (esf5). In the case of external hampering factors (ehf, graph 2), the 
new statistical factors after the grouping exercise were the following: (a) Policy 
(ehf1), (b) Risks (ehf2), (c) Users and partners (ehf3), (d) Finances (ehf4), and 
(f) Laws and regulations (ehf5). 
Figure 6.12 shows fundamental differences between different innovation 
types in public services if we collate the five new statistical factors externally 
supporting (esf, graph 1), and other five externally hampering (ehf, graph 2) 
innovation in public sector services. To a lesser extent than in case of internal 
factors, however, the external supporting factors are also assessed as being more 
important than the external hampering ones. 
From the supporting factors’ side (graph 1 in figure 6.12), users (esf2) were 
assessed as the most important external factor supporting innovation process in 
all three types of public service innovations. This pattern was also followed by 
the next two factors – technology and partners (esf4) and policy (esf1). In front 
office innovations (1) and both front and back office innovations (3), economy 
(isf3) was the least important supporting factor. As said earlier, the relatively 
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low importance of economic factor (isf3) might be linked to the fact that it 
includes quite opposite initial factors (competition and budgetary pressure). 
Knowing the initial factors behind the new statistical factor ʻusers’ (esf2), we 
can surely say that user demand and user trust are the two most important 
factors externally supporting all types of innovation in public services. 
Analysing the external hampering factors side in the frame of three 
innovation types (graph 2 in figure 6.12), we see that in two out of three types of 
innovations, in front office innovations (1) and both front and back office 
innovations (3), the most important external barrier was related to finances (ehf4). 
Therefore, we can conclude that the lack of finances have a negative effect in 
public service innovation development. However, we should keep in mind that 
the external hampering factors (graph 2) in general were assessed as being less 
important compared to the external supporting factors (graph 1). The general 
pattern of external hampering factors was similar to front office innovations (1), 
and both front and back office innovations (3). The back office innovations (2) 
faced stronger external hampering factors, especially linked to different risks 
(ehf2), as well as to users and partners (ehf3). The higher importance of risks in 
this innovation type might be linked to the fact that all back office innovation 
cases come from the UK, where due to the size of the country projects are larger, 
more costly, and therefore financially and politically more risky. 
To identify any possible statistically significant differences between 
innovation types in the importance of different external innovation supporting 
and hampering factors, we performed ANOVA analysis. However, the 
univariate analysis did not show any statistically significant differences between 
different innovation types (see annex 14 for details). 
 
Graph 1     Graph 2 
  
Notes: (1) esf = external supporting factors; esf1 = policy; esf2 = users; esf3 = economy; esf4 = 
technology and partners; esf5 = technological experiences. (2) ehf = external hampering factors; 
ehf1 = policy; ehf2 = risks; ehf3 = users and partners; ehf4 = finances; ehf5 = laws and 
regulations. (3) 1 = service delivery (front office); 2 = process integration (back office); 3 = both 
front office and back office. 
Figure 6.12 External factors supporting and hampering innovation in public sector 
services: innovation type determinant 
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The sub-chapter above focused on innovation-type specific determinants. 
Indeed, in terms of basic or advanced innovation goals and results, different 
internal and external innovation supporting and hampering factors, the 
univariate analysis did not show any statistically significant differences between 
different innovation types (see annex 14 for details). Therefore, we reject sub-
proposition PS2.2 stating that the nature of public service innovations depends 
on the type they are. 
 
 
6.7. Summary and considerations 
The first part of this chapter used principal component factor analysis (PCA) 
techniques to group the initial innovation goals and results, as well as organi-
sational and external innovation supporting and hampering factors into 
meaningful meta-groups (new statistical factors). The exercise was considered 
successful, as it was possible to group the initial goals and results, as well as the 
innovation influencing factors into new statistical factors. The new statistical 
factors developed are listed in section 6.3. These new factors were then used in 
univariate (ANOVA) analysis of variance of country, field and innovation-type 
specific determinants of the innovation process. 
The chapter carried out univariate analyses to test the statistical significance 
in differences between countries in the importance of new statistical factors sup-
porting or hampering innovation (internally and externally) created in chapter 5. 
The results of these analyses can be closely followed by looking at figures and 
elaborations in the text. As the results show (section 6.4), there are many 
statistically significant differences across countries and we therefore accept 
proposition PS2.3 that the nature of public service innovations depends on the 
country they are from. These results contrast with most of the comparative work 
on cultures (see Didero et al., 2008), which are based on the assumption that 
there is a large degree of homogeneity within nation states as opposed to large 
differences between nation states. The sub-chapter also provided inputs against 
the acceptance of proposition PS4, stating that, overall, the main characteristics 
and driving forces of the public service innovation system do not differ across 
countries. Indeed, further analyses are needed, to be more confident in accepting 
or rejecting this proposition. 
The focus of sub-chapter 6.5 was on field-specific determinants. In order to 
study these, we developed respective graphs and univariate (ANOVA) analyses 
were carried out to test the statistical significance in differences between fields 
of public service in the importance of certain new statistical factors supporting 
or hampering innovation (internally and externally). Contrary to what the 
literature suggests, the empirical evidence show that there are very few 
statistically significant differences if comparing innovation goals, internal and 
external innovation supporting as well as hampering factors by the field of 
innovation. Therefore, we reject sub-proposition PS2.1 that the nature of public 
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service innovations depends on the field they belong to, even if it is known from 
the practice of private sector innovation research that there might be several 
factors, for example industrial field and organisational structure, which are 
determining the innovation intensity and success of firms.  
Sub-chapter 6.6 was focusing on innovation-type specific determinants. For 
that purpose, also appropriate graphs were developed and univariate (ANOVA) 
analyses carried out to test the statistical significance in differences between 
public service innovation types on the importance of new statistical factors 
supporting or hampering innovation (internally and externally). However, in 
terms of basic or advanced innovation goals and results, different internal and 
external innovation supporting and hampering factors, the univariate analysis 
did not show any statistically significant differences between different inno-
vation types (see annex 14 for details). Therefore, we reject sub-proposition 
PS2.2 stating that the nature of public service innovations depends on the type 
they are. 
The above-mentioned three determinant analyses suggest to partly reject 
proposition PS2, stating that that the nature of public service innovations de-
pends on different determinants. As we saw, the only determinant with statisti-
cally significant impact in many areas was ʻcountry’. In terms of determinant 
ʻfield’, the univariate analysis showed only one statistical difference in external 
hampering factor – policy (ehf1), which was significantly more important in 
education services (2) compared to business services (5) [(2)>(5)]. The differ-
ences in the importance of other factors between different fields of public 
service were not statistically significant (see annex 13 for details). Further-
more, as said earlier, in terms of determinant ʻinnovation type’, there were no 
statistical differences found. 
These results clarified the theoretical discussion in the literature about 
framework factors determining innovation in public sector services (see for 
example Mohr, 1969; Cornford et al., 2006; Koch et al., 2005; Didero et al., 
2008). The analysis and answers to propositions presented above also facilitate 
our research towards identifying the specifics of public service innovation 




7. SYNTHESIS OF THE RESEARCH RESULTS 
The ultimate aim of this thesis as presented in the main research question (RQ) 
was to discover what is relative importance of different managerial and 
contextual factors influencing the innovation process in information technology-
based public sector services and how do they determine the nature of the public 
service innovation system in four European countries. The present chapter 
analyses the results of the empirical analysis within the proposed theoretical 
framework to describe the dynamics of the public service innovation system. 
The chapter starts with the overall underlying configuration of the public 
service innovation system based on the research results. This is followed by a 
country-specific picturing of the public service innovation systems of the UK, 
Denmark, Finland and Estonia. The final sub-chapter presents the summary of 
the research results in comparison to other theoretical and empirical works on 
public sector innovation. The latter is achieved using original sub-research 
questions and propositions set up in chapters 3 and 4. 
The theoretical framework for this research was developed in chapter 3, in 
which the empirical on-the-ground case study survey was carried out. The 
system-concept had three main dimensions. Firstly, the external environment 
that represents the influence of political leadership, public policies, and laws 
and regulations on the innovation process in public services. Secondly, the 
learning environment representing the picture of innovation-related organi-
sational learning in public services – including learning from previous/similar 
innovations, internally improved organisational capabilities for innovation, 
areas of externally obtained knowledge, etc. Thirdly, the organisational environ-
ment that represents innovation goals and results as well as intra-organisational 
factors influencing the innovation process. Chapters 5 and 6 performed different 
analyses on the case study survey results. We started with descriptive analyses 
of the survey results describing the multidimensionality and relative importance 
of different managerial and contextual factors influencing innovation in 
information technology-based public sector services (chapter 5). This was 
followed by principal component factor analysis to narrow down and group the 
long list of innovation goals and results, as well as supporting and hampering 
factors, to make a shorter list of more generalised meta-factors. We then 
analysed the impact of country, field, innovation-type specific determinants on 
these meta-factors as well as carried out univariate (ANOVA) analyses to test 





7.1. Overall dynamics of the configuration  
of public service innovation system 
The empirical chapters of the present thesis have shown us that the picture 
behind public service innovations is much more multi-faceted than one might 
initially think. Therefore, we can surely argue that the literature of public sector 
innovation that is full of normative assertions and/or pejorative arguments with 
little serious empirical work behind it (as stated by Osborne and Brown, 2005) 
has its limits and this research has brought us a little closer in understanding and 
managing innovation in public sector services. Based on the empirical results, 
figure 7.1 shows the relative importance of different managerial and contextual 
factors influencing the innovation process in information technology-based 
public service development in three dimensions – the external environment, 
learning environment and organisational environment jointly for all four 
countries. Expect for the learning environment, we used new statistical factors 
developed in chapter 6 using principal component factor analysis to illustrate 
the nature of public service innovation systems (figures 7.1 to 7.5). 
As of the broadest conclusion from the public service innovation system 
pictured above (for all four countries), the internal supporting factors are 
statistically significantly more important for the innovation process in the public 
services than the external supporting factors. Within this, indeed, the prominent 
position of personal leadership might be slightly biased as mostly persons, who 
were responsible or linked to the particular public service innovation 
development, filled in the questionnaires. However, the results support the basic 
statement of Drucker (1985: 30), who stated “entrepreneurs innovate”, as well as 
the importance of such ‘key’ individuals in the innovation process stressed by 
many authors (see Rothwell, 1992; Tidd et al., 2001; Koch and Hauknes, 2005). 
At the same time, the external innovation hampering factors are statistically 
significantly greater in importance than the internal hampering factors. Moreover, 
the internal factors overall (supporting + hampering) are statistically significantly 
more important in the public service innovation process than external factors are 
overall. This difference gives us the confidence to say that in general, in order to 
succeed in public service technological innovations, organisational factors are 
more important than the ones of external environment. This means that the 
existence of written strategy, open minded managers, and ‘product champions’ 
who are ready and motivated to carry through the project, are more important than 
external influences, i.e. political demand, budgetary pressure, or appropriate laws 
and regulations. Also, comparing merged supporting (external + internal) and 
hampering (external + internal) factors, one can clearly see that the importance 
of supporting factors very significantly out performs the importance of 
hampering factors. This might be partly so as it was a best practice research. 
However, in order to succeed in public service innovations, the innovation-
motivating forces should be greater than the obstacles. From the country 
difference perspective, these are greater in terms of hampering factors 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(A) Learning environment 
From the learning perspective, this thesis has shown that technological inno-
vation in public sector services requires a broad range of managerial and 
organisational improvements, and that external learning and consultancy plays a 
positive role in successful public service innovations. Here we see a slight 
contradiction, as the internal supporting factors in general were statistically 
significantly more important for the innovation process in the public services 
than the external supporting factors. However, in our sample, external learning 
was heavily skewed towards one type of knowledge. Namely, 81 per cent of 
public organisations obtained external technological advice/support to innovate; 
this was followed by project management skills and advice: 21 per cent of the 
organisations. Only 11 per cent of public organisations obtained external 
management advice and support, and external human resource management 
skills and support was obtained by as few as 5 per cent of public organisations. 
Similarly, internally the most improved organisational capability to innovate 
was technological knowledge, by 69 per cent of organisations. Project manage-
ment skills were internally upgraded by 64 per cent, general management skills 
by 34 per cent, organisational structure by 28 per cent, and motivation system of 
personnel by 15 per cent of public organisations. 
The survey also showed that innovation-related learning in public sector 
services is seen to be cumulative – it can result from the previous positive and 
negative experiences, internally and externally. Organisations were slightly 
more likely to learn from others than their own previous experiences; they also 
learned more from positive than negative experiences. Overall, as much as 
53 per cent of organisations had previous positive experiences with similar 
innovations, compared to 11 per cent of organisations having negative 
experiences. Slightly less than half of the public sector organisations (45 per 
cent) did not have any previous experiences with similar innovations. Almost 
one-fifth of public organisations reported having not learned from any previous 
experiences, whether internal to the organisation or externally. The fact that 
almost half of public organisations under investigation did not have their own 
respective previous experiences shows that innovation in the public sector, 
generally, tends to be more an ad hoc project-based thing than a result of 
continued and more systemic development processes. To some extent, external 
best practices and policy learning can compensate for this; however, it does not 










(B) Organisational perspective 
From the managerial perspective, factors (including goals) influencing the 
innovation process in public sector services differ to some extent from those 
known from the private sector (see chapter 5). Competitiveness44 and service 
cost, which are important drivers in the private sector, were both among the 
least important innovation goals rated by the respondents. Innovation goals in 
the public sector were not too polarised – despite the responding organisations 
having many different innovation goals, the major ones emerge clearly: 
improvements in service quality, going online, responding to user needs, and 
improving the take-up of the service. Howells and Tether (2004; sub-chapter 
3.1), for example, discovered a similar dominant position of quality issues in 
relation to the aim of innovation in their private sector services’ analysis. Also, 
most of the public sector organisations in the survey track the performance of 
their innovations and compared to the initial expectations, the innovation results 
are mostly rated as good (60 per cent) or excellent (30 per cent). 
What is interesting to see after the principal component factor analysis is that 
in the beginning of the innovation, overall, the ʻadvanced goals’ set slightly 
dominated over the ʻbasic goals’. This means that public organisations were 
setting up more complex/advanced tasks for their innovation, i.e. to raise service 
diversity, to improve the quality of the service, to reduce time spent on service 
delivery as well as to reduce costs. However, if one looks at the results, then the 
ʻbasic results’ dominate over the ʻadvanced results’. This means that despite 
more complex goals, more primitive results were achieved with the innovation. 
The service was simply online, modern technologies were used, transparency 
improved, social or political popularity gained, or the take-up of the service was 
improved. 
Within the organisations, internal innovation supporting factors clearly 
dominated over the respective hampering factors. From the principal component 
factor analysis, the group ʻoperational management’ was clearly the most 
important set of internal factors leading to successful innovation in public 
services. Organisational structure and culture, external cooperation and top 
management followed this. Within the operational management group, there are 
factors like personal leadership/committed key individuals, open-minded man-
agers, and available mandate, motivation and tools of the project manager. 
Based on this one can confidently say that innovation in public service organi-
sations is people-centric. These are people who directly lead the innovation 
projects – literature has called them guerrillas, policy entrepreneurs, revo-
lutionary and missionary civil servants, inventors, adaptors, advocates, brokers 
or innovation champions. 
                                                                          
44  Competition means the presence of alternative service providers, both in the public (e.g. 
other hospital, school or library) as well as private sector (e.g. commercial banks in 
providing personal identification services). 
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From the internal hampering factors’ perspective, the groups of factors were 
different, if not to say the opposite to supporting factors. The most important 
group of internal hampering factors was external cooperation, followed by 
organisational structure and culture, top management, and operational manage-
ment. Weak external cooperation means weak cooperation with technology 
suppliers, lack of market knowledge, and weak cooperation with future users or 
user-groups (as individual factors within the group called external cooperation). 
We can see it throughout the thesis that external technological cooperation and 
respective learning are certainly keys to success as well as one of the largest 
bottle-necks hampering the innovation projects and therefore certainly also 
leading to failures. There can be several reasons for that and problems can 
equally start from demand side (public organisations), supply side (technology 
providers), but also from regulations’ side, i.e. rules of public procurement. We 
will elaborate this more in the policy implication part of the thesis (see 
conclusions). 
 
(C) External environment 
The importance of external factors influencing the innovation process in public 
service organisations slightly but statistically significantly underperforms the 
importance of internal factors. Within the external factors, the supporting 
factors slightly dominate over the hampering factors across all countries. 
Principal component factor analysis showed that group users (composed by the 
initial factors of user demand and user trust) was the most important external 
supporting factor, followed by technology and partners, policy, and the 
economy. From the external hampering factors’ perspective, the composite 
factor finance was the most important one, followed by risks, policy, laws and 
regulations, and users and partners. 
It is generally assumed that public sector institutions are non-innovative 
because of their bureaucratic nature with strict rules, rigid regulations and no 
real competition. Therefore, it can be expected that innovation in the public 
sector require changes in laws and regulations; moreover, it requires significant 
contribution from public policy. However, contrary to initial expectations, the 
current study showed that relatively few public service innovations required 
changes in laws and regulations (21 per cent of all responding organisations; see 
table 5.16). Appropriate laws and regulations were also rated as relatively non-
important in the question on external factors supporting innovation (see figure 
5.6); the same was true in the case of legal and regulatory barriers that were 
relatively unimportant as external factors hampering innovation (see figure 5.8). 
This situation did not change also after the principal component factor analysis. 
Indeed, positive public policy support is much more important (see table 5.17) 
than changes and support in laws and regulations. Across all countries, only 35 
per cent of organisations reported not having any influence from public policies 
while innovating. From the innovation financing perspective, the composite 
factor economy was only the fifth most important external factor supporting 
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innovation. Indeed, the composite indicator finances appears to be the most 
important external hampering factor to public service innovation as said earlier. 
The latter can, however, be slightly biased, as the easiest thing to say if 
something does not work out is always ʻinsufficient resources allocated’. 
 
 
7.2. Country-specific characteristics of  
the public service innovation system 
(A) United Kingdom 
The survey has shown that from the external factors perspective, public service 
innovation systems look very similar across countries. The variations are much 
larger within the organisations as well as in their learning environments. The 
larger country size of the UK and related larger and more complicated 
institutional setup might make the innovation process more costly, and therefore 
also riskier, as the survey showed. The survey also showed that risks are 
mitigated and confidence gained through the political demand and commitment 
to long-term major projects, strong top management commitment and support, 
close cooperation with technology suppliers and future users, as well as just 
through better market (demand) knowledge, which all are relatively more 
important in the UK than in other countries. More important hampering factors 
in the UK were the lack of supportive strategy, stagnating organisational 
culture, rigid structures, and the existence of previous failures – all common 
issues to larger countries. Moreover, even if not important in absolute terms, 
gaining social and political popularity as a goal of innovation was assessed as 
being slightly more important in the UK than in other countries. Principal 
component factor analysis showed that the UK was the only country where the 
factor external cooperation was weighted as the most important factor 
supporting the innovation process; in other countries this was operational 
management. However, the latter was seen as the second most important 
internal hampering factor in the UK, while top management was the least 
important factor hindering the innovation process internally (in contrast to most 
other countries). Also, external cooperation was weighted as a relatively less 
important internal hampering factor in the UK than in other countries, which 
shows the relative advancement of external, often technological cooperation in 
the UK public service organisations. This proposition is supported also by the 
fact that the UK public service organisations were most intensively using 
external technological advice and support while innovating (87 per cent). The 
UK institutions also used relatively more external general management advice 
and support (as organisations are larger) than organisations in other countries 
did. Interestingly, at the same time no external human resource management 
and support was used to support the public service innovation process in the 
UK. 
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As public service organisations in other countries, the UK institutions had 
some previous experience with similar innovations – 53 per cent had positive 
and 13 per cent had negative ones; they also learned firstly from their own 
experiences and then externally. However, as much as 40 per cent of public 
service organisations in the UK did not have any previous experiences while 
innovating and 13 per cent also did not learn from external experiences. 
The UK public service organisations together with Estonian counterparts 
both set more advanced innovation goals for their innovations then the Danes 
and Finns did. However, innovations produced mostly basic outcomes across 
countries, not the advanced ones, as was shown by the principal component 
factor analysis (see annex 11). The UK public service organisations were most 
optimistic in terms of their innovation results (47 per cent rated them excellent 
and 40 per cent as good). Figure 7.2 shows the relative importance of different 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Compared to the UK, in smaller countries often other issues dominate in the 
public service innovation process and system. In Denmark, transparency issues 
are rated as more important than in other countries. Danish innovators face 
relatively less internal hampering factors while innovating than their colleagues 
in other countries. At the same time, external hampering factors such as the lack 
of supportive policies, absence of relevant good examples and digital divide are 
relatively more important in Denmark than in other countries. Danish inno-
vators overemphasise (compared to other countries) the importance of different 
internal supporting factors, such as open-minded managers, the existence of 
personal leadership and committed ‘key’ individuals, as well as flexible organi-
sational structure together with the learning capabilities of the organisation. The 
Danish pattern might be explained by the fact that a large part of the public 
sector innovation experiments in the survey were carried out on an ad hoc basis 
under a larger project supporting regional innovation projects in Northern 
Jutland. However, as much as 65 per cent of Danish public service organisations 
stated having previous experiences with similar innovations (see figure 7.3), the 
highest ratio across countries, and as few as 6 per cent had had negative 
experiences, the lowest ratio across all countries. At the same time, 24 per cent 
of public service innovators in Denmark did not learn from previous 
experiences, internally or externally – again the highest ratio across countries. 
Principal component factor analysis showed that Danish public service 
organisations dominated over other country counterparts in setting up basic 
innovation goals (versus advanced goals). While in other countries techno-
logical knowledge was the most improved internal capability to innovate, in 
Denmark this was project management skill, only followed by technological 
knowledge. None of the public service organisations in Denmark claimed 
having used any external general management support while innovating – an 
indication that innovations were more ad hoc initiatives and with lower influ-
ence, importance or risks. Finally, the positive role of operational management 
in the innovation process was the highest in Denmark, over all other countries 
in the survey. At the same, factors such as top management and organisational 
structure and culture were relatively less important internal innovation 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Public service innovation goals in Finland tend to be relatively user-oriented 
(see chapter 5 for descriptive survey results). This is supported by the results of 
the principal component factor analysis, where the importance of users as 
external supporting factor for innovation were rated the highest compared to all 
other countries (see annex 11). Internal supporting factors, such as supportive 
organisational strategy and innovation accepting organisational culture, tend 
also to be more important in Finland than in other countries. The importance of 
external issues, such as appropriate laws and regulations, the existence of good 
examples, good cooperation with partners (including technology providers), and 
user demand together with trust, are signs of a more systematic work and 
relatively higher sophistication of the public service innovation process in 
Finland. Stronger external commitment to public service innovation is indicated 
also by the fact that the importance of none of the external hampering factors in 
Finland dominates over the ones of other countries. 
Finnish public service organisations have the highest rate in internal negative 
experiences with similar innovations – 20 per cent (see figure 7.4). At the same 
time, together with the UK, Finns are the most active learners from previous 
experiences, mostly from positive experiences outside the organisation (55 per 
cent) and inside the organisation (45 per cent). Only 15 per cent of public 
service innovators in Finland reported having not learned from any previous 
experiences, whether internally or externally. Together with the UK, Finnish 
public service organisations obtained slightly more external project manage-
ment advice and support than other country organisations did. However, no 
external general management or human resource management advice and 
support were used by Finnish public service organisations while innovating. 
Similar to other countries, technological advice was the most important 
internally improved capability in Finnish public service organisations while 
innovating (65 per cent of the organisations). Accordingly, technological advice 
and support were the first externally obtained capabilities to innovate in public 
services (80 per cent). Finally, compared to the other countries in the survey, the 
relative importance of organisational structure and culture as an internal factor 
supporting innovation was higher in Finnish public service organisations (see 
annex 11). Together with Denmark, Finnish public service organisations also 
saw top managements as an important hampering factor for innovation, in 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The public service innovation goals tend to be more advanced in Estonia than in 
other countries, as they are more focused on the issues related to the raised 
service diversity (including personalised services) and reduced time spent on 
service delivery, etc. (see chapters 5 and 6). External factors, such as supportive 
policies, appropriate laws and regulations, competition, and technology push, 
are also relatively more important in Estonia than in other countries. From 
another perspective, no or weak political demand, no political commitment to 
long-term major projects, inappropriate laws and regulations, lack of financial 
resources, lack of trust and digital divide are relatively more important external 
hampering factors in Estonia compared to other countries. Internally, good 
knowledge of the existing technologies is relatively more supporting, and lack 
of ideas more hampering the innovation process in Estonia. The relative 
advancement of the Estonian public service innovation process can be explained 
by the small size of the country, as projects are smaller and, therefore, less risky 
to carry out. Also, relatively smaller national wealth (i.e. resources available) 
together with the advanced infrastructure (telecommunication, electronic bank-
ing, ID card, digital signature, etc.) motivates producing creative technological 
solutions to traditional problems. Relatively young socio-economic structure 
might also be less reluctant to new ideas compared to the countries with long 
traditions and historical habits of doing things. 
Estonian public service organisations had relatively fewer positive (46 per 
cent) and negative (7 per cent) experiences than other countries on average did, 
and as much as 54 per cent of Estonian innovators did not have any previous 
experiences while innovating (see figure 7.5). As much as 21 per cent of 
Estonian public service organisations did not learn from previous experiences, 
whether internal to the organisation or externally – the second highest percent-
age after Denmark. 
Estonia was the only country in the survey where public service organisa-
tions obtained all kinds of external capabilities while innovating. In addition to 
technological advice (82 per cent) and project management support (18 per 
cent), also general management advice and support (14 per cent) as well as 
human resource management assistance (11 per cent) were used. 
From the external supporting factors perspective, the composite factor 
technological experiences (consisting of the existence of good examples, 
including best practices, and technology push, including lobbing by technology 
providers) was rated as more important in Estonia than in all other three 
countries in the survey. The same is true in the case of the composite indicators 
policy, and laws and regulations under the external hampering factors category. 
These were both rated as more important in Estonia than in other three 
countries, even if not the most important factors in absolute terms (these were 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































7.3. Summary of the research results  
in comparison to other theoretical and  
empirical works on public sector innovation 
The previous sections (7.1 and 7.2) presented the results of our experimental 
survey of public sector innovativeness in the theoretical framework developed 
in chapters 3. Relying on the data of our exploratory survey, the chapter first 
drew a picture of the overall underlying configuration of the public service 
innovation system. This was followed by country-specific constructs of the 
same systems structure, picturing the composition public service innovation 
systems in the UK, Denmark, Finland and Estonia. 
This sub-chapter is meant for interpretation of our survey results in a broader 
context of theoretical and empirical understandings of public sector innovation. 
We do it in the framework of the propositions defined in chapter 3 and 4, the 
validity of which was tested in chapters 5 and 6. These propositions were set up 
based on contradicting theoretical views drawn from the literature (chapters 1 
and 2) and the few existing empirical public sector innovation studies (chapter 
2). In addition to these propositions, chapters 5 and 6 also provided answers to 
our four following sub-research questions: 
 Managerial perspective – What are the key-features influencing, sup-
porting and hampering, the development and implementation of success-
ful, technologically innovative public sector services (SRQ1)? 
 Learning perspective – Which managerial and organisational improve-
ments are necessary to innovate in public sector services (SRQ2)? 
 Technological perspective – What is the importance of technological 
knowledge in the public service innovation process, where and how it is 
developed (SRQ3)? 
 Systems perspective – What does the composition and dynamics of 
public sector (service) innovation system look like across countries 
(SRQ4)? 
 
The ultimate aim of the research was to answer the main research question (RQ) 
of the thesis: “What is relative importance of different managerial and 
contextual factors influencing the innovation process in information technology-
based public sector services and how do they determine the nature of the public 
service innovation system in four European countries?” 
Overall, our results of the empirical survey and analyses propose to accept or 
reject research propositions as presented in table 7.1. After the table presented 
below, reasoned answers to each of the sub-research questions together with 




















PM1: Factors (including goals) influencing the innovation process in public 
sector services differ from those known from the private sector. 
Accepted 
PM2: Innovation goals in the public sector are polarised. Neutral 
PM3: The success of technological innovations in public sector services is 
below the initial expectations. 
Rejected 
PM4: Innovation supporters in the public sector can be internal to the 
organisation and external. 
Rejected 
PM5: Innovation barriers in the public sector are predominantly internal to the 
organisation. 
Rejected 
PM6: Personal leadership (i.e. existence of ‘key’ individuals) is an internally 










PL1: Technological innovation in the public sector services requires a broad 
range of managerial and organisational improvements. 
Accepted 
PL2: External learning and consultation plays a positive role in successful 
public service innovations. 
Partly 
accepted 
PL3: Innovation-related learning in public sector services is cumulative and 














PT1: Technological knowledge is the major element improved internally and 
obtained externally in the development process of public service innovations. 
Accepted 








PT4: Technological risk is among the most important external hampering 








PS1: The innovation process in the public services is a systemic phenomenon. Accepted 
PS2: The nature of public service innovations depends on different 
determinants. 
PS2.1: The nature of public service innovations depends on the field they 
belong to. 
PS2.2: The nature of public service innovations depends on the type they are. 
PS2.3: The nature of public service innovations depends on the country they 






PS3: Public policy effects (in their wider sense) on technological innovation in 
public sector services are multi-factorial and weight differently depending on 
the activity. 
PS3.1: Innovation in public sector services requires changes in laws and 
regulations. PS3.2: Innovation in public sector services requires contribution 





PS4: The main characteristics and driving forces of the public service 
innovation system do not differ across countries. 
Rejected 
Notes: (*) For theoretical and empirical arguments drawn from the literature see respective sub-
chapters 3.1–3.4. (**) The term ʻneutral’ is used in case data does not allow to take a clear position 
(e.g. there are equally pros and cons); term ʻpartly’ is used in the case that data supports or hesitates 
the proposition, however there is an important conditionality (ʻyes, but’ or ʻno, but’) to be aware of. 
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Chapter 5 answered sub-research question SRQ1 while analysing the key 
features influencing, supporting and hampering, the development and imple-
mentation of successful, technologically innovative public sector services. In 
general, supporting factors were rated much more important than the hampering 
factors (both internally and externally), and internal factors (supporting + 
hampering) were less important, but still statistically significantly out-per-
formed the importance of external factors (supporting + hampering). According 
to importance, across countries, the three most important factors were 
accordingly the following (see also sub-chapter 5.4): 
- Internal supporting: personal leadership or existence of ‘key’ indi-
viduals45, top management commitment and support, and open-minded 
managers; 
- Internal hampering: the lack of knowledge about existing technologies, 
weak cooperation with technology suppliers, and weak top management 
commitment and support; 
- External supporting: good cooperation with partners (intermediates and 
technology providers), user demand, and user trust; 
- External hampering: lack of finances, high technological risk, and 
absence of relevant good examples. 
 
Based on the research result, we should accept proposition PM1 stating that 
factors (including goals) influencing the innovation process in public sector 
services differ from the ones we know from the private sector. Competi-
tiveness46 and service cost, which are important innovation drivers in the private 
sector, were both among the least important innovation goals rated by the 
respondents, see figure 5.1. Moreover, competitiveness, as well as budgetary 
pressure, is one of the least important external innovation supporting factors in 
public sector services (indeed, as a direct hampering factor, lack of finance is 
seen as one of the most important). This is contrary to Borins (see 2001c and 
chapter 2) who concluded from his research that a common denominator of all 
the characteristics of public sector innovation is that they look very much like 
the private sector. Indeed, Borins (2001b) was right in supporting the idea that 
innovation supporters in public sector organisations are always multi-factorial. 
In their case study research, Vigoda-Gadot et al. (2005) received mixed results 
on this issue, where the majority of interviewees reported differences between 
innovation in the public and in the private sectors (see also chapter 2). During 
these interviews the authors of the same study also found was that the public 
                                                                          
45  The prominent position of personal leadership might be slightly biased as mostly persons 
who were responsible or linked to the particular public service innovation development filled 
in the questionnaires. 
46  Competition means the presence of alternative service providers, both in the public (e.g. 
other hospital, school or library) as well as private sector (e.g. commercial banks in 
providing personal identification services). 
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sector is less willing to take risk than the private sector (see Koch and Hauknes, 
2005). The results proved the views of Røste and Miles (2005), who argue that 
differences between private and public sector innovation are less distinct and 
more nuanced than simplistic views would imply. 
Willcocks and Harrow (1992; sub-chapter 1.2) stress that there is a reason to 
believe that possible goals in the public sector services are much more polar 
ones compared to the private sector. The research gave mixed results regarding 
this point. Therefore, we remain neutral in terms of proposition PM2 that inno-
vation goals in the public sector are polarised. Although the responding organi-
sations had many different innovation goals, cumulatively, the major ones are 
clearly drawn out: improvements in service quality, going online, responding 
user needs, and improving the take-up of the service (see figure 5.1). Howells 
and Tether (2004; sub-chapter 3.1) discovered a similar dominant position of 
quality issues in relation to the aim of innovation in their private sector services’ 
analysis. In contrast, Grout et al. (2003; sub-chapter 1.2) have stressed the 
typical concerns is that publicly controlled organisations, not subject to the 
discipline of the competitive market, may therefore lack incentives to control 
costs or provide quality of service and respond to the needs of consumers. In 
our research, we see quality issues falling behind if look at the most important 
innovation goal by country: in Estonia it was to reduce the time spent on service 
delivery, in Finland and the UK to go online, and in Denmark to improve 
transparency. 
We have rejected proposition PM3 that the success of technological 
innovations in public sector services is below the initial expectations. Most of 
the organisations in the survey measured the success of their innovations (only 
14 per cent do not, see table 5.14). Compared to the initial expectations, 30 per 
cent rated their innovation results as excellent and 60 per cent as good, meaning 
that 90 per cent of respondents consider their innovations as successes. This 
relatively good evaluation is partly due to the fact that it was best practice 
research by its nature, partly because it is hard (and maybe not possible) to find 
any (common) quantitative measures to measure the innovation success in the 
public sector (compared to the private sector where return on investment, sales 
or productivity measures can be used). The UK has the most and Estonia the 
least optimistic organisations in terms of evaluating their public service inno-
vation results. The latter is interesting, because typically the larger the develop-
ment, the more likely it is that it will be unsuccessful (Goldfinch, 2007), 
however, the largest country (the UK) in our survey was most optimistic about 
the results. Although it was a best practice research, our results contradict 
literature statements that most governments experience problems when 
implementing large technology, mostly information technology projects. 
Budgets are exceeded, deadlines are over-run and often the quality of new 
systems is far below the standards agreed when the project was undertaken (see 
sub-chapter 3.3; Standish Group International, 1995, 1996; Borins, 2001b). 
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Contrary to what literature assumes, we reject proposition PM4, stating that 
innovation supporters in the public sector can be internal to the organisation and 
external, or as Borins (2001b) simply puts innovation supporters are always 
multi-factorial. Internal supporting factors were statistically significantly more 
important than the external ones, i.e. organisational issues are more important 
when the external influence in boosting the innovation process. According to 
Borins, while he asked the respondents what was innovation in their 
programme, the most frequent characteristic, observed in approximately 60 per 
cent of programmes, was ʻholism’, namely that the innovation depended on 
inter-organisation cooperation, that it delivered multiple services to individuals, 
or that it took a systems approach to a problem. In Contrast, our results support 
the views of Vigoda-Gadot et al. (2005), who found that all of the participants 
could be initiators of innovation in the public sector; however, internal actors 
like managers and frontline employees are the primary initiators of innovation. 
These are followed by employees, other organisational personnel and only then 
by professionals, government and politicians, end-users and external organi-
sations. 
In terms of hampering factors, it was opposite (with smaller differences 
only); internal barriers were statistically significantly less important than the 
external ones, rejecting both proposition PM5 that innovation barriers in the 
public sector are predominantly internal to the organisation, as well as the views 
of Vigoda-Gadot et al. (2005), who found that barriers to innovation in the 
public sector are mostly internal. Their findings showed that interviewees 
perceive barriers to innovation as deriving from public service’s leadership and 
management (i.e. budget cuts or poor allocation of budget funds, and poor 
leadership). Indeed, our research results support the private services expe-
riences, where, the external conditioning factors are more significant barriers 
than internal ones to firm innovation (Howells and Tether, 2004). 
Across countries, the result support proposition PM6 that personal leadership 
(i.e. existence of ʻkey’ individuals) is the internally dominating factor sup-
porting innovation in public sector services, followed by top management 
commitment and support, and open-minded managers. These results support the 
basic statements of the literature emphasising the importance of innovation 
champions (see Drucker, 1985; Rothwell, 1992, Tidd et al., 2001, Koch and 
Hauknes, 2005), however, we have to acknowledge that mostly project leaders 
themselves filled in questionnaires in our survey. Indeed, the UK showed 
different results, where a supportive organisational structure, top management 
commitment and support, and close cooperation with technology suppliers were 
more important. Therefore, we suggested to extend the ʻkey’ individuals 
definition in the public sector according to the Troika-model of innovation 
promotors (see Hauschildt and Kirchmann, 2001), where three layers of 
promotors are differentiated: power promotor (at the top), process promotor (in 
the middle) and technical promotor at the expert or innovator level. Finally, as 
Altshuler (1997) stresses, people in government fear nothing more than 
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newsworthy failure, therefore it has been rightly put by Teofilovic (2002) that 
strong leadership is a necessary imperative for establishing a cohesive, yet 
flexible, workplace culture that encourages idea experimentation and tolerates 
ʻsmart failures’. 
Similar results were also achieved after principal component factor analysis, 
where operational management (isf3; referring to open-minded managers, 
personal leadership or committed ʻkey’ individuals, available mandate, moti-
vation and tools of the project manager, existence of ideas, and previous nega-
tive experiences/failures) was seen statistically significantly the most important 
internal supporting factor, while top management (isf1) the least important 
internal supporting factor. The importance of structure and organisational 
culture (isf2) and external cooperation (isf4) were positioned in the middle of 
these two component factors. The relative differences between new statistical 
factors within the internal hampering factor question were smaller, with 
structure and organisational culture (isf2), as well as external cooperation (isf4) 
slightly more important than top management (isf1) and operational manage-
ment (isf3), see chapter 6 for details. 
The analyses in sub-chapter 5.2 focused on answering sub-research question 
SRQ2 – which managerial and organisational improvements are necessary to 
innovate in public sector services? Our empirical findings support the literature 
that the cumulative accumulation of knowledge and skills is crucial for the 
innovation process. The research showed that innovation-related organisational 
learning is multi-factorial and technological innovation in the public sector 
services requires a broad range of managerial and organisational improvements, 
therefore we accepted the respective proposition PL1. Organisations in the 
survey improved several intra-organisational capabilities in order to innovate 
(e.g. technological knowledge 69 per cent, project management skills 64 per 
cent, general management skills 34 per cent, organisational structure 28 per 
cent, motivation system of personnel 15 per cent). Only 6 per cent reported not 
having any internal capability improvements to innovate. The importance of 
internally improved capabilities was similar across all countries in the survey 
and our conclusions were in line with the views of Røste (2005), who states that 
the cumulative accumulation of knowledge and skills, i.e. the whole learning 
process, is crucial for innovation in the public sector. 
Literature generally supports the proposition that external learning and 
consultation plays a positive role in successful public service innovations (PL2), 
stressing that not all the new ideas are generated inside the focal organisation; 
some are generated externally but are adopted by the organisation (see for 
example Damanpour and Gopalakrishnan, 1998). However, this research 
showed that it could be only partly accepted. Organisations in the survey did 
obtain external capabilities in order to innovate. However, the capabilities were 
too much towards one type of knowledge – namely 81 per cent of them obtained 
external technological advice/support. Other improved factors were too minor 
for fully accepting the proposition (e.g. 21 per cent for project management 
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skills, 11 per cent managerial advice and support, 5 per cent HMR advice/ 
support). External technological advice and support was highly used in all 
countries (from 76 per cent in Denmark to 87 per cent in the UK). The fact that 
external learning is heavily skewed towards technological knowledge indicates 
that learning is not a systemic process in our survey sample, meaning that 
innovators’ fundamental learning processes, also called absorptive capacity (see 
Cohen and Levinthal, 1989 and sub-chapter 3.3), are indeed weak. For example, 
their ability to systematically identify, assimilate, and exploit different types of 
knowledge from the environment. According to Lane et al. (2006), in the 
private sector, developing and maintaining absorptive capacity is critical to a 
firm’s long-term survival and success because absorptive capacity can reinforce, 
complement, or refocus the firm’s overall knowledge base. Fundamentally, a 
key determinant of relative success or failure is the ability to manage the 
learning cycle in explicit form (Hale, 1996; Bowen, 1994; Hayes et al., 1988; 
Maidique et al., 1985). In addition, not all external knowledge may be easily 
used and transformed into new artefacts (Winter, 1984), therefore internal 
dynamic capabilities (Teece et al., 1997) should be continuously developed to 
raise an organisation’s ability of knowledge transformation. Finally, modern 
private sector literature also stresses the more advanced knowledge sharing 
mode, that is, besides acquiring external knowledge, many firms have also 
begun to actively commercialise technology, for example, by means of out-
licensing. This increase in inward and outward technology transactions reflects 
the new paradigm of open innovation (see Lichtenthaler and Ernst, 2009; 
chapter 1.3), which in the public sector can be also called mutual policy 
learning across countries and regions. 
From another learning angle, our research result proved that innovation-
related learning in public sector services can result equally from the previous 
positive and negative experience, internally and externally (PL3). This supports 
also the views of Bloch (2010), who states that the willingness to take on risk 
and the ability to learn from failures are important issues for public sector 
innovation. Overall, 53 per cent of responding organisations had previous 
positive experience with similar innovations; only 11 per cent of the respon-
dents reported having previous negative experience. As much as 45 per cent of 
the responding organisations had no previous experience, positive or negative, 
with similar innovations. This was highest in Estonia – 54 per cent, and lowest 
in Denmark – 35 per cent. Previous positive experience was most encountered 
in Denmark (65 per cent) and least in Estonia (46 per cent). Negative experience 
was most often faced in Finland (20 per cent) and least in Denmark (6 per cent). 
Only 19 per cent of the responding organisations did not learn from the previous 
experience (while 45 per cent had no appropriate experience in-house). All 
experiences, internal and external, positive and negative, were used. This shows 
that at least to some extent, public sector innovators are learning organisations. 
To some extent this might be the result of the growing wave of policy-learning 
during last few decades, however Bason (2010) is very radical about this, 
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stating that many public sector organisations are still essentially navigation 
blind when it comes to real-time, relevant management information on 
performance and applying past experiences and best practices available. 
The research also showed that learning from the previous positive expe-
rience seemingly dominates any learning from the previous negative experience. 
Moreover, organisations are slightly more likely to learn from others than from 
their own previous experience: 43 per cent for the former and 39 per cent for the 
latter in terms of positive experience, 23 per cent and 21 per cent respectively 
from previous negative experience. When comparing different countries, then 
organisations from the UK and Denmark most often learned from their own 
positive experience, while in Finland and Estonia organisations were more open 
to positive experience of others; and similarly for learning from negative 
experience. The external focus of learning discovered, supports the views of 
Koch and Haukens (2005), who claim that in order to learn and innovate, the 
actors in the public sector must interact with other actors, this being people, 
organisations or various sources of information (see sub-chapter 3.4). 
Interestingly, negative previous experiences did not also exist (or had not been 
reviewed) by most of the respondents while developing innovations of our 
sample. Therefore, even if every innovation is different from another, one might 
still expect and we suggest that service providers in the public sector would put 
more emphasis on learning from mistakes and failures. This is especially 
appropriate in the case of large technology projects, which, according to the lite-
rature, fail or are over-budget and over-deadline every now and then (see sub-
chapter 3.3), and, according to Goldfinch (2007), the larger the development, 
the more likely it is that it will be unsuccessful. 
The sub-research question SRQ3 examines the importance of technological 
knowledge in the public service innovation process, asking what is the 
importance of technological knowledge in the public service innovation process, 
where and how is it developed? The empirical findings support the literature 
that technological knowledge is one of the more complicated forms of 
knowledge, which is not so simply distributable and understandable (without 
specific engineering skills), as the study-results support the proposition (PT1) 
that technological knowledge is the major element improved internally and 
obtained externally in the development process of public service innovations. 
Although there were some differences between countries, whether technological 
knowledge or project management skills were the most important internally 
improved the capability for innovation. Overall, the results are showing that the 
most important intra-organisational capability improved by the innovating 
organisations was technological knowledge (69 per cent of respondents). 
Technological advice and support, moreover, was the single most important 
externally obtained capability for innovation (81 per cent of respondents). 
The results also show that the role of technology in today’s public sector is 
becoming integrated with other managerial processes (PT2), indeed, being still a 
strong determinant for subsequent innovation, as stated by Koch and Haukens 
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(2005; see chapter 2). Therefore, we only partly accept the proposition PT2. 
Looking at the supporting and hampering factors (internal and external) of 
innovation, we clearly see that different technological issues, such as good 
knowledge of existing technologies, close cooperation with technology 
providers, technological risk, existence of good examples, technology push 
(lobbying by technology providers) and digital divide are intertwined with 
managerial, political, legal, personal (personnel), and other issues. This is 
supported also by Heeks (2001) in terms of e-government services, there seven 
dimensions are necessary and sufficient to provide the understanding of  
e-government design-reality gaps: (1) information, (2) technology, (3) pro-
cesses, (4) objectives and values, (5) staffing and skills, (6) management 
structures and skills, (7) other resources: time and money. Indeed, in our 
research, from the external learning perspective, technology was still the central 
topic. In addition, the largest challenge today is that innovations in government 
are ad hoc initiatives and mostly linked to a particular technology, key leader, 
organisation or narrow service. Therefore, mutual and continued organisational 
and technological upgrading of governance and service systems is needed to 
successfully face today’s challenges. 
We know from the literature (e.g. Tiits and Rebane, 2009), that successful 
technological innovations depend on many interrelated aspects. The results of 
this research showed also some evidence, that classical ʻtechnology push’ 
(which we mainly know from early private sector innovation literature) does not 
work in the case of public service innovations (PT3). Although external 
cooperation does not automatically mean technology push, the study results 
showed that only 8 per cent of service-innovations in the public sector are fully 
developed externally; 24 per cent are developed only internally; and as much as 
69 per cent are developed in cooperation of the organisation and its external 
partners. This means that the active or passive lobby of technology developers 
and/or providers is not too strong in the case of public service organisations, at 
least comparing it to the alternatives, market-pull or demand-pull (see Martin, 
1994). Also, even if technology push was defined more openly than the 
traditionally industrial innovation literature does (see Godin, 2005; sub-chapter 
3.1), it was rated as the fourth least important external innovation supporting 
factor, together with low technological risk, and after competition and 
budgetary pressure. The low importance of such activity might be linked to the 
fact that technological innovations in the public sector are usually unique 
(tailor-made), i.e. it would be hard to use an existing/standard solution for their 
development (although we sometimes see it, for example in the case of 
educational technologies). However, the fact that as much as 81 per cent of 
innovators obtained external technological advice and support, indeed, tend to 
question proposition PT3 that classical ʻtechnology push’ does not work in the 
public service innovation process. Therefore, we only partly accept the 
proposition. To paraphrase Nathan Rosenberg (1994: 139), “Everyone knows 
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that the linear model of innovation is dead”, however in the public sector, only 
partly. 
The literature considers technological knowledge one of the more complex 
types of knowledge and that innovation is related to risk-taking and uncertainty, 
which politicians typically avoid, as stated by some authors. Failure expla-
nations of public sector technology projects typically include data inadequacies, 
technical problems, management/process/technical skill shortages, cultural 
clashes, political infighting and external environmental factors (see Heeks, 
1999). Therefore, we also saw in our literature review that authors are tackling 
innovation from the risks and obstacles perspectives in the public sector quite 
extensively (e.g. Bhatta, 2003; Kubr, 1988). It is stressed that while citizens 
demand a modernised government, they are generally ambivalent about inno-
vation in the public sector, particularly because innovation often involves risk-
taking that can lead to significant monetary losses (see Teofilovic, 2002; sub-
chapter 1.1). Our research supported this proposition (PT4) that technological 
risk is among the most important external hampering factors in the public 
service innovation process. It was the second most important external ham-
pering factor, after lack of finances, followed by the absence of relevant good 
examples, high political/reputation risk, weak cooperation with partners and 
digital divide. Moreover, as an innovation supportive factor (figure 5.6), low 
technological risk was the third least important factor externally. The thoughts 
of Vigoda-Gadot et al. (2005) also support the proposition, saying that as 
technology innovation is often driven by suppliers (vehicles, devices, tele-
communications), this might lead towards larger technological risks. Indeed, 
public health systems studied in the same Publin project (see Koch and 
Haukens, 2005) appear to share a number of common features which could act 
in a way to hinder or prevent the process of innovation. 
The last sub-research question SRQ4 asks, what does the composition and 
dynamics of public sector (service) innovation system look like across 
countries? Relying on the results of our exploratory research, sub-chapters 7.1 
and 7.2 illustrated the overall dynamics of the configuration of public service 
innovation systems, as well as country-specific characteristics of innovation 
systems (see also figures 7.1–7.5). The results were presented within the 
proposed theoretical framework developed in chapter 2. Data was presented in 
original factors (results of chapter 5) as well as in new statistical factors 
developed in chapter 6 using principal component factor analysis. More detailed 
results can be found in chapters 5 and 6. In this section, we look at the systems 
related research propositions (see tables 4.1 and 7.1). 
Firstly, both the theoretical foundations and our research results support 
proposition PS1 that the innovation process in the public services is a systemic 
phenomenon, and that it should therefore be analysed and managed within a 
broader perspective of the innovation system. There is a general consensus 
among researchers that innovation takes place in a system consisting of 
individuals, firms and institutions, and within a certain cultural and regulatory 
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framework (see Carlsson and Stankiewicz, 1993; Freeman, 1987; Goldsmith 
and Eggers, 2004; Edquist, 1997b; Enzing and Kern, 1999; Lundvall, 1992; 
Malerba, 2002a, b, c; Nelson and Rosenberg, 1993; OECD, 1997). According to 
Røste (2005), innovation in the public sector is systemic (Koch et al., 2005 calls 
these systems ʻinnovation networks’). We call this context the ʻpublic service 
innovation system’, including the organisational environment, learning environ-
ment and external environment. The tendency towards external cooperation in 
innovation development shows us that the public service innovation process 
happens within the broader innovation system framework. From the provision 
perspective, less than half of the innovative services were provided directly by 
public entities, followed by public and private entities in cooperation. This 
growing cooperation necessity is also supported by Borins (2001b), whose 
study discovered that the innovation depended mostly on inter-organisation 
cooperation, that it delivered multiple services to individuals, or that it took a 
systems approach to a problem (see chapter 2). However, the system advantages 
are not fully utilised as innovations appear chaotically in public sector services 
and are mostly institution, key leader or service-centric. Therefore, without 
understanding and properly managing this dynamic innovation system, 
innovation remains an ad hoc process in public administration (which it also 
tends to be in at least half of the best practice cases organisations of this 
research). To make innovativeness a reality, both governments and public 
organisations should have a long-term strategy in which innovation plays a key 
role. Continued innovation, knowledgeable risk-taking and wise piloting should 
be systematically integrated into all levels of administration, management and 
citizen service. It is also important that (service) innovations take place across 
organisational borders and areas of governance, resulting not just in more 
technology-intense services, but also in new business/governance models. 
Continuously raising budgetary pressure in most of the European countries 
requires them to innovate not just with their services, but with broader welfare 
and governance models, which is a much more challenging job to do. 
Following the research results, proposition PS2 stating that the nature of 
public service innovations depends on different determinants, can be only partly 
accepted. From a country perspective, our research results (chapter 6) show that 
there are many statistically significant differences across countries and we 
therefore accept sub-proposition PS2.3 that the nature of public service 
innovations depends on the country they are from. These results contradict most 
of the comparative work on cultures (see Didero et al., 2008), which are based 
on the assumption that there is a large degree of homogeneity within nation 
states as opposed to large differences between nation states. However, our 
empirical evidence shows that there are very few statistically significant 
differences if comparing innovation goals, internal and external innovation 
supporting as well as hampering factors by the field of innovation. Therefore, 
we rejected sub-proposition PS2.1 that the nature of public service innovations 
depends on the field they belong to. This contradicts what is known from the 
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practice of private sector innovation research, that there might be several 
factors, for example industrial field and organisational structure, which 
determine the innovation intensity and success of firms.47 We also rejected the 
literature driven sub-proposition PS2.2 stating that the nature of public service 
innovations depends on the type they are. Sub-chapter 6.6 focused on 
innovation-type specific determinants, where, among other things, we carried 
out univariate (ANOVA) analyses to test the statistical significance in dif-
ferences between public service innovation types on the importance of new 
statistical factors supporting or hampering innovation (internally and exter-
nally). However, in terms of basic or advanced innovation goals and results, 
different internal and external innovation supporting and hampering factors, the 
univariate analysis did not show any statistically significant differences between 
different innovation types (see also annex 14 for details). 
Despite our results, fields and types of innovation in the public sector can be 
defined differently, depending on the nature of the study, and these might give 
different results in terms of statistical significance of a particular determinant. 
We gave an example before from the innovation capacity study of voluntary and 
non-profit organisations (VNPOs) in the UK (see Osborne, 1996, 1998; 
Osborne and Flynn, 1997), where the authors found that for those VNPOs 
which were engaged in innovative activity, it is related to the type of innovation 
that they are pursuing and its management implications (see chapter 2). Also, 
when the National Audit Office in the UK inspected government innovations in 
2006, they found in particular that central government organisations needed to 
improve their understanding about where the potential for innovation lies, 
increase the incentives for individuals to innovate, strengthen their ability to 
learn from one another and improve the pace at which innovations are 
implemented (see National Audit Office, 2009). Koch et al. (2005) also give an 
example that if one country decides to provide care for elderly through publicly 
owned organisations, another through private and yet another through a mix of 
both types, then these should all be included when saying something useful 
about innovation in the public sector, when a functional perspective is chosen. 
These different experiences confirm that different determinants can have a 
different impact on public sector innovativeness. 
Research proposition PS3 stated that public policy effects (in their wider 
sense) on technological innovation in public sector services are multi-factorial 
and weight differently depending on the activity. The proposition was driven 
from the fact that public institutions operate under certain regulatory, social and 
political rules, legacy and heritage – all of them factors that might influence the 
                                                                          
47  For example, Tidd et al. (2001) concluded from the existing private sector knowledge 
base, that there are no easy answers about successful innovation management and that 
innovation varies enormously – by scale, type, sector, etc. Howells and Tether (2004; sub-
chapter 4.1) also discovered significant sectoral differences within services in terms of the 
activities in their private sector services’ research. 
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innovation paradigm in the public sector. In one extreme, of course, public 
sector organisations might enjoy relatively large freedom in their activities, like 
few exploratory state development units do, e.g. NESTA in the UK, SITRA in 
Finland or the Estonian Development Fund. However, it is much more common 
that many public sector innovations may simply be dictated either directly or 
indirectly from external sources like policy changes, regulations, etc. (see 
Bloch, 2010). Among the long list of innovation drivers, the National Audit 
Office (2006) lists also the importance of new government priorities, response 
to crisis, change in ministerial priorities, change in policy environment, changes 
in resource use, implementing EU policies, etc. Furthermore, as the issues faced 
by public authorities are often complex, according to Thenint (2010), the wrong 
policy mix might also have adverse effects on overall government performance. 
Our research results showed that contrary to initial expectations, only 21 per 
cent of innovations required changes in laws and regulations (table 5.16). The 
‘legal barrier’ was larger in Estonia (40 per cent of innovations required legal or 
regulatory changes) and smaller in the UK and Finland (where respectively 7 
per cent and 10 per cent of innovations required such changes). Legal and 
regulatory barriers were also evaluated as non-important in the questions on 
external factors supporting innovation (figure 5.6) and external factors 
hampering innovation (figure 5.8), discussed in sub-chapter 5.4. Therefore, we 
rejected sub-proposition PS3.1 that innovation in the public sector requires 
changes in laws and regulations. Indeed, conversely the majority of organisa-
tions (65 per cent) reported the impact of public policy (in its narrow sense; 
laws and regulations excluded) on their innovations (table 5.17), being most 
influential in the UK (80 per cent of respondents), followed by Finland (65 per 
cent), Estonia (50 per cent) and Denmark (39 per cent). The importance of 
public policy contributions also emerges from the question on external factors 
supporting innovation, where it was the fourth most important (figure 5.6). 
These findings support sub-proposition PS3.2, claiming that innovation in the 
public sector requires contribution from public policy. These two sub-pro-
positions together show that policies (in their narrow sense), and laws and 
regulations have a different impact on technological innovations in public sector 
services, where policies are much more important. Therefore, we accepted the 
overall proposition PS3 that public policy effects (in their wider sense) on 
technological innovation in public sector services are multi-factorial and weight 
differently depending on the activity. Indeed, one should be careful in underesti-
mating the role of laws and regulations; our research was a best practice 
research and non-existing cases might non-exist exactly because of disruptive 
legal and regulatory environment. This is definitely the case when we talk about 
larger infrastructural innovations (such as ID cards, cross-use of different 
databases, etc.). Therefore, the fundamental aim is to maximise the chances that 
the regulatory framework will support innovation objectives, rather than 
running the risk of impeding or undermining them. On the other hand, the 
situation where public policies have a considerable effect on public service 
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innovations supports the broad idea of the so-called third generation innovation 
policy (see European Commission, 2003, as well as related theoretical discus-
sion in chapters 1). However, even if the idea of the third generation innovation 
policy was to put innovation at the heart of each policy area, it was more 
targeted to private sector oriented policies (i.e. enterprise policy, industrial 
policy, technology, science and innovation policy, regional policy, educational 
policies, agricultural policy, etc). Our empirically led suggestion here is that 
innovation should also be put at the heart of any public or administrative policy 
or framework. Indeed, this should be done in a careful manner as the public 
sector is generally risk averse and cannot fail altogether, as some business 
projects might, and are sometimes even expected to do. 
The final proposition PS4 related to systems framework, proposes that the 
main characteristics and driving forces of the public service innovation system 
do not differ across countries. It was driven from views that innovation culture 
is to be understood in terms of attitudes towards innovation, technology, 
exchange of knowledge, entrepreneurial activities, business, uncertainty 
(Hofstede, 2001), and related behaviour and historical trajectories. On the other 
hand, we have the understanding that most comparative work on cultures is 
based on the assumption that there is a large degree of homogeneity within 
nation states as opposed to large differences between nation states (Didero et 
al., 2008). 
The evidence from chapters 5 and 6 reject the proposition that the main 
characteristics and driving forces of the public service innovation system do not 
differ across countries (PS4). Compared to the innovation field and innovation 
type, country is the strongest determinant (in terms of statistically significant 
differences). Indeed, the survey has shown that from the external factors 
perspective, public service innovation systems look relatively similar across 
countries. The variations are much larger within the organisations as well as in 
their learning environments and innovation goals. 
More advanced innovation goals were set in Estonia and the UK, while in 
Denmark the basic goals were seen as more important, and in Finland advanced 
and basic goals had equal importance. There are larger country differences in 
innovation hampering factors than in case of innovation supporting factors 
(however, innovation supporters overall are rated as more important than 
hampering factors). For example, public sector organisations in the UK see 
relatively more hampering factors while innovating than organisations in other 
countries, especially in Finland. This might be due to the size differences 
between the UK and other countries, which pushes up the project sizes and cost, 
and therefore the risks linked to them. Weaknesses in operational management 
are seen as a relatively weak innovation-hampering factor especially in Finland 
and Denmark. External cooperation conversely is seen as a relatively more 
important innovation hampering factor (compared to other factors). 
From the external supporting factors’ perspective, in all four countries users 
were the most important external factor supporting innovation and finances the 
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most important external innovation hampering factor. In absolute terms, lack of 
finances was the most important external restriction in the UK, followed by 
Estonia and Denmark. Users and partners were statistically significantly less 
important innovation external hampering factors in Finland then in other three 
countries. 
There are many other issues which are unique to a particular country public 
service innovation system, as we saw in sections 7.1 and 7.2 of this chapter. For 
example, the larger country size of the UK leads presumably to a larger and 
more complicated institutional setup, which makes the innovation process more 
costly, and therefore riskier, as the survey showed. The survey also showed that 
risks are mitigated and confidence gained in the UK through the political 
demand and commitment to long-term major projects, strong top management 
commitment and support, close cooperation with technology suppliers and 
future users, as well as just through better market (demand) knowledge, which 
all are relatively more important in the UK than in other countries. The UK 
public service organisations also used most intensively external technological 
advice and support while innovating (87 per cent). 
Factors such as top management and organisational structure and culture 
were relatively less important internal innovation supporters in Denmark than in 
other countries. Moreover, together with Finland, public service organisations 
in Denmark saw top management as an important innovation hampering factor, 
in contrast to the UK and Estonia. Indeed, internal supporting factors, such as 
supportive organisational strategy and innovation accepting organisational 
culture tend to be more important in Finland than in other countries. Finnish 
public service organisations have also the highest rate of internal negative 
experiences with similar innovations – 20 per cent. At the same time, together 
with the UK, Finns are the most active learners from previous experiences, 
mostly from positive experiences outside the organisation (55 per cent) and 
inside the organisation (45 per cent). 
External factors, such as supportive policies, appropriate laws and regu-
lations, competition, and technology push, are relatively more important in 
Estonia than in other countries. From another perspective, no or weak political 
demand, no political commitment to long-term major projects, inappropriate 
laws and regulations, lack of financial resources, lack of trust and digital divide 
are relatively more important external hampering factors in Estonia compared to 
other countries. 
The relative advancement of the Estonian public service innovation process 
can be explained by the small size of the country, as projects are smaller and, 
therefore, less risky to carry out. Also, relatively smaller national wealth (i.e. 
resources available) together with the advanced infrastructure (telecommu-
nication, electronic banking, ID card, digital signature, etc.) motivates producing 
creative technological solutions to traditional problems. A relatively young socio-
economic structure might also be less reluctant to new ideas compared to the 
countries with long traditions and historical habits of doing things. 
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Finally, the dynamics of the innovation processes discovered in this ex-
ploratory research opposes the proposition PS4, stating that the main 
characteristics and driving forces of the public service innovation system do not 
differ across countries. 
Overall, the uniqueness of this exploratory research is that it empirically 
showed the relative importance of different managerial and contextual factors 
influencing the innovation process in information technology-based public 
sector services. Moreover, attempts were made to show how these factors 
determine the possible nature of public service innovation systems in four 
European countries – the UK, Denmark, Finland and Estonia. The author 
believes that this exploratory thesis stepped a little closer towards a systemic 






The aim of this thesis was to facilitate the way towards a systemic approach to 
understand and manage innovation in technologically innovative public sector 
services. Using exploratory methodology and unique combination of literature 
streams, the research brought out the main characteristics, driving forces and 
differences of public service innovation systems in four countries – the UK, 
Denmark, Finland and Estonia. The research had four perspectives in which the 
public sector innovation process was analysed: managerial, learning, techno-
logical, and systems perspective. This final part of the thesis comprises a 
summary of the key conclusions, the main contributions to different streams of 
literature, methodology, and implications for policy and public sector manage-
ment. It is followed by the boundaries and possible generalisations of the 
current research and outstanding questions for further research. 
 
Summary of the key findings – interpretation 
The contribution of new knowledge of the present dissertation is four-fold. 
Firstly, the purposely-developed theoretical framework that gives a structured 
approach how to understand and manage innovation in public sector services. 
Secondly, the new conceptual-methodological approach of how to study and 
analyse the innovation process in public service organisations. Thirdly, the 
hand-made list of public service innovations from four countries and the 
database of the survey results. Fourthly, the quantitative analysis and synthesis 
of the survey results which characterises the innovation process of public 
service organisations in the survey countries. Especial value of the research is 
that it allows understanding the relative importance of different managerial and 
contextual factors (in comparison to other factors) influencing the innovation 
process in information technology-based public sector services and shows the 
dynamics of the public sector innovation system. Research results contribute to 
the literature of public sector innovation and management and enriching 
academic debates around this increasingly important topic. Moreover, the 
research also analyses the differences of public and private sector innovation as 
well as innovation-related organisational learning issues, contributing both to 
theories of evolutionary economics and innovation. Additionally, contributions 
can also be drawn for economic theory, organisational theory, public 
administration and political science. 
The research question and theoretical framework developed in the first part 
of the thesis argue that innovation in public sector services is a systemic 
phenomenon, and therefore, it should be analysed as well as managed within the 
broader context. This context, which could be labelled ʻpublic service 
innovation system’, includes the organisational environment, learning environ-
ment and external environment. The systemic dynamics in which innovation 
happens in public sector services was the centre of the analysis. A number of 
278 
different methods were used to provide insights into the nature of the successful 
innovation projects in the public sector. 
The theoretical and conceptual part of the thesis started with the analyses of 
the literature focusing on key debates on the characteristics of innovation 
process in public sector services (chapter 1). This literature review chapter 
originated with the analysis of the evolution of innovation in the public sector 
and respective contemporary challenges; it then drew up the main differences 
between the public and private sector innovation, as well as analysed other 
modernisation and transformation waves, typologies, characteristics and trends 
of innovation in the public sector. The next chapter (chapter 2) concentrated on 
the empirical background and discussed the measurement of innovative 
activities in the public sector in previous empirical research. The third chapter 
defined conceptual framework for analysing the innovation process in public 
sector services and opened up four respective streams of literature related to that 
framework. Chapter four brought out and summarised the methodological 
procedures used in the following exploratory empirical research. 
The empirical analysis of the research were based on the sample of 135 
concrete cases of technologically innovative public sector services in four 
countries – the UK, Denmark, Finland and Estonia. Both the sample and the 
questionnaire used were unique, developed especially for the present research 
by the author. An overall response rate of 60 per cent was achieved. 
In the empirical chapters of the present research, several different methods 
were used to analyse the dataset, to assess the relative importance of different 
managerial and contextual factors influencing the innovation process and to 
draw out the dynamics and differences of the public service innovation systems 
in four countries under observation. For statistical methodology, descriptive 
statistics, principal component factor analysis and univariate (ANOVA) analysis 
were used. In chapters six and seven, a number of characteristics connected to 
the nature of innovations and their development, related knowledge-base, 
organisational and technological learning, innovation goals and results, drivers 
of innovation as well as barriers were analysed. This analysis was performed 
from three different layers of the public service innovation system: the 
organisation, its learning environment and the external environment. Merging 
the theoretical-conceptual framework (developed in chapters one, two and 
three) and the analysed survey data (chapters five and six), chapter seven 
synthesised the empirical results of the study from the systems perspective, 
presenting overall and country-specific dynamic pictures of public service 
innovation systems, as well as other major research findings of the present 
research. 
Hereafter we provide a short overview of the research findings (see also 
chapter 7). The main research question of the thesis was: “What is relative 
importance of different managerial and contextual factors influencing the 
innovation process in information technology-based public sector services and 
how do they determine the nature of public service innovation system in four 
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European countries?” To conduct the analysis, a four layer conceptual frame-
work was used: managerial perspective, learning perspective, technological 
perspective and systems perspective. These dimensions were associated with the 
four specific sub-research questions. All these questions also had respective 
propositions drawn out from the literature and accepted or rejected during the 
research (see also tables 4.1 for propositions and 7.1 for their acceptance). 
In answering sub-research question SRQ1, we showed that the most 
important internal factors supporting public sector innovation were personal 
leadership or the existence of ‘key’ individuals, followed by top management 
commitment and support, and open-minded managers. Most favourable internal 
hampering factors were the lack of knowledge about existing technologies, 
weak cooperation with technology suppliers, and weak top management 
commitment and support. Externally, the largest supporters were respectively 
good cooperation with partners (intermediates and technology providers), user 
demand, and user trust; indeed from the external barriers perspective: lack of 
finances, high technological risk, and absence of relevant good examples were 
seen as the most important. 
Proposition PM1 was accepted as factors (including goals) influencing the 
innovation process in public sector services differ from the ones we know from 
the private sector. Competitiveness and service cost, which are important 
innovation drivers in the private sector, were both among the least important 
innovation goals rated by the respondents. 
The research gave mixed results for proposition PM2 that innovation goals 
in the public sector are polarised. Although the responding organisations had 
many different innovation goals, cumulatively, the major ones are clearly drawn 
out: improvements in service quality, going online, responding to user needs, 
and improving the take-up of the service. 
We rejected proposition PM3 that the success of technological innovations 
in public sector services is below the initial expectations. Compared to the 
initial expectations, 30 per cent rated their innovation results as excellent and 60 
per cent as good, meaning that as many as 90 per cent of respondents consider 
their innovations as successes (indeed, we have to admit that it was a best practice 
research, which might have an impact on this type of success questions). 
We rejected proposition PM4, stating that innovation supporters in the public 
sector can be internal to the organisation and external. Internal supporting 
factors were statistically significantly more important than the external ones, i.e. 
organisational issues are more important when the external influence in 
boosting the innovation process. 
In terms of hampering factors, it was the opposite (with smaller differences 
only); internal barriers were statistically significantly less important than the 
external ones, rejecting both proposition PM5 that innovation barriers in the 
public sector are predominantly internal to the organisation, as well as the views 
of Vigoda-Gadot et al. (2005), who found that barriers to innovation in the 
public sector are mostly internal. 
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Across countries, the result supported proposition PM6 that personal 
leadership (i.e. the existence of ʻkey’ individuals) is the internally dominating 
factor supporting innovation in public sector services, followed by top 
management commitment and support, and open-minded managers. These 
results support the basic statements of the literature emphasising the importance 
of innovation champions (see Drucker, 1985; Rothwell, 1992, Tidd et al., 2001, 
Koch and Hauknes, 2005). However, we have to acknowledge that mostly 
project leaders themselves filled in the questionnaires in our survey, probably 
having a positive effect in favouring personal leadership issues. 
In answering sub-research question SRQ2, which managerial and organisa-
tional improvements were necessary to innovate in public sector services, our 
empirical findings supported the literature that the cumulative accumulation of 
knowledge and skills is crucial for the innovation process. We accepted the 
respective proposition PL1; organisations in the survey improved several intra-
organisational capabilities in order to innovate, e.g. technological knowledge 69 
per cent, project management skills 64 per cent, general management skills 34 
per cent, organisational structure 28 per cent, and motivation system of 
personnel 15 per cent. Only 6 per cent reported not having any internal capa-
bility improvements to innovate. 
Research generally supported the proposition that external learning and 
consultation plays a positive role in successful public service innovations (PL2), 
stressing that not all the new ideas are generated inside the focal organisation; 
some are generated externally but are adopted by the organisation. However, 
our research showed that it could be only partly accepted. Organisations in the 
survey did obtain external capabilities in order to innovate. However, the 
capabilities were too much towards one type of knowledge – namely 81 per cent 
of them obtained external technological advice/support. Other improved factors 
were too minor for fully accepting the proposition (e.g. 21 per cent for project 
management skills; 11 per cent for managerial advice and support; 5 per cent 
for human resource management (HMR) advice or support). 
From another learning angle, our research result proved that innovation-
related learning in public sector services can result equally from the previous 
positive and negative experience, internally and externally (PL3). Overall, 53 
per cent of responding organisations had previous positive experience with 
similar innovations; only 11 per cent of the respondents reported having 
previous negative experience. As much as 45 per cent of the responding 
organisations had no previous experience, positive or negative, with similar 
innovations. The research also showed that learning from the previous positive 
experience seemingly dominates any learning from the previous negative 
experience. Moreover, organisations are slightly more likely to learn from 
others than from their own previous experience: 43 per cent for the former and 
39 per cent for the latter in terms of positive experience, 23 per cent and 21 per 
cent respectively from previous negative experience. 
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Under sub-research question SRQ3, our study-results supported proposition 
PT1 that technological knowledge is the major element improved internally and 
obtained externally in the development process of public service innovations. 
The results showed that the most important intra-organisational capability 
improved by the innovating organisations was technological knowledge (69 per 
cent of respondents). Technological advice and support, moreover, was the 
single most important externally obtained capability for innovation (81 per cent 
of respondents). Even if the purpose of our research was not to study 
organisational success, the results are somewhat contrary to the experiences of 
Damanpour et al. (2009), who found that organisational success in the UK 
public service organisations does not follow a technological trajectory and 
depends on the adoption of both technological and non-technological inno-
vations. Their analysis provided empirical evidence for this view and demon-
strated that the co-adoption of service, technological process, and administrative 
process innovations influence organisational performance in public service 
organisations. 
The results also show that the role of technology in today’s public sector is 
becoming integrated with other managerial processes, indeed, being still a 
strong determinant for subsequent innovation as stated by Koch and Haukens 
(2005), therefore we only partly accept the respective proposition PT2 (stating 
that the role of technology in the today’s public sector is integrated with other 
managerial processes). The research results showed also some evidence that 
classical ʻtechnology push’ (which we mainly know from early private sector 
innovation literature) does not work in the case of public service innovations. 
Although external cooperation does not automatically mean technology push, 
the study results showed that only 8 per cent of service innovations in the public 
sector are fully developed externally; 24 per cent are developed only internally; 
and as much as 69 per cent are developed in cooperation of the organisation and 
its external partners. This means that the active or passive lobby of technology 
developers and/or providers is not too strong in the case of public service 
organisations (at least, comparing it to the alternatives, market-pull or demand-
pull (see Martin, 1994). However, the fact that as much as 81 per cent of 
innovators obtained external technological advice and support, indeed, tends to 
question proposition PT3 that classical ʻtechnology push’ does not work in 
public service innovation processes. Therefore, we only partly accepted this 
proposition. 
Our research supported proposition PT4 that technological risk is among the 
most important external hampering factors in public service innovation 
processes. It was the second most important external hampering factor, after 
lack of finances, followed by the absence of relevant good examples, high 
political/reputation risk, weak cooperation with partners and digital divide. 
Moreover, as an innovation supportive factor, low technological risk was the 
third least important factor externally. 
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Sub-research question SRQ4 asked what does the composition and dynamics 
of public sector (service) innovation system look like across countries. Both the 
theoretical foundations and our research results supported the respective 
proposition PS1 that the innovation process in the public services is a systemic 
phenomenon, and that it should therefore be analysed and managed within a 
broader perspective of the innovation system. In our survey, the context of the 
ʻpublic service innovation system’ included the organisational environment, 
learning environment and external environment. The tendency towards external 
cooperation in innovation development showed us that the public service 
innovation process happens within the broader innovation system framework. 
From the provision perspective, less than half of the innovative services were 
provided directly by public entities, followed by public and private entities in 
cooperation. We also claimed that systems advantages are not fully utilised as 
innovations appear chaotically in public sector services and are mostly 
institution, key leader or service-centric. Therefore, without understanding and 
properly managing this dynamic innovation system, innovation remains an ad 
hoc process in public administration (which it also tends to be in at least half of 
the best practice case organisations of this research). To make innovativeness a 
reality, both governments and public organisations should have a long-term 
strategy in which innovation plays a key role. Continued innovation, 
knowledgeable risk-taking and wise piloting should be systematically integrated 
into all levels administration, management and citizen service. It is also 
important that (service) innovations take place across organisational borders and 
areas of governance, resulting not just in more technology-intense services, but 
also in new business/governance models. Continuously raising budgetary 
pressure in most of the European countries requires them to innovate not just 
with their services, but with broader welfare and governance models, which is 
much more challenging job to do. 
Proposition PS2 stating that the nature of public service innovations depends 
on different determinants was only partly accepted. From a country perspective, 
our research results proved that there are many statistically significant 
differences across countries and we therefore accepted sub-proposition PS2.3 
that the nature of public service innovations depends on the country they are 
from. Indeed, our empirical evidence showed that there were very few statisti-
cally significant differences comparing innovation goals, internal and external 
innovation supporting as well as hampering factors by the field of innovation, 
rejecting the respective sub-proposition PS2.1. We also rejected the literature 
driven sub-proposition PS2.2 stating that the nature of public service 
innovations depends on the type they are; the univariate analysis of variance 
performed did not show any statistically significant differences between dif-
ferent innovation types. 
Research proposition PS3, which stated that public policy effects (in their 
wider sense) on technological innovation in public sector services are multi-
factorial and weight differently depending on the activity, was overall accepted. 
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Indeed, our research results showed that contrary to initial expectations, only 
21 per cent of innovations required changes in laws and regulations, rejecting 
the respective sub-proposition PS3.1 that innovation in the public sector 
requires changes in laws and regulations. Indeed, conversely the majority of 
organisations (65 per cent) reported the impact of public policy (in its narrow 
sense; laws and regulations excluded) on their innovations, being most 
influential in the UK (80 per cent of respondents), followed by Finland (65 per 
cent), Estonia (50 per cent) and Denmark (39 per cent). The importance of 
public policy contributions also emerges from the question on external factors 
supporting innovation, where it was the fourth most important. These findings 
supported sub-proposition PS3.2, claiming that innovation in the public sector 
requires contribution from public policy. These two sub-propositions together 
show that policies (in their narrow sense), and laws and regulations have a 
different impact on technological innovations in public sector services, where 
policies are much more important. Indeed, one should be careful in underesti-
mating the role of laws and regulations; our research was a best practice 
research and non-existing cases might non-exist exactly because of a disruptive 
legal and regulatory environment. 
Finally, proposition PS4 proposing that the main characteristics and driving 
forces of the public service innovation system do not differ across countries was 
rejected. As said earlier, compared to the innovation field and innovation type, 
country was the strongest determinant (in terms of statistically significant 
differences). Indeed, the survey has shown that from the external factors 
perspective, public service innovation systems look relatively similar across 
countries. The variations are much larger within the organisations as well as in 
their learning environments and innovation goals. For more detailed results, see 
the respective empirical chapters, or the synthesis chapter seven above. 
 
Implications for the literature and the methodology 
This experimental research relied on a unique combination of literature, 
supporting and framing a possible structure of the public service innovation 
system framework and the empirical survey of the thesis. The thesis has used 
the contributions from several streams of literature, including the relatively 
young and fragmented literature of innovation in the public sector, grounding 
partly on decades-long knowledge of innovation in the private sector, partly 
flourishing from modernisation and transformation waves of public bureau-
cracies. This was followed by the development of the public service innovation 
system concept with respective theoretical foundations from four different 
perspectives: managerial, learning, technological and systems perspective. From 
the methodological and empirical angle, the thesis has analysed the few existing 
empirical works on innovation in the public sector (some of them conducted 
after the original survey of the present research in 2005). The aim of this sub-
chapter is to contribute to these streams of literature, what we have been 
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discovering and learning during this research. An important chapter to follow in 
this respect is also the previous synthesis chapter (chapter seven). 
This thesis contributes to innovation and organisational literature, to eco-
nomic theory and organisational theory, as well as to public administration and 
political science. There are two important shortages of public service innovation 
research this thesis contributes the most in public sector/service innovation 
research as well as government modernisation literature. Firstly, it develops a 
theoretical framework (including the literature review) of how to understand 
and study innovation in the public sector, and it sets up a unique set of public 
service innovations cases from four different countries. Secondly, the 
exploratory research itself: the methodology, the survey, the database and the 
analysis. The theoretical and methodological shortages this thesis contributes to 
are emphasised by authors such as Osborne and Brown (2005) and Mulgan et 
al. (2008). The general understanding has been that there is a lack of good 
empirical evidence about innovation in public service organisations and of a 
solid framework by which to analyse it. Authors state that the case of innovative 
capacity of public organisations is under-researched and the literature is full of 
normative assertions and/or pejorative arguments, but little empirical work. 
Mulgan et al. also stressed that they found no major datasets or long-term 
analyses, and few signs of interest from large foundations or academic research 
funding bodies on this topic. This thesis helps to overcome some of these 
theoretical, methodological and empirical shortages. 
Indeed from the public sector angle, the research also contributes to wider 
innovation theory, which is not a formal and established theory as such, but an 
amalgam of various disciplines such as economics, management, organisational 
psychology, cognitive theory and systems theory (Røste, 2005). We have 
brought the public sector innovation perspective into historically private sector 
dominated evolutionary theories (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Nelson, 1987, 
1995). The research showed that from the innovation perspective, the public 
sector differs to some extent from what we know from the private sector. On the 
one hand, the research has opened up a potential list of key arguments, 
assessing their relative importance, of why innovation in the public sector takes 
place overall. The research showed that competitiveness and service cost, which 
are typically important innovation drivers in the private sector, were both 
among the least important innovation goals rated by public sector innovators. 
Therefore, the common theoretical concerns are valid that publicly controlled 
organisations are not subject to the discipline of the competitive market; they 
may lack incentives to control costs or provide quality of service and respond to 
the needs of consumers (Grout et al., 2003). In addition, they have a wide 
stakeholder base, and abstract and wide social values and goals such as safer 
streets, better public health and educational levels. 
On the other hand and from the organisational theory, public administration 
and political science perspective, compared to the private sector, the innovation 
process in the public sector is hectic and not a routine process. While in the 
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modern private sector, innovation, product and process design and R&D are 
often institutionalised (they are part of the strategy, organisations have R&D 
units, R&D/strategy board members, even Chief  Innovation Officers (CIOs), 
etc.), in the public sector innovation mostly relies on certain key individuals 
who are enthusiastic, knowledgeable and often self motivated to execute a 
particular innovation project. The industrial innovation literature knows these 
people also as product champions (Schon, 1963) or technological gatekeepers 
(Allen, 1986). Public sector management and innovation literature talks more 
about public entrepreneurship (Kingdon, 1984; Osborne and Brown, 2005; 
Osborne and Gaebler, 1992; Polsby, 1984; Roberts and King, 1989; Schon, 
1971; Teofilovic, 2002; van Mierlo, 1995). Radošević (2006), however, stresses 
that systematic aspects of public entrepreneurship as a policy challenge need 
deeper understanding. He suggests doing a series of case studies of entre-
preneurial and systems of innovation functions aimed at developing empirically 
based taxonomies for the public sector. This research provided its contribution 
in this respect. 
The research proved that innovation in the public sector is ʻpeople centred’, 
also supporting the views of Rubenstein et al., (1976), according to whom 
organisations do not make development projects successful, but individuals do. 
Indeed, we have to acknowledge that persons directly related to the develop-
ment and implementation of the surveyed innovation filled in the question-
naires, which might have slightly influenced the results towards the importance 
of such key individuals. However, the research also showed that across 
countries it is not enough to have only public entrepreneurs to execute success-
ful innovation projects. Top management commitment and support, and open-
minded managers followed personal leadership as an internally dominating 
factor supporting innovation in the survey. Based on this empirical evidence we 
suggested using ʻthe Troika-model of teamwork for innovation’ [developed by 
Hauschildt and Kirchmann (2001) based on the original work of Witte (1973) 
and Chakrabarti and Hauschildt (1989)] to raise the number and success 
probability of public service innovations of a particular organisation. The model 
helps to integrate strategic project level functions with the managerial context, 
widening the perspective of the project manager as a ʻprocess promotor’ (also 
project champion, promotor by organisational know-how) and bringing in the 
roles of ʻtechnology promotor’ (also expert, inventor, promotor by techno-
logical know-how) and ʻpower promotor’ (also sponsor, innovator, promotor by 
hierarchical power). 
The research also contributed to the literature related to organisational 
learning (see Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; Cowan et al., 2000; Dosi, 1997; 
Lundvall, 1992, 1993; Lundvall and Johnson, 1994; Metcalfe, 1998; Nelson, 
1995; Teece et al., 1997; Winter, 1984). The research proved that innovation-
related learning in public sector services can result equally from the previous 
positive and negative experience, internally and externally (however, there are 
certain country differences, see discussion earlier). What is interesting here is 
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that based on the empirical evidence, the dynamic capabilities (see Teece et al., 
1997) as well as absorptive capacity (see Cohen and Levinthal, 1990 and Lane 
et al., 2006) of innovating public service organisations are heavily (and perhaps 
too much) inclined to technological aspects (as elaborated earlier). This over-
technocratic behaviour of public innovators allows them to bring ʻyesterday’s ’ 
routine services to the Internet; however, governments need much more in order 
to cope with twenty-first century problems. We know from the private sector 
that most innovation processes start within companies trying to solve certain 
problems (Røste, 2005), however in public services, as the present research 
showed, the largest innovation goal has been going online with a service to 
respond to the user needs.48 Therefore, we suggest more out-of-the-box thinking 
and contextual problem definition while innovating in the public sector. 
Governments should develop internal capacities and external connections, 
partnerships, citizen linkages and learning environments in a way that brings 
them closer to fundamental problem designs and cross-functional, cross-
organisational and cross-sectoral solutions. Using collective learning tools (such 
as foresight and scenarios, citizen panels and pilot projects, but also so-called 
design thinking) to reach deeper/get closer to the fundamental problems could 
be helpful in developing totally new governance, organisation and working 
models, systems and interfaces, or service products – be it in healthcare and 
prevention, social affairs, education, business development or public adminis-
tration and state management itself. 
We know from the literature that innovation in the private sector mostly 
takes place in a system consisting of individuals, firms and institutions, and 
within a certain cultural and regulatory framework (Carlsson and Stankiewicz, 
1993; Freeman, 1987; Goldsmith and Eggers, 2004; Edquist, 1997b; Enzing and 
Kern, 1999; Lundvall, 1992; Malerba, 2002a, b, c; Nelson and Rosenberg, 
1993; OECD, 1997). The empirical findings of this thesis help us to understand 
what the layout and the forces of public service innovation system look like, as 
well as to see how the latter differs across four different countries (see earlier 
discussions and chapter 7). 
The public service innovation system seems to be a dynamic environment in 
which public service organisations innovate. The system consists of three 
layers: the external environment (mostly external forces), the learning environ-
ment (partnerships and possibilities) and the organisation (structure, culture, 
management and leadership). The more we want to reach a truly networked 
                                                                          
48  The normative literature considers technology in government mainly related to e-
government activities in a number of stages (Irani, 2006), see for example Gartner Group, 
2000; Howard, 2001; Chandler et al., 2002; Layne et al., 2001; United Nations DPEPA, 
2002; Silcock, 2001; Rambøll, 2004; Capgemini, 2006; Windley, 2002; Atallah, 2001; 
OECD 2004a; UNO, 2003; UNPAN, 2006). These frameworks tend to have three to five 
stages, starting from simple online presence of an organisation (i.e. posting of basic 
information) up to seamless or fully integrated web presence of government services (i.e. 
integrated services, data sharing, common platforms). 
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government (see Goldsmith et al., 2004), the more seamless, integrated and 
effective the public service innovation system should be. According to 
Goldsmith, governing by network represents the synthesis of four large trends – 
combining the high level of public-private collaboration characteristics of third-
party government with the robust network management capabilities of joined-up 
government, and then using technology to connect the network together and 
give citizens more choices in service delivery options. Therefore, we strongly 
suggest that any future public service or sector innovation study to be made 
should be done in a wider context to really understand the reasonability and 
effectiveness of certain type of innovations, developments, improvements, and 
modernisations in government. The experiences from the current research show 
that relatively innovative public service organisations do exist. However, their 
innovativeness tends to be ad hoc, not too systematic, and often relatively 
simple with questionable effects on larger structural changes. Generally 
speaking, today’s governments are long away from being ready to really 
upgrade themselves – to rethink of how they lead, structure and manage their 
countries to respond twenty-first century challenges, furthermore, to take 
advantages of those. The technologies are there, but leaders and organisations 
not yet. This proves the validity of the statement of Bason (2010: 8) that “public 
leaders must find better ways to institutionalise innovation, setting up structures 
and processes and building the capacity that effectively embedded innovation as 
a core activity in the organisations they run.” 
 
Implications for policy makers and public service managers 
As the world is changing and governments are more and more challenged, to 
understand how the public sector innovation happens, what is the environment 
and what are factors influencing it, becomes a crucial topic for future 
discussions among politicians, policy makers and public service managers. The 
empirical findings of this thesis can facilitate this discussion and be helpful in 
making governments more systematic in their innovation management. Until 
now, the topic of governments innovating has been under researched with little 
empirical work done in this field, and this research has given its contribution in 
this respect. 
The research suggests that innovation in public services takes place in a 
system frame, which can be labelled the public service innovation system, 
consisting of the external environment, the learning environment and the 
organisation (see also earlier discussions). Within these environments, there are 
different factors which influence the innovation process, both positively and 
negatively, within the organisation and externally. The evidence also shows that 
innovations in government tend to be ad hoc initiatives, which rely too much on 
certain key individuals who believe in them and are executing them. Inno-
vations also tend to be too technocratic, i.e. instead of elaborating new cross-
institutional and cross-functional governance models, public sector organisations 
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are increasingly trying to put their offline services online. Compared to the 
private sector, the public sector lacks institutionalisation in their innovation 
activities. With some exemptions, it is hard to find any permanent innovation 
structures or teams in governmental institutions, dedicated to a continued 
review of challenges and responsible for quick, creative and effective responses. 
Therefore, even more than in the private sector, innovation in government needs 
high level leadership and encouragement, where the Chief Innovation Officer 
should be the Prime Minister. This is because governments lack common 
innovation motivators, such as competitiveness and competition in the private 
sector, and that bureaucratic and regulated structures are usually unwilling to 
change, moreover, often psychologically, financially or politically punished in 
case of failure. The previous sub-chapter suggested following the Troika model 
to make innovation processes more active and successful in the public sector. 
According to this, project managers should act as process promotors, who are 
supported and backed by technology promotors from the knowledge side and 
power promotors from the (top) management side. 
If the existence and success of innovations in the public sector is relying so 
much on certain key individuals as the research shows, then there are two 
crucial questions governments should carefully address: firstly, where and how 
are these public entrepreneurs prepared (educated), and secondly, how to utilise 
them effectively once they are employed in the public sector. Indeed, civil 
servants are predominantly seen, developed and motivated as administrators and 
stability holders, and not as entrepreneurs, innovators and change managers. 
Surely, public sector institutions cannot be flexible like start-up companies are, 
however, the spiritual climate should be there to encourage innovative thinking 
and allow bright people and small teams to emerge and experiment with certain 
services or governance practices. To make this innovation process more cross-
functional and cross-organisational, and to isolate it from daily administration 
functions, we suggest using so-called task forces. Originally introduced by 
military, these temporary or permanent and mission oriented, often multi-
disciplinary teams study a particular challenge (which often involves respon-
sibility areas of several ministries, or even the private and non-for-profit 
sectors) and provide appropriate, creative and effective solutions. There are 
good examples where task forces have been in introduced in today’s more 
advanced and strategically agile49 governments; Singapore being the most 
famous example of how to make them an organic part of the governance system. 
                                                                          
49  Strategic agility is a term coined by Doz and Kosonen (2008). Strategically agile 
companies not only learn to make fast turns and transform themselves without losing 
momentum but their CEOs and top teams also have higher ambitions: to make their 
companies permanently, regularly, able to take advantages of change and disruption. They 
want their organisations to learn to thrive on continues waves of change, not to periodically 
and painfully adjust to change. Strategic agility requires strategic sensitivity, collective 
commitments and resource fluidity – allowing CEOs and their management teams to 
perceive early, decide quickly, and strike with strength and speed. 
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The research evidence showed that supportive policies have a positive effect 
in public service innovations, being the fourth most important external 
innovation supporting factor. Moreover, 65 per cent of responding organisations 
had an impact from public policies while innovating; at the same time only 
21 per cent of them reported that their innovation required changes in laws and 
regulations. Based on that knowledge, we suggest, that similarly to the so-called 
ʻthird generation innovation policy’ (see European Commission, 2002), which 
is meant to place innovation at the heart of each policy area, the innovation-
minded thinking should be encouraged also across and within different govern-
mental bodies, agencies, activities and government-focused policies. Therefore, 
innovation within government should be made more important policy goal in 
itself, deserving perhaps its own policy documents like ʻinnovation policy for 
government’ and related national execution plans. Public sector innovation 
literature as well as the current research provide relevant knowledge in 
preparing these policies and plans. 
The present research also provides empirically grounded knowledge for 
leaders of public service organisations – to the power and process promotors of 
government innovation. As innovativeness is typically not something formally 
required or directed by legal acts or regulations, then this informal role of heads 
and managers of different government bodies, agencies and units is extremely 
important. The research showed that top management commitment and support, 
as well as open-minded managers are equally the second most important 
internal innovation supporting factors, following only the existence and 
personal leadership of key individuals. Moreover, being attractive as an organi-
sation to these entrepreneurial key individuals (whose personality is often 
different from typical administrators) and using their contributions effectively is 
also the managers’ job to secure. 
The key to success also relies on partnerships. Innovators in the sample of 
the present research show that good knowledge of existing technologies 
together with good cooperation with technology suppliers are essential to 
success. These are followed by close cooperation with future user and user 
groups (i.e. citizen engagement) as an important internal innovation supporting 
factor. 
Good innovators are also learning organisations. Evidence from the research 
shows that the cumulative accumulation of knowledge and skills is crucial for 
the innovation process. This innovation-related organisational learning is multi-
factorial – organisations in the survey improved several intra-organisational 
capabilities in order to innovate (e.g. technological knowledge, project manage-
ment skills, general management skills, organisational structure, and the 
personnel motivation system). Innovators are also learning from their own 
previous innovations and from external experiences, both from successes and 
failures. Therefore, developing and sustaining cross-functional learning environ-
ments and partnerships is crucial for being a successful innovator in the public 
sector. Moreover, the public service organisation managers are encouraged to 
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extend their external learning practices beyond purely technology-related 
knowledge, especially if they want to act as real government leaders (see 
Mahbubani, 2011b and sub-chapter 1.1) in a more transformational and value 
adding sense. 
 
Boundaries and limitations of the research 
The results of the thesis, i.e. the nature of proposed public service innovation 
system framework and the factors influencing the innovation process in public 
sector services (predominantly IT and e-services, see annex 9) could be 
extended to some extent to a wider context of governments innovating, indeed 
these generalisations have their boundaries. Therefore, the author takes full 
responsibility for the results of this exercise and the results surely do not answer 
all of the questions one might have related to the topic of governments and 
public bureaucracies innovating. 
There are certainly limits of the nature and scope of the research findings, 
which need to be taken into account when interpreting and using the results. It is 
an exploratory case study research carried out in a certain time frame, with 
limited human and financial resources, and it is limited to four countries. 
From another perspective, case studies typically rely on descriptive 
information provided by different people and this leaves room for important 
details to be left out. Moreover, much of the information collected is retro-
spective data, recollections of past events, and is therefore subject to the 
problems inherent to memory and attribution bias (Dougherty, 1992). Also, the 
survey did not captured innovation processes over time, as well as it did not 
focus on overall innovation performance particular organisations but on 
concrete innovation projects (see annex 9). 
Case studies also often involve only a few people and therefore may not be 
representative of the general group or population. Indeed, among the discovered 
public service innovations in four countries, the survey was carried out as a total 
survey, eliminating the typical sampling problem. Therefore, the research 
methods used have their limitations, which to some extent are solvable and on 
the other hand can be considered as natural side effects of a case study research 
undertaken with the naturally limited resources of student research. 
As it is an exploratory study, one could challenge the definition of the unit of 
analysis, case identification logic and methods, and the representativeness of the 
survey sample as well as how well the sample was spread. Related to that, the 
choice of respondents within the sample can also be challenged, although we 
have pointed out the project manager bias several times. Indeed, asking not just 
the project managers, but also those further up or further down the decision-
making chain, would have affected the outcomes. 
There are challenges related to the fact that this is a best practice research by 
its nature and experience has shown this method having certain limitations such 
as selectivity, sustainability and comparability (Borins, 2001b; Lynn, 1996; 
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Overman and Boyd, 1994). Additionally, as the research did not include inno-
vation failures or non-existing innovation (from the perspective of innovation 
diffusion for example), therefore the usage of the dataset was surely limited. 
Although the research question and design, as well as the sample size, 
dictated to some extent the research methods that were used, there might certainly 
be limitations in relation to that. Therefore, extra data would have provided 
opportunities to explore other methodologies – for example, multivariate 
analysis in addition to the univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA) we used. 
In terms of geography, we choose more innovative countries rather than less. 
From the perspective of the world, these four countries are fairly homogenous. 
Therefore, a question arises how transferable would the study results be to less 
innovative countries. One could surely compare public service management and 
innovation practices of highly innovative countries with non-innovative (e.g. 
developing) countries in the future, depending on his/her study interest and the 
fundamental research question to be answered. 
The purpose of the research was not to assess the impact of public sector 
innovations, nor were our plans to valuate or compare the innovativeness of the 
countries in our survey. Nor do the public sector services as a component of 
services sector represent fully the economy or society. 
Finally, there are surely methodological challenges as innovation in the 
public sector is a relatively new research area and there are only few empirical 
and some quantitative studies in this arena. Similarly, from the theoretical 
perspective, the set of literature used is also exploratory and certainly debatable. 
This leaves room for researchers to consider alternative theoretical foundations 
the future public service innovation research. 
 
Agenda for further research 
Overall, the area of public sector innovation is under-researched, especially 
from the empirical studies aspect (i.e. compared to the private sector) and the 
majority of literature in this field is still (with some exceptions) full of 
normative assertions and/or pejorative arguments with little serious empirical 
work behind them. This thesis has been a best practice research leaving both the 
failure-cases and the organisations where innovations have not happened at all 
aside. Therefore, one might consider also studying public organisations from 
the aspect of innovation failures, or the ones not innovating at all, or to compare 
successes with failures. This might be even more valuable if done in an area, 
which in reality needs fundamental upgrading and ground-breaking innovations 
– be it healthcare, social affairs or education. As the failures of large IT projects 
are relatively well studied (see for studies and elaborations: Standish Group 
International, 1995, 1996; Borins, 2001b; OECD, 2001b; United Nations, 2003; 
Heeks, 2001, 2006), then future studies should look more, for example, at 
fundamentally new governance and service models. An interesting aspect might 
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be the comparative study of issues, why some countries (e.g. Singapore), 
regions or organisations can radically innovate, but others cannot. 
As both the challenges and opportunities that different governments today face 
are cross-sectoral, cross-functional or cross-organisational (be it unemployment, 
education, business development, healthcare, etc), innovation researchers 
should focus their studies on innovations and organisational structures (e.g. task 
forces, ʻLego’ governments, etc.) in this area. Especially valuable would be 
comparative studies across nations, but also across geographical regions (e.g. 
Northern-Europe and South-East Asia). 
Public procurement also remains an important area to study from the 
perspective of successful innovations in the public sphere. These studies should 
look beyond the procurement laws, as there are examples of countries with quite 
progressive procurement regulations, however, where in reality the cost is still 
the major argument in deciding the winners. This is especially the case in 
purchasing unconventional or complex solutions with no relevant examples. 
The usage of pilot projects and related purchasing exceptions could be an 
interesting angle to look at government innovations and procurement. 
This research has shown that public entrepreneurship, i.e. the existence of 
key individuals or project champions is the key to success in public services 
innovations. Therefore, two aspects are worth studying from this perspective. 
Firstly, how systematically public sector organisations are trying to discover 
and employ these types of people, and how they are empowered and motivated 
once at work within bureaucratic structures. Secondly, what remains unclear is 
how much different public administration, political economy and public policy 
programmes at universities are tackling the issues of public entrepreneurship, as 
well as strategic leadership and technology governance. Moreover, what are the 
best practices in this respect, both in the case of university education and life-
long learning? 
Both, from the researchers’ and practitioners’ perspectives, one would also 
expect to see proper and sustainable, transdisciplinary public sector innovation 
research centres developing. As we saw from the present research, the few 
empirical exercises carried out around this growingly important topic, are ad 
hoc projects. In addition, there is also a ʻsmall production’ of predominantly 
qualitative case study reviews by some consultancy companies. Indeed, this 
chaotic and erratic production of public sector innovation knowledge does not 
make it realistic that will see significant changes in how countries are led and 
managed. Despite permanently turbulent surroundings, unsustainable state 
finances and social systems, and almost zero economic growth perspectives in 
the developed world in years to come. 
We have seen throughout the thesis that research of innovation in the public 
sector and public service organisations is in its early stages. Therefore, the 
theoretical, methodological and empirical explorations of this research can be 
used as one of the early cornerstones to build up more coherent and systematic 
approaches (frameworks) in which to understand, analyse and manage 
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innovation in the public sector. Indeed, as time goes by, it is not only public 
organisations and governments alone which need to innovate more systemati-
cally. To be successful as a nation in the long-run, governments, the third 
sector, social enterprises and the private sector should co-innovate and co-work 
as there will be fewer services (or industries, like healthcare) being purely 
public or purely private in the future. This meaning that in more successful 
countries, we will see totally new and deeper ways of public-private partner-
ships (PPPs) in the future to come. For example, as stated by Philips (Green, 
2008: 9), “The biggest industries of the 21st century will be the social 
industries.” Are they public, private or non-for-profit entities? 
Finally, the exploratory nature of the study, the case study method used in 
the survey, together with the fact that this was a best practice research by its 
nature, all have their limitations. Therefore, the full responsibility of the 
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Annex 2 – General framework statistics of cases (A) 
A1. To which field of public service does the service belong? 
Statistics 
 N A1.1 A1.2 A1.3 A1.4 A1.5 A1.6 A1.7 A1.8 
ALL 
Valid 13 7 14 13 9 8 12 5 
Missing 68 74 67 68 72 73 69 76 
UK 
Valid 2 1 3 5 1 1 2 0 
Missing 13 14 12 10 14 14 13 15 
DK 
Valid 6 2 3 0 2 0 4 1 
Missing 12 16 15 18 16 18 14 17 
FIN 
Valid 2 2 3 3 2 3 3 2 
Missing 18 18 17 17 18 17 17 18 
EST 
Valid 3 2 5 5 4 4 3 2 
Missing 25 26 23 23 24 24 25 26 
A2. Which part of your service did your innovation mainly influence? 
Statistics 
 N A2.1 A2.2 A2.3 
ALL 
Valid 22 2 57 
Missing 59 79 24 
UK 
Valid 8 2 5 
Missing 7 13 10 
DK 
Valid 4 0 14 
Missing 14 18 4 
FIN 
Valid 7 0 13 
Missing 13 20 7 
EST 
Valid 3 0 25 
Missing 25 28 3 
A3. Did your service exist before the innovation?
Statistics 
 N A3.1 A3.2 A3.3 
ALL 
Valid 19 40 21 
Missing 62 41 60 
UK 
Valid 3 7 5 
Missing 12 8 10 
DK 
Valid 2 12 3 
Missing 16 6 15 
FIN 
Valid 4 11 5 
Missing 16 9 15 
EST 
Valid 10 10 8 
Missing 18 18 20 
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A4. Where was your innovation developed? 
Statistics 
 N A4.1 A4.2 A4.3 
ALL 
Valid 19 6 55 
Missing 62 75 26 
UK 
Valid 5 0 10 
Missing 10 15 5 
DK 
Valid 3 4 10 
Missing 15 14 8 
FIN 
Valid 8 1 11 
Missing 12 19 9 
EST 
Valid 3 1 24 
Missing 25 27 4 
A5. At what level of public administration is your service provided? 
Statistics 
 N A5.1 A5.2 A5.3 A5.4 
ALL 
Valid 4 11 49 17 
Missing 77 70 32 64 
UK 
Valid 0 1 12 2 
Missing 15 14 3 13 
DK 
Valid 3 7 7 1 
Missing 15 11 11 17 
FIN 
Valid 0 1 15 4 
Missing 20 19 5 16 
EST 
Valid 1 2 15 10 
Missing 27 26 13 18 
A6. Who is providing your innovative service?
Statistics 
 N A6.1 A6.2 A6.3 A6.4 A6.5 
ALL 
Valid 33 11 31 5 1 
Missing 48 70 50 76 80 
UK 
Valid 6 1 7 1 0 
Missing 9 14 8 14 15 
DK 
Valid 7 2 6 2 1 
Missing 11 16 12 16 17 
FIN 
Valid 8 5 6 1 0 
Missing 12 15 14 19 20 
EST 
Valid 12 3 12 1 0 




Annex 3 – General framework statistics of cases (G) 
G1. Did the innovation require any changes in laws and regulations? 
Statistics 
 N G1.1 G1.2 G1.3 
ALL 
Valid 4 13 63 
Missing 77 68 18 
UK 
Valid 1 0 14 
Missing 14 15 1 
DK 
Valid 0 3 14 
Missing 18 15 4 
FIN 
Valid 0 2 18 
Missing 20 18 2 
EST 
Valid 3 8 17 
Missing 25 20 11 
G2. Was your innovation motivated or influenced by written/codified public policy? 
Statistics 
 N G2.1 G2.2 G2.3 G2.4 
ALL 
Valid 6 46 10 28 
Missing 75 35 71 53 
UK 
Valid 0 12 0 3 
Missing 15 3 15 12 
DK 
Valid 3 7 3 7 
Missing 15 11 15 11 
FIN 
Valid 2 13 2 5 
Missing 18 7 18 15 
EST 
Valid 1 14 5 13 
Missing 27 14 23 15 
G3. Does the usage of your innovation require legally valid authorisation of the user? 
Statistics 
 N G3.1 G3.2 
ALL 
Valid 26 54 
Missing 55 27 
UK 
Valid 2 13 
Missing 13 2 
DK 
Valid 7 10 
Missing 11 8 
FIN 
Valid 4 16 
Missing 16 4 
EST 
Valid 13 15 
Missing 15 13 
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G4. Which methods do you use for the authorisation of the user? 
Statistics 
 N G4.1 G4.2 G4.3 G4.4 G4.5 
ALL 
Valid 23 11 22 16 31 
Missing 58 70 59 65 50 
UK 
Valid 0 1 8 2 7 
Missing 15 14 7 13 8 
DK 
Valid 1 0 4 5 5 
Missing 17 18 14 13 13 
FIN 
Valid 6 3 2 4 11 
Missing 14 17 18 16 9 
EST 
Valid 16 7 8 5 8 
Missing 12 21 20 23 20 
G5. Which sources were used to finance the development of your innovation? 
Statistics 
 N G5.1 G5.2 G5.3 G5.4 G5.5 G5.6 
ALL 
Valid 40 18 1 27 11 9 
Missing 41 63 80 54 70 72 
UK 
Valid 8 1 1 4 0 2 
Missing 7 14 14 11 15 13 
DK 
Valid 4 6 0 11 2 0 
Missing 14 12 18 7 16 18 
FIN 
Valid 12 4 0 8 2 2 
Missing 8 16 20 12 18 18 
EST 
Valid 16 7 0 4 7 5 
Missing 12 21 28 24 21 23 
G6. Which methods were used to market your new innovative service? 
Statistics 
 N G6.1 G6.2 G6.3 G6.4 G6.5 
ALL 
Valid 63 53 45 10 6 
Missing 18 28 36 71 75 
UK 
Valid 12 11 6 0 2 
Missing 3 4 9 15 13 
DK 
Valid 14 11 10 2 0 
Missing 4 7 8 16 18 
FIN 
Valid 19 13 15 3 1 
Missing 1 7 5 17 19 
EST 
Valid 18 18 14 5 3 
Missing 10 10 14 23 25 
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G7. Has the success of your innovation been measured?  
Statistics 
 N G7.1 G7.2 G7.3 G7.4 G7.5 
ALL 
Valid 42 31 27 15 11 
Missing 39 50 54 66 70 
UK 
Valid 10 9 6 1 1 
Missing 5 6 9 14 14 
DK 
Valid 10 6 6 3 1 
Missing 8 12 12 15 17 
FIN 
Valid 10 9 8 9 1 
Missing 10 11 12 11 19 
EST 
Valid 12 7 7 2 8 
Missing 16 21 21 26 20 
G8. In terms of initial expectation, how do you rate the current results of your 
innovation? 
Statistics 
 N G8.1 G8.2 G8.3 G8.4 
ALL 
Valid 24 49 5 1 
Missing 57 32 76 80 
UK 
Valid 7 6 1 0 
Missing 8 9 14 15 
DK 
Valid 5 12 0 0 
Missing 13 6 18 18 
FIN 
Valid 7 13 0 0 
Missing 13 7 20 20 
EST 
Valid 5 18 4 1 
Missing 23 10 24 27 
H. Length of innovation development (months). 
Statistics 
N ALL UK DK FIN EST 
Valid 73 14 14 19 26 
Missing 8 1 4 1 2 
Mean 17.37 19.29 20.00 17.26 15.00 
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H2. Starting year of developing the innovation. 
 





 1994 1 1.2 1.3 1.3 
 1995 1 1.2 1.3 2.6 
 1996 4 4.9 5.3 7.9 
 1997 1 1.2 1.3 9.2 
 1998 3 3.7 3.9 13.2 
 1999 5 6.2 6.6 19.7 
 2000 18 22.2 23.7 43.4 
 2001 12 14.8 15.8 59.2 
 2002 14 17.3 18.4 77.6 
 2003 14 17.3 18.4 96.1 
 2004 3 3.7 3.9 100.0 
 Total 76 93.8 100.0  
Missing System 5 6.2   
Total  81 100.0   
 





 1994     
 1995     
 1996     
 1997     
 1998 1 6.7 7.1 7.1 
 1999 1 6.7 7.1 14.3 
 2000 4 26.7 28.6 42.9 
 2001     
 2002 2 13.3 14.3 57.1 
 2003 5 33.3 35.7 92.9 
 2004 1 6.7 7.1 100.0 
 Total 14 93.3 100.0  
Missing System 1 6.7   








 1994 1 5.6 6.3 6.3 
 1995     
 1996     
 1997     
 1998     
 1999 1 5.6 6.3 12.5 
 2000 1 5.6 6.3 18.8 
 2001 8 44.4 50.0 68.8 
 2002 5 27.8 31.3 100.0 
 2003     
 2004     
 Total 16 88.9 100.0  
Missing System 2 11.1   
Total  18 100.0   




 1994     
 1995     
 1996 2 10.0 10.5 10.5 
 1997 1 5.0 5.3 15.8 
 1998 2 10.0 10.5 26.3 
 1999 2 10.0 10.5 36.8 
 2000 7 35.0 36.8 73.7 
 2001 1 5.0 5.3 78.9 
 2002 3 15.0 15.8 94.7 
 2003 1 5.0 5.3 100.0 
 2004     
 Total 19 95.0 100.0  
Missing System 1 5.0   
Total  20 100.0   




 1994     
 1995 1 3.6 3.7 3.7 
 1996 2 7.1 7.4 11.1 
 1997     
 1998     
 1999 1 3.6 3.7 14.8 
 2000 6 21.4 22.2 37.0 
 2001 3 10.7 11.1 48.1 
 2002 4 14.3 14.8 63.0 
 2003 8 28.6 29.6 92.6 
 2004 2 7.1 7.4 100.0 
 Total 27 96.4 100.0  
Missing System 1 3.6   
Total  28 100.0   
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H4. Number of languages the service is available. 
 





 1 39 48.1 48.8 48.8 
 2 20 24.7 25.0 73.8 
 3 19 23.5 23.8 97.5 
 5 1 1.2 1.3 98.8 
 7 1 1.2 1.3 100.0 
 Total 80 98.8 100.0  
Missing System 1 1.2   
Total  81 100.0   
 





 1 8 53.3 53.3 53.3 
 2 6 40.0 40.0 93.3 
 7 1 6.7 6.7 100.0 
 Total 15 100.0 100.0  
 





 1 16 88.9 88.9 88.9 
 2 2 11.1 11.1 100.0 
 Total 18 100.0 100.0  
 





 1 2 10.0 10.0 10.0 
 2 6 30.0 30.0 40.0 
 3 11 55.0 55.0 95.0 
 5 1 5.0 5.0 100.0 
 Total 20 100.0 100.0  
 





 1 13 46.4 48.1 48.1 
 2 6 21.4 22.2 70.4 
 3 8 28.6 29.6 100.0 
 Total 27 96.4 100.0  
Missing System 1 3.6   




Annex 4 – Organisational capabilities (B) 
B1. Which organisational capabilities did you improve internally in order to 
innovate? 
Statistics 
 N B1.1 B1.2 B1.3 B1.4 B1.5 B1.6 B1.7 
ALL 
Valid 27 51 55 22 12 3 5 
Missing 54 30 26 59 69 78 76 
UK 
Valid 6 11 11 5 1 1 1 
Missing 9 4 4 10 14 14 14 
DK 
Valid 7 13 11 7 5 1 0 
Missing 11 5 7 11 13 17 18 
FIN 
Valid 4 9 13 4 4 1 3 
Missing 16 11 7 16 16 19 17 
EST 
Valid 10 18 20 6 2 0 1 
Missing 18 10 8 22 26 28 27 
B2. Which capabilities did you obtain externally?
Statistics 
 N B2.1 B2.2 B2.3 B2.4 B2.5 B2.6 
ALL 
Valid 9 17 65 4 4 7 
Missing 72 64 16 77 77 74 
UK 
Valid 5 4 13 0 1 1 
Missing 10 11 2 15 14 14 
DK 
Valid 0 3 13 1 2 1 
Missing 18 15 5 17 16 17 
FIN 
Valid 0 5 16 0 1 3 
Missing 20 15 4 20 19 17 
EST 
Valid 4 5 23 3 0 2 
Missing 24 23 5 25 28 26 
B3. Has your organisation any previous experiences with similar innovations? 
Statistics 
 N B3.1 B3.2 B3.3 
ALL 
Valid 42 9 36 
Missing 39 72 45 
UK 
Valid 8 2 6 
Missing 7 13 9 
DK 
Valid 11 1 6 
Missing 7 17 12 
FIN 
Valid 10 4 9 
Missing 10 16 11 
EST 
Valid 13 2 15 
Missing 15 26 13 
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B4. Had you learned from the previous experiences while innovating?
Statistics 
 N B4.1 B4.2 B4.3 B4.4 B4.5 
ALL 
Valid 17 31 18 34 15 
Missing 64 50 63 47 66 
UK 
Valid 5 8 4 5 2 
Missing 10 7 11 10 13 
DK 
Valid 3 6 1 5 4 
Missing 15 12 17 13 14 
FIN 
Valid 7 9 7 11 3 
Missing 13 11 13 9 17 
EST 
Valid 2 8 6 13 6 
Missing 26 20 22 15 22 
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Annex 5 – Goals and results of innovation (C and F) 
 
Means of total sample for questions C1.1 – C1.12 (goals of innovation); F1.1 – 










77 77 76 80 77 78 78 78 75 77 79 77
4 4 5 1 4 3 3 3 6 4 2 4





C1.1 C1.2 C1.3 C1.4 C1.5 C1.6 C1.7 C1.8 C1.9 C1.10 C1.11 C1.12
Statistics
77 78 77 79 77 77 78 77 77 78 79 77
4 3 4 2 4 4 3 4 4 3 2 4





F1.1 F1.2 F1.3 F1.4 F1.5 F1.6 F1.7 F1.8 F1.9 F1.10 F1.11 F1.12



































Single most important goal (C1.14) and single most important result (F1.14) of 





Single least important goal (C1.15) and single least important result (F1.15) of 












































































































Means of the UK for questions C1.1 – C1.12 (goals of innovation); F1.1 – F1.12 












15 15 15 15 14 15 15 14 14 15 15 14
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1





C1.1 C1.2 C1.3 C1.4 C1.5 C1.6 C1.7 C1.8 C1.9 C1.10 C1.11 C1.12
Country = UKa. 
Statisticsa
15 15 15 15 14 14 15 14 14 15 15 14
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1





F1.1 F1.2 F1.3 F1.4 F1.5 F1.6 F1.7 F1.8 F1.9 F1.10 F1.11 F1.12
Country = UKa. 





































Single most important goal (C1.14) and single most important result (F1.14) of 





Single least important goal (C1.15) and single least important result (F1.15) of 
innovation in the UK 
 





















1 1 1 1
Country: UK
C1.14



























































Means of Denmark for questions C1.1 – C1.12 (goals of innovation); F1.1 – F1.12 












17 16 15 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16
1 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2





F1.1 F1.2 F1.3 F1.4 F1.5 F1.6 F1.7 F1.8 F1.9 F1.10 F1.11 F1.12
Country = DKa. 
Statisticsa
17 17 15 17 16 16 17 17 16 17 17 17
1 1 3 1 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 1





C1.1 C1.2 C1.3 C1.4 C1.5 C1.6 C1.7 C1.8 C1.9 C1.10 C1.11 C1.12
Country = DKa. 





































Single most important goal (C1.14) and single most important result (F1.14) of 





Single least important goal (C1.15) and single least important result (F1.15) of 






























































































Means of Finland for questions C1.1 – C1.12 (goals of innovation); F1.1 – F1.12 










17 19 19 20 19 19 19 20 18 18 20 19
3 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 2 2 0 1





C1.1 C1.2 C1.3 C1.4 C1.5 C1.6 C1.7 C1.8 C1.9 C1.10 C1.11 C1.12
Country = FINa. 
Statisticsa
17 19 19 20 19 19 19 20 19 19 20 19
3 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1





F1.1 F1.2 F1.3 F1.4 F1.5 F1.6 F1.7 F1.8 F1.9 F1.10 F1.11 F1.12
Country = FINa. 





































Single most important goal (C1.14) and single most important result (F1.14) of 





Single least important goal (C1.15) and single least important result (F1.15) of 




























































































Means of Estonia for questions C1.1 – C1.12 (goals of innovation); F1.1 – F1.12 












28 26 27 28 28 28 27 27 27 27 27 27
0 2 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1





C1.1 C1.2 C1.3 C1.4 C1.5 C1.6 C1.7 C1.8 C1.9 C1.10 C1.11 C1.12
Country = ESTa. 
Statisticsa
28 28 28 28 28 28 28 27 28 28 28 28
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0





F1.1 F1.2 F1.3 F1.4 F1.5 F1.6 F1.7 F1.8 F1.9 F1.10 F1.11 F1.12
Country = ESTa. 





































Single most important goal (C1.14) and single most important result (F1.14) of 





Single least important goal (C1.15) and single least important result (F1.15) of 




































































































Annex 6 – Internal and external supporting  
factors of innovation (D) 
Means of total sample for questions D1.1 – D1.13 (internal supporters of 













76 78 78 77 78 78 79 78 79 79 79 79 79
5 3 3 4 3 3 2 3 2 2 2 2 2





D1.1 D1.2 D1.3 D1.4 D1.5 D1.6 D1.7 D1.8 D1.9 D1.10 D1.11 D1.12 D1.13
Statistics
78 78 76 76 76 77 77 77 76 79 79 76
3 3 5 5 5 4 4 4 5 2 2 5





D2.1 D2.2 D2.3 D2.4 D2.5 D2.6 D2.7 D2.8 D2.9 D2.10 D2.11 D2.12



































Single most important internal supporting factor (D1.15) and single most 





Single least important internal supporting factor (D1.16) and single least 


















































































































Means of the UK for questions D1.1 – D1.13 (internal supporters of innovation); 











14 15 15 14 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0





D1.1 D1.2 D1.3 D1.4 D1.5 D1.6 D1.7 D1.8 D1.9 D1.10 D1.11 D1.12 D1.13
Country = UKa. 
Statisticsa
15 15 15 14 14 15 14 14 14 15 15 14
0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1





D2.1 D2.2 D2.3 D2.4 D2.5 D2.6 D2.7 D2.8 D2.9 D2.10 D2.11 D2.12
Country = UKa. 





































Single most important internal supporting factor (D1.15) and single most 





Single least important internal supporting factor (D1.16) and single least 


























































































Means of Denmark for questions D1.1 – D1.13 (internal supporters of innovation); 













15 16 16 16 15 16 17 16 17 17 17 17 17
3 2 2 2 3 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1





D1.1 D1.2 D1.3 D1.4 D1.5 D1.6 D1.7 D1.8 D1.9 D1.10 D1.11 D1.12 D1.13
Country = DKa. 
Statisticsa
16 16 14 15 15 15 16 16 15 17 16 15
2 2 4 3 3 3 2 2 3 1 2 3





D2.1 D2.2 D2.3 D2.4 D2.5 D2.6 D2.7 D2.8 D2.9 D2.10 D2.11 D2.12
Country = DKa. 





































Single most important internal supporting factor (D1.15) and single most 





Single least important internal supporting factor (D1.16) and single least 



























































































Means of Finland for questions D1.1 – D1.13 (internal supporters of innovation); 











19 19 19 19 20 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1





D1.1 D1.2 D1.3 D1.4 D1.5 D1.6 D1.7 D1.8 D1.9 D1.10 D1.11 D1.12 D1.13
Country = FINa. 
Statisticsa
19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 20 19
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1





D2.1 D2.2 D2.3 D2.4 D2.5 D2.6 D2.7 D2.8 D2.9 D2.10 D2.11 D2.12
Country = FINa. 





































Single most important internal supporting factor (D1.15) and single most 





Single least important internal supporting factor (D1.16) and single least 
important external supporting factor (D2.15) of innovation in Finland 
 
  
















































































Means of Estonia for questions D1.1 – D1.13 (internal supporters of innovation); 












28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0





D1.1 D1.2 D1.3 D1.4 D1.5 D1.6 D1.7 D1.8 D1.9 D1.10 D1.11 D1.12 D1.13
Country = ESTa. 
Statisticsa
28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0





D2.1 D2.2 D2.3 D2.4 D2.5 D2.6 D2.7 D2.8 D2.9 D2.10 D2.11 D2.12
Country = ESTa. 





































Single most important internal supporting factor (D1.15) and single most 





Single least important internal supporting factor (D1.16) and single least 
important external supporting factor (D2.15) of innovation in Estonia 
 





















































































Annex 7 – Internal and external hampering  
factors of innovation (E) 
 
Means of total sample for questions E1.1 – E1.14 (internal obstacles of innovation); 













74 75 73 74 72 73 74 74 74 73 74 74 74 74
7 6 8 7 9 8 7 7 7 8 7 7 7 7





E1.1 E1.2 E1.3 E1.4 E1.5 E1.6 E1.7 E1.8 E1.9 E1.10 E1.11 E1.12 E1.13 E1.14
Statistics
74 74 75 74 75 75 74 75 75 75 74 73
7 7 6 7 6 6 7 6 6 6 7 8





E2.1 E2.2 E2.3 E2.4 E2.5 E2.6 E2.7 E2.8 E2.9 E2.10 E2.11 E2.12



































Single most important internal obstacle (E1.16) and single most important external 





Single least important internal obstacle (E1.17) and single least important external 































































































































Means of the UK for questions E1.1 – E1.14 (internal obstacles of innovation); E2.1 











15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0





E1.1 E1.2 E1.3 E1.4 E1.5 E1.6 E1.7 E1.8 E1.9 E1.10 E1.11 E1.12 E1.13 E1.14
Country = UKa. 
Statisticsa
15 15 15 15 15 15 14 15 14 15 15 15
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0





E2.1 E2.2 E2.3 E2.4 E2.5 E2.6 E2.7 E2.8 E2.9 E2.10 E2.11 E2.12
Country = UKa. 





































Single most important internal obstacle (E1.16) and single most important external 





Single least important internal obstacle (E1.17) and single least important external 




















1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Country: UK
E1.16


































































Means of Denmark for questions E1.1 – E1.14 (internal obstacles of innovation); 











14 15 14 14 14 14 14 14 15 15 14 14 14 14
4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 4





E1.1 E1.2 E1.3 E1.4 E1.5 E1.6 E1.7 E1.8 E1.9 E1.10 E1.11 E1.12 E1.13 E1.14
Country = DKa. 
Statisticsa
14 14 15 14 14 14 14 14 15 15 14 14
4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 4 4





E2.1 E2.2 E2.3 E2.4 E2.5 E2.6 E2.7 E2.8 E2.9 E2.10 E2.11 E2.12
Country = DKa. 





































Single most important internal obstacle (E1.16) and single most important external 





Single least important internal obstacle (E1.17) and single least important external 
obstacle (E2.15) of innovation in Denmark 
 
 






















































































Means of Finland for questions E1.1 – E1.14 (internal obstacles of innovation); 










17 17 16 17 16 16 17 17 16 16 17 17 17 17
3 3 4 3 4 4 3 3 4 4 3 3 3 3





E1.1 E1.2 E1.3 E1.4 E1.5 E1.6 E1.7 E1.8 E1.9 E1.10 E1.11 E1.12 E1.13 E1.14
Country = FINa. 
Statisticsa
17 17 17 17 18 18 18 18 18 17 17 18
3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 2





E2.1 E2.2 E2.3 E2.4 E2.5 E2.6 E2.7 E2.8 E2.9 E2.10 E2.11 E2.12
Country = FINa. 





































Single most important internal obstacle (E1.16) and single most important external 





Single least important internal obstacle (E1.17) and single least important external 
obstacle (E2.15) of innovation in Finland 
 
 



























































































Means of Estonia for questions E1.1 – E1.14 (internal obstacles of innovation); 











28 28 28 28 27 28 28 28 28 27 28 28 28 28
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0





E1.1 E1.2 E1.3 E1.4 E1.5 E1.6 E1.7 E1.8 E1.9 E1.10 E1.11 E1.12 E1.13 E1.14
Country = ESTa. 
Statisticsa
28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 26
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2





E2.1 E2.2 E2.3 E2.4 E2.5 E2.6 E2.7 E2.8 E2.9 E2.10 E2.11 E2.12
Country = ESTa. 





































Single most important internal obstacle (E1.16) and single most important external 





Single least important internal obstacle (E1.17) and single least important external 




































































































Annex 8 – Paired Sample T-Tests 
C1 vs F1 / Goals vs Results / 
Paired Samples Statistics 





Pair 1 C1.1 3.43 77 .966 .110 
 F1.1 3.71 77 .686 .078 
Pair 2 C1.2 3.29 76 .977 .112 
 F1.2 3.21 76 .822 .094 
Pair 3 C1.3 2.72 75 1.021 .118 
 F1.3 2.85 75 .940 .109 
Pair 4 C1.4 3.48 79 .617 .069 
 F1.4 3.43 79 .634 .071 
Pair 5 C1.5 2.53 77 .995 .113 
 F1.5 2.60 77 .977 .111 
Pair 6 C1.6 3.18 77 .884 .101 
 F1.6 3.08 77 .929 .106 
Pair 7 C1.7 2.74 77 1.018 .116 
 F1.7 2.95 77 .887 .101 
Pair 8 C1.8 2.34 76 .946 .109 
 F1.8 2.42 76 .997 .114 
Pair 9 C1.9 2.24 75 .956 .110 
 F1.9 2.53 75 .977 .113 
Pair 10 C1.10 2.99 76 .841 .096 
 F1.10 2.87 76 .772 .089 
Pair 11 C1.11 3.51 77 .661 .075 
 F1.11 3.64 77 .511 .058 
Pair 12 C1.12 2.17 75 .964 .111 
 F1.12 2.75 75 .946 .109 









































–.06 .784 .089 –.24 .11 –.727 76 .469 
































–.57 .918 .106 –.78 –.36 –5.409 74 .000 
 
Paired Samples Statistics 







MEANC1 2.9264 80 .41102 .04595 
MEANF1 3.0222 80 .42521 .04754 




















–.0958 .32201 .03600 –.1674 –.0241 –2.660 79 .009 
 
D1 vs D2 / Internal motivating factors vs External motivating factors /
Paired Samples Statistics 







MEAND1 2.9524 80 .38937 .04353 
MEAND2 2.5800 80 .51041 .05707 


























E1 vs E2 / Internal hampering factors vs Internal motivating factors /
Paired Samples Statistics 







MEANE1 1.8479 75 .67496 .07794 
MEANE2 1.9578 75 .68873 .07953 




















–.1099 .34782 .04016 –.1899 –.0299 –2.736 74 .008 
 
D1E1 vs D2E2 / Internal factors vs External factors / 
Paired Samples Statistics 







MEAND1E1 2,4337 80 ,45360 ,05071 
MEAND2E2 2,3077 80 ,54265 ,06067 





















.1260 .23268 .02601 .0742 .1778 4.844 79 .000 
 
D1D2 vs E1E2 / Supporting factors vs Hampering factors /
Paired Samples Statistics 







MEAND1D2 2.7500 78 .38762 .04389 
MEANE1E2 1.9248 78 .66066 .07480 





















.8252 .62567 .07084 .6841 .9662 11.648 77 .000 
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Annex 9 – Cases identification letter and cases  





Country Case name Web address 
UK Worktrain website http://www.worktrain.co.uk 
UK Travel Advice Online http://www.fco.gov.uk/ 
UK DirectGov http://direct.gov.uk/ 
UK 




Purchasing System http://www.sci-ware.com/ 
UK 
Electronic Passport Application 
Service https://www.passport-application.gov.uk/ 
UK London Transport Portal http://www.tfl.gov.uk/ 
UK 
University/College Online 
Application Service http://www.ucas.ac.uk/ 
UK 
Practical Driving Test Online 
Booking http://www.dsa.gov.uk/ 
UK Transport Direct (response 1) http://www.transportdirect.info/ 
UK Transport Direct (response 2) http://www.transportdirect.info/ 
UK Community Legal Service Direct http://www.clsdirect.org.uk/ 
UK Jobcentre Plus http://www.jobcentreplus.gov.uk/ 
UK 
Online Purchasing Training 
Service http://www.ogc.gov.uk/ 
UK Vehicle Related Online Services http://www.dvla.gov.uk/ 
DK Electronic Shared Patient Record http://www.astmacenter.dk/ 
DK The Digital Hospital  
DK 
Journalist Centre for Analytical 
Reporting http://www.dicar.dk/ 
DK Digital County Administration http://www.nja.dk/ 
DK Visual Handicap Solutions http://www.synsinstituttet.dk/ 
DK 
Citizen Participation in Public 
Debate http://www.danmarksdebatten.dk/ 
DK 
Distant Education for Mentally 
Disabled http://www.brydisolationen.dk/ 
DK 
A Speaking Internet Portal – All 
Talking http://www.adgangforalle.dk/ 
DK 
The Healthy Shop – Individual 
Health Counselling http://www.densundecirkel.dk/ 
DK E-Procurement Service Portal https://www.gatetrade.net/ 
DK E-Tax Administration http://www.tastselv.toldskat.dk/ 
DK DK Library Union Catalogue http://bibliotek.dk/ 
DK The Active Aalborg Map http://www.aalborg.dk/ 
DK The National E-Health Portal http://www.sundhed.dk/ 
DK 
The Digital North Denmark 
Projects http://www.detdigitalenordjylland.dk/ 
DK 
Cultural Search Database of 
North Jutland http://www.noks.dk/ 
DK A Business Service Portal http://www.virk.dk/ 
DK SeniorCityDenmark http://www.senior-city.dk/ 
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FIN 
Portal of Public Sector 
Information in Finland http://www.suomi.fi/ 
FIN Public Sector Forms Online https://lomake.fi/ 
FIN 
Finnish Food Composition 
Database http://www.fineli.fi/ 
FIN 
A Guide to Citizen Influence in 
Local Gov. http://www.fineli.fi/vallakas/ 
FIN 
The Central Archive of 
Parliament and Jur. Publications http://selma.linneanet.fi/ 
FIN Online Crime Reporting http://www.poliisi.fi/ 
FIN Helsinki Region Journey Planner http://www.ytv.fi/journeyplanner/ 
FIN 
Road Weather Information Online 
Service http://www.tiehallinto.fi/alk/ 
FIN Statistics on the Web http://webstat.stat.fi 
FIN 
The Finnish Internet School for 
People Abroad http://kauko.jkl.fi/ 
FIN 
Collection of Web Education 
Materials http://www.opintoluotsi.fi/ 
FIN Internet Portal for Pensions http://www.tyoelake.fi/ 
FIN E-Tax Administration http://www.tyvi.fi/ ; http://www.vero.fi/ 
FIN 
Consumer Guide for Online 
Shopping http://www.tieke.fi/kauppa/ostoksilla/ 
FIN 
ID Card Portal, Population 
Register Centre http://www.fineid.fi/ 
FIN 
Interactive Service Promoting 
Traffic Safety & Accessibility http://www.tieliikelaitos.fi/ (KatuKanava) 
FIN 
MUISTI Research Database for 
Digi Info of Libs & Museums http://www.lib.helsinki.fi/memory/muisti.html 
FIN Notification of Move http://www.posti.fi/muuttoilmoitus/ 
FIN Window to Finland http://www.virtual.finland.fi/ 
FIN Check Your Own Details! http://www.vaestorekisterikeskus.fi/ 
EST Mobile Parking http://www.parkimine.ee/; http://www.emt.ee/ 
EST 
University/College Electronic 
Application System https://www.sais.ee/ 
EST Estonian Internet Voting System http://www.valimised.ee/ 
EST eHealth Insurance Services http://www.haigekassa.ee/eteenused/ 
EST 
Official Citizen Information 
Portal http://www.eesti.ee/ 
EST 
eState – Official State 
Information Portal http://www.riik.ee/ 
EST Official Legal Acts Online https://www.riigiteataja.ee/ 
EST WeatherPortal http://www.ilm.ee/ 
EST Check Your Own Details! 
https://portaal.riik.ee/x/kodanik/index.php?fp=
querylist 
EST Land Information System http://www.maaamet.ee/ 
EST 
Parental and Family Benefits e-
Application http://www.eesti.ee/ 
EST eUniversity Portal for eLearning http://www.e-uni.ee/ 
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EST mTartu http://www.tartu.ee/mtartu/ 
EST mLibrary of Tartu Public Library http://www.tartu.ee/mtartu/ 
EST 
Online Database of Supreme 
Court Judgements http://www.nc.ee/ 
EST TOM – eDemocracy Portal https://www.eesti.ee/tom/ 
EST Personal ID Card of Estonia http://www.id.ee/ ; http://www.pass.ee/ 
EST The National Archives Online http://ais.ra.ee/ais/ 
EST eStat Services http://www.stat.ee/ 
EST 
Hotels Online – Hotel Booking in 
Baltics http://www.balticreservations.com/ 
EST State Employment Portal http://www.amet.ee/ 
EST E-Tax Administration http://www.emta.ee/ 
EST Tallinn City – Forms Online http://www.tallinn.ee/ 
EST Estonian Securities Register https://www.e-register.ee/ 
EST 
Energy Conservation Information 
Portal http://www.kokkuhoid.energia.ee/ 
EST Web Portal of ID Card Solutions http://www.id.ee/ 
EST 
ESTER – Library Information 
System http://ester.nlib.ee 
EST Estonian Business Registry https://info.eer.ee/ 
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Annex 10 – One Sample Test – statistical differences 
between new statistical factors 

























–.12500 .20128 .02250 –.16980 –.08021 –5.555 79 .000 
Pair 
3 
isf1-isf2 –.08868 .27568 .03122 –.15084 –.02652 –2.841 77 .006 
Pair 
4 
isf1-isf3 –.19161 .26374 .02986 –.25107 –.13214 –6.416 77 .000 
Pair 
5 
isf1-isf4 –.08868 .28565 .03234 –.15308 –.02428 –2.742 77 .008 
Pair 
6 
isf2-isf3 –.10292 .22810 .02583 –.15435 –.05150 –3.985 77 .000 
Pair 
7 
isf2-isf4 –.00633 .24049 .02706 –.06019 .04754 –.234 78 .816 
Pair 
8 







































































































































Annex 11 – Means of groups of function by country 
GROUP OF FUNCTION UK Denmark Finland Estonia ALL 
countries 
Innovation goals   
 – advanced 0.6519 0.585 0.5667 0.6925 0.6306 
 – basic 0.6111 0.6601 0.575 0.5575 0.5938 
Innovation results   
 – advanced 0.585 0.51 0.55 0.657 0.5854 
 – basic 0.70 0.706 0.711 0.718 0.7104 
Internal Supporting factors   
 – ISF1 – top management 0.578 0.50 0.544 0.542 0.542 
 – ISF2 – structure and culture 0.628 0.62 0.675 0.604 0.639 
 – ISF3 – operational 
management 
0.696 0.785 0.76 0.702 0.73 
 – ISF4 – external cooperation 0.75 0.635 0.618 0.568 0.627 
Internal hampering factors   
 – IHF1 – top management 0.322 0.262 0.206 0.274 0.271 
 – IHF2 – structure and culture 0.393 0.214 0.307 0.294 0.307 
 – IHF3 – operational 
management 
0.393 0.175 0.111 0.29 0.252 
 – IHF4 – external cooperation 0.385 0.325 0.203 0.325 0.309 
External supporting factors   
 – ESF1 – policy 0.548 0.489 0.469 0.506 0.50 
 – ESF2 – users 0.762 0.611 0.807 0.637 0.692 
 – ESF3 – economy 0.393 0.289 0.219 0.375 0.326 
 – ESF4 – technology and 
partners 
0.607 0.533 0.596 0.53 0.553 
 – ESF5 – technological 
experiences 
0.464 0.389 0.456 0.476 0.456 
External hampering factors   
 – EHF1 – policy 0.289 0.31 0.206 0.345 0.294 
 – EHF2 – risks 0.422 0.373 0.203 0.349 0.333 
 – EHF3 – users and partners 0.356 0.31 0.105 0.329 0.281 
 – EHF4 – finances 0.633 0.476 0.275 0.512 0.479 
 – EHF5 – laws and regulations 0.289 0.31 0.196 0.321 0.282 
Note: ISF – internal supporting factor; IHF – internal hampering factor; ESF – external 
supporting factor; EHF – external hampering factor 
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Annex 12 – The ANOVA tests – means of dependent 
variables, determinants: country 
Question 
/ field 
Dependent variable Determinant 
(fixed factor) 




Advanced goal (G2) Country 3.681 0.016 Est>Dk 
Est>Fin 
Basic goal (G1) Country 1.297 0.282 – 
Innovation 
results 
Advanced result (R2) Country 2.750 0.048 Est>Dk 




Top management (ISF1) Country 0.268 0.848 – 
Structure and org. culture 
(ISF2) 
Country 0.703 0.553 – 
Operational management 
(ISF3) 
Country 0.872 0.459 – 




Top management (IHF1) Country 0.519 0.671 – 
Structure and org. culture 
(IHF2) 
Country 1.293 0.283 – 
Operational management 
(IHF3) 
Country 4.884 0.004 Uk>Dk 
Uk>Fin 
Est>Fin 




Policy (ESF1) Country 0.479 0.698 – 
Users (ESF2) Country 2.663 0.054 Fin>Dk 
Economy (ESF3) Country 1.895 0.138 – 
Technology and partners 
(ESF4) 
Country 0.711 0.548 – 
Technological experiences 
(ESF5) 




Policy (EHF1) Country 1.002 0.397 – 
Risks (EHF2) Country 1.533 0.213 – 
Users and partners (EHF3) Country 3.477 0.020 Uk>Fin 
Est>Fin 
Dk>Fin 
Finances (EHF4) Country 1.892 0.139 – 
Laws and regulations (EHF5) Country 0.575 0.633 – 
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Annex 13 – The ANOVA tests, means of dependent 
variables, determinant: field of innovation (A1) 
Question 
/ field 
Dependent variable Determinant 
(fixed factor) 




Advanced goal (G2) Innovation field 1.945 0.075 Does not show 
difference 
Basic goal (G1) Innovation field 0.497 0.833 – 
Innovation 
Results 
Advanced result (R2) Innovation field 0.637 0.724 – 
Basic result (R1) Innovation field 2.324 0.034 eDemocracy 







Top management (ISF1) Innovation field 0.223 0.979 – 
Structure and org. culture 
(ISF2) 
Innovation field 0.316 0.944 – 
Operational management 
(ISF3) 
Innovation field 1.575 0.157 – 
External cooperation 
(ISF4) 




Top management (IHF1) Innovation field 0.383 0.909 – 
Structure and org. culture 
(IHF2) 
Innovation field 0.909 0.505 – 
Operational management 
(IHF3) 
Innovation field 0.462 0.858 – 
External cooperation 
(IHF4) 




Policy (ESF1) Innovation field 0.518 0.818 – 
Users (ESF2) Innovation field 0.465 0.857 – 
Economy (ESF3) Innovation field 1.305 0.261 – 
Technology and partners 
(ESF4) 
Innovation field 0.961 0.466 – 
Technological 
experiences (ESF5) 




Policy (EHF1) Innovation field 1.857 0.090 Education 
services (2) > 
Business 
services (5) 
Risks (EHF2) Innovation field 0.197 0.985 – 
Users and partners 
(EHF3) 
Innovation field 0.360 0.922 – 
Finances (EHF4) Innovation field 1.051 0.405 – 
Laws and regulations 
(EHF5) 
Innovation field 1.714 0.121 – 
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Annex 14 – The ANOVA tests, means of dependent 
variables, determinant: type of innovation (A2) 
Question 
/ field 
Dependent variable Determinant 
(fixed factor) 




Advanced goal (G2) Innovation type 2.896 0.061 Does not 
show 
difference 
Basic goal (G1) Innovation type 0.106 0.899 – 
Innovation 
Results 
Advanced result (R2) Innovation type 2.573 0.083 Does not 
show 
difference 




Top management (ISF1) Innovation type 1.574 0.214 – 
Structure and org. culture 
(ISF2) 
Innovation type 0.688 0.506 – 
Operational management 
(ISF3) 
Innovation type 0.437 0.647 – 
External cooperation 
(ISF4) 




Top management (IHF1) Innovation type 1.741 0.183 – 
Structure and org. culture 
(IHF2) 
Innovation type 0.761 0.471 – 
Operational management 
(IHF3) 
Innovation type 1.778 0.176 – 
External cooperation 
(IHF4) 




Policy (ESF1) Innovation type 0.888 0.416 – 
Users (ESF2) Innovation type 2.323 0.105 – 
Economy (ESF3) Innovation type 2.475 0.091 Does not 
show 
difference 
Technology and partners 
(ESF4) 
Innovation type 1.211 0.303 – 
Technological experiences 
(ESF5) 




Policy (EHF1) Innovation type 0.387 0.680 – 
Risks (EHF2) Innovation type 1.179 0.313 – 
Users and partners (EHF3) Innovation type 1.225 0.300 – 
Finances (EHF4) Innovation type 0.003 0.997 – 
Laws and regulations 
(EHF5) 
Innovation type 0.046 0.955 – 
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SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN – KOKKUVÕTE  
Juhtimisalaste ja kontekstitegurite mõju 
innovatsioonile infotehnoloogiapõhistes avalikes 
teenustes: otsinguline uurimus neljas euroopa riigis 
Töö aktuaalsus 
Vaatamata väljakutsetele on innovatsioon avalikus sektoris pigem erand kui 
reegel. Erasektoris on uute või oluliselt parendatud toodete ja teenuste välja-
arendamine äritegevuse strateegiline osa – seda tõukavad tagant nii konkurents 
turul kui ka soov kasvatada käivet, kasumit ja turuosa. Kuivõrd sellised darvi-
nistlikud konkurentsi ja ellujäämise väljakutsed avalikus sektoris enamasti 
puuduvad, on innovatsioon riigijuhtimise või kohaliku omavalitsuse tasandil 
paremal juhul vabatahtlik tegevus. Seda seepärast, et uute algatuste, tehnoloogia 
ja eksperimenteerimisega kaasnevad erinevad riskid, mille suhtes on juht-
kondade tolerantsus piiratud. Näiteks poliitilistel kaalutlustel. Üksikisiku tasan-
dil pärsib innovatsiooniga tegelemist lisaks riskidele ka rahalise motivatsiooni 
puudumine, eeskujude vähesus, bürokraatlikus mõttes jäigad organisatsioonid ja 
rutiinist kõrvalekaldumist vältivad regulatsioonid. 
Niisiis on riikide avalikud sektorid jõudnud paradoksaalsesse olukorda. 
Ühelt poolt on majandusteadlaste seas vähe lahkarvamusi innovatsiooni olu-
lisuse kohta pikaajalises majanduskasvus (Freeman, 1994) – hinnanguliselt 
enam kui pool kaasaja majanduskasvust tuleb innovatsioonist ja uutest tead-
mistest (Helpman, 2004). Teisalt on 2007–2008. aasta globaalsele finantskriisile 
järgnenud aeg näidanud kui suutmatud on riigid kasvõi näiteks struktuursete 
reformide läbiviimisel konkurentsivõime taastamiseks, välisvõla ohjamiseks ja 
uute tasuvate töökohtade loomiseks. Euroopa olukorra teeb veelgi keerukamaks 
asjaolu, et regiooni turg ja majandus tervikuna ei kasva ning traditsioonilised 
lahendused on kas piiratud (nt ühtse rahaliidu tõttu) või puuduvad varasemas 
arsenalis sootuks (nt arusaam töö ja töökohtade loomisel post-industriaalses 
globaliseerunud maailmas). Seega on arenenud riikide avalike sektorite innovat-
sioonivõimekuse kasvatamine vältimatu – samas teadmisi selles valas napib, nii 
praktilises kui ka akadeemilises võtmes.  
Käesolev doktoritöö keskendub innovatsioonile avalikus sektoris. Püsiv majan-
duslik ebastabiilsus, riikide võlakoorem, ühiskondade vananemine, arenenud 
maailma paigalseisev majanduskasv ning püsivalt kõrge töö- ja tööjõupuudus, 
muudavad kulude kokkuhoiu avalikus sektoris vältimatuks. Samal ajal suureneb 
vajadus avalike teenuste kvaliteedi säilitamiseks ja tõstmiseks, veelgi enam aga 
radikaalsete lahenduste leidmiseks üha mitmetahulisematele probleemidele. 
Vaja on uusi arenguideid, liidreid, tõhusaid juhtimismudeleid ja võimekaid 
organisatsioone, et neile väljakutsetele vastata. Seepärast on muutunud innovat-
sioonivõimekus avalikus sektoris keskseks teemaks, riikide ning tervete piir-
kondade konkurentsivõime küsimuseks. 
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Vaatamata üsna pikale innovatsiooni uurimise traditsioonile, on valdav 
enamus sellest keskendunud erasektorile. Avaliku sektori innovatsioonile 
suunatud tööde arv hakkas näitama suurenemise märke kümnend tagasi. Samas 
vaatamata mõningasele arengule eksisteeris 2012. aastal avaliku sektori inno-
vatsiooni kohta võrreldes erasektoriga siiski üle kümne korra vähem uurimus-
töid (León et al., 2012). Avaliku sektori innovatsiooniuuringute kasvavat trendi 
kahetuhandete teisel poolel ilmestab hästi Matthews et al. (2009), kelle sõnul on 
üle poole (51.1 protsenti) 167-st akadeemilise ajakirja avaliku sektori innovat-
siooni puudutavast artiklist (monitooritud ulatusliku Thomson-Reuters aka-
deemiliste ajakirjade andmebaasi põhjal ajavahemikus 1971–2008) publit-
seeritud kolmel aastal: 2006–2008. Siia juurde lisandub valitsusasutuste, valit-
susväliste organisatsioonide ja konsultatsioonifirmade poolt koostatud mitte-
akadeemiliste (ja vähem kriitiliste) avaliku sektori innovatsiooni puudutavate 
kirjutiste ja analüüside arvu märgatav kasv (tehnilised raportid, töödokumendid, 
konsultatsiooniraportid, avaliku sektori publikatsioonid jne). Sellise nö halliks 
kirjanduseks (ingl. k. gray literature) nimetatava materjali täpset kogust ja 
juurdekasvu on tema olemuse tõttu raske numbriliselt mõõta.  
Avaliku sektori innovatsiooni uurimise vajakajäämist põhjendab kaudselt ka 
Kelman (2012), kelle sõnul on alates 1950-ndate lõpust avalik haldus (ingl. k. 
public administration) uurimisvaldkonnana eraldatud peavoolu sotsiaalteadusest 
(ingl. k. social science) ja peavoolu organisatsiooniuuringutest (ingl. k. organi-
sational studies). Viimane on Kelman’i sõnul toonud endaga kaasa nö ‘avaliku 
halduse geto’ (ingl. k. ‘the public administration ghetto’), kus liiga väike arv 
teadlasi uurib tänapäeval avalikku haldust ning sedagi liiga madala kvaliteediga.  
Vaatamata sellele, et viimasel dekaadil on siiski toimunud avaliku sektori 
innovatsiooni puudutava kirjanduse kasv, on empiiriliste uuringute osas vald-
konnas olulised puudujäägid. Osborne ja Brown (2005) sõnul on valdav osa 
kirjandusest täis normatiivseid väiteid ja/või halvustavaid argumente, mille taga 
on vähe tõsist empiirilist tööd. Samuti eksisteerib kasvav arusaam, et on suur 
puudus süstemaatilisest ja võrreldavast andmestikust, mis käsitleb innovatsiooni 
avalikus sektoris ja teenustes (Koch ja Hauknes, 2005). Olemasolevad katsed 
uurida avaliku sektori innovatsiooni on suhteliselt pealiskaudsed; vähesed 
suudavad organisatsiooni töö kirjeldamise kõrval analüüsida ja mõtestada inno-
vatsiooniprotsessi ennast (Osborne ja Brown, 2005). Sarnane situatsioon ümb-
ritseb ka sotsiaalset innovatsiooni (ingl. k. social innovation), kus Geoff 
Mulgan’i (2007) sõnul ei eksisteeri pea ühtegi olulist andmekogu või pika-
ajalist analüüsi ning samal ajal võib täheldada ka vähest akadeemilist huvi selle 
valdkonna vastu. Eeltoodu tulemusel on situatsioon avaliku sektori innovat-
siooni uurimisel ka metoodiliselt puudulik – väljakutse, millele käesolev väite-
kiri mõningast leevendust pakub ning annab loodetavasti ideid ka edasisteks 




Uurimustöö eesmärk, ülesanded ja struktuur 
Käesoleva väitekirja eesmärk on tuua välja, milline on erinevate innovatsiooni-
protsessi mõjutavate juhtimisalaste ja kontekstitegurite vastastikune olulisus 
infotehnoloogiapõhiste avalike teenuste väljaarendamisele ning kuidas see 
mõjutab avalike teenuste innovatsioonisüsteemi olemust. Uurimustöö empiiri-
line osa põhineb nelja valitud riigi – Suurbritannia, Taani, Soome ja Eesti võrd-
lusuuringul. Tegemist on ühega esimestest kvantitatiivsetest uuringutest (läbi-
viidud 2005. aastal), mis keskendub tehnoloogiliselt innovatiivsete avalike 
teenuste arendamist mõjutavate tegurite ja nende vastastikuse olulisuse hinda-
misele. Uurimustöö tulemused publitseeriti osaliselt esmakordselt 2007. aastal 
(Pärna ja von Tunzelmann, 2007). 
Doktoritöö näol on tegemist otsingulise (ingl. k. exploratory) uurimustööga, 
mis põhineb originaalsel teoreetiliste lähenemiste kombinatsioonil, unikaalsel 
metodoloogilisel lahenduskäigul ja töö raames läbi viidud riikideülesel empiiri-
lisel uuringul. Eesmärgi saavutamiseks keskendub doktoritöö nii teoreetilises 
kui ka empiirilises osas innovatsiooniteooriast lähtuvalt neljale olulisele vaatele, 
milleks on juhtimise, õppimise, tehnoloogia- ja süsteemivaade. Sellele raamis-
tikule tuginevalt on üles ehitatud nii doktoritöö ala-uurimisküsimused (ingl. k. 
sub-research questions; SRQ) kui ka töös tõestatavad/ümberlükatavad väited 
(ingl. k. propositions). Töös otsitakse vastust neljale järgnevale ala-uurimisküsi-
musele: 
 Juhtimisalane perspektiiv – millised võtmetegurid ja millisel määral 
mõjutavad, soodustavad või takistavad, tehnoloogiliselt innovatiivsete 
avalike teenuste arendamist ning kasutuselevõttu (SRQ1)? 
 Õppimise perspektiiv – millised juhtimisalased ja organisatoorsed tead-
mised ning oskused on vajalikud edukaks tehnoloogiliseks innovatsioo-
niks avalikes teenustes (SRQ2)? 
 Tehnoloogia perspektiiv – milline on tehnoloogilise teadmise olulisus 
avalikke teenuseid puudutavas innovatsiooniprotsessis ning kus ja kuidas 
need teadmised on välja arendatud (SRQ3)? 
 Süsteemi perspektiiv – milline on avalike teenuste väljaarendamist 
mõjutava innovatsioonisüsteemi tegurite kompositsioon ja nende oma-
vaheline dünaamika erinevates riikides (SRQ4)? 
 
Doktoritöö eesmärgi saavutamiseks vajalikud ülesanded on järgmised: 
1. mõistmaks innovatsiooni olemust avalikus sektoris ja avalikes teenus-
tes, tuuakse esmalt välja avaliku sektori innovatsiooniprotsessi käsit-
levad akadeemilised debatid, analüüsitakse avaliku- ja erasektori inno-
vatsiooniprotsesside erinevusi ning käsitletakse töö mõttes olulisi muid 
avaliku sektori moderniseerimist puudutavaid lähenemisi; 
2. järgnevalt on fookuses avaliku sektori innovatsiooni puudutavad vara-
semad empiirilised uuringud ja analüüsid, millisesse konteksti (sh 
ajaskaalal) käesolev töö positsioneeritakse; 
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3. seejärel defineeritakse innovatsiooniteooriale tuginedes töö empiirilist 
osa kujundav teoreetiline raamistik ning tuuakse välja selle erinevate 
osade (eelnimetatud nelja perspektiivi) teoreetilised käsitlused; 
4. tuginedes eelnevale kirjeldatakse järgnevalt töö empiirilise osa 
metoodilised protseduurid, sh uurimise objekt, riikide valik, valim, 
uurimisküsimused ja kinnitamist või ümberlükkamist vajavate formu-
leeritud väidete (ingl. k. propositions) loetelu ning ehitatakse üles 
küsitluse ankeedi struktuur; 
5. järgnevalt analüüsitakse empiirilise uuringu tulemusi (ingl. k. descrip-
tive statistics), sh innovatsiooniprotsessiga seotud õppimise protsessi, 
eesmärke ja tulemusi, seda mõjutavate (soodustavate ja takistavate, 
organisatsioonisiseste ja -väliste) tegurite suhtelist vastastikkust olu-
lisust; 
6. eelneva analüüsi andmete põhjal grupeeritakse innovatsiooniprotsessi 
eesmärgid ja tulemused ning seda mõjutavad tegurid põhikomponen-
tide faktoranalüüsi (ingl. k. principal component factor analysis) kasu-
tades sarnaselt käituvateks meta-teguriteks, mille põhjal omakorda 
teostatakse ühesuunaline variatsiooni analüüs (ingl. k. univariate 
analysis of variance – ANOVA), toomaks välja riigi-, valdkonna- ja 
innovatsiooni-tüübi põhiste määrajate (ingl. k. determinants) mõju 
meta-tegurite käitumisele; 
7. järgnevalt ühendatakse töö esimeses pooles väljatöötatud teoreetiline 
raamistik ja empiirilise uuringu tulemused, mille tulemusena kirjel-
datakse avalike teenuste innovatsioonisüsteemi (juhtimisalaseid ja kon-
tekstitegureid) nii kogu valimi ulatuses (neli riiki koos) kui ka riikide 
lõikes eraldiseisvalt, misjärel vastatakse empiirilise uuringu tulemuste 
põhjal töö käigus püstitatud uurimisküsimustele ja kinnitatakse või 
lükatakse ümber püstitatud väited; 
8. töö viimases osas võetakse kokku doktoritöö tulemused, esitatakse 
nende üldistused, tuuakse välja teoreetilised ning metoodilised järel-
dused, esitatakse tulemuste interpreteerimise piirangud (ingl. k. boun-
daries and limitations of the research) ning pakutakse välja mõtteid 
tulevastele avaliku sektori innovatsiooni puudutavate uurimistööde 
tarvis. 
 
Doktoritöö struktuur lähtub uurimisülesannete täitmise loogikast, mis on toodud 
alljärgneval joonisel 1. 
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Doktoritöö teoreetiline taust 
Kirjanduses tõdetakse, et innovatsioonist peab saama orgaaniline osa avalikust 
haldusest, strateegiast ja tegutsemisest. Mulgan (2009) rõhutab, et innovatsioon 
on avalik kaup, mida toodetakse ebapiisavalt just puuduvate stiimulite tõttu. 
Samas vaatamata teema olulisusele, on innovatsiooni avalikus sektoris ja avalikes 
teenustes vähe uuritud (Teofilovic, 2002; Osborne ja Brown, 2005; Nelson, 2008; 
Mulgan et al., 2008) ja veelgi vähem süstemaatiliselt praktiseeritud. Viimane ei 
tähenda, et oleks vähe uuringuid avalike teenuste kui selliste kohta. Alates 
politoloogiast ja avalikust haldusest kuni majandusteaduseni on läbi aegade 
tehtud rohkelt analüüse sellest, kuidas avalikku sektorit moderniseerida, nö 
uuesti leiutada (ingl. k. reinvent), detsentraliseerida, paremini organiseerida ja 
juhtida, programme luua, efektiivsust tagada jne (vt Dunleavy et al., 2005; 
Eadie, 1996; Golembiewski, 1996; Hale, 1996; Hale ja Williams, 1989; Hood, 
1991; Ingraham ja Jones, 1999; McLaughlin et al., 2002; Mohr, 1999; OECD, 
2000; Osborne ja Gaebler, 1992; Peters, 1994; Willcocks ja Harrow, 1992). 
Oluline on eristada innovatsiooni igapäevastest parendustest, mida on hästi 
illustreerinud Richard Nelson (2008), kelle sõnul nähakse innovatsioonialastes 
uurimustes innovatsiooni kui eesmärgistatud tegu, eesmärgiga teha midagi 
 





1. Teoreetiline taust innovatsioonist ja 
moderniseerimisest avalikus sektoris, sh avaliku ja 
erasektori innovatsioonialastest erinevustest. 
2. Varasemate avaliku sektori ja avalike teenuste 
innovatsiooni puudutavate empiiriliste uurimuste 
analüüs ning käesoleva uurimustöö positsioneering. 
3. Kontseptuaalse uurimisraamistiku väljaarendamine järgnevaks uurimistööks. 
4. Töö empiirilise osa metoodika kirjeldamine. 
5. Empiirilise uuringu tulemuste esmane kirjeldav analüüs (i.k. descriptive statistics). 
6. Uuringu tulemuste põhikomponentide faktoranalüüs (i.k. principal component factor analysis) ja 
ühesuunaline variatsiooni analüüs (i.k. univariate analysis of variance – ANOVA). 
  
7. Uuringu tulemuste süntees, nende presenteerimine väljatöötatud kontseptuaalses raamistikus (sh riikide 
lõikes) ning töö käigus püstitatud uurimisküsimuste ja väidete vastamine. 
 
8. Doktoritöö kokkuvõte, sh uurimuse tulemuste üldistused, teoreetilised ning metoodilised järeldused, 
tulemuste interpreteerimise piirangute väljatoomine ja soovitused  tulevastele uuringutele. 
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paremat, vastata uutele vajadustele või olukordadele. “Soov proovida midagi 
uut, selle asemel, et teha lihtsalt erinev valik valitsevate ja hästitajutavate alter-
natiivide vahel, on innovatsiooni kui fenomeni keskseks osaks,” sõnab Nelson. 
Kui jätta kõrvale vähesed varased katsed (nt Mohr, 1969; Gray, 1973; 
Roessner, 1977), siis on avaliku sektori innovatsioonialane kirjandus küllalt 
uus, alustades valdavalt Ameerika Ühendriikidest, Kanadast ja Suurbritanniast 
(Altshuler, 1997; Altshuler ja Zegans, 1997; Bartlett ja Dibben, 2002; Bekkers 
et al., 2011; Berry, 1994a, b; Berry ja Berry, 1999, 2007; Bason, 2010; Borins, 
2001a, b; Considine et al., 2009; Damanpour, 1987; Damanpour ja William, 
1984; Damanpour et al., 2009; Hartley, 2005, 2006; Kimberly ja Micheal, 1981; 
McCormic, 2003; Moore ja Hartley, 2013; Mulgan, 2009; Osborne ja Brown, 
2005; Shergold, 1997; Sørensen ja Torfing, 2005, 2010, 2011; Teofilovic, 2002; 
Walker, 2008; Walker et al., 2002; Walker et al., 2011; Zegans, 1997).  
Autorid on lähenenud innovatsioonile muuhulgas ka riskide ja takistuste 
perspektiivist (Bhatta, 2003; Kubr, 1988). Nagu võib ennustada, siis osa kirjan-
dust on keskendunud avaliku ja erasektori innovatsiooni erisuste väljatoomisele 
(Earl, 2004; Grout et al., 2003; Halvorsen et al., 2005; Koch ja Hauknes, 2005; 
Miles, 2004; Oracle, 2003; Tomkins, 1987; Vinten, 1992; Willcocks ja Harrow, 
1992). Mõnede autorite poolt käsitletakse ka avaliku poliitika innovatsiooni ja 
innovatsiooni poliitikates (European Commission, 2002; Kinder, 2002; 
Kingdon, 1984; Osborne ja Brown, 2005; Polsby, 1984; Roberts ja King, 1989; 
Schon, 1971), samuti õnnestumisi ja ebaedu riigiülesest poliitikatest õppimises 
(ingl. k. policy learning) – Dolowitz ja Marsh, 2000; Etheredge ja Short, 1983; 
Kemp ja Weehuizen, 2004; Johnson ja Lundvall, 2001. 
Mitmed autorid on tegelenud laia, kuid olulise ettevõtlikkust avalikus sek-
toris käsitleva teemaga (ingl.k. public entrepreneurship), vt Kingdon, 1984; 
Osborne ja Brown, 2005; Osborne ja Gaebler, 1992; Polsby, 1984; Roberts ja 
King, 1989; Schon, 1971; Teofilovic, 2002; van Mierlo, 1986. Seejuures Ra-
došević (2006) rõhutab, et avaliku sektori ettevõtlikkust puudutavad süste-
maatilised aspektid kui poliitikaväljakutsed vajavad palju sügavamat mõistmist 
ja soovitab selle tarvis läbi viia rea erinevaid juhtumianalüüse. Hilisemast ajast 
eksisteerib töid, mis käsitlevad sotsiaalset innovatsiooni kui kasvavat valdkonda 
(Mulgan et al., 2008), innovatsiooni motivaatoreid nagu näiteks innovatsiooni-
auhinnad (Altshuler ja Zegans, 1997; Borins, 2001c, d; Hale, 1996) ja kodanike/ 
klientide kaasamist innovatsiooni- ja arendusprotsessi (Dooren et al., 2004; 
OECD, 2001a; Peters ja Savoie, 2000). 
Valdavalt tõdetakse, et innovatsioon on interdistsiplinaarne ja multifunktsio-
naalne fenomen. Teoreetilisest vaatevinklist ei ole tegemist formaalse ja välja-
kujunenud distsipliini või teooriaga; pigem on tegemist kombinatsiooniga erine-
vatest distsipliinidest: majandusteadusest, juhtimisest, organisatsioonipsühho-
loogiast, organisatoorsest õppimisest, kognitiivsest teooriast ja süsteemiteooriast 
(Røste, 2005).  
Vaatamata innovatsiooni mitmepalgelisele olemusele, keskenduvad paljud 
teaduslikud tekstid sellest ühele kitsale dimensioonile nagu näiteks teadus- ja 
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arendustegevus, tootmine ja operatsioonide juhtimine, turunduse juhtimine, 
tootmise või organisatsiooni arendus (Tidd et al., 2001). Veelgi enam, näiteks 
erasektori innovatsioonis eksisteerivad vastastikused seosed mikrotaseme tege-
vuste ja makrotaseme majanduskasvu ja arengu vahel (von Tunzelmann, 1995). 
Sarnased seosed avanevad ka riigi tasandil ja kahes suunas. Ühelt poolt mõjutab 
uuendus avalikus sektoris ja tema teenustes riigi üldist arengut, teisalt mõju-
tavad kontekstitegurid (nt regulatsioonid, partnerid, tehnoloogiline areng jne) 
konkreetse avaliku sektori innovatsiooniga alguse tegemist ja selle õnnestumist. 
Innovatsiooniuurimine omakorda on seepärast kombinatsioon evolutsioonilis-
test (majandus-) teooriatest kui dominantsest perspektiivist innovatsiooni taga 
(Nelson ja Winter, 1982; Nelson, 1987, 1995). Töö empiirilise osa raamistik 
koosneb lähtuvalt eeltoodud argumentidest neljast alljärgnevast perspektiivist, 
mis on visuaalselt esitatud joonisel 2. 
Juhtimise perspektiiv – innovatsioon on mitmeski mõttes organisatoorne küsi-
mus. Edu on mitmefaktoriline – eksisteerib mitmeid organisatoorseid ja juhtimis-
alaseid tegureid, mis seda mõjutavad (Cooper ja Kleinschmidt, 1988; Gallouj 
2002; Manz et al., 2000; Peters ja Waterman, 1982; Rothwell, 1977 ja 1992; 
Rothwell et al., 1974; Schumpeter, 1936, 1947 ja 1950; Terry, 1986; Tidd et al., 
2001). 
Õppimise perspektiiv – erinevat laadi teadmiste ja oskuste rolli innovat-
siooniprotsessis on rõhutatud mitmetes kirjanduse käsitlustes. Kuivõrd tead-
mistes nähakse kaasaegse majandusarengu fundamentaalset allikat, on seda 
toetavaks kõige olulisemaks protsessiks õppimine (Cohen ja Levinthal, 1989, 
Cowan et al., 2000, Dosi, 1997; Lundvall, 1992 and 1993; Lundvall ja Johnson, 
1994; Metcalfe, 1998; Nelson, 1995; Teece et al., 1997, Winter, 1984).  
Tehnoloogia perspektiiv – majandus ja ühiskonna ajaloost on teada, et tehno-
loogiline progress ning innovatsioon on kandnud arengus keskset rolli. Sarna-
selt nagu see on juhtunud ärimaailmaga, nähakse tehnoloogilises arengus ja 
informatsiooni levikus ‘kord sajandis’ võimalust ka valitsussektori kaasajasta-
misel (Dunleavy et al., 2005; Earl, 2004; Eggers, 2005; Hamel, 2000, Heeks, 
2001 ja 2006; Jorgensen ja Klay, 2001; Magnus, 2007; Tiits ja Rebane, 2009; 
The Standish Group, 1995). 
Süsteemi perspektiiv – innovatsioon leiab valdavalt aset süsteemis, mis koos-
neb indiviididest, ettevõtetest ja erinevatest institutsioonidest ning mingis 
kindlas kulutuurilises või regulatiivses keskkonnas (Carlsson ja Stankiewicz, 
1993; Freeman, 1987; Goldsmith ja Eggers, 2004; Edquist, 1997b; Enzing ja 
Kern, 1999; Lundvall, 1992; Malerba, 2002a, b, c; Nelson ja Rosenberg, 1993; 
OECD, 1997). Suur osa innovatsiooniprotsessi algab mingis kindlas ettevõttes 
(või institutsioonis), mis püüab lahendada mingit väljakutset. Läbi õppimis-
protsessi kasutab ettevõte mitmesuguseid kompetentse üle innovatsioonisüs-
teemi, olgu need kliendid, tarnijad, konsultandid, patendid või erinevad teadus- 
ja arendusasutused. Süsteemi vaates innovatsiooni uurimine on seetõttu ka 
valdavalt ettevõtte (või institutsiooni) keskne (Røste, 2005). 
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Joonis 2 Doktoritöö kontseptuaalne uurimisraamistik 
 
Uuringu metodoloogia ja kasutatavad andmed 
Väitekirja raames läbi viidud uuring põhineb autori poolt välja töötatud metodo-
loogilisel lähenemisel ning see korraldati ankeetküsitlusena neljas valitud 
Euroopa riigis: Suurbritannias, Taanis, Soomes ja Eestis. Uuring viidi läbi 2005. 
aastal ja selle ankeet on toodud doktoritöö lisas 2. Uurimisobjekti defineerimisel 
lähtuti innovatsiooniuurimist metoodiliselt teotava Oslo manuaali lähte-
kohtadest (OECD/Eurostat, 2005), mida tulenevalt avaliku sektori olemusest ja 
käesoleva uuringu eesmärgist täpsustati. Oslo manuaali järgi peavad inno-
vatsiooni andmed olema ideaalsel juhul kogutud organisatsiooni tasandil, kus on 
tehtud innovatsiooni puudutavad otsused. Uurimisobjekt (ingl. k. the statistical 
unit of the population) võib vastavalt manuaali paragrahvile 237 olla ka orga-
nisatsiooni asemel tegevusüksus (ingl. k. kind-of-activity-unit) – organisatsiooni 
osa, mis haakub konkreetse tegevusega ja ei ole piiratud tegevuse toimumise 
geograafilise kohaga (vt ka Bloch, 2011). Käesolevas uuringus loetakse uuri-
misobjektiks infotehnoloogiliselt uudset avalikku teenust, mis otseselt või 
kaudselt teenib kodanike või klientide huve. Uuringus osalenud organisat-
sioonid (või nende osad) ja nende tehnoloogiliselt uudsete avalike teenuste 
loetelu on toodud väitekirja lisas 9. Valimi moodustamisel kasutati erinevaid 
tehnikaid: (a) esmalt küsitleti e-maili teel valdkonna eksperte (vt ankeeti lisas 
9), et nad nimetaksid neile teadaolevaid definitsioonile vastavaid avalikke tee-
nuseid; (b) teiseks korraldati ulatuslik viidete otsing kirjanduses (nii akadeemi-
line kirjandus kui ka erinevad poliitikaraportid, analüüsid jne); (c) kolmandaks 
teostati ulatuslik otseallikate ja viidete otsing internetis. Kokku tuvastati sellisel 
viisil 159 avalikku teenust, millest 135 vastasid korrektselt uuringu definit-
sioonile. Nimetatud 135 tehnoloogiliselt uudse avaliku teenuse seas viidi läbi 
ankeetküsitlus, mille riikideülene kumulatiivne vastanute protsent oli 60.0 
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(81 vastanut). Vastanute protsent oli riikide lõikes järgmine: Suurbritannia 45.5; 
Taani 69.3; Soome 57.1; ja Eesti 68.3. Selline tulemus on analoogne varasemate 
sarnase valdkonna uuringutega (Osborne ja Flynn, 1997–52.1%; Bugge et al., 
2011 – riigiti 42.0–77.6%). Koos kontseptuaalse uurimisraamistiku väljatööta-
misega töötati peatükis 3 ala-uurimisküsimuste lõikes välja 17 uuringu tule-
muste põhjal tõestatavat või ümberlükatavat väidet (ingl. k. propositions). 
Väidete suhteliselt suure arvu tingis autori soov testida võimalikult mitmeid seni 
kirjanduses domineerinud väiteid, samuti anda maksimaalne panus käesoleva 
otsingulise uurimuse tulemuste põhjal teoreetiliste arusaamade täpsustamisse. 
Uuringu eesmärk oli konteksti mõistmine, milles tehnoloogiliselt uudseid 
avalikke teenuseid arendatakse ja ellu viiakse, mitte innovatsioonide endi uuri-
mine. Kuivõrd sellel eesmärgil uuriti vaid eksisteerivaid (mitte ebaõnnestunud 
või mingitel põhjustel mitte-eksisteerivaid) tehnoloogiliselt uudseid avalikke 
teenuseid, siis võib tööd pidada ‘parimate praktikate’ uurimuseks (ingl. k. best 
practice research). Selline metoodiline lähenemine on avaliku sektori juhtimis-
analüüsides, eriti poliitika kujundamisega seotud uuringutes vajalik ja põhjen-
datud (vt Borins, 2001b), samuti kasutatud (Barzelay, 1992; Osborne ja Gaebler, 
1992). Sellist meetodit kasutades peab arvestama selle limiteeringutega nagu 
selektiivsus (ingl. k. selectivity), järjepidevus (ingl. k. sustainability) ja võrrel-
davus (ingl. k.comparability). 
Töös püstitatud eesmärgi ja uurimisülesannete täitmiseks teostati analüüs 
neljas etapis. Esiteks empiirilise uuringu tulemuste esmane võrdlev analüüs 
(ingl. k. descriptive statistics; peatükk 5), mis tõi välja innovatsiooniprotsessiga 
seotud õppimise nüansid, innovatsiooniprotsessi eesmärgid ja tulemused ning 
innovatsiooniprotsessi mõjutavate (soodustavate ja takistavate, organisatsiooni 
siseste ja väliste) tegurite suhtelise vastastikkuse olulisuse. Teiseks uuringu 
tulemuste põhikomponentide faktoranalüüs (ingl. k. principal component factor 
analysis; peatükk 6), mille abil grupeeriti eelneva analüüsi andmete põhjal 
innovatsiooniprotsessi eesmärgid ja tulemused ning innovatsiooniprotsessi 
mõjutavad tegurid sarnaselt käituvateks ja loogiliselt kokkusobivateks meta-
teguriteks. Nimetatud meta-tegurite baasil viidi riigipõhiste, valdkonnapõhiste 
ja innovatsiooni-tüübi põhiste määrajate (ingl. k. determinants) mõju olulisuse 
hindamiseks kolmandaks läbi ühesuunalised variatsiooni analüüsid (ingl. k. uni-
variate analysis of variance – ANOVA; peatükk 6). Neljandaks teostati uuringu 
tulemuste sünteesanalüüs – tulemuste analüüs ja presenteerimine väljatöötatud 
kontseptuaalses raamistikus (sh riikide lõikes) ning töö käigus püstitatud 







Vastused töös püstitatud uurimisküsimustele ja väidetele 
Doktoritöö eesmärgiks on tuua välja, milline on erinevate innovatsiooniprot-
sessi mõjutavate juhtimisalaste ja kontekstitegurite vastastikune olulisus info-
tehnoloogiapõhiste avalike teenuste väljaarendamisele ning kuidas see mõjutab 
avalike teenuste innovatsioonisüsteemi olemust. Eesmärgist lähtuvalt ja nelja 
ala-uurimisküsimuse raames püstitati 17 väidet (ingl. k. propositions) avaliku 
sektori innovatsiooniprotsessi mõjutavate tegurite, innovatsiooniga seotud 
õppimise, tehnoloogia rakendamise ja avalike teenuste innovatsioonisüsteemi 
olemuse kohta. Järgnevalt on toodud vastavad uurimisväited ja empiirilise ana-
lüüsi tulemused nelja Euroopa Liidu riigi näitel. Uuringu tulemuste täpsema 
analüüsi leiab doktoritöö peatükkidest viis ja kuus ning tulemuste sünteesi ja 
kokkuvõtte peatükkidest seitse ning kaheksa. Joonisel 3 on uurimuse tulemused 
esitatud väitekirja kontseptuaalses raamistikus. 
 
 
Ala-uurimisküsimus SRQ1 ‘juhtimise perspektiiv’ – millised võtmetegurid 
ja millisel määral mõjutavad, soodustavad või takistavad, tehnoloogiliselt 
innovatiivsete avalike teenuste arendamist ning kasutuselevõttu? 
 
Vastates esimesele ala-uurimisküsimusele SRQ1 näitasid uuringu tulemused, et 
kõige olulisemad organisatsioonisisesed innovatsiooni toetavad tegurid olid 
(tähtsuse järjekorras) personaalne eestvedamine ja/või vastavate võtmeinimeste 
olemasolu, millele järgnes tippjuhtkonna kaasatus ja tugi, ning avatud mõtle-
misega juhid. Olulisemad organisatsiooni sisesed innovatsiooni takistavad tegu-
rid olid vähesed teadmised eksisteerivatest tehnoloogiatest, nõrk koostöö tehno-
loogia pakkujatega, ning nõrk tippjuhtkonna kaasatus ja tugi. Organisatsiooni 
välistest innovatsiooni toetavatest teguritest olid olulisemad hea koostöö 
partneritega (sh vahendajad ja tehnoloogiapakkujad), kasutajate nõudlus, ning 
kasutajate usaldus. Organisatsiooni väliste innovatsiooni takistavate tegurite 
poolest paistsid eriti silma finantsvahendite puudus, kõrge tehnoloogiline risk, 
ja relevantsete heade näidete puudumine. 
Uurimisküsimusele vastamise raames kinnitati väide PM 150, mille kohaselt 
avalike teenuste innovatsiooniprotsessi mõjutavad tegurid (sh eesmärgid) eri-
nevad erasektoris innovatsiooniprotsessi mõjutavatest teguritest. Viimast erine-
valt Borins (2001c) analüüsist, mille kohaselt on avaliku sektori innovatsioo-
nide ühisnimetaja selles, et nad kõik sarnanevad erasektoriga. Käesolev uuring 
näitas, et konkurentsivõime kasvatamine ja teenuse hinna alandamine, mis on 
olulised innovatsiooni vedurid erasektoris, olid mõlemad kõige vähem olulised 
innovatsiooni eesmärgid uuringule vastanute seas.  
                                                                          
50  PM1: Avalike teenuste innovatsiooniprotsessi mõjutavad tegurid (sh eesmärgid) erinevad 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Uuring andis vastandlikke tulemusi väitele PM251, et innovatsiooni eesmärgid 
avalikus sektoris on polariseerunud (mitmed sarnaselt olulised eesmärgid), mis 
võib erinevalt erasektorist tuleneda sellest, et avalikus sektoris on paralleelselt 
olulised mitmetahulised väärtused, erinevad eesmärgid ja huvigrupid (Willcocks 
ja Harrow, 1992). Kuigi vastanud organisatsioonidel oli mitmeid erinevaid 
innovatsiooni eesmärke, eristusid olulisemad nende seast selgesti: teenuse 
kvaliteedi parandamine, teenusega internetti minek, kasutajate ootustele vasta-
mine, ja teenuste kasutajaskonna suurendamine. Fookus kvaliteedile toob jälle 
mõningasi paralleele erasektori innovatsiooniprotsessi eesmärkidega (Howells 
ja Tether, 2004). 
Uuringu tulemusena lükati ümber väide PM352, et avaliku sektori tehno-
loogiliste innovatsioonide edukus on alla esialgseid ootusi. Sellise väite püstita-
mist toetas laialt levinud tõdemus, et enamus valitsusi kogeb märkimisväärseid 
probleeme suurte (info-)tehnoloogia projektide arendamisel, seda nii võrreldes 
varasemalt planeerituga madalamas kvaliteedis, kõrgemas hinnas ja pikemas 
arendusprotsessis (Standish Group International, 1995, 1996; Borins, 2001b), 
või siis osutuvad arendused tervikuna ebaedukateks (Goldfinch, 2007). Ebaedu 
põhjustena tuuakse välja andmete mitteadekvaatsus, tehnilised probleemid, 
juhtimisalaste, protsessijuhtimise või tehniliste teadmiste nappus, erinevate 
kultuuride põrkumine, poliitilised võitlused ja muud keskkonnast tulenevad 
tegurid (Heeks, 1999). Käesolev uuring näitas, et võrreldes algsete ootustega 
hindasid 30 protsenti vastanutest innovatsiooniprotsessi tulemusi suurepärasteks 
ja 60 protsenti headeks. Seega pidas 90 protsenti vastanutest ette võetud avaliku 
teenuse innovatsiooniprotsessi edukaks. Siiski on oluline tähele panna, et 
‘parimate praktikate’ uuringuna töös ebaedukaid ja erinevatel põhjustel mitte-
eksisteerivaid tehnoloogiliselt uudseid avalikke teenuseid ei käsitletud. Samuti 
olid vastajad projekti elluviimisele võimalikult lähedal seisvad isikud, mistõttu 
võib nende hinnang olla mõneti ebaobjektiivne.  
Uuringu põhjal lükati ümber ka väide PM453, mille kohaselt võivad innovat-
siooni toetavad tegurid olla nii organisatsiooni sisesed kui ka välised. Näiteks 
Borins (2001b) on leidnud, et innovatsiooni toetavad tegurid on avalikus 
sektoris alati multi-tegurilised ja innovatsioon sõltub valdavalt (60%) holismist 
ehk ametkondadevahelisest koostööst. Käesolev uuring seevastu näitas, et antud 
valimi põhjal olid sisemised innovatsiooniprotsessi toetavad tegurid statistiliselt 
oluliselt mõjusamad kui organisatsiooni välised tegurid. 
Innovatsiooni takistavate tegurite vaatevinklist oli tulemus erinev – pisut 
väiksema erinevusega, kuid siiski statistiliselt oluliselt olid organisatsioonivälised 
innovatsiooniprotsessi takistavad tegurid kesksemal kohal kui organisatsiooni-
                                                                          
51  PM2: Innovatsiooni eesmärgid avalikus sektoris on polariseerunud (neutraalne). 
52  PM3: Tehnoloogiliste innovatsioonide edukus avalikes teenustes on alla esialgseid ootusi 
(ümberlükatud). 
53  PM4: Innovatsiooni toetavad tegurid avalikus sektoris võivad olla nii organisatsiooni 
sisesed kui ka välised (ümberlükatud). 
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sisesed mõjurid. Seetõttu lükati käesoleva uuringu põhjal ümber väide PM554, 
mis sarnaselt Vigoda-Gadot et al. (2005) poolt tõdetule sedastas, et innovat-
siooni takistused avalikus sektoris on peamiselt organisatsiooni sisesed. 
Üle nelja riigi toetasid uuringu tulemused väidet PM655, et personaalne 
eestvedamine ja/või vastavate võtmeinimeste olemasolu on organisatsiooni 
siseselt dominantne innovatsiooni toetav tegur. Selline tulemus toetab kirjan-
dust, mis käsitleb nö innovatsiooni tšempionite rolli uuenduste ja tootearenduse 
protsessis (vt Drucker, 1985; Rothwell, 1992, Tidd et al., 2001, Koch ja 
Hauknes, 2005). Samas tuleb meeles pidada, et kuna vastajad olid eelistatult 
projekti elluviimisele lähedal seisvad isikud, siis võis see uuringu käesoleva 
punkti tulemust mõjutada. 
 
 
Ala-uurimisküsimus SRQ2 ‘õppimise perspektiiv’: millised juhtimisalased 
ja organisatoorsed teadmised ning oskused on vajalikud edukaks tehno-
loogiliseks innovatsiooniks avalikes teenustes? 
 
Vastates teisele ala-uurimisküsimusele SRQ2, siis uuringu tulemused toetasid 
eriala kirjanduses domineerivaid vaateid, et kumulatiivne akumulatsioon 
teadmisi ja oskusi on innovatsiooniprotsessis määrava tähtsusega (vt Røste, 
2005; Koch ja Haukens, 2005; Kemp ja Weehuizen, 2004). Uuringu tulemused 
toetasid ka väite PL156 kinnitamist. Selleks et innoveerida, parandasid uuringus 
osalenud mitmeid organisatsioonisiseseid võimekusi: tehnoloogilisi teadmisi 69 
protsenti; projektijuhtimise oskusi 64 protsenti; üldjuhtimise alaseid teadmisi 34 
protsenti; organisatsiooni struktuuri 28 protsenti; personali motivatsiooni-
süsteemi 15 protsenti. Ainult 6 protsenti osalenutest väitis, et nad ei parandanud 
innoveerimiseks mingeid organisatsioonisiseseid võimekusi. 
Mitte kõik innovatiivsed ideed ei ole loodud organisatsiooni sees; mõned on 
genereeritud organisatsioonist väljastpoolt ja adopteeritud seejärel organisat-
siooni poolt (Damanpour ja Gopalakrishnan, 1998). Seejuures, mida paremini 
organisatsioon arendab erinevaid võrgustikke, mille läbi vajalike teadmiste ja 
partneriteni jõuda, seda suurema tõenäosusega osutub innovatsiooniprotsess 
edukaks (Kemp ja Weehuizen, 2004). Käesoleva uuringu tulemused laiemas 
plaanis toetasid väidet, et organisatsiooni väljastpoolt õppimine ja konsultat-
sioon mängib positiivset rolli avalike teenuste innovatsiooniprotsessis (PL257). 
Samas saame me seda väidet aktsepteerida vaid osaliselt. Nimelt tuli uuringust 
                                                                          
54  PM5: Innovatsiooni takistavad tegurid avalikus sektoris on peamiselt organisatsiooni 
sisesed (ümberlükatud). 
55  PM6: Personaalne eestvedamine (sh võtmeinimeste olemasolu) on organisatsiooni 
siseselt dominantne avalike teenuste innovatsiooni toetav tegur (kinnitatud). 
56  PL1: Tehnoloogiline innovatsioon avalikes teenustes eeldab laias spektrumis 
juhtimisalaseid ja organisatoorseid edendusi/parendusi (kinnitatud). 
57  PL2: Väljastpoolt organisatsiooni õppimine ja konsultatsioon mängib positiivset rolli 
edukates avalike teenuste innovatsioonides (osaliselt kinnitatud). 
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välja, organisatsiooniväline õppimine on märgatavalt kaldu ühte tüüpi kompe-
tentside ja oskuste ammutamise suunas. Tervelt 81 protsenti vastanutest hanki-
sid väljastpoolt organisatsiooni tehnoloogilisi teadmisi või nõustamist. Teised 
arendatud valdkonnad innoveerimise nimel oli oluliselt väiksema tähtsusega – 
näiteks 21 protsenti vastanutest arendas projektijuhtimise oskusi, 11 protsenti 
vajas juhtimisalast nõu ja tuge, 5 protsenti vastanutest aga personalijuhtimise 
alast teadmist või nõustamist. 
Riskide võtmine ja ebaõnnestumistest õppimise võimekus on oluline element 
avaliku sektori innovatsioonis (Bloch, 2010). Suhtelise edu või ebaedu määra-
jaks on organisatsiooni võimekus oma õppimisprotsessi juhtida (Hale, 1996; 
Bowen, 1994; Hayes et al., 1988; Maidique et al., 1985). Uuringu tulemused 
toetasid väidet (PL358), et innovatsiooniga seotud õppimine avalikes teenustes 
on kumulatiivne ning saab võrdselt tuleneda positiivsetest ja negatiivsetest 
varasematest kogemustest, seda nii organisatsioonisiseselt kui ka organisat-
siooniväliselt. Vastanutest 53 protsenti omasid varasemaid positiivseid koge-
musi sarnaste innovatsioonidega. Vaid 11 protsenti olid kogenud varasemaid 
negatiivseid kogemusi. Uuringus osalenutest 45 protsenti ei omanud kogemusi, 
positiivseid või negatiivseid, sarnaste innovatsioonidega. Tulemused näitasid, et 
õppimine varasematest positiivsetest kogemustest domineerib negatiivsetest 
õppimise üle. Veelgi enam, organisatsioonid olid pisut enam valmis õppima 
teiste kogemustest kui enda omadest: positiivsete kogemuste puhul vastavalt 43 
ja 39 protsenti; negatiivsete kogemuste puhul vastavalt 23 ja 21 protsenti. 
 
 
Ala-uurimisküsimus SRQ3 ‘tehnoloogia perspektiiv’: milline on tehno-
loogilise teadmise olulisus avalikke teenuseid puudutavas innovatsiooni-
protsessis ning kus ja kuidas need teadmised on väljaarendatud? 
 
Uuringu tulemused toetasid väidet PT159, et tehnoloogilised teadmised on põhi-
line valdkond, mida on arendatud organisatsioonisiseselt ja hangitud organisat-
siooniväliselt avalike teenuste innovatsiooniprotsessi käigus. Tulemused näita-
sid, et kõige olulisem organisatsioonisisene arendatud valdkond oli tehnoloogi-
line kompetents – 69 protsenti vastanutest. Tehnoloogilised teadmised olid ka 
kõige olulisemad organisatsiooni väljast hangitud teadmised – tervelt 81 
protsenti vastanutest. 
Uuringu tulemused näitavad, et tehnoloogia hakkab küll integreeruma teiste 
organisatsiooni juhtimisalaste protsessidega, kuid tal on siiski dominantne 
                                                                          
58  PL3: Innovatsiooniga seotud õppimine avalikes teenustes on kumulatiivne ning saab 
võrdselt tuleneda positiivsetest ja negatiivsetest varasematest kogemustest, seda nii 
organisatsiooni siseselt kui ka organisatsiooni väliselt (kinnitatud). 
59  PT1: Tehnoloogilised teadmised on põhiline valdkond, mida on arendatud organisat-
siooni siseselt ja hangitud organisatsiooni väliselt avalike teenuste innovatsiooniprotsessi 
käigus (kinnitatud). 
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positsioon innovatsiooniprotsessi edukuse määrajana – sarnasele järeldusele 
jõudsid ka Koch ja Haukens (2005). Seepärast saame me vaid osaliselt kinnitada 
väite PT260, et tehnoloogia roll tänapäeva avalikus sektoris on integreeritud 
teiste juhtimisalaste protsessidega. Uurimistulemused andsid ka tõendeid selle 
kohta, et klassikaline ʻtehnoloogiline surve’ (ingl. k. technology push) avalike 
teenuste innovatsiooniprotsessi küll mõjutab, kuid ei domineeri selle üle, 
mistõttu aktsepteeriti vastav väide PT361 vaid osaliselt. Tulemused näitasid, et 
vaid 8 protsenti tehnoloogiliselt uudsetest avalikest teenustest arendati täiel 
määral väljaspool organisatsiooni; 24 protsenti olid arendatud sisemiselt ja 
koguni 69 protsenti organisatsiooni ning tema väliste partnerite koostöös. 
Uuringu tulemused kinnitasid väidet PT462, et tehnoloogiline risk on üks 
peamisi organisatsiooniväliseid avaliku teenuse innovatsiooniprotsessi takis-
tavaid tegureid. See oli olulisuselt teine väline innovatsiooniprotsessi takistanud 
tegur, peale finantsvahendite nappust ja enne sobivate näidete puudumist, kõr-
get poliitilist riski, nõrka koostööd partneritega, ning digitaalset lõhet ühis-
konnas. Sama paistis silma ka innovatsiooni toetavate faktorite poolelt – madal 
tehnoloogiline risk oli tagantpoolt kolmas organisatsiooniväline soodustav 
tegur, mis innoveerimist mõjutas.  
 
 
Ala-uurimisküsimus SRQ4 ‘süsteemi perspektiiv’: milline on avalike 
teenuste väljaarendamist mõjutava innovatsioonisüsteemi tegurite kom-
positsioon ja nende omavaheline dünaamika erinevates riikides? 
 
Nii teoreetilised alustalad kui ka uuringu tulemused toetavad väidet PS163, mille 
kohaselt on innovatsiooniprotsess avalikes teenustes süsteemne fenomen ning 
seda tuleb ka analüüsida ja juhtida sellest lähtuvat. Uuringu kontekstis kuulusid 
innovatsioonisüsteemi raamesse organisatsioonisisene keskkond, õppimise 
keskkond ja organisatsiooniväline keskkond. Kaldumine väliste koostöösuhete 
suunas (eelkõige tehnoloogiavaldkonnas) näitas meile, et innovatsioon avalikes 
teenustes leiab aset laiemas raamistikus, mida võib antud kontekstis nimetada 
avaliku teenuse innovatsioonisüsteemiks. Teenuste osutamise vaatevinklist, 
vähem kui pooled uuringus osalenud tehnoloogiliselt innovatiivseid teenuseid 
osutati otse ja ainult avaliku sektori asutuste poolt, millele järgnesid avaliku- ja 
erasektori koostöös osutatud teenused. Analüüsi tulemuste pinnalt tuleb rõhu-
tada, et innovatsioonisüsteemi eelised ei ole kaugeltki täiel määral kasutatud. 
                                                                          
60  PT2: Tehnoloogia roll tänapäeva avalikus sektoris on integreeritud teiste juhtimisalaste 
protsessidega (osaliselt kinnitatud). 
61  PT3: Klassikaline ‘tehnoloogiline surve’ (ingl. k. technology push) avalike teenuste 
innovatsiooniprotsessis ei mõjuta (osaliselt kinnitatud). 
62  PT4: Tehnoloogiline risk on üks peamisi organisatsiooni väliseid avaliku teenuse 
innovatsiooniprotsessi takistavaid tegureid (kinnitatud). 
63  PS1: Innovatsiooniprotsess avalikes teenustes on süsteemne fenomen (kinnitatud). 
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Veelgi enam, innovatsioonid avalikes teenustes juhtuvad suhteliselt juhuslikult 
ja nende edu- või ebaedu on konkreetse projekti liidri kätes. Seega, ilma piisava 
mõtestamise ja/või dünaamilise juhtimiseta jääb innovatsioonisüsteemi filo-
soofia avalike teenuste arendamisel kasutamata ning tehnoloogiline innovat-
sioon ad hoc asjaks. 
Selleks, et teha innovatsioonist avalikus sektorist süstemaatiliselt viljeletav 
ja professionaalselt juhitav tegevus, vajab avalik sektor pikaajalast strateegiat, 
milles innovatsioon ning tehnoloogilised arendused mängivad olulist, mõnel 
puhul ka keskset rolli. Pidev innoveerimine, piloteerimine ja kaalutletud riskide 
võtmine peab olema integreeritud kõikidesse valitsemistasemetesse. Samuti on 
oluline, et teenuseinnovatsioonid leiaksid aset organisatsioonide ja valitsemis-
valdkondade üleselt ning nende tulemused oleksid mitte vaid uued tehnoloogia-
põhised teenused vaid ka uued tegevus- ja valitsemismudelid. Viimased on 
valitsustele vajalikud, et tulla toime üha pingestuvate eelarvete ja üha komp-
lekssemate väljakutsetega. 
Uuringu tulemuste põhjal aktsepteeriti väide PS264, et innovatsiooniprotsessi 
olemus avalikes teenustes sõltub erinevatest määrajatest (ingl. k. determinants), 
vaid osaliselt. Uuringu käigus testiti põhikomponentide faktoranalüüsi põhjal 
grupeeritud meta-tegureid riigipõhiste, valdkonnapõhiste ja innovatsiooni-tüübi 
põhiste määrajatega. Ühesuunalised variatsiooni analüüsid näitasid statistiliselt 
olulisi erinevusi vaid ühes kategoorias – määraja ‘riik’ lõikes. Sellest tulenevalt 
kinnitati ala-väide PS2.365, mille kohaselt sõltub innovatsiooniprotsessi olemus 
tehnoloogiliselt uudsetes avalikes teenustes riigist. Samal ajal leiti väga vähe 
statistidelt olulisi erinevusi võrreldes innovatsiooni eesmärke, organisatsiooni-
siseseid ja -väliseid innovatsiooni toetavaid ja takistavaid tegureid määrajate 
‘innovatsiooni valdkond’ ja ‘innovatsiooni tüüp’ lõikes. Seepärast lükati ümber 
ka vastavad ala-väited PS2.166 ja PS2.267. 
Uurimisväide PS368, mille kohaselt on avaliku poliitika mõju tehnoloogi-
lisele innovatsioonile avalikes teenustes mitmetine ja erineb sõltuvalt poliitika 
olemusest laiemas tähenduses (koos õigusaktide ja regulatsioonidega), uuringu 
tulemuste põhjal kinnitati. Ühelt poolt näitas uurimistulemuste analüüs, et vaid 
viiendik (21 protsenti) innovatsioonidest vajasid muudatusi õigusaktides või 
regulatsioonides, mistõttu lükati ümber ka vastav väide PS3.169. Teisalt rapor-
                                                                          
64  PS2: Innovatsiooniprotsessi olemus avalikes teenustes sõltub erinevatest määrajatest 
(ingl. k. determinants) (osaliselt ümber lükatud). 
65  PS2.3: Innovatsiooniprotsessi olemus avalikes teenustes sõltub riigist (kinnitatud). 
66  PS2.1: Innovatsiooniprotsessi olemus avalikes teenustes sõltub innovatsiooni vald-
konnast (ümberlükatud). 
67  PS2.2: Innovatsiooniprotsessi olemus avalikes teenustes sõltub innovatsiooni tüübist 
(ümberlükatud). 
68  PS3: Avaliku poliitika mõju tehnoloogilisele innovatsioonile avalikes teenustes on 
mitmetine ja erineb sõltuvalt poliitika olemusest laiemas tähenduses (kinnitatud). 
69  PS3.1: Innovatsioon avalikes teenustes eeldab muudatusi õigusaktides ja regulatsioonis 
(ümber lükatud). 
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teeris valdav enamus (65 protsenti) uuringus osalejaid, et avalik poliitika oma 
kitsamas tähenduses (ilma õigusaktide ja regulatsioonideta) omas positiivset 
mõju avaliku teenuse tehnoloogilistele uuendustele. Suurim oli see mõju Suur-
britannias 80 protsendiga ja Soome 65 protsendiga. Poliitika mõju oli väiksem 
Eestis ja Taanis, vastavalt 50 ja 39 protsenti. Avaliku poliitika panus kitsamas 
tähenduses joonistus välja ka organisatsiooni väliste innovatsiooni toetavate 
tegurite analüüsist, kus see oli olulisuselt neljas tegur. Need leiud toetavad ala-
väite PS3.270 kinnitamist, mille kohaselt innovatsioon avalikes teenustes eeldab 
avaliku poliitika (kitsamas tähenduses) tuge. Need kaks ala-väidet üheskoos 
näitavad, et poliitikate (kitsamas tähenduses) mõju on tehnoloogilistele innovat-
sioonidele avalikes teenustes märkimisväärselt suurem kui õigusaktide ja regu-
latsioonide mõju. Samas, kuna tegemist oli ‘parimate praktikate’ põhiselt läbi 
viidud uuringuga, siis võisid ebasobivad õigusaktid või regulatsioonid piirata 
teatud tehnoloogiliselt uudsete avalike teenuste väljaarendamist, turuletoomist 
ja seeläbi ka uuringu valimisse sattumist. 
Lõpetuseks oli üheks uuringu eesmärgiks testida, kas innovatsiooniprotsessi 
karakteristika ja liikumapanevad jõud on avaliku teenuse innovatsioonisüs-
teemis riikide lõikes sarnased. Uuringu tulemused lükkasid vastava väite PS471 
ümber – võrreldes innovatsiooni tüübi ja valdkonnaga, oli riik ainus määraja, 
mis statistiliselt olulisel määral mõjutas põhikomponentide faktoranalüüsi 
põhjal grupeeritud meta-tegurite käitumist ühesuunalise variatsiooni analüüsi-
des. Samas kui võrrelda organisatsioonisiseseid ja kontekstitegureid, siis võib 
uuringu põhjal öelda, et konteksti ehk väliste tegurite (nt poliitikad ja regulat-
sioonid) mõju osas näevad tehnoloogiliselt uudsete avalike teenuste innovat-
sioonisüsteemid riikide lõikes välja suhteliselt sarnased. Suuremad erinevused 
tulevad välja organisatsioonisisestes tegurites, innovatsiooniga seotud õppi-
mises ja innovatsiooni eesmärkides. Uuringu täpsemad tulemused on toodud 
doktoritöö empiirilistes peatükkides viis ja kuus ning sünteesipeatükis seitse. 
 
Soovitused poliitika kujundajatele ja avaliku sektori juhtidele 
Muutuv maailm, suured väljakutsed ja keerulised arenguülesanded panevad 
valitsusi, poliitikuid ja ametnikke üha enam proovile. Olulisem kui kunagi 
varem on mõista, kuidas innovatsioon avalikus sektoris aset leiab (või miks ei 
leia), milline on seda mõjutavate tegurite vastastikune olulisus, kuidas üleüldse 
avalike teenuste arendamist kitsamalt ja riigijuhtimist laiemalt mõjutav 
innovatsioonisüsteem välja näeb. Käesolev töö ja selle raames aastal 2005 läbi 
viidud uuring on üks varasemaid katseid sellist süsteemi empiiriliselt kirjeldada. 
Samuti võimaldavad töö erinevad osad ja uuringu tulemused detailsemalt 
                                                                          
70  PS3.2: Innovatsioon avalikes teenustes eeldab avaliku poliitika (kitsamas tähenduses) 
tuge (kinnitatud). 
71  PS4: Innovatsiooniprotsessi karakteristika ja liikumapanevad jõud avaliku teenuse 
innovatsioonisüsteemis riikide lõikes ei erine (ümberlükatud). 
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mõista, millised tegurid avaliku sektori innovatsiooniprotsessi ühes või teises 
vaatest enim mõjutavad (vt käesoleva kokkuvõtte eelmist alapeatükki). Uuringu 
tulemused näitasid ühtlasi, et toetavad poliitikad avaldavad innovatsioonile 
avalikes teenustes märkimisväärselt rolli – nad on tähtsuselt neljas oluline 
väline innovatsiooni toetav tegur ja 65 protsenti vastanud organisatsoonidest 
väitis, et poliitika toetas nende innovatsioonide väljaarendamist. Samal ajal 
väitis vaid 21 protsenti vastanutest, et nende innovatsioon eeldas muudatusi 
õigusaktides ja regulatsioonides, mida on kirjanduses varem peetud oluliseks 
avaliku halduse uuenemist pidurdavaks teguriks. 
Väitekirjas näidati, et innovatsiooni õnnestumiseks avalikes teenustes on 
oluline seda mõjutava innovatsioonisüsteemi (või laiemalt ökosüsteemi) mõist-
mine ja teadlik arendamine. Sarnane lähenemine on oluline ka laiemate ühis-
konda puudutavate väljakutsete lahendamiseks ja riigi arenguvõimaluste reali-
seerimiseks. Kuivõrd viimased on ühiskonna ja valitsemise mõttes enamasti 
valdkondadeülesed ning komplekssed, siis avaldub innovatsiooni suurim mõju 
olukorras, kus see lahendab üheaegselt paljusid osapooli puudutavaid välja-
kutseid. Näitena võib tuua nn targa linna kontseptsiooni arendamise mingis 
piirkonnas, kus see puudutab nii tulevikku suunatud urbanistlikku filosoofiat, 
kogukondade tegutsemisloogikat, energiaääslikku ehitamist, funktsionaalset 
sünergiat loovat linnaplaneerimist, optimaalset transpordi korraldamist, digitaal-
seid süsteeme kõige selle juhtimiseks jne. Need on asjad, mida ei suuda kunagi 
korraldada mõne üksiku kinnistu omanik või arendaja – need on kompleks-
süsteemid, analoogselt näiteks lennukitele, mis püsivad turvaliselt õhus paljude 
süsteemide ja innovatsioonide eesmärgipärasel koostööl. Seejuures on inno-
vatsioonisüsteemid üha suurema rahvusvahelise avanemise surve all – seda 
tõukab tagant maailmastuv teadus- ja arendustegevus ning innovatsioon, samuti 
organisatsioonide ja tehnoloogiaarenduse väärtusahelate piiriülesus. Selleks, et 
valdkondadeülene innovatsioon avalikus sektoris õnnestuks ja mõju avaldaks, 
on oluline ka erinevate valdkondade (innovatsiooni-) poliitikate integratsioon, 
mille eelduseks on organisatsioonide väljatoomine nn silotornide põhisest 
mõtlemisest ja tööloogikast. Samuti tuleb leida ja arendada püsivaid koostöö-
platvorme era- ja vabasektoriga. Paljud keerukamad ärivaldkonnad, näiteks 
meditsiiniteenuste eksport, eeldavad erapraksiste, avaliku sektori haiglate, 
tervishoiupoliitika kujundajate, regulaatorite ja seadusandjate ühist eesmärgi-
pärast tegutsemist. Kirjanduses nimetatakse sarnast koostööd ka ‘kolmanda 
põlvkonna innovatsioonipoliitikaks’ (European Commission, 2002), mis tähen-
dab innovatsiooni paigutamist iga poliitik ala keskmesse; innovatsiooni toetavat 
mõtlemist peab innustama üle valitsemissektori, alates keskvalitsusest lõpetades 
erinevate agentuuride ja kohaliku taseme juhtimise ning poliitikaga. 
Avalik sektor omab ka teisi tööriistu innovatsiooni innustamiseks nii ise-
enese tegevuses kui ka ühiskonnas laiemalt. Riik saab seda teha näiteks regu-
laatorina, standardite kehtestamise läbi, eksperimenteerimisplatvormide loomise 
kaudu ja targa hankijana. Avaliku sektori eksperimenteerimisüksusi leiab pea-
miselt arenenud riikidest – näiteks Nesta Suurbritannias, Sitra Soomes, Eesti 
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Arengufond Eestis jne. Sellistel üksustel on vabamad käed komplekssete 
probleemide ja võimaluste analüüsimisel, lahenduskäikude piloteerimisel, uud-
sete ideede demonstreerimisel, füüsiliste ja virtuaalsete koostöökeskkondade 
pakkumisel, innovatsioonidega riskimisel ning ka eksimisel. Riigihanked on 
samas oluliselt ulatuslikum instrument oma kapitalimahu tõttu, mis on arenenud 
tööstusriikides hinnangulise 10–15 protsenti SKTst (Geroski, 1990). Kui käsit-
leda riigihankeid nõudluspõhise innovatsioonipoliitika instrumendina, siis saa-
vad nad mõjutada innovatsiooni kahel viisil: mõju innovatsioonile tellija organi-
satsioonis või kasusaajana või siis mõju innovatsioonile kolmandates organisat-
sioonides, näiteks pakkujates ja müüjates (Bloch, 2010). Kui siia lisada Euroopa 
avalike teenuste osakaal SKP-st, mis jääb vahemikku 40–55 protsenti (Thenint, 
2010) võrrelduna 32 protsendiga Ameerika Ühendriikides, 26 protsendiga Jaa-
panis, 16 protsendiga Hiinas või 17 protsendiga Indias, siis on avaliku sektori 
käes päris ohtralt võimalusi ühiskonna erinevate osade innovatiivsuse kasvata-
misel. Iseasi on, kui palju neist teatakse, osatakse või tahetakse ära kasutada. 
Üks viis selle tõenäosuse suurendamiseks on kindlasti nö avaliku sektori ette-
võtjate (ingl. k. public entrepreneurs) esilekerkimise tõenäosuse suurendamine, 
nende motiveerimine, tunnustamine jne. 
Seejuures suurendab nn Troika mudel – innovatsiooni toetavate indiviidide 
samaaegne olemasolu kõigil organisatsiooni tasemetel (võimutasandi promootor, 
protsessi-promootor ja tehnoloogia-promootor) – märkimisväärselt innovatsiooni 
esilekerkimise ja õnnestumise tõenäosust (Hauschildt ja Kirchmann, 2001). 
Käesolev uuring näitas, et tippjuhtkonna kaasatus ja tugi, samuti avatud mõtle-
misega kesktasemejuhid on võrdselt teiseks olulised organisatsioonisisesed 
innovatsiooni toetavad tegurid. Neid edestab vaid personaalne eestvedamine ja 
vastavate võtmeinimeste (ingl. k. key individuals või project champions) ole-
masolu. Uuring näitas samuti, et edu põhineb uute tehnoloogiate tundmisel ja 
heal koostööl tehnoloogia pakkujatega. Sellele järgneb olulisuselt koostöö 
tulevaste kasutajagruppidega. 
Edukad innovaatorid on õppivad organisatsioonid. Uuringu tulemused tõid 
välja, et kumulatiivne uute teadmiste ja oskuste akumulatsioon on innovat-
sioonile määrava tähtsusega. Seejuures on organisatsioonisisene õppimine 
mitmetine – innovatsioonide arendamise ja elluviimise nimel arendati tehno-
loogilist teadmist, projektijuhtimise oskusi, üldjuhtimise alaseid oskusi ja mees-
konna motivatsioonisüsteemi. Edukad innovaatorid õppisid samuti varasematest 
kogemustest – nii organisatsiooni sees kui ka väljaspool, nii edukatest projekti-
dest kui ka ebaõnnestumistest. Seepärast on funktsioonide ülest õppimist toe-
tava keskkonna ja partnerluse arendamine üks innovatsioonidega õnnestumise 
eeltingimusi. Mida murrangulisemaid innovatsioone oodatakse, seda keskse-
maks elemendiks selline organsatsioonide ülene progressiivne ja ebaõnnestu-
mistest ühiselt õppiv keskkond osutub.  
Organisatoorsest vaatest on lõpetuses oluline märkida, et väiksemaid inno-
vatsiooniprojekte saab arendada organisatsiooni sees, luues selleks vastavaid 
allüksusi vms. Samas suuremate ja rohkemate osapoolte koostöötamist nõud-
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vate projektide puhul tuleb kasutada põhitegevusest kõrvaletõstetud mudeleid, 
näiteks mandaadi ja vahenditega projektorganisatsioone (ingl. k. task forces; 
Singapuris Statutory Boards), start-up kasvuettevõtte laadseid eraldiseisvaid ja 
professionaalselt (riskikapitali meetodil) rahastatud arendusprojekte vms. Kõike 
seda omakorda toetab, õnnestumise tõenäosust ja innovatsioonid mõju suuren-
dab, pidev avalikus sektori strateegilise intelligentsuse arendamine – tuleviku-
seire, otsuste tõenduspõhisus, poliitikate, tegevuste ja investeeringute mõju 
hindamine jne. Siia lisaks avaldab mõju haridus- ja teadusasutuste (sh valitsemis-
koolide) töö – seda nii ettevõtlike ja uuendusmeelsete tudengite koolitamisel, 
esmapilgul eraldiseisvate distsipliinide ühendamisel, teaduslikult tõestatud 
lahenduskäikude väljapakkumisel ja tehnoloogiaplatvormide arendamisel. 
Riikidevahelises konkurentsis mängib samuti rolli valitsussektori strateegiline 
väledus (ingl. k. strategic agility; vt Doz ja Kosonen, 2008), seda nii probleemide 
lahendamisel kui ka arenguvõimaluste ärakasutamisel. 
 
Soovitused tulevasteks uuringuteks 
Avaliku sektori innovatiivsus, innovatsioonid ja innovatsiooniprotsess on 
empiirilises mõttes väheuuritud valdkonnad. Samas ühiskonna väljakutseid ja 
nende kompleksust silmas pidades on tegemist äärmiselt olulise teemaderingiga, 
mida lähimal kümnendil kindlasti enam lahti püütakse mõtestada. Suure 
tõenäosusega on globaalses konkurentsis tulevikus edukamad just need riigid, 
kes innovatsioonijuhtimise võimekuses ja tulemuslikkuses teisi edestavad – 
seda nii era-, avalikus- ja kolmandas sektoris kui ka nende üleses koostöös. 
Käesolev uurimus keskendub eksisteerivatele (ja juba seeläbi edukatele) 
tehnoloogiliselt uudsetele avalikele teenustele ja nende arendamist puudutavate 
tegurite suhtelise olulisuse empiirilisele hindamisele/mõõtmisele. Teatud 
metoodiliste edasiarendustega saab ja peaks tegurite/mõjurite olulisust uurima 
ka ebaõnnestunud tehnoloogiliste uuenduste seas. Arvestades käesoleva empiiri-
lise uuringu järgset mobiilitehnoloogiate ja sotsiaalvõrgustike kiiret arengut, 
väärib sarnasel metoodikal põhinev tehnoloogiliselt uudsete avalike teenuste 
uuring uuenenud kontekstis tulevikus kordamist. Selline lähenemine võimal-
daks tekitada võrdlusbaasi ja teha selle tulemusel veelgi täpsemaid järeldusi 
avaliku sektori innovatiivsuse parandamiseks. Akadeemilist uurimust väärib ka 
uudsete avaliku sektori juhtimisplatvormide (ingl. k. task forces) valdkond – 
kuidas neid on kasutusele võetud, miks mõned riigid on nende rakendamisel 
edukamad kui teised, kas ja kuidas nad avaliku sektori innovatsiooniprotsessi 
kiirendavad jne. Kuna riik on avalike teenuste läbi oluline tellija erasektorile (sh 
oma tellimuste läbi ka mõjutaja ning eeskuju), siis väärib uurimist sellise tege-
vuse võimalik mõju erasektori innovatiivsusele. Kuivõrd käesolev uurimus tõi 
välja just avaliku sektori võtmeinimeste-ettevõtjate määrava rolli innovatsiooni-
protsessis (ingl. k. public entrepreneurs, key individuals, project champions), 
siis tasub uurimist, kus, kuidas ja kui süstemaatiliselt selliseid inimesi erine-
vates riikides ette valmistatakse ja avaliku sektori uuenemisel rakendatakse. 
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Samuti väärib uurimist, kuidas selliseid võtmeindiviide innustatakse, motiveeri-
takse ja nende tegevusega seotud riske maandatakse ja/või tolereeritakse. Olu-
line teema uurida on ka võimalused ja viisid, kuidas avalik-, era- ja kolmas 
sektor saavad üheskoos innovatsioone välja arendada ning ellu viia – millised 
on selle tegevuse platvormid, kuidas seda jätkusuutlikult korraldada, finant-
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